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Mark Wilkinson 
Intra-Professional Specialist Differentiation In 
The UK Surgical Profession 
Abstract 
 
This thesis studies specialist differentiation in the surgical profession of the United Kingdom, 
seeking to clarify what the combinations of factors favour or hinder it. It draws on interviews 
with two hundred surgeons, general practitioners and hospital CEO’s, as well as on 
sociological literature, especially Bucher and Strauss’s (1961) ‘Process Model’, the concept of 
‘profession’ developed by Freidson (1970), Larson’s (1977) model of the ‘Professional Project’ 
and Bourdieu’s (1981, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 2005) seminal work on ‘Capital’ and 
‘Power’ in ‘Social fields’. The thesis aims to interpret specialisation as a dynamic political 
process influenced by different groups’ deployment of accumulated specific types of ‘capital’, 
challenging the view, widespread in the profession itself and still present in functionalist 
sociological literature, that specialist differentiation is an inevitable consequence of advances 
in knowledge and technology. In addition to the introduction, conclusion and appendices, the 
thesis includes chapters on: (1) theoretical framework; (2) methodology; (3) the role of 
knowledge and technology in specialist differentiation; (4) the role of institutions before the 
establishment of the NHS; (5) the role of the relationship between the profession and the state 
in the period 1948-1990; (6) ditto in the period 1991-1997; (7) the current situation and how it 
might develop.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Over the course of the last seventy-eight years, the surgical profession of the United Kingdom has 
experienced major structural changes as a result of intra-professional specialist differentiation. 
This thesis is a case study of this phenomenon, aiming to clarify the factors effecting its pace and 
direction, and its effect on the profession and organisation of surgical services. Given the 
protracted nature of these structural changes, the thesis will have historical and contemporary 
strands. 
 
Intra-professional specialist differentiation is the ultimate form of specialisation, resulting in groups 
within the mature profession achieving independent professional status: ‘a license and mandate’ 
(Hughes, 1958:78) to have control over their own work. It differs from sub-specialisation/super-
specialisation, which occurs under the aegis of the mature profession or a recognised speciality 
and articulates with the whole; and from fragmentation or intra-professional specialist 
differentiation, which is separation and disarticulation from the mature profession or recognised 
surgical speciality.  
 
The utility of the study is two-fold: firstly, it makes a contribution to the literature on the sociology 
of the professions, which despite the difference in perspective and emphasis, has concerned itself 
primarily with the growth of the ‘mature’ profession. 
 
In the 1950’s and ‘60’s, the sociology of the professions was dominated by a structural functionalist 
ideology. Macdonald (1995) notes that, the writings of Durkheim and Parsons emphasised the 
functional utility of the professions within the social division of labour. A useful summary of the 
trend is offered by Heinz and Laumann (1994):  
 
‘Talcott Parsons and some generally like-minded theorists, including Joseph Ben-David 
and William J. Goode,1 have argued that the growth of the mature profession is one of the 
most salient features of modern industrial societies. The occupations included by these 
theorists were lines of work that emphasised involvement with the “cognitive complex” – 
 
1 Joseph Ben-David, “Professions in the Class System of Present Day Societies: A trend Report and 
Bibliography,” Current Sociology 12 (1963-64): 247-330; William J. Goode, supra note 9, pp.194-200.  
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that is, in a sense, the emphasis was on the “learned” in the term “learned profession”’ 
(p.14).  
 
Although the authors do not give specific examples, one can presuppose that the term “learned 
profession” refers to professions such as Medicine and Law. Heinz & Laumann go on to note that 
Parsons et al argued that the success of these professional groups and their rise to prominence 
was natural and inevitable because they fulfilled a specific functional pre-requisite relating to 
complex modern societies. 
 
The primacy Parson’s and his followers attributed to the functional significance of the growth of 
the mature profession is reflected in his seminal essay: “The Professions and Social Structure” 
(1954). The functional significance of the professions to social structure can be summed up as 
follows: “rationality”, “functional specificity”, and “universalism”. Indeed, Brante (1988) notes 
Parsons considers the professions as ‘the major bearers and transmitters of rational values’ 
(p.120).  
 
Rationality in the scientific sense is best summed up by Newton-Smith (1981), as providing ‘an 
objective appraisal of the merits of scientific theories’ (p.1). In other words, it provides a framework 
whereby the justification for scientific theories is evaluated in an objective manner. Parsons (1954) 
contends that the same rational values, inextricably linked to the application of science, are a 
fundamental characteristic of industrialised societies. Scientific investigation by its very nature, 
according to Parson’s, is objective and autonomous of personal or long-established judgements. 
Parsons relates this rationality to specific professional examples namely, lawyers and 
businessmen. He contends that they are ‘enjoined to seek the “best” and most “efficient” way of 
carrying on his function, not to accept the time-honoured mode’ (p.37). That is to say, 
professionals reach decisions based on rational deliberations, within institutional frameworks.  
 
Professional authority is not based on superior status but on the superior ‘technical competence’ 
of the professional. Parsons (1954, 2012) defines this as ‘specificity of function’. Specificity of 
function or competence ‘has primarily the function of delimiting a field so that it is relatively 
manageable, so that competence will not be destroyed by spreading too thinly’ (2012:320). Last, 
but not least is the function of ‘universalism’. Parsons (1954) maintains that the relationship 
between professional and client is universalistic, i.e. based on standards and not by virtue of 
personal feelings or judgements about the client. 
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In summary, the significance of the mature profession to Parson’s is one of an institutional conduit 
in which ‘the most important social functions ensue, namely the pursuit of science and liberal 
learning and its practical application in medicine, technology, law and teaching’ (1954:48). Brante 
(1988) describes this as an ‘integrated rational unity, generating the force propelling society 
forward’ (p.121). 
  
By the 1970’s, though the focus in the sociology of the professions was still on the growth of the 
mature profession, the theoretical emphasis had changed, shifting from the generally accepted 
structural functionalist theories of the 1960’s which focused on structure and questions relating to 
the ‘part played by the professions in the established order of society’ (Macdonald, 1995:xii) to 
more action-based theories drawing on the Chicago school of sociology of the 1960’s, with 
questions  relating to how professions ‘manage to persuade society to grant them a privileged 
position’ (ibid.).   
 
Freidson and Hughes were successors of the Chicago school, and the sociology of the professions 
has used their works, in particular their concept of profession, to elicit the processes or stages 
behind the development and growth of the mature profession. 
 
Freidson argued that ‘what is critical for the status of medicine and any other profession is its 
ultimate control over its own work’ (Freidson, 1970:185). The privilege of self-regulation, that is 
the professions’ ‘license and mandate’ (Hughes, 1958:78) to self-police, is granted by society (or 
in effect the state), by virtue of winning the support a group of people with significant power and 
influence in society, that is to say, an elite (Freidson, 1970). 
  
The thesis builds on this rich legacy of sociological writings and attempts to take the analysis to 
another level: using intra-professional specialist differentiation in the surgical profession of the 
United Kingdom as a case study, it analyses the processes through which aspirant groups within 
the ‘‘mature profession’’ have to go in order to be able to self-police.  
 
The thesis will argue that intra-professional specialist differentiation is a journey and not just an 
end-point; it is a process which begins when a group decides to pursue this course,2 and reaches 
 
2 Many groups do not set out with the intention of pursuing the ‘professional project’ with a view to self-
regulating; this goal comes later on in their development. 
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fruition when the surgical establishment either grants the group the privilege to self-police or 
refuses to grant such a privilege.  
 
The processes involved in intra-professional specialist differentiation have general characteristics. 
For example, each group will need to carve out a distinct area of knowledge and technical skill 
and demonstrate that they and they alone have the necessary skills and expertise to practice it. 
Each group will also have specific characteristics which they bring into the processual equation, 
for example resources which the particular group has accumulated over a period of years even 
prior to any conscious decision to pursue such a course of action.  
 
Processes operate within contextual junctures, whether historical or contemporary, so they cannot 
be analysed in isolation from the immediate context and circumstances in which they operate. The 
interaction of general, specific, and contextual variables will effect the pace and direction of these 
processes along the way, and ultimately determine the success or failure of groups to self-regulate 
in what is a political battle for control of knowledge. 
 
There is clearly a need for analysis at this level. For example, Bucher and Strauss’ seminal work 
(Professions in Process 1961) focused on the growth and development of groups which they term 
‘segments’ within the mature profession, and the ‘conflicts of interest’ (p.325) and power struggles 
which ensue. Since medicine is usually considered the prototypical profession, Bucher and 
Strauss’ illustrative points are taken from the profession of medicine. However, their level of 
analysis does not include the conditions under which segments become formal specialities in their 
own right, a significant point which they allude to in their work:  
 
‘Possibly the acme for some expanding segments is the recognised status of speciality. 
Certainly, this is the way specialities seem to develop. But the conditions under which 
segments will become formal specialities is in itself a fascinating research problem.’ 
(p.333) 
 
Structural functionalist theory explains away differentiation (of which intra-professional 
differentiation is the ultimate form) as part of a structural response to functional need, just as the 
rise of the profession is a structural response to a functional need of society. Thus, the structure 
of the division of labour (medicine and surgery) is viewed as ‘natural’, i.e. determined by the laws 
of the social system. Indeed, according to Parsons (2012) the proliferation of knowledge and 
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technical complexity, and the scientific knowledge underpinning it, is objective and impartial 
resulting in specificity of function which Parson’s notes is inevitable: ‘It is inevitable that both 
incumbency of the role should be achieved and that performance criteria by standards of technical 
competence should be prominent’ (p.305).  
 
Thus, the processual elements involved in structural differentiation are viewed as evolving in 
response to the ineluctable forces of the social system, devoid of human agency and action, and 
given their theories’ explicit scientific logic they are unable to explain the failure to differentiate. 
Indeed, as Colomy and Rhoades (1994) note, structuralist accounts of differentiation ‘suffer from 
a macro bias which is reflected in their inability to account for variable patterns of structural change’ 
(p.547).  
 
Accounts of structural differentiation should not ignore the fact that human beings are actively 
involved. Human beings create knowledge; however, to create knowledge does not in and of itself 
mean that you can control it and apply it. Professions are stratified by differentials in power and 
resources, and struggles will ensue for the control and ability to apply that knowledge. Thus, 
differentiation is far from inevitable and unproblematic. 
 
In the spirit of fairness to Parson’s, it should be said that he does not completely discount human 
action, indeed Parsons had what could be described as a: 
 
‘complicated, almost love/hate, relationship with scientific positivism. On the one hand he 
was a thoroughgoing empiricist, believing that the entire scientific enterprise is dedicated 
to understanding and explaining an identifiable empirical world.’ (Smelser, N. 2012. 
Foreword. In: Parsons, T. The Social System. New Orleans: Quid Pro, V.)  
 
However, Smelser was at pains to point out that Parsons, unlike the behaviourist approach, which 
is only concerned with observable stimulus response behaviours, Parsons did not discard the 
individuals own internalised drivers of motivation, including moral values and conviction, as ‘for 
him these states were central, identifiable ingredients of action’ (ibid.). 
 
Parsons (2012) starting point is social systems of action and the interactions between individual 
actors in certain situations and certain conditions, which he argues can be treated in a scientific 
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sense and subjected ‘to the same order of theoretical analysis which has been successfully 
applied to other types of systems in other sciences’ (p.1). The dichotomy in Parson’s theory is 
evidenced when he moves on to describe the social system as comprising a diversity of actors 
engaging in interaction with one another, with motivational significance to the individual actor, or 
in the case of a collectivity, its component individuals. The actor or actors will have at their disposal 
the means and conditions of action, their personality systems (i.e. actor and actors) and cultural 
systems, in the form of tradition, ideas, beliefs, etc. However, Parsons stresses that the above 
elements are not ‘theoretically reducible to terms of one or a combination of the other two. Each 
is indispensable to the other’ (ibid.). 
 
Recent works in the sociology of the professions, most notably Abbott (1988), suggests that there 
is some inevitability attached to specialist differentiation which most commonly arises ‘because 
the skills applicable to a given task area develop beyond the ability of single practitioners’ (p.106). 
However, Abbott does concede that differentiation does not always arise as a corollary of the 
highly complex nature of professional knowledge, rather through differentiation in an external 
structure. Abbott uses the difference in client groups in the legal profession as an example. 
Interestingly, she observes that differentiation can take on two forms: horizontal and vertical, 
however, a successful outcome is not always realised when attempted. Abbott defines ‘horizontal’ 
division or differentiation as division based on task, and ‘vertical’ division as division based on 
status whether this distinction is so clear cut in practice is another matter, given that groups may 
wish to differentiate based on specific knowledge and skills which are high in status. However, 
although clarification of this point is an interesting area of research in its own right, it is beyond the 
remit of the thesis.  
 
Although Abbott (1998) admits that differentiation is not always achieved when attempted, the 
remit of his work does not extend to any analysis of the processual aspects of what he terms 
horizontal division, which ultimately effect the pace and direction resulting in success for some 
groups and failure for others. Thus, despite the fact that Abbott explicitly notes that there are 
‘disparities in income, power, and prestige within professions’ (p.120), his analysis does not 
extend to the highly political nature of intra-professional specialist differentiation.  
 
Likewise, studies which have focused on specific professions, such as Hugman’s Power in the 
Caring Professions (1991), do not focus on the processual elements entailed in division: 
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‘In the same way in which the caring professions have developed through claims to skills 
and knowledge, so groups within the professions have attempted to demarcate specific 
aspects of the skills and knowledge which are regarded as prestigious…These specialisms 
represent the success of sub-groups in marking out an area of practice which attracts 
enhanced status because additional training is required, and to which access by other 
members of the wider professional group can be restricted.’ (p.97) 
 
Thus, this thesis will contribute to a greater understanding of intra-professional differentiation. It is 
not, however, intended to provide a generic template for explaining intra-professional 
differentiation across all professions, since professions are unique in their history and structural 
development. 
 
The second area to which this study hopes to contribute is the literature of medical sociology. 
Turner (1995) notes that ‘Medical sociology became a well-established and formally recognised 
component of the sociology curriculum in the 1960’s’ (p.6). However, despite its history and the 
vast array of work published, it has generally failed to question the development of the foundation 
blocks of medicine and medical settings and institutions, namely the specialist division of labour. 
As Atkinson (1995) shrewdly remarks,  ‘Medical settings and institutions have all too frequently 
been treated as the occasion for commentary on ‘other’ themes’ (p.38): sociologists of medicine 
take the specialist division of labour for granted, and use it as a conduit for studying other things.3 
For example, Fox (1992) critises Burkett and Knafl (1974); Knafl and Burkett, (1975) who 
concentrate  on the speciality of orthopaedic surgery and compare it with other specialities in terms 
of how surgeons within the speciality ‘develop clinical judgement of whether a case is appropriate 
for surgical or non-surgical disposal’ (p.5). Pringle (1998) uses fragmentation in general surgery 
as a means to explain feminisation.4 In her opening paragraph she notes that: 
 
‘General surgeons, capable of responding to any emergency, are a disappearing species. 
Although in the UK nearly a third of all surgeons still do a lot of paediatric, vascular and 
abdominal surgery, the trend everywhere is towards specialisation. She then goes on to note 
that: Fragmentation within the field, and its shifting boundaries with other fields, open up 
 
3 Additional examples adduced by Fox (1992) include, Becker, 1961; Glaser and Strauss, 1970; Bloor, 1976; 
Stimson, 1976 used interactionist and ethnomethodological perspectives to study the rules women and men use 
during interactions (pp.4-6).  
4 Other studies have focused on gender and surgery namely, Cassell (1998) The Woman in the Surgeon’s Body. 
Harvard: MA. 
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new possibilities for women, who once had very limited opportunities to succeed as 
general surgeons.’ (pp.76-77) 
 
Exceptions to the tendency not to study the division of labour in its own right do exist. For instance, 
some studies have focused on the factors determining the overall growth of specialisation. Starr 
(1982) refers briefly to structural factors which impact on specialisation in the medical profession 
at large, while other works concentrate on particular medical and surgical specialities. Halpern 
(1988) studies the development of American Paediatrics, and Casper (1998) the growth and 
development of Foetal surgery in several hospitals in the United States. Studies such as these 
stress the socially organised nature of specialist divisions of labour and the importance of external 
context-specific variables in shaping a specialities development. For example, Casper (1998) 
notes that ‘increasing medical specialisation and the search for new health care markets, and 
intense cultural and political investments in foetuses provided the ‘fruitful contexts’ for foetal 
surgery’s growth’ (pp.6-7).  
 
While not discounting knowledge and technology as variables, existing studies recognise that 
these variables lack the power to impose their own imperatives on the organisation of work. For 
example, Halpern (1988) does not deny the role of science in the development of medical 
specialities; and indeed, holds that ‘even in the evolution of a social problem based field like 
paediatrics, scientific progress and systematization of knowledge are vital to professional 
consolidation’  However, she tempers this by adding that other variables are more significant, for 
example, ‘organisational innovation’ (pp.28-29). 
 
One important feature which sets the present thesis apart from the studies which do study the 
division of labour in its own right, such as those just discussed, is that they tend to focus on the 
United States. Since, as will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, there are significant differences in 
the development of the regulatory structures of the surgical profession in the US and the UK, the 
findings of American-focussed investigations are not well suited to explaining the dynamics of the 
UK context. This study adopts emphases and perspectives which are different from those of 
American-focussed investigations. In particular, it will analyse the journey towards ‘self-regulation’ 
as a political battle for control of knowledge.  
 
A further difference between this study and previous ones lies in its compass of enquiry, as many 
publications which do recognise the need to investigate the division of labour in its own right do 
so in a somewhat restricted sphere, such as paediatrics (Halpern) or foetal surgery (Casper). The 
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present study’s broader perspective on the profession in its entirety enables a more organic and 
wholesome understanding of the phenomena and their interconnections. 
 
The present thesis thus hopes to contribute to the long-term goal of achieving ‘a greater 
understanding and awareness of intra-professional, inter-professional and inter-organisational 
dynamics and power dependence relationships’ (Hunter, 1990:219).  
 
This study’s focus on the highly regulated and officially sanctioned nature of self-regulation within 
the UK surgical profession, and its analysis of the processes through which aspirant groups within 
the ‘‘mature profession’’ have to go in order to be able to self-police, adds a distinctive and fresh 
approach to the existing body of literature. 
 
 
1.2 Historical Sources 
 
As alluded to at the beginning of this introductory chapter, intra-professional differentiation in the 
body of surgery has a protracted history spanning seventy-eight years. Accordingly, historical 
literature constitutes an essential foundation block to this thesis, upon which sociological 
conceptualisations can be built in order to investigate intra-professional differentiation.  
 
The thesis will draw on and utilise four principal historical sources, namely the works of Rosemary 
Stevens: The Impact of Specialisation and State Medicine: Medical Practice in Modern England – 
2003 & American Medicine and the Public Interest: A History of Specialisation (1998); Roger 
Cooter: Surgery and Society in Peace and war: Orthopaedics and the Organisation of Modern 
Medicine 1880-1948 (1993); Christopher Lawrence: Medicine in the Making of Modern Britain 
1700-1920 (1994); and Fletcher-Shaw: Twenty-Five Years: The Story of the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 1929-1954 (1954).  
 
Stevens’s work on specialisation in the English context provides a general and sound chronology 
of dates and events leading to differentiation; her work on specialisation in the American context 
is equally thorough and provides a useful contrast with England. Cooter provides a specific 
account of the growth of orthopaedics as an area prior to the establishment of a national health 
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service; in particular, he highlights beautifully the precarious nature of orthopaedics’ growth during 
this period. Both authors set these developments in the social fabric and related processes 
operative at that time. 
 
The work of Lawrence is invaluable in this respect. Lawrence provides a thorough understanding 
and appreciation of the norms, values and ideology underpinning societal structures particularly 
during the 1800’s. This is indispensable for understanding exactly how the surgical establishment 
held the status quo together during this period, preventing any fragmentation of the body of 
surgery. 
 
Fletcher-Shaw’s work on the history of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists is 
distinct in that its author is a former President and one of the leading lights in the founding of the 
College. This provides the thesis with a unique insight into the political processes which resulted 
in the ultimate form of intra-professional differentiation with the formation of a separate Royal 
College. Of course, such an account is open to the charge that it was written by an interested 
party, but it nonetheless remains an indispensable historical source. 
 
 
1.3 Background 
 
During the early years of the nineteenth century, the long and elaborate process of specialist 
differentiation within the body of surgery began to evolve and develop. From the early nineteenth 
century to the beginning of the twentieth century, special hospitals began to be set up, and around 
these hospitals specialist societies began to evolve. For example, ‘The Ophthalmological Society 
of the UK was founded in 1881, evolved from informal discussions in the house surgeons’ room 
at Moorfields eye hospital’ (Stevens, 2003:31).  
 
Between 1929 and 1947 the specialisation process went a step further, and professional 
consolidation through self-regulation became the order of the day for some areas, resulting in 
separation and disarticulation from the surgical corpus.  For example, in 1929 gynaecology broke 
away and combined with obstetrics to form their own College, separate from the Royal College of 
Surgeons and the Royal College of Physicians, and with its own examinations and the power to 
license. By the 1940’s ophthalmology and otolaryngology were demanding a form of self-
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regulation, namely their own fellowship examinations. The FRCS (Fellow of The Royal College of 
Surgeons) in Ophthalmology and Otolaryngology was instituted in 1947. Both specialities 
continued to take the primary examination in the basic medical sciences, but they were no longer 
examined in general surgery in their finals (Stevens, 2003). 
 
Stevens points out that this point specialist differentiation ceased:  
 
‘Other surgical specialities remained largely content with their own speciality association 
or set up particular bodies with limited functions. For example, a Joint Committee for 
Postgraduate Orthopaedic Training was formed in 1948 under the aegis, among others of 
the Royal College of Surgeons, the British Orthopaedics Association, and The Institute of 
Orthopaedics. Orthopaedics, neurosurgery, plastic surgery, and urology which were all 
well developed scientific areas of surgical practice, made no move for independent 
examinations.’ (ibid.:114) 
 
These surgeons continued to take the general FRCS examination (the primary which examined in 
the basic medical sciences, and the final, in general surgery) before embarking on apprenticeship 
in registrar and senior registrar grades in their chosen surgical field (Stevens, 2003). Rutkow 
(1993) points out that general surgery was the base on which surgical science throve. 
Consequently, intra-professional specialist differentiation has made the 
 
‘greatest inroads in the broad territories once presided over by so-called general-surgeons. 
Before specialisation, a surgeon performed basically all types of operations. Thus, the 
average nineteenth century surgeon could perform a urological procedure as well as an 
orthopaedic operation.’ (p.512) 
 
General surgery lost ophthalmology (1947), otolaryngology (ENT) (1947), gynaecology (1929) 
(Stevens, 2003). Orthopaedics, neurosurgery, urology, plastic and thoracic Surgery were also 
firmly established, but remained tentatively attached to general surgery, and were seen as 
specialist interests within general surgery. By the 1980’s however, urology, orthopaedics, 
neurosurgery and cardiothoracic surgery had all broken away from general surgery and had their 
own fellowship examinations. Ophthalmology seceded and formed its own College on 14th April 
1988 (it was granted a Royal License in 1993) (www.rcophthac.uk/about/college/history). More 
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recently, paediatric surgery (1992) and maxillofacial surgery (1994) were granted their own 
fellowship examination by the Royal Colleges. 
 
Watkin (1998) points out that: 
 
‘The process of increasing specialisation has continued, with the emergence of sub-
specialities within each surgical speciality. This has perhaps been most marked in general 
surgery, which encompasses breast surgery, coloproctology, endocrine surgery, upper-
gastrointestinal surgery, hepato-pancreatico-bilary surgery, transplantation and vascular 
surgery The other surgical specialities are also increasingly sub-specialising; and for 
example, there are nine specialist groups or associations within orthopaedics.’ (p.105) 
 
Some of the sub-specialities aspire to independence. For example, during the late ‘80’s and early 
‘90’s there were ‘several loud and persuasive voices arguing that vascular surgery should seek 
independent speciality status from general surgery’ (Jackson, 1992:63), and laparoscopic 
surgeons also began their quest for independence. More recently, reports are recommending that 
surgery on children (across all of the specialities) should be carried out exclusively by paediatric 
surgeons (RCS, 2000). With these voices came the predictions of the imminent demise of the 
general surgeon: 
 
‘In the dining rooms of teaching hospitals and in the bars at conferences specialist 
surgeons may be heard forecasting the imminent demise of the general surgeon and his 
replacement by specialised multi-disciplinary teams who will concentrate on one system 
or even part of one system.’ (Irving, 1986:741) 
 
Another commentator also predicts further specialist differentiation, suggesting that the areas 
which originally broke away from surgery to form their own specialities will also fragment: 
 
‘History suggests that existing surgical specialities will fragment, their present sub-
specialities becoming independent specialities, so there is the potential for the emergence 
of up to 57 surgical specialities!’ (Watkin, 1998:106) 
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These viewpoints are widespread in medical circles, where specialisation leading to the 
differentiation of a specialist field is viewed as an inevitable consequence of advances in 
knowledge and technology. Such viewpoints are not only contemporary but are historically 
sourced too. For example, an anonymous author writing in the Lancet (1945) asserts that: 
 
‘With the growth of knowledge and the development of technique the division of labour 
naturally followed.’ (p.209) 
 
The thesis argues that intra-professional specialist differentiation in the surgical profession, 
whether in the past or future, cannot be explained by reference to advances in knowledge and 
technology alone. Such a contention would be reductionist and technologically deterministic.  
Knowledge and technology are means to an end and not ends in themselves. Thus, although 
knowledge and technology are important in terms of providing the basis for the possibility of new 
boundaries (i.e. specialities) they do not determine whether groups will be successful in their quest 
to differentiate and self-police. 
 
This thesis has an eclectic quality, since one theoretical perspective alone cannot possibly explain 
the complexities involved in specialist differentiation in surgery. Indeed, this should come as no 
surprise, as one of the joys of sociology is its richness of theoretical perspectives, which is 
stimulating in its own right as well as providing a reminder that it is rare that there is only one valid 
view of a social action or a social phenomenon. 
 
The thesis will show that intra-professional specialist differentiation in surgery is not a natural or 
inevitable phenomenon which can be explained in terms of its ever growing knowledge and 
technology base. On the contrary, specialist differentiation is a complex process drawing together 
micro, meso and macro strands; it is very much an intra-professional political process drawing on 
other variables, for example, government, and the NHS and the way these interrelate, at different 
contextual junctures in time. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
In arguing against a structural reductionist approach to intra-professional specialist differentiation, 
the thesis we will adopt a working theoretical framework which emphasises action within structure. 
It will build on the central notion of profession identified by Freidson (1970) and Hughes (1958): 
autonomy and self-direction, and in particular how they develop. It will also utilise Larson’s (1977) 
concept of “Professional Project” and Bucher and Strauss (1961) “Process” model, and include 
key concepts: “Social field,” “Capital” “Habitus” and “Power”,  from the seminal works of Bourdieu: 
(The Specificity of The Scientific Field 1981; Distinction: A Social Critique of The Judgement of 
Taste 1984; The Forms of Capital 1986; Homo Academicus 1988; The Logic of Practice 1990; 
The Peculiar History of Scientific Reason 1991 and The Social Structures of the Economy 2005). 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical Foundations 
 
Though Freidson and Hughes focus on the growth of the mature profession, this thesis will use 
their seminal work as a foundation for taking the level of analysis further. 
 
Freidson and Hughes’s processual approach, with its emphasis on professional groups actively 
negotiating their position is pivotal, as it locates professionalisation within a political arena in which 
groups actively use knowledge as a justifier in their quest for autonomy and self-direction. Indeed 
Freidson was keen to stress that knowledge and technical skill are a means to an end and not an 
end in themselves: ‘Knowledge and expertise, whether accepted or rejected’, do not exist ‘in and 
of themselves’; on the contrary they are ‘abstractions which are realised by the activities of men 
organised into occupational careers and groups’ (Freidson, 1970:xi).  
 
Freidson and Hughes were unanimous that what is unique and central to the notion of profession 
is the ‘special privilege of freedom from the control of outsiders’ (Freidson, 1970:137 & Hughes, 
1958), in other words they are autonomous and self-directing. This privilege is not a natural 
historical fact, but rather a special privilege granted by society (or in effect the state), by virtue of 
winning the support of a powerful societal group that is to say 
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‘an elite segment of society which has been persuaded that there is some special value in 
its work. It’s position is thus secured by the political and economic influence of the elite 
which sponsors it.’ (Freidson, 1970:72)  
 
It is justified by two central claims: knowledge expertise and conformity with the rules governing 
professional conduct. In relation to the former, it is claimed that the depth of knowledge and 
expertise required in professional work, is such that non-professionals are not equipped to provide 
evaluatory judgements or put controls in place to regulate it. In fact, the profession asserts that it 
is the most dependable authority on the specialised area it deals with. Such claims are also linked 
to ethicality, inasmuch as professionals are involved in important duties and decision making and 
by default are responsible individuals who can be depended on to work unsupervised and, in the 
cases where a professional does not perform his or her work to a satisfactory standard or ethically, 
the profession itself may be trusted to carry out the proper regulatory action (Freidson, 1970).  
 
The arguments and claims made by generic medicine for self-regulation in an attempt to persuade 
the state to grant them a ‘license and mandate to control their own work’ (Hughes, 1958:78) are 
and have been replicated by aspiring groups within the ‘mature’ profession in their attempt to 
persuade and win the support of the elite within the surgical profession in order to be able to self-
regulate. In this respect the thesis moves the level of analysis to another tier: from the relationship 
between the state and the ‘mature’ profession to the relationship between the ‘mature’ profession 
and its relationship with the aspiring professional groups within it. 
 
In building on Freidson and Hughes’s pivotal foundation, this thesis will utilise Larson’s (1977) 
concept of ‘Professional Project’ and will also draw on Macdonald’s (1995) synopsis of this 
concept. The professional project is a concept originating from the Chicago school of American 
sociology, with an emphasis on action within structure (Macdonald, 1995). Larson’s objective was 
to examine how occupations organise themselves to attain market power. Not unlike Freidson, 
Larson (1977) stressed that the success of professional groups was not a ‘natural historical fact’ 
and indeed Larson used Freidson’s emphasis on the need for professions to secure the ‘grace of 
powerful protectors’ (p.xii), that is to say the backing of a powerful section of society.  
 
Larson’s concept of ‘Professional Project’ is processual in nature. As its name suggests, it is a 
strategy for acquiring ‘the related objectives of market monopoly and social status’ (ibid:.104), 
through professionalisation. Though, like Freidson and Hughes, Larson is concerned with the 
growth of the mature profession, her concept can contribute most usefully to producing a workable 
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theory of intra-professional differentiation in the surgical profession. The concept’s utility lies in its 
ability to elicit the stages or benchmarks through which aspirant groups pass, and the justificatory 
arguments they draw on in their quest for professional status. The ‘professional project’ 
emphasises the ‘coherence and consistence of a particular course of action’ (Macdonald, 
1995:10) through the goals and strategies pursued by a given group.  
 
The professional project is not an inevitable by-product of a societal functional prerequisite, on the 
contrary it is a ‘collective mobility project’ (Larson, 1977:66), as it is only through joint effort that 
professionalisation can be potentially realised. Therefore, the project is the collective outcome of 
the actions and efforts of the group. However, Larson does point out that the project is not a 
‘deliberate’ or conscious effort for all members of the group. The group’s efforts do not stop there, 
as once the group has been brought into existence, it is necessary to ensure the group is 
maintained and if possible, the position of the group is strengthened (Macdonald, 1995). From a 
practical standpoint the ultimate goal is ‘market control, work autonomy and status prerogatives 
on the basis of specialised training and scarce expertise’ (Larson, 1977:198).  
 
The use of the word market for Larson underlines the fact that she ‘draws directly on Weber’s 
ideas of the economic and social order, and the notion that specialist knowledge constitutes an 
‘opportunity for income’ (Macdonald, 1995:9). The professional project is thus: 
 
‘an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources – special knowledge and skills – into 
another – social and economic rewards. To maintain scarcity implies a tendency to 
monopoly: monopoly of expertise in the market, monopoly of status in a system of 
stratification.’ (Larson, 1977: xvii) 
 
The surgical profession has an economic monopoly in the health market for surgical services and 
enjoys high social status. The underlying trend towards Intra-professional specialist differentiation 
within the profession may have monetary and status linked agendas, even though this is unlikely 
always to be stated explicitly. However, whatever a group’s underlying motivation, in order to 
achieve a monopoly in the market it is necessary to pass through two interrelated stages in the 
professional project. The first stage in the process is the need to establish, a ‘cognitive basis’ 
(ibid.:15), in other words, define a distinct body of knowledge, that the group claims is theirs and 
theirs alone. The establishment of a cognitive basis enables the group to differentiate and 
therefore distinguish, the ‘commodity’ they are providing. Without this cognitive basis, the group(s) 
could not hope to ‘negotiate cognitive exclusiveness’ (ibid.) – that is to say, the authority to be 
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autonomous and self-regulating, with a monopoly and control over recruitment and selection, 
education, training and the internal evaluation and regulation of standards, around their particular 
body of knowledge. 
 
It is during the negotiating stage that the group is required to demonstrably prove that they, and 
they alone, possess the necessary knowledge and skill required to perform a specified activity(s) 
and that it would have adverse consequences if such activities were performed by those without 
the education, knowledge, and training (Macdonald, 1995); indeed, education and training is ‘a 
critical portal on which exclusionary closure is based, that generates definitions of ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ (Allsop & Saks, 2002:6). The central element in the negotiation of cognitive 
exclusiveness and exclusion is ‘autonomy of technique’ (Larson, 1977:38). 
 
The final stage of the professional project requires the support of a group of people with significant 
power and influence in society, that is to say, an elite (Freidson, 1970). However, it is the power 
of the state which ultimately guarantees the autonomy of the profession (Larson, 1977); in the 
case of the surgical profession, it is the surgical establishment. Knowledgeable skill may be a 
justifying claim for self-regulation, but it does not explain why some groups are successful in their 
attempts to persuade the surgical elite and others are not. Larson’s concept of professional project 
is pivotal in terms of its ability to provide a benchmarking framework which begins at the group’s 
inception and ends in the political arena. However, given Larson’s focus on the growth of the 
mature profession, her analysis does not extend to diversity, conflicts of interest and power 
struggles within the profession which have the potential to effect the pace and direction of the 
professional project along the way.  
 
Bucher and Strauss’ ‘Process Model’ (1961) focuses upon the pluralistic diversity and ‘conflicts of 
interest’ and power struggles within a profession, and their implications for change. Given that 
medicine is usually considered the prototype of the professions, Bucher and Strauss’ illustrative 
points are taken from the medical profession. They note that it is characterised by specialities 
which they term ‘major segments’ and a ‘loose amalgamation of segments (groups) pursuing 
different objectives in different manners and more or less delicately held together under a common 
name at a particular period in history’. They further contend that ‘at any one time the segments 
within a profession are likely to be in different phases of development and engaging in tactics 
appropriate to their position’ (p.326). Despite this however, Bucher and Strauss also note that the 
fate of segments (groups) are also closely entwined, thus there is a relationship of 
interdependency.  
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Bucher and Strauss’ remit does not extend to focusing on the conditions under which segments 
become formal self-regulating specialities in their own right. However, their work’s usefulness for 
this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, their level of analysis focuses on the development of groups and 
how they pursue their objectives during their professional development: the relationship between 
the speciality and the groups within it, as well as the relationship between the aspiring groups 
themselves. Secondly, it is invaluable in terms its ability to highlight hot areas where conflicts of 
interest and power struggles ensue, as knowledge becomes contested. Indeed, their model and 
associated concepts are invaluable tools for eliciting the nature of politicking between groups or 
segments at the micro-level, and between groups or specialities at the meso-level and how these 
play out at the macro-level (Institutions and Relations with important special publics outside the 
Profession). Unlocking this potential enables an understanding of how such conflicts effect the 
pace and direction of specialist differentiation as groups pursue the professional project. 
 
Not unlike Larson, Bucher and Strauss (1961), note that early on in their development, segments 
(groups) pursue goals and strategies. However, given the plethora of interests which characterise 
the mature profession, there are likely to be conflicting interests and power struggles, on two 
different levels. Firstly, in view of the fact that ‘professional movements’ ensue within an 
institutional context, a large part of the activity of segments is a power struggle for institutional 
recognition. This thesis provides a very good historical example of this in the shape of 
orthopaedics, which attempted to gain a foothold in the prestigious teaching hospitals during the 
early years of the twentieth century, only to be thwarted by the powerful surgical establishment at 
that time. In an attempt to secure an institutional place, segments  
 
‘carve out for themselves and proclaim unique missions. They issue a statement of the 
contribution that their area and it alone, can make in a total scheme of values, and with it 
an argument to show why it is peculiarly fitted for this task.’ (p.326)   
 
In other words, they attempt to establish exclusivity, a central strand being cognitive 
exclusiveness, which is a crucial intervening variable. 
 
Bucher and Strauss note that: 
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‘In order to survive and develop, a segment must be represented in the training centers.5 
The medical school curriculum is crowded as specialities compete for the student’s time 
and attention, seeking to recruit, or at least to socialise the budding professional into the 
correct attitudes towards themselves.’ (1961:331)  
 
The second level at which power struggles are likely to take place, is that of ‘master segments’, 
or specialities. Bucher and Strauss note that within established specialities, there is going to be a 
power struggle for control of the speciality associations, for two reasons: firstly, control of the 
specialty associations’ reins of power enables the leading groups to have at their disposal a range 
of ‘sanctions’ to ensure that rank and file members comply with the rules and regulations they 
have successfully implemented. Secondly, the leading groups within the specialty associations 
enjoy a privileged relationship with the public and what Bucher & Strauss describe as ‘special 
publics’. The ability to control external relations, places the controlling groups (segments) in a 
unique position to forward their own interests when negotiating with relevant special publics, as 
associations do not represent all interests under their umbrella, on the contrary they represent one 
group (segment) or coalition of ‘segments’.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Bucher and Strauss’ work focuses on conflict and power within the mature 
profession and within specialities or master segments; and in doing so it pinpoints areas of 
potential power struggles and conflict. However, their work does not focus on the processual 
elements in power struggles, the sum of which equals either success or failure. For example, they 
do not explain the reasons behind the success and failure of segments to gain a foothold in the 
training centres, nor the reasons behind the success of some segments in taking the reins of 
power and controlling the professional associations. Ultimately, their work does not focus on the 
conditions under which segments become self-regulating ‘pure’ specialities in their own right.  
 
Bourdieu’s works on capital and power in social fields (see section 1.1), adds to the work of Larson 
and Bucher and Strauss. Bourdieu’s conceptual framework is very useful for this thesis in providing 
solid theoretical scaffolding for understanding and explaining intra-professional specialist 
differentiation in the field of surgery, and the success and failure of groups in their push for self-
regulation. In order to be able to fully understand and appreciate the utility of Bourdieu’s concepts 
for this study, they require elucidation. The most profitable way of achieving this is through an 
exploration of his writing.   
 
5 Halpern emphasises the importance for an aspiring specialist group of achieving an autonomous department in 
a medical school (1988:57). 
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Bourdieu’s (1988) analysis of the social field, in this case the French university field begins with 
structural concerns. He argues that: 
 
‘the structure of the university field is only, at any moment in time, the state of the power 
relations between the agents or, more precisely, between the powers they wield in their 
own right and above all through the institutions to which they belong; positions held in this 
structure are what motivate strategies aiming to transform it, or to preserve it by modifying 
or maintaining the relative forces of the different powers, that is, in other words, the 
systems of equivalence established between the different kinds of capital.’ (p.128)  
 
Bourdieu provides a detailed exposition of the different types of capital6 and how these relate to 
structure and power. His use of the word ‘homologous’ to describe the composition of the 
university field in relation to the field of power, indicates that it has a similar relative position and 
purpose. Thus, at one extreme is situated the faculties of Law and Medicine imbued with inherited 
social capital and holders of economic and political capital, and at the other, the faculties of science 
and the arts, in possession of the capital of scientific authority or intellectual renown. The schism 
between what Bourdieu describes as the ‘scientifically dominant but socially subordinate faculties’ 
and the ‘scientifically subordinate but temporally dominant faculties’ (ibid.:54), is reflected in the 
power structure in the university field. Thus, the faculties of Medicine and Law hold more power in 
the university structure than the socially subordinate faculties namely, the science and arts. 
 
The holders of academic power are in possession of academic capital which according to 
Bourdieu, is acquired and sustained by holding a position with the means and authority to control 
other positions.  For example, a position on the Universities Consultative Committee provides the 
holder(s) with ‘power over the agencies of reproduction of the university body ensuring for its 
holders a statutory authority’ (ibid.:84). Bourdieu goes on to note, that capital has multiplying 
properties in as far as holding one position can lead to holding new positions of authority.  
 
This ‘statutory authority’ is played out in what Bourdieu describes as ‘the complex and multi-
dimensional opposition between the clinical practitioners and the biologists in the medical faculties’ 
(ibid.:59). Within the internecine faculty battle, the dominant (i.e. the Professors of medicine 
imbued with social capital, symbolic capital, and specific cultural capital, as opposed to the 
biologists in possession of scientific capital and closer to the socially subordinate faculties), have 
 
6 See Bourdieu’s Homo Academicus, 1988. 
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the power to determine academic initiation. In the case of medicine, this academic initiation takes 
the form of consecutive and highly ‘competitive examinations’ which ‘postpone until very late true 
initiation into the scientific methods of the laboratory’ (ibid.:105). This is also a clear manifestation 
of power determining what counts as knowledge and is played out further across the gamut of 
faculties within the university field. Indeed, Bourdieu notes that the faculties themselves are 
characterised by divisions organised along the same lines as the university field namely, between 
the socially dominant faculties and socially subordinate faculties. 
 
Bourdieu’s pivotal paper on the scientific field (1981), a precursor to his work on the French 
University field, focuses on the internal struggles between the dominant and newcomers. He notes 
that every social field is characterised by a competitive struggle between agents (dominant) 
imbued with specific types of capital on which the field is dependent, and the dominated, in 
possession of relatively little of this capital. Indeed, the scientific field is no exception to this rule; 
Bourdieu describes the struggle that ensues as a ‘political struggle for scientific authority, a 
particular kind of social capital which gives power over the constitutive mechanisms of the field’ 
(p.262).  
 
This enables those who control such authority, namely the dominant, to ‘impose the definition of 
science that best conforms to their specific interest, that is, the one best suited to preserving or 
increasing their specific capital’ (Bourdieu, 1991:13). Given this, the dominant are committed to 
‘conservation strategies aimed at ensuring the perpetuation of the established scientific order to 
which their interests are directly linked’ (Bourdieu, 1981:270).   
 
Given that the dominant view of science is objectified in institutions, and is thus self-perpetuating, 
conservation strategies are naturally built into the institutional supports. For example, the 
education system is the institution responsible for ensuring the continuance of the ‘official’ 
(dominant) view of science by methodically instilling, what Bourdieu terms the ‘scientific habitus’ 
upon newcomers to the field. Bourdieu describes the scientific habitus as consisting of:  
 
‘systems of generative schemes of perception, appreciation and action, produced by a 
specific form of educative action, which make possible the choice of objects, the solution 
of problems, and the evaluation of solutions.’ (ibid.) 
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In other words, it is the means by which groups succeed in imposing perspectives favourable to 
their interests. 
 
Bourdieu points out that:  
 
‘The established scientific order also includes the instruments of circulation, in particular 
the scientific journals which, by selecting their articles in terms of the dominant criteria, 
consecrate productions faithful to the principles of official science, thereby continuously 
holding out the example of what deserves the name of science, and exercise a de facto 
censorship of heretical productions, either by rejecting them outright or by simply 
discouraging the intention of even trying to publish them by means of the definition of the 
publishable which they set forward.’ (ibid.:271)  
 
From the outset Bourdieu (1981, 1991) is at pains to point out that the scientific field, like any other 
field, is a social field; social fields by their very nature are populated by individuals. Indeed, social 
fields and their supporting structures are created and brought into existence by individuals, as 
Bourdieu observes when he notes that the structure of the field, and the objective relations which 
characterise, it are brought about through previous struggles. Although Bourdieu produces a 
macro-structural framework, he does not lose sight of micro-concerns. For example, he relates 
the micro to the macro when he focuses on the scientist’s career pathway. His use of the word 
‘agent’, which he uses to denote the scientist, clearly suggests that agency as well as structure is 
important.  
 
This is further reinforced in his analysis of the structure of the French university field, which he 
argues, reflects the differentials in power between agents situated within institutions. 
Subsequently, Bourdieu moves from the macro to the micro as his discussion progresses from the 
hierarchical organisation of the field to faculties or sub-fields and the agents that comprise them  
 
It is fair to say, that Bourdieu’s conceptual tools: social field, capital and habitus have dualistic 
properties (action and structure), in that field denotes structure as well as a social space; capital 
in all its forms is a resource for agents, and its exchange value is dependent on the type of capital 
and the social field, and its relationship with other social fields in space and time (Thomson, 2014). 
However, possession of certain types of capital is actualised in structures and enables the 
dominant to exercise power over the dominated or newcomers; in the case of the scientific field, 
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and in the case of the university field, the ‘temporally subordinate faculties’, and the ‘socially 
dominant faculties’ (Bourdieu, 1988:41). Habitus is structured and influenced by the agents past 
and present environmental conditions, for example, family background and educational 
experiences. It is these past experiences which Bourdieu contends, are internalised by the 
individual as ‘schemes of perception, thought and action.’ He describes this as a ‘system of 
dispositions which generate – a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future’ 
(1990:54). Conversely, it is doubtful that Bourdieu was implying that agents are structurally 
programmed without free will, on the contrary, in his work on the scientific field he submits that:  
 
‘Depending on the position they occupy in the structure of the field the new entrants may 
find themselves orientated toward risk-free investments of succession strategies, which 
are guaranteed to bring them at the end of a predictable career, the profits awaiting those 
who realise the official ideal of scientific excellence through limited innovations within 
authorised limits; or towards subversion strategies, infinitely more costly and more 
hazardous investments which will not bring them profits accruing to the holders of the 
monopoly of scientific legitimacy unless they can achieve a complete redefinition of the 
principles legitimating domination: newcomers who refuse the beaten tracks cannot beat 
the dominant at their own game unless they make additional, strictly scientific investments 
from which they cannot expect high profits, at least in the short run, since the whole logic 
of the system is against them.’ (1981:271) 
 
In addition, in his work on the university field, Bourdieu (1988) also suggests that the logic of the  
field is very much dependent on the thesis director or head, imbued with academic power, being 
able to manage the career aspirations of his/her students, and the students willingness to 
participate in the competition, based on their disposition.  
 
Overall, Bourdieu’s concepts and their dichotomous relationship between action and structure, 
should be viewed together as opposed to in isolation. Indeed, Bourdieu (1984) formally 
summarised the interrelationship between the concepts in an equation: [(Habitus) (Capital)] + Field 
= Practice (p.101). In other words, we cannot understand habitus without understanding the 
agents position in the field, relative to the capital possessed, and we cannot understand the types 
of capital if we do not understand the field they operate in (Maton, 2014). Indeed, the relationship 
between action and structure in Bourdieu’s theoretical schema, share similarities with Giddens’s 
‘Structuration theory’ in that Bourdieu places ‘the knowledgeability of actors and conscious 
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intentionality in the context of structure as the medium and outcome of contingently accomplished 
activities of situated actors’ (Kilminster, 1991:95).  
 
Bourdieu’s work, which navigates between action and structure, provides a robust theoretical 
scaffolding for explaining specialist differentiation in surgery. At the same time, it is malleable 
enough to enable other concepts to be accommodated within its theoretical boundaries, resulting 
in a workable theory which is able to elicit the factors which effect the pace and direction of intra-
professional specialist differentiation in surgery.  
 
 
1.3 A Workable Theoretical Framework 
 
The profession of surgery, not unlike the scientific field and the university field, is composed of 
structures. However, all structures are created by individuals and are composed of individuals, 
and in this respect are, in Bourdieuian terms, social fields. As in any other social field, individuals 
will associate with other like-minded individuals and in turn form groups.  By their very nature 
groups will have different identities, values and goals; some may wish to pursue the project 
towards professional status, as described by Larson (1977), with self-regulation as a long-term 
goal, others may not. Thus, it follows that the surgical profession, not unlike other professions, is 
a loose amalgamation of interest groups or ‘segments pursuing different objectives in different 
manners and more or less delicately held together under a common name at a particular period 
in history’ (Bucher and Strauss, 1961:326).  
 
As with any structure, however, it will be stratified by differentials in power as Freidson (1988) and 
Abbott (1988) rightly state: between those at the top of the profession, namely the ‘dominant’, who 
are committed to ‘conservation strategies’ aimed at ensuring the perpetuation of the established 
surgical order to which their interests are linked (Bourdieu, 1981),  and the aspirant groups, whose 
objective or occupational quest in practical terms is to have complete control of their own affairs 
through self-regulation, with their own postgraduate examinations, effectively ensuring a market 
monopoly based on their service expertise (Larson, 1977), as well as the added cachet of 
advancing the status of the area. 
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As in any social field, power, as Flyvbjerg (1998) states, ‘determines what counts as knowledge; 
procures the knowledge which supports its purposes and suppresses the knowledge which does 
not serve it’ (p.226). The ability to ‘facilitate or suppress knowledge is what makes one group or 
party more powerful than another’ (ibid.:36); in this case: the dominant over the aspirant groups. 
This ability comes from a significant differential between the capital/resources at the disposal of 
the dominant group and the aspirant groups. The dominant are in possession of a greater volume 
of capital/resources, since they control the institutions which propound, inculcate, and support the 
norms and values of the dominant group (Bourdieu, 1981). 
 
Bourdieu (1986) writes that: 
  
‘Capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is 
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the forms 
of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible on certain conditions, into 
economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of educational qualifications; 
and as social capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, 
in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the form of a 
title of nobility.’ (p.16)  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the types of capital discussed will be: social capital, with reference 
to the social origins of the dominant in the field of surgery, particularly in relation to the first surgical 
epoch, 1800 - 1947; social capital in relation to the group and the potential for members to 
accumulate the combined capital of the group, as a result of what Bourdieu (1986) describes as 
the ‘multiplier effect’. This will be of particular relevance in Chapters Five and Six, in regard to 
power, political alliances and lobbying; surgical authority, not unlike scientific authority, ‘a 
particular kind of social capital which gives power over the constitutive mechanisms of the field’ 
(Bourdieu, 1981:262); economic and political capital accumulated from the relationship of mutual 
dependence between the medical profession and the state, since the inception of the NHS in 
1948; scientific capital associated with the development of technical foci and advances in surgical 
knowledge, and publication in esteemed peer reviewed medical journals, such as the Lancet; 
symbolic capital, which Bourdieu (1988) describes as the capital ‘attached to a proper name and 
capable, just like a famous brand name in business, of guaranteeing a lasting relationship with a 
captive clientele’ (p. 58), as was the case in the development of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, and 
specific cultural capital which 
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‘constitutes an advantage all the more powerful if the capital common to the field, 
considered, whether faculty or discipline, is less objectified, less formalised, and it is more 
completely reducible to the dispositions and the experience constitutive of an art which 
can only be acquired in the long-term, and at first hand.’ (ibid.:59)  
 
It could be argued that medicine and surgery are an art and that understanding the process of 
disease is something which cannot be learned from objectified knowledge contained in a textbook, 
alone, but requires a long-period of observation and practice. Indeed, the same argument can be 
used with regards to bodies of knowledge that are attached to a new technique, such as the 
Ophthalmoscope or Laparoscope; mastery of these technologies requires long-periods of training 
and at first hand. 
 
The structure of the distribution of capital in its forms varies according to the structure of the social 
field in question at that juncture in time and determines the chances of the successful 
operationalisation of capital by groups’. Indeed, if a group(s) is imbued with specific types of capital 
that the field depends on for its preservation, the group(s) will be able to garner additional capital 
as the field produces more of that type(s) of capital (Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
Thus, aspirant groups occupy various positions within the field, depending on the 
‘capital’/resources they possess (Bourdieu, 1991). There may be new groups possessing a lower 
volume of capital/resources and more established groups which have managed to accumulate 
capital/resources over a period of time. Thus, a hierarchy of opportunity arises, for a group’s 
chances of achieving self-regulation will be very much dependent on the capital/resources at that 
group’s disposal: the greater its resources, the greater the group’s lobbying power, in what is 
effectively a political process; The political process involves struggles and conflict as well as 
strategies and negotiation, and can operate not only on a macro-level, but also on a meso-level. 
On a macro-level the politicking occurs between the leaders of the aspirant groups and the 
dominant (i.e. the surgical establishment); this also includes power struggles within the specialist 
associations over who controls the reins of power (Bucher & Strauss, 1961). A very pertinent 
contemporary example of this is the political machinations and power struggles which ensued 
within the walls of the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) during the 
latter years of the 1990’s. This will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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At the meso-level the politicking occurs between the leaders or pioneers7, who are predominantly 
found in the highly specialised world of the teaching hospital and located in the large urban centre, 
and their generalist colleagues, who practise in the district general hospital (DGH) in the suburbs. 
The dispute may be about ‘turf’, whereby the leaders in the teaching centres attempt to take more 
of the difficult cases from the hands of their generalist colleagues, fuelling the argument that 
difficult cases should be performed by specialists. This provides additional capital in terms of 
lobbying power on a macro (national level). This will clearly be seen in Chapter Six with 
contemporary examples from teaching hospitals and district general hospitals.  
 
There may also be a third level on which politicking takes place, namely a micro-level between the 
leaders or pioneers of groups and the rank and file membership, who for various reasons may not 
share the same aspirations for the future of their area as their leaders. This may have the effect 
of altering the pace and direction of the group’s aims with regard to self-regulation. A germane 
example here is vascular surgery and the issue of private practice, which will be discussed at 
length in Chapter Six. 
 
The fact that fields are social means they do not exist in a vacuum, therefore when social fields 
meet and interact each has the potential to effect the other: the state on the profession; and the 
public or ‘civil society’ on the profession (Salter, 2004).  A pertinent example is cardiac surgery, 
which will be covered in Chapter Seven.  
 
The profession has the potential to effect the state (‘special publics’ – Bucher & Strauss, 1961), 
a good example being paediatric surgery, which will be covered in Chapters six and seven. 
Additionally, management has the potential to effect the profession, and vice versa. Such 
interactions may add another dimension to the political process and the pace and direction of 
specialist differentiation.  In this context, the value of capital may not only be defined by the 
establishment, but by other fields which interact with the profession. The value of capital may 
therefore be relative to the context of the interaction and its outcomes. 
 
The dominant group may, in an attempt to protect its interests and those of the profession in 
general, change its conservation strategies in line with changing contexts/threats. An historical 
example of this is the decision taken by the Royal College of Surgeons to legitimise scientific 
 
7 “Leaders” and “Pioneers” is adopted from an article appearing in the 1945 edition of the Lancet, entitled 
“Clinical Specialism”. This will be discussed at length in chapter four. 
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medicine and specialisation from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. This will be discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
 
The dominant group may also be replaced over time as contexts change, fields interact, and 
groups become imbued with greater capital. A pertinent example is the changes to the power 
structure of the Royal College of Surgeons during the late 1940’s, when general surgery’s power 
base had been eroded and the potential for one group to hold power had been curtailed. This will 
be discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
Boundaries between groups may also blur, and interdependence may become the order of the 
day (Bucher & Strauss, 1961). A pertinent example is the medical speciality of radiology and 
vascular surgery, a general surgical sub-speciality. This will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
1.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has attempted to construct a workable theoretical framework which will enable a 
sound understanding of intra-professional specialist differentiation in the surgical profession of the 
United Kingdom, the factors which have effected the pace and direction of these processes in the 
past, and the factors which are effecting the pace and direction of these processes in the present.  
 
The proposed framework emphasises an ‘Action within Structure’ approach in which it is 
considered that individuals and groups are actively involved in the processes relating to intra-
professional specialist differentiation. Intra-professional differentiation is not determined by the 
laws and pre-requisites of the social system (Parsons, 2012). 
 
Individuals and groups create and apply knowledge, but to create knowledge does not in itself 
guarantee that one can control it and decide when to apply it. Professions are stratified by 
differentials in power and resources, and struggles will ensue for the control and ability to apply 
that knowledge. Knowledge is a politically contested resource surrounded by a political battle for 
the right to self-regulate and determine what counts as knowledge. 
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2.1 Introduction and Aims 
 
This thesis is a case study of intra-professional specialist differentiation in the surgical profession 
of the United Kingdom. The core data on which the analysis draws were in-depth interviews 
conducted by the author with two hundred surgeons drawn from across the nine surgical 
specialities and from all levels of the surgical profession. In addition, general practitioners and 
hospital medical directors were also interviewed. In total, four rounds of interviews were 
conducted, the first three in 1997-1999, and the last round in 2003. 
 
The core ambition of the thesis is to elicit the dynamics behind, intra-professional differentiation in 
UK surgery. As noted in the preceding chapters, this thesis will adopt an ‘Action within Structure’ 
approach, in which it is considered that individuals and groups are actively involved in the 
processes relating to intra-professional specialist differentiation. In doing so, the eclectic synthesis 
of theoretical perspectives utilised in this thesis guides us in the methodology(s) employed; 
indeed, theory channels us in research, in other words, it could be said that methodology is an 
extension of ideas. A more thorough exposition of this will be covered in Section 2.2 Theory and 
Methodological Considerations. 
 
The richness of theory generates thinking and out of thinking, ideas and concepts become 
polished. Indeed, Atkinson (2017) argues that theory and ideas are pivotal to quality of outcome 
in qualitative research. Section 2.3 “Ideas: A Processual Approach”, seeks to explore this further 
and how it relates to the initial stages of this study. 
 
The remaining sections (2.4 to 2.6 inclusive) will systematically document the interview design, 
including sampling, ethical questions, data analysis and the generation of theory. Section 2.7 
provides a summary. 
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2.2 Theory and Methodological Considerations 
 
The difference between qualitative and quantitative methodological approaches cannot be 
reduced to technical differences alone, on the contrary, the differences are attributable to 
divergent philosophical and theoretical traditions. Methodological considerations are thus, an 
extension of theory (King & Horrocks, 2010). 
 
Glaser and Strauss (2008) point out that the debate between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches is an historical one and reflected a change in emphasis from theory generation to 
theory verification. This change in emphasis was very much in vogue between 1940 and 1960 
and dominant in scientific positivism. This approach posits that human beings are part of nature 
and can be studied objectively, not unlike objects in the physical world. Therefore, research within 
this epistemological tradition seeks to generate knowledge that is objective and unprejudiced by 
the researcher or research process (King & Horrocks, 2010). 
 
Glaser & Strauss (2008) suggest that the ability to vigorously test theory based on a systematic 
approach including sampling, coding, distribution of values, the formulation of concepts and 
generation of hypotheses, directed sociology in a scientific direction.  
 
The scientism of sociology and epistemological tradition of objectivism was reflected in structural 
functionalist theory in the 1950’s and 1960’s and in particular in the work of Talcott Parson’s. 
Although, this was discussed in the introductory chapter, it is worth reiterating that, Parson’s had 
a ‘complicated, almost love hate relationship’ (Smelser, N. 2012, Foreword. In: Parsons, T. The 
Social System. New Orleans: Quid Pro, V), with the ontological position that human beings can 
be studied in the same way as physical objects in the natural world and subjected to the same 
system of analysis. He was empiricist in as far as he believed ‘that the entire scientific enterprise 
is dedicated to understanding and explaining an identifiable empirical world’ (ibid.). His emphasis 
on the inevitability of specificity of function, as technical complexity, and scientific knowledge 
advance leads to a technologically deterministic stance, whereby the specialist division of labour 
and specialist differentiation are viewed as inevitable and the role of human beings is one of 
reacting to the functional pre-requisites or laws of the social system. On the other hand, Parson’s 
(2012) did not completely discount human action. On the contrary, he describes the social system 
as comprising actors with motivation interacting with other actors in a social space, utilising their 
personality systems and cultural systems.  
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The theoretical framework utilised in this thesis emphasises an action within structure approach; 
whilst not discounting structure it argues that knowledge and technology do not operate 
autonomously of human agency and action, but that actors are the creators of knowledge and 
new technologies and the institutional structures buttressing these. Indeed, if knowledge and 
technology existed independently, devoid of human agency, you would expect to see a similar 
pattern of specialisation across countries, given the global nature of knowledge and surgery; 
however, this is not the case. A general comparison is provided in Chapter Three, of the pattern 
of intra-professional specialist differentiation in the UK surgical profession in comparison with the 
profession in the United States. The essential thrust of the argument employed, is that the growth 
of knowledge and new technologies alone cannot explain the variation in the rate of specialist 
differentiation between the UK and the USA and indeed, between specialties in the UK. Therefore, 
this would suggest that there are other processes at work. 
 
I would argue that a qualitative methodological approach provides the best theoretical fit, given 
this thesis argues against the scientific reducibility of specialist differentiation. In addition, attempts 
to uncover the processes at work, determining whether intra-professional specialist differentiation 
is successful or unsuccessful are likely to be complex and therefore unlikely to be expounded 
through a quantitative approach.  
 
Qualitative methods tend to be synonymous with theoretical approaches, such as interactionism, 
phenomenology and ethnography which emphasise the importance of understanding the social 
world, not in terms of causation, but in terms of social actors, social processes, and systems. As 
sociologists we are required to question and elucidate the taken for granted realities of everyday 
life. For example, the reality we are faced with when entering a modern hospital, is a vast array of 
specialisms, indeed, the hospital is associated with the ‘specialist’ and there is an assumption that 
the specialist has greater expertise and specialist knowledge than the generalist. However, as 
Atkinson (2017) points out, our ideas and ‘assumptions’ about the world we live in ‘are generated 
through socially shared beliefs, knowledge, and conventions’ (p.20). 
 
The socially shared beliefs Atkinson refers to, are produced by the surgical profession and its 
constituent specialties; social fields, whose members bring them into existence, and demarcate 
these distinctive boundaries. As is often the case, beneath the taken for granted realties of 
everyday life, there is competition and claims for legitimacy, that ‘actions of type X should be 
performed by actors of type X’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1967:72). 
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Atkinson (2017) describes boundaries as being significant, given the ‘symbolism’ accorded to 
them. In this case the symbolism attached to specialist boundaries is one of expertise in a field of 
knowledge and skill; this is reinforced through ‘language’ and ‘rhetoric’. The significance of 
language and rhetoric, according to Atkinson, lies in their utility for ‘justifying’ and ‘explaining’. 
Atkinson suggests that we should view justificatory narratives in the context of ‘accounts’, which 
present ‘versions of stories that contain distinctive kinds of speech acts’ that are ‘deployed to 
move and persuade the listener’ (p.64). 
 
For example, interviews with members of the surgical profession (the leaders and advocates of 
specialisation) revealed the use of an empiricist like accounting device which described 
specialisation as a “predictable” and “irresistible” consequence and engine for the advancement 
of knowledge (See Chapter Three, section 3.2). Accounts and accounting devices may also 
include, what Atkinson describes as ‘contrastive rhetoric’. For example, specialist laparoscopic 
surgeons contrast positive outcomes for the expert trained in this technique in terms of patient 
outcomes, length of stay and cost, in comparison with non-laparoscopic open procedures.  
 
Justificatory rhetoric can be a powerful lobbying tool. Indeed, boundary demarcation lines between 
the ‘specialist’ and the ‘generalist’ regarding certain procedures often begin with the specialist 
associations setting out guidelines, which are reinforced by rhetorical devices employed in the 
right forums. For example, breast cancer and cancers in general are still high up on the 
government of the day’s agenda. It is therefore not surprising that ABS (Association of Breast 
Surgery) guidelines on who could and who could not practice breast surgery were accepted not 
only by the government, but also by the profession (see Chapter Six, Section 6.5.4).  
 
 
2.3 Ideas: A Processual Approach 
 
As suggested earlier, methodological considerations are an extension of theory, however ideas 
are theory in embryonic form; indeed Atkinson (2017) contends that theory and ideas are one and 
the same. Not unlike most postgraduate doctoral theses, the research focus for this thesis 
changed as ideas were generated and refined over time. This did not cause any concern, as 
qualitative research by its very nature is more exploratory and investigative. 
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The initial research focus was on the status passage of surgeons as they became more 
specialised in their career and Erving Goffman’s (1961) concept of ‘Moral Career’8 was utilised. 
However, as I began to read about specialisation, I became more interested in the structure of the 
profession itself and not on the individual surgeon.  
 
The first stage of the enquiry consisted in assessing the state of existing research and 
documentation. Investigation of secondary literature (discussed in the Introduction) revealed that, 
though specialisation in the UK (and the United States) figured prominently as a theme in 
discussions of other topics in surgery (e.g. Feminisation, Pringle 1998; and Consultations in 
Paediatric Cardiac Surgery, Silverman 1981), sociologists had not yet sought to problematise it in 
its own right, to uncover its history, development and underlying dynamics. 
 
Before research into these questions could begin in earnest, it was necessary for me to familiarise 
myself with the complex organisation of the profession, the nature, and functions of the relevant 
professional bodies, and of the specialities and various sub-specialist areas. I acquired this 
background information primarily from publications in UK surgical journals including Annals of The 
Royal College of Surgeons of England; Journal of The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh; 
Surgery; The BMJ; The Lancet; The American Journal of Surgery; Archives of Surgery. In 
particular (Irving, The General Surgeon. BMJ, 1986; Jackson, Coloproctology – A Speciality in 
Transition. Annals of The Royal College of Surgeons of England, 1992; Jordan, The Future of 
General Surgery. The American Journal of Surgery, 1991).     
 
As I acquired familiarity with the state of the profession, I began to formulate my overall interest in 
a more precise manner, breaking it down into a preliminary set of research questions: 
 
• Why has specialist differentiation within surgery occurred? 
• Had its pace changed over time, and if so, why? 
• Does the NHS impact on this process, and vice-versa? 
• Is the profession driving it, if so why? 
• What role does knowledge/technology play in this? 
 
8 The concept of “Moral Career” was applied by Goffman in his seminal account of the moral career of the 
mental patient within the context of a total institution. The term career was not used in the traditional sense, but 
in a ‘broadened sense to refer to any social strand of any person’s course through life’. The ‘concept of career 
allows one to move back and forth between the personal and public, between the self and its significant society’ 
(1961:123). 
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• Is general surgery on the road to extinction? 
• In what ways does specialist differentiation impact on the profession? 
 
Though perusal of surgical literature enabled the formulation of questions such as these, neither 
it nor the writings of sociologists (which, in surgical matters, tended to be confined to the US 
context) contained the sorts of information necessary to answer them.  It became apparent that, 
for this, it would be necessary to talk directly to members of the profession and get the inside story. 
 
 
2.4 The Qualitative Research Project and the Interview 
 
Qualitative research is processual in nature, designed to educe an outcome; the outcome is 
knowledge, ideas, and ultimately theory. Given the processual nature of qualitative research, there 
are stages that the qualitative researcher is likely to pass through when formulating the research 
project (Warren 2001; King & Horrocks, 2010) and my research was not an exception to this rule. 
For example:  
 
1. Formulating a research question 
2. Selecting the type of interview to utilise 
3. Deciding on who to interview and recruiting a representative sample  
4. Gaining access and ethics 
5. Developing an interview guide, comprising areas to be covered  
 
 
As alluded to in the previous section, I developed a preliminary set of research questions which 
were “broad” and “causal” in nature. King and Horrocks (2010) suggest that qualitative research 
cannot answer such questions and propose utilising quantitative methods in the hypothetico-
deductive method tradition, that is to say, formulating hypotheses that can be falsified through the 
testing of observable data. However, I would argue that use of a survey to answer such questions 
would at best, have provided superficial answers and at worst, would not have provided the depth 
and richness, that only qualitative methods can; in addition, such an approach is the very 
antithesis of what this thesis argues against.  
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There is an abundance of literature on the qualitative interview: Arksey & Knight (1999); Warren 
(2001); Charmaz (2001, 2014); Marvasti (2004); King and Horrocks (2010); to name but a few.  
 
The interview is one of the oldest methodologies utilised by social scientists, an approach 
championed by the ethnographers of the Chicago School. The Chicago School methodology 
utilised a combination of case studies, documentary analysis and qualitative interviews. These 
methods were employed to enable a greater understanding of the diversity of the Chicago urban 
experience of the 1930’s and 1940’s (Warren, 2001). 
 
The qualitative interview is just as relevant today as it was to the urban ethnographers of the 
Chicago School. The interview is the most widely used tool employed by qualitative researchers, 
in their quest to understand the social world. I hesitate to use the word “data” even though 
qualitative research does indeed produce data. I would argue that the qualitative interview is not 
merely an instrument utilised to produce data, per se, but to reveal the richness of social structures 
and social systems. The kernel of the qualitative interview is essentially a dialogue involving two 
people ‘in which one person has the role of researcher’ (Arksey & Knight, 1999:2), designed to 
educe this richness. 
 
Warren (2001) poses the question as to who should one interview? The answer to this question 
is dependent on theoretical stance, i.e. whether the researcher seeks to verify theory and therefore 
seeks to establish statistically significant and generalisable data, or whether the researcher seeks 
to understand the social world and underlying processes. The former utilise social surveys with a 
representative sample of the population to be studied. 
 
In contrast, qualitative research does not set out to establish statistical generalisability, however, 
it does seek to understand social phenomena through the collection of rich and complete data. In 
addition, there is more importance attributed to analysis and explanation that is more ‘holistic’ in 
nature as opposed to recording statistical correlations. Given this, samples in qualitative research 
are usually purposive, in other words, participants are selected because of the likelihood they will 
generate valuable data for the research project (Green & Thorogood, 2004), or to advance the 
researcher’s theory (Charmaz, 2001). 
 
King & Horrocks (2010) suggest that the sampling and recruiting of participants may occur at 
numerous stages during the course of the qualitative research project. For example, the initial 
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sample may be recruited and interviewed, and based on initial analysis of the data, an additional 
sample delineated to address particular issues that have emerged. Glaser & Strauss (2008) 
describe this form of theoretical sampling, as “Grounded Theory”, in which the process of data 
collection generates theory and informs the researcher as to what data to collect subsequently, 
and where to find them. This process is controlled by the embryonic theory that emerges from the 
data.  
 
As alluded to in section (2.3), I began to generate a set of preliminary research questions around: 
specialisation; knowledge and technology; the future of general surgery and specialisation in the 
context of the NHS. My sampling strategy was purposive as the literature enabled the formulation 
of questions but provided no answers. The initial sample was British surgeons who had written 
about specialisation. At first there was the preoccupation that access might be problematic 
because of the busy nature of a surgeon’s life, and the daunting prospect of being interviewed by 
a social scientist probing for answers to questions relating to the internal workings of the 
profession. Indeed, Feldman, Bell & Berger (2003) suggest that gaining access may seem like an 
unwelcome obstruction to an enthusiastic researcher however, gaining access is a vital stage in 
the research process, as without access one cannot garner data. In addition, the authors argue 
that the actual process of gaining access affects the data available to the researcher. Indeed, the 
authors suggest that access, like research itself, is a dynamic process and one which is very much 
dependent on developing relationships.  
 
In practice, however responses were overwhelmingly positive, and the initial fears groundless: it 
was possible to find ample numbers of suitable interviewees in all four rounds of interviews. This 
illustrates the paradox of access Feldman, Bell & Berger describe in their work, that is, regardless 
of having ‘so little to offer our informants’ (2003: viii), we manage to gain the access required. The 
authors seek to elucidate this contradiction by viewing it through a ‘relational lens’. They contend 
that relationships and their motivations in the context of research are akin to relationships in 
everyday life. For example, they note that key informants may also get something out of the 
encounter, this could be related to the prestige they realise as a result of their connection with the 
researcher or because they want the researcher to do well. 
 
Some pertinent examples from my research experience reinforce the seminal work of Feldman, 
Bell & Berger. Firstly, what I would describe as the Oxbridge effect enabled easier access to all 
levels of the profession, but especially to the teaching hospital professors and leaders in the 
profession, many of whom had been students at Cambridge or Oxford once upon a time. Secondly, 
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it facilitated a platform upon which to build good relationships as it was a conversation point during 
the interviews. Thirdly, since childhood I have always had a keen interest in medicine and surgery 
and was therefore familiar with the professional nomenclature; this enabled a very good 
relationship dynamic between me and my interviewees and facilitated contacts within the 
profession. Feldman, Bell & Berger compare the access process to opening a door, with success 
being dependent on whether the researcher can find the door and has the ‘right key or combination 
that enables one to open it’ (ibid.: ix). However, once you are through the door there is an 
opportunity to build relationships, garner further contacts and expedite the research project. In this 
respect, access and sampling have a symbiotic relationship. 
 
Interviews were held in total with over 200 professionals in the course of four rounds. Overall, the 
sample was primarily comprised of surgeons, although in round two, hospital CEO’s and General 
Practitioners were interviewed. The sampling for this research was conducted (i.e. interviewees 
were selected) in two ways: ‘systematic sampling’ and an element of ‘snowballing’. In systematic 
sampling’ the researcher arbitrarily selects every tenth or twentieth name from a list. ‘Snowballing’ 
involves using personal contacts to build up a sample of the group to be studied. During rounds 
one, two, and four, systematic sampling and snowballing techniques were utilised and in round 
three systematic sampling was used.  
 
For rounds one, three and four, respectively, the systematic sampling techniques employed 
combined: compiling a list of surgeons drawn up from the UK medical directory; teaching hospital 
and district general hospital (DGH) websites; names were chosen using the method above. Once 
the list of names was generated, letters were sent to all, outlining my background and the research 
project (see Appendix 1 for an example of a letter). The list purposively reflected demographic and 
teaching hospital vs DGH considerations. For example, it was important that the sample was not 
London centric or weighted in favour of teaching hospitals. The systematic sampling technique 
employed in round two for Trust CEO’s followed the same technique as outlined above. The 
snowballing technique employed in round one, involved utilising two surgical contacts of my 
college tutor; personal GP contacts in round two and a small number of surgical contacts 
recommended by interviewees in rounds one and four, respectively. Overall, both techniques 
(systematic sampling and snowballing) were employed effectively throughout the research. 
 
Ethical considerations have become more prominent as society has become more cognisant of 
the rights of individuals (Tinker & Coomber, 2004). Indeed, King & Horrocks (2010) note that 
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organisations, such as the National Health Service (NHS) specify that research that involves either 
patients or staff must go through the procedures of the National Research Ethics service (NRES). 
 
This research did not follow the ethics committee route. This was due in part to a combination of 
inexperience and pragmatism. However, the research adhered to ethical considerations. For 
example, as alluded to above, all participants were sent letters outlining the research question; 
this was expanded on during the introductory element of the interviews and clarity provided if 
required. In addition, a few of the participants asked for assurance that they would have site of 
any material for publishing before it went into the public arena.  
 
The final stage in the development of a qualitative research study is the interview guide. King & 
Horrocks (2010) recommend the use of an interview guide that serves as a framework for the main 
topics the researcher needs to cover but has enough flexibility in the way the questions are 
phrased, the order in which the questions are posed, and permits the interviewee to steer the 
discussion in unexpected directions. 
 
The interview guide was utilised effectively during all four rounds of interviews. I set out with a list 
of main themes and questions relating to these, to be covered during the course of the interview. 
However, the order in which they were asked was very much dependent on the rapport established 
with the participant at the beginning of the interview. In addition, the participant would often answer 
a question, which would then require a clarificatory question, and more often than not, the 
participant would go off on a tangent and in doing so would provide more information. 
 
As alluded to in this section, the qualitative interview is not merely an instrument utilised to produce 
data, on the contrary, it is a social interaction between interviewer and interviewee and should not 
viewed as ‘something to be controlled, as they are in standardised survey interviews’ (Warren, 
2002: 91). Indeed, as Charmaz (2001) suggests, the qualitative interview is an encounter whereby 
the interviewer delineates the topics and prepares the questions, however there is an element of 
fluidity whereby ideas and topics materialise, and the interviewer can follow these pointers. 
 
The format of the interviews was relatively informal, and most lasted between thirty and sixty 
minutes. All interviews were tape-recorded. Warren (2001) suggests that the turning on of a tape-
recorder may have significance for the interviewee. This was certainly an issue for a minority of 
interviewees. The interviewees in question, were suspicious and asked for assurance that 
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information gleaned was for research purposes only. Once anonymity was assured, they were 
happy to continue. Of course, it is hard to quantify whether the presence of a tape-recorder 
influenced the depth of information submitted. However, there were occasions when the 
conversation continued after the tape-recorder had been switched off and a written record was 
utilised thereafter; the interviewees were not opposed to this method being employed. 
 
The interview style employed combined two tried and tested styles, namely ‘non-directive’ and 
‘active’. The ‘non-directive’ style was used initially to establish a rapport with the interviewee. This 
involved paying attention to the interviewee’s responses, refraining from offering opinions, in order 
to avoid expressions of approval and disapproval, enabling the interviewee to pen up and talk 
freely. Indeed, building a rapport is essential to unlocking the information held by the interviewees, 
indeed Feldman, Bell & Berger (2003), propose that trust is fundamental in developing this rapport, 
and courteousness, focussed listening and a genuine interest in the information the interviewee is 
imparting are pivotal in building this.  Once trust and its resulting rapport had been established 
between myself and the interviewee, I then adopted a more ‘active’ style in which I responded to 
them by following up on what they had said with more in-depth probing questions.  
 
There are three main types of probe that can be used effectively during the interview process, 
namely: elaboration, clarification, and completion. As their names suggest, they fulfil a specific 
purpose. For example, ‘elaboration’ probes are what I would describe as garnering probes, as 
they prompt the interviewee to provide more detail about a specific topic; ‘clarification’ probes are 
utilised for the purpose of amplification of words or technical detail that the interviewer has not 
completely understood; ‘completion’ probes invite the interviewee to finish explaining a topic that 
he / she did not conclude (King & Horrocks, 2010). 
 
Below are examples of elaboration probes used during the interview process: 
 
Example 1 
JLC: We’re having difficulty getting patients to go back to somewhere…say the patient is 
sent straight from a DGH casualty department to us, we have nowhere to send the patient 
back to. In that way, sub-specialisation has excluded a group of patients from treatment in 
their own hospital, taking up beds in our hospital and we can’t get them out…our beds are 
filling up with these patients. This is an example of where sub-specialisation is 
exclusive…it excludes patients - sub-specialisation is a bit like that, in that it narrows to a 
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focus which has good points and bad points… you can produce better results and have 
more interesting people, but it excludes other people who fall between stools, and people 
suffering with backache is an enormous sub-set of the population with nowhere to go.  
 
MW: When you talk about back work are you talking about all levels of the spine? 
 
JLC: Well, neurosurgery has traditionally dealt with neck problems more than other 
levels…I suppose because where there is neck trauma there is often spinal cord 
involvement, and that’s where we get involved. A few of the lumbar discs were treated by 
neurosurgeons and that’s the way it used to be, but over the last 10 or 15 years orthopaedic 
surgeons are withdrawing from that and we are now dealing with a lot more degenerative 
work… we’re still not well sorted to treat other levels of the spine, other than degenerative 
work. So, whereas we’ll take cervical spine trauma, we don’t have good resources and we 
don’t have the skills really, to sort out trauma at other levels. 
 
MW: Why do you think orthopaedic surgeons are withdrawing? 
 
JLC: Orthopaedic surgeons have traditionally been a big target for lawyers – society wants 
to get back at doctors for what they perceive they do, and it’s unsustainable really… but I 
think it’s a big influence on some people that when they get sued for something they say 
‘I’m never going to do that again… I’m not going to deal with those cases. But if you 
withdraw from those cases there is no one else to take it up, and that’s why there has been 
increasing pressure on Neurosurgery to take more of this spinal work, and whereas we 
have the skills to take on some of it, we haven’t got the skills to take on all of it 
 
Example 2: 
 
VVP: There are fewer people wanting to do pure thoracic – there are not enough thoracic 
surgeons to do all of the jobs. 
 
MW: Would you mind explaining why this is the case? 
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VVP: There is almost a sub-division within that, in that the oesophagus is moving away 
from the cardiothoracic people towards the Upper GI surgeons… the lungs will be done by 
cardio-pulmonary surgeons, and that’s the current trend. I suppose that makes sense…the 
oesophagus is a very unforgiving organ, there’s a lot of complications and morbidity 
attached to it… even though we have two specialist thoracic surgeons, they have had great 
difficulty drawing the oesophagus back, whereas in somewhere like (B) the two thoracic 
surgeons do lungs and gullets. 
 
 
2.5 Gathering and Analysing Data 
 
The methodological framework to which the data-gathering during interviews broadly adhered is 
known as ‘grounded theory’, developed by Glaser & Strauss in 1967. Charmaz (2014), describes 
grounded theory methodology, as ‘systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing 
qualitative data to construct theories from the data themselves’ (p.1). Thus, it is not a dogmatic 
approach, as it offers a set of principles and exploratory mechanisms as opposed to rigid rules. 
 
Grounded theory essentially consists of two diametrically opposing positions in sociology, namely 
Columbia University scientific positivism and Chicago University (Chicago School) qualitative 
research. Glaser was trained at the University of Columbia and Strauss at the University of 
Chicago (Glaser & Strauss, 2008). However, despite its positivistic heritage, grounded theory 
methodological guidelines, e.g., coding, sampling, and comparative method, are on the whole, 
impartial. As alluded to above, grounded theory offers the researcher a set of ‘guidelines’ and 
experimental / ‘heuristic’ mechanisms rather than rigid rules to be followed (Charmaz, 2014). 
Grounded theory is thus an enabler. It could also be said that grounded theory is instinctive, almost 
common-sense like. For example, as qualitative researchers we set out with questions we would 
like to try and answer and as we progress in our quest further questions emerge from our initial 
findings.  
 
As indicated in section (2.4), this research utilised in-depth qualitative interviews. Charmaz (2001) 
suggests that there is a good fit between in-depth qualitative interviews and grounded theory 
methods. For example, qualitative interviews are open-ended and enable a deeper examination 
of a topic which the interviewee has extensive knowledge, experience, and vision. The fluidity of 
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this approach enables the interviewee to pursue pointers during the interview and develop new 
lines of enquiry.  
 
Round One Interviews (Spring 1997) 
The purpose of the first round of interviews was twofold: to familiarise myself in more detail with 
general aspects of the profession relevant to my research, and more particularly to elicit opinions 
on the question of specialisation.  Given the impression of inevitable decline for general surgery 
circulating in specialist literature, it was necessary to understand how members of the profession 
themselves regarded and explained the issue. 
 
As alluded to in section (2.4), the sample of interviewees was chosen using systematic sampling 
and snowballing, although initial contact was made with authors of articles on this topic in surgical 
journals. Given the important place of general surgery in the research, ninety-three general 
surgeons across the sub-speciality range were interviewed (particularly vascular surgery, given 
that they were the leading group pushing for independence from general surgery). There was 
representation from specialist centres and district general hospitals. The distribution of general 
surgeons across the sub-specialities was as follows: 
 
• Vascular:  40 
• Colo-rectal: 28 
• Laparoscopic: 10 
• Upper GI: 5 
• HPB: 1 
• Breast: 4 
• Endocrine: 1 
• Transplantation:4 
 
The questions posed to interviewees in the course of the semi-structured interviews were: 
• Why has specialist differentiation within surgery occurred? 
• Has its pace changed over time, and if so, why? 
• What impact does the NHS have on the process, and vice-versa? 
• Is it being driven by the profession, if so, why? 
• What role does knowledge / technology play in this? 
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• Is general surgery on the road to extinction? 
 
 
Given the emergent and fluid nature of the interviews, questions were not posed in the same order 
for all interviewees and the phraseology varied from interview to interview as the conversation 
developed. All of the interview material from this round was transcribed. 
 
Charmaz (2001) submits that coding is the quintessential first-step in terms of moving the 
researcher from ‘description to conceptualisation of that description’ (p.683). Glaser & Strauss 
(2008) describe coding as a process whereby data is broken down, labelled, and compared with 
data. They describe this process as the ‘Constant Comparative Method’. The first stage in the 
constant comparative method entails ‘the analyst coding each incident in his data into as many 
categories of analysis as possible’ (p.105). The initial analysis in round one interviews employed 
a line by line approach to coding each incident in the data. Examples of this approach are set out 
below in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Initial Coding 
Example 1: GB 
 
Inevitability  
of specialisation 
 
Territory / control / power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GP referral patterns 
Trust management 
Inevitability  
of specialisation 
 
Whether they like it or not, surgeons are becoming  
more and more specialised, through factors not relevant to  
the surgeon…they are just happening. In addition, the  
vascular society, the colo-proctology society and the  
breast society, are saying, let’s try and strengthen what 
has already happened… in other words, we want you to  
be signed up as breast and general surgeon and not just  
a general surgeon. It is common-sense that you would want  
to group together like-minded people with similar interests, and 
on top of that there is power. If you fragment and chop up the 
size of the pond, you can be a big fish in a small pond 
 
One of the factors that has led specialisation, is the selection  
of surgeons to whom you refer particular patients. Nowadays  
GP’s are more likely to refer varicose veins to that surgeon 
and gallbladder to that surgeon. They are also getting 
feedback from the Trust advising them of   
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Specialisation beneficial  
to Trusts 
Amalgamation 
Service provision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 2: J.T.B. 
 
Knowledge base 
generalist / specialist 
 
 
Specialisation 
Expansion in  
knowledge and technology 
 
 
 
Patient expectations 
Media 
Specialist vs. generalist 
Calman Hine  
Specialist centre 
 
 
 
Prestige 
Generalist / specialist 
 
special interests.  
 
I am not sure that the Trusts are pushing for specialisation,  
but they are jumping on the bandwagon. Our Trust was helpful  
in building the vascular practice, so they clearly see that as 
a good thing. Pressure may prevail under the new NHS in 
terms of grouping together hospitals, in order to provide  
a vascular service for a much larger group of patients. In practice, it is  
not always that easy, as there are vested interests. 
 
 
 
The corpus of knowledge the profession had a hundred years 
ago was such, that a surgeon could encompass the entire  
corpus of knowledge and practice the whole range of  
surgery, as it was then…there was no such thing as a specialist 
surgeon a hundred years ago, they were surgeons full-stop. 
 
Over the last 30 years there has been a trend to specialise in  
the so-called areas of general surgery…surgery of the  
peripheral blood vessels (vascular), intestines from  
oesophagus to anus, breast, and endocrine glands. The  
reasons for this trend is related to the expansion in the corpus 
of knowledge and technologies. In addition, there is  
pressure from patients, as the concept of a general surgeon,  
who is not a specialist, does not go down well with the general 
population. This is partly media fuelled, that if you go and see 
a generalist you are likely to get inferior or even the wrong  
advice. A recent government report by Calman and Hine,  
suggests that there is evidence that the treatment for  
breast cancer is better if you are treated in a specialist centre. 
 
There is a perception amongst some surgeons that being a  
specialist is more prestigious than being a generalist. If one  
then sets up specialist surgical societies and groups, you can  
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Power of  
specialist associations 
Affiliations 
Power / weak /  
Without form 
Influence on the centre 
Membership strength 
become treasurer, secretary, and possibly president. People 
like to wear medals around their necks and call  
themselves president…this is not the most important factor,  
but nevertheless, it is there as an undercurrent. 
 
The specialty associations are also becoming more powerful. 
In general, surgeons associate with their specialty associations 
rather than their college. The Royal Colleges are seen  
as amorphous and have definitely become weaker.  
The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain  
and Ireland is the specialty association representing  
general surgery and its sub-specialties, and has a much more 
powerful voice with the government – strength in numbers,  
etc. It is probably more powerful than the British Orthopaedic 
Association. 
 
 
The interviewees suggested a broad range of reasons for the intensification of specialisation and 
differentiation within the profession and following the initial coding phase, a number of codes and 
corresponding categories were developed and further problematised in subsequent rounds.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Generated Categories and Codes 
Categories Codes 
 
Developments in knowledge/technology 
 
Natural-inevitable process / 
Techniques with steep learning curve 
 
GP referral patterns 
 
Surgeons powerless/forced to  
specialise /patient expectations 
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Internal market & NHS Trust managers 
 
Specialisation more lucrative for NHS  
trusts/market power 
 
Professionally driven by speciality  
Societies and (SAC’s) controlling the pace 
& direction of specialisation 
 
Power, status, diminishing power of  
Royal Colleges 
  
 
Turf wars between hospital types 
 
 
Specialist centres vs. district  
general hospitals / Power / territory 
 
Anatomical turf wars 
 
Power & politics / Specialist associations / 
technique vs. organ related discipline 
 
 
Calman-Hine report  
 
 
Positive outcomes increase with volume  
of procedures  
 
Calman training programme 
 
Reduction in training times /  
Early specialisation 
 
General take 
 
NHS resources - shortage of surgeons / 
Need to provide general emergency  
service to populace. 
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Glaser & Strauss (2008) suggest that in addition to the generation of a number of categories and 
codes, the constant comparison of incidents within the data begins to ‘generate theoretical 
properties of the category’. For example, the ‘continua of the category, its dimensions, the 
conditions under which it is pronounced or minimised, its major consequences, its relation to other 
categories’ (p.106). 
 
Subsequent to the generation of categories and codes / properties, it was possible to identify 
‘‘power’’ as a dimension peculiar to four of the categories, namely: Internal Market & NHS Trust 
Managers; Professionally Driven by Specialty Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the Pace and 
Direction of Specialisation; Turf Wars between Hospital Types, and Anatomical Turf Wars. Thus, 
at an albeit superficial level, it could be said that, comparatively speaking, the four categories were 
related. Glaser & Strauss submit that as ‘categories’ and their codes / ‘properties’ materialise, the 
researcher will uncover two types: ‘those that he has constructed himself and those that have 
been extracted from the language of the research situation’ (ibid.:107). In regard to this research, 
“Power” as a code / property was extracted from the language used by the interviewees. However, 
it was also possible to construct / educe two further codes / properties relating to the four 
categories, namely “Agendas” and “Resources”. For example, if we focus on the category 
Professionally Driven by Specialty Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the Pace and Direction of 
Specialisation; the specialist societies agenda is to be able to control their body of knowledge, 
through standard setting, professional examinations, and training. Knowledge itself, is a resource, 
and the ability to control it, places specialist societies in a powerful position. 
 
There is two fundamental questions in sampling: firstly, what group(s) should I interview next? 
Secondly, what is the underlying theoretical rationale and process employed in the selection of 
these groups? The authors recommend that the basic principle underlying the decision to select 
one group over another relates to their significance in advancing the development of theoretical 
categories (Glaser & Strauss, 2008). During the initial coding phase, nine categories were 
generated as contributing to the specialisation of surgery and of these categories, three involved 
other professional groups: GP referral patterns; Internal Market & NHS Trust Managers; 
Professionally Driven by Specialty Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the Pace and Direction of 
Specialisation. It was therefore necessary to interview these comparison groups of peer 
professionals, namely the Presidents of the Royal Colleges, General Practitioners, and Trust 
managers in order to enable them to respond to the statements of the surgeons. 
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Round Two Interviews (Autumn 1997) 
The samples were chosen as follows: snowballing (for GPs) systematic sampling (for Trust 
Managers, from a list of Specialist Centres and District General Hospitals).  The Presidents of the 
Royal Colleges in London, Edinburgh and Glasgow were interviewed, but it was not possible to 
interview the fourth (Dublin).  
 
General Practitioners   
Three GPs were interviewed, one each from North Yorkshire, Cambridgeshire, and Berkshire. 
They were asked the following questions: 
 
• Surgeons suggest that GP referral patterns are a factor driving specialist differentiation – 
could you give me your opinion on this? 
• Does patient expectation have any effect on your referral patterns to surgeons? 
• What sort of strategies do you employ as a fundholding Trust with regard to the purchasing 
of specialist services? (The purpose of this question was to determine the extent to which 
GP’s influence the organisation of surgery in their local hospitals) 
 
 
Table 3 Generated Categories and Codes (2) 
Categories Codes 
Professionally driven by specialty societies 
and (SAC’s) controlling the pace and 
direction of specialisation 
Surgeons and specialty societies inform 
GPs of specialist services  
 
GP referral patterns Low expectation of patients  
 
Internal Market & NHS Trust Managers Trust managers inform GP’s  
of specialist services 
Purchasing of specialist services Waiting list priorities / 
Local access to surgeons 
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Trust Managers  
Two Trust managers from Cambridgeshire were interviewed. One managed a DGH, the other a 
specialist centre, and they were chosen so that their answers might be compared. They were 
asked the following questions: 
 
• Would you say that your NHS trust impacted on the pace and direction of specialist 
development within your hospital? 
• Given the nature of the purchaser provider split, is it in the interest of a trust (such as 
yours) to have highly specialised surgeons? 
• Many of the surgeons interviewed argue that trusts put pressure on them to develop 
certain services given their marketing potential – would you say that this is an accurate 
picture? 
• Would a highly specialised surgeon have more bargaining power in terms of the 
allocation of resources across departments?  
 
Table 4 Generated Categories and Codes (3) 
Categories Codes 
 
Internal Market and NHS Trust Managers 
 
 
 
No pressure on surgeons / 
Extra-contractual referrals attractive /Finite Resources 
Supportive of specialisation 
Allocation of resources based on need to provide 
service to local populace 
Calman-Hine Report Hospital configuration 
Driven by Royal Colleges  
 
Presidents of Royal Colleges:  
The Presidents of the Royal Colleges of London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow. They were asked the 
following questions: 
 
• Would you say that the surgical Royal Colleges have been weakened by the increasing 
influence of the specialist associations? 
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• Can you explain the specialist training structure and the role of the surgical Royal 
Colleges in it? 
• If an aspiring specialty group wishes to break away and form its own self-regulating 
specialty, which body would hold the ultimate veto? 
 
 
Table 5 Generated Categories and Codes (4) 
Categories Codes 
Colleges’ statutory role to  
supervise and oversee surgical training 
Colleges not weak /  
Ear of Government / 
Service planning (1948 onwards) 
Professionally driven by  
specialty societies and (SAC's) controlling 
the pace and direction of specialisation 
 
 
Report to Colleges / specialist  
arm of Colleges 
Surgical power structures Senate of Surgery - ultimate veto over  
self-regulation   
 
Following initial coding, additional categories and underlying codes were created for General 
Practitioners (Table 3) and Presidents of the Royal Colleges (Table 5) and it was also possible 
to add additional codes to the categories generated following round one interviews: 
Professionally Driven by Specialty Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the Pace and Direction of 
Specialisation, GP Referral Patterns, and Internal Market & NHS Trust Managers. In addition, 
the use of comparison groups and comparison of incidents within the data, enabled me to 
question the continua and minimisation of specific categories -   
  
• The continua of the category GP Referral patterns, as a contributory factor driving 
specialisation was brought into question, in light of GP interviewee responses. The 
comparison of incidents across this data suggests that GP referral patterns are based on 
the information provided by surgeons and NHS Trusts, and that overall, patient 
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expectation does not influence choice of surgeon, either specialist or generalist. 
Furthermore, the GP sample adds more credence, as the interviewees were from large 
fundholding practices; their population base was a mix of affluent and non-affluent areas.  
One of the practices purchased services from a teaching hospital and the other two, from 
district general hospitals. 
 
• The category Professionally Driven by Specialty Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the 
Pace and Direction of Specialisation was minimised, given the role of the Royal Colleges 
in surgical training and the surgical structure. Thus, although specialty societies may be 
one of the driving forces behind specialisation, it is the Royal Colleges and the specialty 
societies through the SAC’s, that oversee specialist training. In addition, if a sub-specialty 
wishes to set up its own separate specialty, the area will require the support of its parent 
specialty, and the Senate of Surgery holds the ultimate veto. 
 
 
 
Round Three Interviews (Winter 1998-1999) 
The purpose of the third round of interviews was to investigate whether the specialities which 
have broken away from general surgery and no longer from part of it (Trauma & Orthopaedics, 
Plastic Surgery, Neurosurgery, Cardiothoracic Surgery, Paediatric Surgery, Urological Surgery, 
ENT and Oral and Maxillofacial) are experiencing calls for further specialisation and splintering 
(i.e. aspiring sub-specialist groups wanting to self-regulate); and if so, how these compare to the 
corresponding calls currently made in general surgery.  
 
The sampling method used was systematic sampling. A total of 82 interviewees were selected 
from specialist centres as well as district general hospitals. The distribution across specialities 
was as follows:  
• Trauma & Orthopaedics: 38  
• Plastic: 6 
• Neurosurgery: 4 
• Cardiothoracic: 22 
• Paediatric: 3 
• Urological: 6 
• ENT: 2 
• Oral and Maxillofacial: 1 
 
55 
 
Some of the questions were as in round 1, the difference being in the nature of the respondents: 
in round one the respondents were ‘general’ surgeons, who had not yet specialised to the point 
of self-regulation, whereas the respondents in round three belonged to the specialities which 
had broken away from general surgery and begun to self-regulate. 
 
• Why has specialist differentiation within surgery occurred? 
• Has its pace changed over time, and if so, why? 
• Is it being driven by the profession, if so why? 
• What role did knowledge/technology play in this? 
• Is general surgery on the road to extinction? 
• Is it true that the Royal Colleges ultimately control the pace and direction of 
specialisation? 
 
In the light of the responses in round one, the question about the NHS was focussed specifically 
onto NHS trusts, and a new question was inserted about GP referral patterns: 
 
• What impact do NHS Trusts have on the process, and vice-versa? 
• Do you think that GP referral patterns push specialisation, if so why? 
 
Questions were also devised to identify differences across different specialities: 
 
• Has sub-specialisation occurred within your speciality? Do you see this progressing 
further, and if so to what extent? 
 
 
Initial line by line coding was carried out, examples of which can be seen in Table 6, below. 
Table 6. 
Example 1: H.U. 
General ortho surgeons / 
Specialist spinal  
surgeons 
Specialisation 
Territory / expansion of  
General orthopaedic surgeons stopped doing spinal surgery… 
specialist spinal surgeons do this surgery, but there aren’t 
vast numbers of specialist spinal orthopaedic surgeons…there are 
only a few highly specialist orthopaedic surgeons doing Scoliosis 
surgery. However, I see a day when neurosurgeons, rather like when 
plastic surgeons did hands… they will muscle in… maybe it’s just a 
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neurosurgery 
 
 
Consultant led  
trauma service 
Power of  
specialist associations 
Limited manpower 
 
 
 
 
Trauma will not separate 
Exclusive trauma centres 
 
 
 
 
Private practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 2: V.V.P. 
 
Specialist societies 
Oesophageal surgery 
/ territory 
Training / examinations 
in thoracic and  
general surgery 
 
reflection of the expansion of neurosurgery. 
 
 
In the 90’s the BOA (British Orthopaedic Association), started to 
feel, that it was a good idea to have a consultant led trauma service. 
I hadn’t done trauma for about 7-8 years to any great degree, and 
couldn’t understand why after 7-8 years, I’d have to do  
trauma lists again. So, with limited manpower you can see how a  
Trust would want everyone to do it – I was resistant to it. 
 
 
 
I do not see a time when Trauma will be hived off from orthopaedics… 
I see there being orthopaedic trauma surgeons. Now, there are 
some…you can go around the country and you’ll find trauma 
centres with surgeons’ dealing exclusively with trauma… I 
think that’s a perfectly reasonable way to go…there’s even talk 
of having it here, but people say, well you’ll not find people to do it. 
Well of course you will, provided you dress the job up. If 
you’re expected to come in and do trauma and everything else as 
well, you won’t, but if you acknowledge that this is a specialty 
that needs sorting out, you’ll fill it. There would be no private 
practice in this area though, which would put some off. 
 
 
 
There’s a big dispute regarding oesophageal surgery and general  
surgery, because we do a lot of oesophageal surgery as well… times have 
changed a lot, in that a lot of the upper GI tract surgeons are doing 
oesophageal surgery and chest surgery but are not trained to do chest 
surgery… we grumble at the fact that they’re not trained to do it. I was 
at a recent meeting of the Association of Upper GI Tract Surgeons, and 
we basically agreed that anyone who wants to do oesophageal surgery 
should train for a while in thoracic; also, our trainees are not getting 
general surgical exposure. We want our guys to train in general surgery 
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Resources 
Power 
Negotiate your specialty 
Lung cancer not topical 
 
 
 
 
Inevitable 
Volume / outcomes 
Calman-Hine report 
Cancer units / Cancer  
Centres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal politicking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Without form 
 
Royal Colleges 
as well…hopefully there will be a good crossover between the two 
specialities. So, thoracic surgeons at the moment…some don’t do any 
oesophageal work, a lot do. 
 
 
I think things have gotten better to a certain extent, for instance this 
clinical director system of management… I think it’s more sort of upfront 
and confrontational, and I think you are in a better position to negotiate 
your speciality. So, I think things are actually improving… again it’s 
communication, because a lot of people don’t understand what thoracic 
surgeons do. They know how many breast cancers are taken out each 
year, but they’re not interested in lung cancer… it’s not very topical, but 
then again, it’s killing more women than breast cancer. So, now they 
have to get interested in it and it’s becoming more topical. But I think the 
thing that’s stimulated thoracic surgery, has been the development of 
cancer unit’s, cancer centres and the Calman recommendations… that if 
you’re doing 2 oesophagectomies you shouldn’t be doing it, you should 
be sending them to the major centres. So, there’s a lot of evidence now 
that volume equals good results…if you’re not doing the volume, you 
shouldn’t be doing it at all. Hence, the patterns of referrals have changed 
a lot, because of the cancer units and cancer centres and also the 
availability of intensive care. 
 
 
I sit on the cardiothoracic management team (CMT)…I’m the thoracic 
advisor, and we’re in the process of amalgamating with (B), so that we’re 
going to have a new unit built at (J)… so there’s a lot of politics going on 
underneath, and there are committees here and there that you can put 
your two penneth into. 
 
 
The college has nothing to do with the way services are planned to be 
quite honest. Personally, I find it very hard to know what the Royal 
Colleges do, apart from education and meetings and, perhaps SAC’s. In 
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Professionally driven  
by specialist societies 
guidelines /  
service planning 
 
 
 
 
 
Influence on centre 
Bristol and  
cardiac surgery 
Dr Foster and  
league tables 
 
terms of local presence and involvement in the way services are 
distributed, I don’t think they do a very good job, to be honest. 
 
 
The societies have done more than the Colleges in terms of giving advice 
on how specialities should be set up. For instance, the Society of 
Cardiothoracic Surgeons and The European Association of Cardiothoracic 
Surgeons have developed guidelines and protocol etc, and we did one on 
how a Thoracic unit should be set up. So, they’ve done more in terms of 
planning how many surgeons you should have per million of population, 
what the services should actually include, and that’s been more useful in 
planning your speciality.  
 
The government talks to the speciality associations more than the 
colleges, particularly over the Bristol affair – paediatric surgery, cardiac 
surgery…so, when it comes to things like that, it has been the societies 
that have been dealing with it, not the colleges. 
 
 
Overall, the interview data reinforced the data obtained from round one interviews with general 
surgeons. However, given that round three was conducted in 1999, two years after round one, 
it seemed desirable to ascertain whether things had changed significantly with regard to the lead 
player in the push for separation from the specialty of general surgery, namely vascular surgery. 
Accordingly, the President of the Vascular Surgical Society of GB & Ireland was re-interviewed. 
His answers from round one already being on record, he was just asked the following: 
 
• Has vascular surgery’s position changed since 1997 – are vascular surgeons still 
pushing for separation from general surgery? 
 
He responded by noting that the situation had changed somewhat, in as far as vascular surgery 
was not pushing for separation as it had back in 1997. The reasons given: demographic factors; 
recruitment issues and private practice. Given his responses, and overall responses, additional 
categories and codes were created accordingly.  
 
 
59 
 
Table 7. Generated Categories and Codes (5) 
Categories Codes 
Specialty Specific traits 
Demography Eclectic Hospital 
 
The first category: specialty, not only to reflect the traits of vascular surgery (e.g. recruitment 
issues and private practice) but also to reflect traits specific to other specialties. These traits 
impact on the pace and direction of specialisation / specialist differentiation, either driving it 
forward or slowing it down. For example, the specialty of trauma and orthopaedics is the largest 
specialty outside of general surgery; highly specialised with a number of sub-specialist areas, 
trauma being one of them. According to interviewees, there have been many predictions about 
the future of trauma surgery within orthopaedics, and despite many longing for the day when 
separation occurs, this is unlikely as there is no private practice, and it has onerous on calls. The 
second category, demography reflects the data gleaned from the President of The Vascular 
Surgical Society of Great Britain and Ireland.  
 
Round Four Interviews (Autumn 2003) 
In December 1997 the newly elected Labour government began introducing changes to the 
NHS. The emphasis was on quality of care and health outcome. New structures were created in 
order to deliver these (NICE and CHI) and trusts were expected to embrace the concept of 
‘clinical governance.’ The government was also keen to involve clinicians in the development of 
service agreements with commissioners of health care (e.g. GPs). The purpose of round four, 
held in Autumn 2003, was to ascertain whether the changes of 1997 had effected the pace and 
direction of specialist differentiation, and whether they were likely to do so in the future.  
 
Interviews were conducted with surgeons from three specialist centres and two district general 
hospitals. The sample was constructed using systematic sampling and the snowballing 
technique. The distribution of interviewees across specialities was as follows: 
 
• General Surgery (Vascular): 3 
• General Surgery (Colorectal): 2 
• General Surgery (HPB): 1 
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• Trauma & Orthopaedics: 3 
• Neurosurgery: 3 
• Cardiothoracic:5 
• Urology: 5 
 
The interviewees were asked a number of questions, beginning with one which was posed also 
in rounds one and three.  
 
• Why has specialist differentiation within surgery occurred?  
 
A specific question was asked to elicit the current state of specialisation in the speciality 
concerned  
 
• How is sub-specialisation currently progressing within your speciality? 
 
A further three specific questions were then asked: to elicit the respondent’s overall view of the 
impact of governmental reforms on sub-specialisation in the respondent’s speciality, and overall 
factors likely to affect the pace and direction of sub-specialisation and possibly specialist 
differentiation in the future: 
 
• A labour government has been in power for six years.  Have changes to the health 
service (e.g. foundation of government organisations such as NICE, CHI and the 
emphasis on Service improvement and Clinical Governance) effected the pace and 
direction of sub-specialisation within your speciality? 
• The government White Paper and Royal College of Surgeons Workforce Document note 
that reforms will result in greater professional involvement in designing surgical services 
– what are the implications for your speciality?  
• What do you see as the factors most likely to influence the direction of future sub-
specialisation and possibly differentiation/separation in the future? 
 
The responses to the first question generally reinforce the responses from previous rounds. 
Responses to the latter question generated additional categories (clinical governance and 
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NCEPOD) when compared with a similar question posed to surgeons in round three, and an 
additional category (Medical litigation) was created. 
 
Table 8. Generated Categories and Codes (6) 
Categories Codes 
Clinical governance Results/outcome/medico-legal 
 
Medical litigation 
 
 
Patient expectation 
 
Calman-Hine report 
 
 
Number of Procedures / 
Cancer centres 
NCEPOD (confidential enquiry –  
perioperative deaths) 
 
Centralising of certain types of  
surgery into specialist centres 
Private practice 
 
BUPA / number of procedures / financial 
considerations 
Calman training scheme Reduced length of training / 
Forced to sub-specialise earlier  
 
 
2.6 Overall Analysis and Theory Generation  
 
As documented in section (2.1), the bulk of research interviews took place between 1997 and 
1999 with a further round conducted in 2003. Throughout the previous section I described the 
use of the constant comparative method; the utilisation of comparison groups; generation of 
categories, codes / properties; identification of relationships between categories; the continua 
of categories and minimisation of categories. This systematic and iterative approach, entailing 
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constant checking, elaborating, and refining of categories during the emerging analyses, 
enabled the refinement of research questions, categories and associated properties and the 
development of theoretical ideas. It is to the development of theoretical ideas that I now turn. 
 
My experience of theory building, at least in embryonic form, began during the analysis phase, 
following the first round of interviews. In summary, it was possible not only to generate codes 
/ properties from the language used by the interviewees, but to develop properties for a number 
of categories that conceptualised and encapsulated these codes / properties, namely 
“Agenda’s” and “Resources”. For example, in section (2.5), I used the category “Professionally 
Driven by Specialist Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the Pace and Direction of 
Specialisation” as an example of how these concepts encapsulated the codes / properties 
derived from the interviewees, namely “power”. 
 
I was able to develop these conceptualisations, as it was palpable to me that the sample of 
surgeons, comprising leaders of the specialist societies, teaching hospital professors and 
district general hospital surgeons were driving their own agenda’s, and that resources would 
be intricately linked to these. This approach to theory building is in keeping with Glaser & 
Strauss methodological guidelines. For example, they suggest that as theory develops, the 
researcher will observe that the concepts extracted from the interview setting (language used 
by interviewees) will tend to be existing explanations / justifications for the practices and 
developments (in this case, factors affecting the pace and direction of specialisation and 
specialist differentiation, according to surgical interviewees), in contrast concepts created by 
the researcher will tend to be explicatory, (in this case, the beginnings of a framework 
elucidating the factors, sociologically).  
 
Glaser & Strauss submit that as the analysis progresses, the ‘delimiting features of the 
constant comparative method’ (2008:110), results in what they describe as ‘reduction’. 
According to the authors, reduction essentially means that the researcher could potentially 
uncover consistencies in the initial categories / properties, enabling the formulation of theory 
with a reduced number of concepts and a higher degree of complexity. As this research 
progressed, I discovered that the concepts constructed were reinforced by subsequent 
interview rounds and it became possible not only to discover underlying uniformities in the 
initial categories, but also to advance the theory. This process was aided through the use of 
diagrammatic delineations; sociological literature on the professions; library materials, both 
63 
 
 
 
historical and contemporaneous, and what Charmaz (2014), describes as ‘sensitizing 
concepts’.  
 
Lempert (2007) submits that diagrammatic delineations are pivotal in the generation of theory, 
as unlike memos they are less loquacious and are able to visually display links between 
categories more succinctly. 
Figure 2.1. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
AGENDA’S 
Plan 
Motives 
Intensions of a 
particular group 
RESOURCES 
Assets that can be 
drawn on by a 
group or 
organisation; an 
action or strategy 
which may be 
adopted in extremis  
Developments in 
Knowledge & 
Technology 
Internal 
market & 
Trust 
managers 
Professionally Driven by 
Specialty Societies and 
(SAC’s) Controlling the 
Pace & Direction of 
Specialisation 
 
Turf wars 
between hospital 
types 
Anatomical turf wars 
Specialty traits 
The Surgical Power Structures 
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The diagram in Figure 1. reflects the progressive analysis between rounds one and three, 
respectively. It illustrates the commonality between categories based on their interconnection 
with the concepts: “Agenda’s” and “Resources.” Thus, if we isolate the categories: “Surgical 
Power Structures”; “Professionally Driven by Specialty Societies and (SAC’s) Controlling the 
Pace & Direction of Specialisation” and “Internal Market and Trust Managers”, and focus on 
the professional groups behind these categories; all of the groups concerned have an agenda, 
which may be similar or may differ. For example, it is in the interests of aspiring specialty 
groups to assert and propagate that they are the driving force behind specialisation; that they 
have the ear of government, and in comparison, the Royal Colleges are weak and amorphous. 
Intentionally putting another group down, is a rhetorical device which helps bolster a groups 
position (in this case the aspiring specialty groups), enabling them to garner support from grass 
roots members, as strength in numbers exerts greater pressure for their demands to be met. 
Conversely, the Royal Colleges agenda, is to ensure no further differentiation in the body of 
surgery, and they will draw on their resources to ensure this does not happen. NHS Trust 
managers may have similar agendas to individual surgeons at the clinical coal face, and 
aspiring specialty leads, i.e. to develop specialist services within their hospital. 
 
In addition, to the commonality between categories, there is also a commonality between the 
concepts: “Agenda’s” and “Resources”, as professional groups draw on resources to either 
further their agendas or protect their position and interests.  
 
It was also possible to progress the theory and develop a workable theoretical framework 
through the utilisation of concepts from the existing sociological literature: the central notion of 
profession identified by Freidson (1970) and Hughes (1958): autonomy and self-direction. In 
addition, Larson’s (1977) concept of “Professional Project”; Bucher and Strauss (1961) 
“Process” model, and key concepts: “Social Field,” “Capital”, “Habitus” and “Power”, from the 
seminal work of Bourdieu (1981; 1984; 1986; 1988; 1990; 1991, 2005). 
 
Although, the central premise of grounded theory is the generation of theory from analysis of 
the data, Glaser & Strauss (2008) submit that a discovered grounded theory ‘will tend to 
combine mostly concepts and hypotheses that have emerged from the data with some existing 
ones that are clearly useful’ (p.46).  Indeed, Charmaz (2014) suggests that grounded theorists 
begin their research with an interest / curiosity regarding a particular phenomenon and already 
possess an armoury of concepts for looking at these. For example, she notes that her studies 
of people with chronic illnesses began initially with an interest in how their experience of illness 
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shaped their experience of time. These interests directed her in her selection of concepts, 
namely: ‘self-concept, identity, and duration’ (p.31). Charmaz, describes these as “sensitizing 
concepts”, which from the outset, were utilised to develop interview questions, reflect on 
interviewees responses, and examine and ‘think analytically about the data’ (ibid.). At the 
outset my guiding sensitizing concepts were: “Agency”, “Action” and “Power” These concepts 
reflected my approach: action within structure. This approach focusses on agency and action 
on an individual, group and structural levels (micro, meso and macro levels).  
 
Glaser & Strauss (2008) submit that primary historical material, such as historical documents 
and secondary sources such as scholarly texts may be utilised during the initial stages of the 
research process to promote a granular understanding of the area of study. The authors go on 
to note however, that specific primary historical materials, such as correspondence between 
key figures in history, can be significant sources of qualitative data, although they caveat this, 
by noting that they are not the most important resource in theory generation. 
 
The use of primary and secondary source material and sensitizing concepts complemented 
the data collection. Firstly, given the necessity of acquiring a historical (developmental) 
perspective on differentiation, it was necessary to consult sources over and above the interview 
transcripts, as the interviewees could not be expected to have the necessary historical memory 
or understanding. Accordingly, historical sources (primary and secondary) (see the 
introductory chapter section (1.2)), constitute an essential foundation block to this thesis.  In 
addition, to historical sources, seminal texts on the NHS, were utilised, particularly in relation 
to the internal market (purchaser provider split) and relationship between the state and medical 
profession. For example, Klein (1995) ‘The new politics of the NHS’ and Marnoch (1996) 
‘Doctors and Management in the National Health Service.’ Finally, publications in UK surgical 
journals were consulted in order to familiarise myself with the current state of general surgery 
and its sub-specialty areas. In addition, key interviewees provided access to significant 
professional publications, which enabled me to understand and appreciate the complex 
organisation of the profession, surgical training, the nature, and functions of the relevant 
professional bodies, and of the specialities and various sub-specialist areas.  
 
Secondly, professional publications were used comparatively during the data analysis, 
following interviews with Presidents from the Surgical Royal Colleges, and were used in 
conjunction with interview data to generate further interview questions in round three.  
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Thirdly, my sensitizing concepts acted as points of departure to form conceptualisations 
(Agenda’s & Resources) that encapsulated codes / properties relating to a number of 
categories, enabling the identification of underlying uniformities, and greater analytical clarity; 
finally, my sensitizing concepts directed me towards higher-level sociological concepts that 
would allow me to build on the conceptualisations noted above, and formulate a workable 
theoretical framework.  
 
Having established a robust theoretical framework following interview rounds one – three, it 
was germane to ascertain whether the new NHS structures introduced by the Labour 
government between 1997 and 2003 had affected the pace and direction of intra-professional 
specialist differentiation and whether they were likely to do so in the future. As alluded to in 
section (2.5), interviewee responses in relation to the question as why specialist differentiation 
in surgery occurred, reinforced responses from previous interview rounds. Additional 
categories were created to reflect interviewee responses to the question, as to the factors most 
likely to influence the direction of future sub-specialisation and differentiation. Although 
additional categories were created, this does not detract from the central theoretical 
framework; on the contrary, they are another set of variables in what is a complex process. 
 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
The foregoing sections have explained the qualitative approach this research adopted, including 
how I gathered data and utilised the general principles of ‘Grounded Theory’ to analyse the data, 
and generate theory.  
 
It was possible to distil three explanatory themes / models from interviewees for elucidating 
specialist differentiation in surgery and the factors affecting its pace and direction: 
 
1) Intra-professional specialist differentiation is driven by the exponential rise in knowledge and 
new technology(s). The importance of knowledge and technology is given an objective primacy 
– with the profession having little control. 
2) Specialist differentiation is driven by the profession and tied up with power and status.  
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3) The trend towards differentiation is driven by the NHS and factors such as GP referrals, patient 
expectations, the Calman report, and clinical governance. 
 
In addition, through the use of the constant comparative method, it was possible to generate 
theoretical properties (encapsulated in above themes) that conceptualised the generated 
categories, namely ‘Agenda’s’ and ‘Resources’. These concepts were precursors to a workable 
theoretical framework and were further developed with concepts from the existing sociological 
literature, in order to illuminate sociologically, the complexity of intra-professional differentiation. 
 
It remains to explain how the data is incorporated into the body of this thesis. Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 incorporate literature on the history of surgery in the UK; chapters 5, 6 and 7 incorporate 
literature on the history of the NHS (from 1948 to the present day). Additionally, some of the 
interviewees provided non-public access documents about the planning and provision of 
surgical services, and these were utilised in Chapters 6 and 7. The thesis draws on the 
interviews and a robust theoretical framework to test the heuristic weight of these three 
explanations and the factors they comprise, in an attempt to obtain a clearer understanding of 
what governs the pace and direction of intra-professional specialist differentiation in UK 
surgery. The interviews are discussed most intensively in Chapters 6 & 7, but also utilised in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Atkinson (2017) aptly notes that ‘all research is imperfect. We never attain perfect ‘data,’ and 
analysis is always partial’ (p.167). This research is no exception to this rule. Indeed, generated 
data is the outcome of our subjectivity. As alluded to in section (2.6), Charmaz (2014), suggests 
that as researchers our interests direct us to focus on and question particular phenomena and 
these in turn influence our selection of concepts and interview questions. This research 
focussed on the factors effecting the pace and direction of specialist differentiation in the UK 
surgical profession. As a result, the data was more general and not specific, and consequently, 
did not reveal explicit strategies employed by groups in seeking separate specialty status, of 
how groups control training and the curriculum and of influence in key professional bodies. Not 
unlike data generation, decisions in relation to how data is incorporated in the body of the 
thesis can never be free from the researchers subjectivity.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Professional Project: Knowledge and 
Technology, Means to an End  
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3.1 Introduction and Aims 
 
The exponential growth of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, over the past hundred 
years encourages the supposition that the power of knowledge has grown correspondingly. And 
surely there is ground for this. 
 
‘The power to render whole continents, if not the entire planet, virtually uninhabitable has 
grown out of the physical sciences. While unprecedented power over the shape of life itself 
seems to be developing out of the biological and medical sciences.’ (Freidson, 1988:1)  
 
Formal knowledge may be powerful, however ‘in and of itself knowledge is an abstraction’, 
therefore in order to 
 
‘have any impact on the natural world knowledge must have human agents or carriers, and 
the impact it makes must be influenced in part by the characteristics of those agents who 
create it and apply it.’ (ibid.:9) 
 
This chapter will stress that, although knowledge and technology are powerful, and indeed the 
basis of specialities within medicine and surgery are highly specialised knowledge and technical 
skill, care must be taken not to give knowledge and technology objective primacy over the agents 
and conditions through which it is created and applied. 
 
The introductory chapters have clearly documented the fact that structural functionalism assigns 
objective primacy to knowledge and technology in explaining structural differentiation. Primary and 
secondary sources also suggest that the medical and surgical professions attribute primacy to 
knowledge and technology. However, their emphasis may have underlying professional agendas. 
 
The first section of this chapter will analyse this proposition, and in so doing it will outline the 
arguments propounded by structural functionalism and in doing so will take relevant quotes from 
primary and secondary source material from the medical and surgical professions.  
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The second section of this chapter will provide counter arguments to those in the first section. It 
will argue that knowledge and technology are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. It will 
utilise key examples from the world of science, then move to focus on the growth of two 
professional groups in the surgical field, namely vascular surgery, and laparoscopic surgery. It will 
explore how they create and utilise knowledge as a means to an end in terms of advancing their 
knowledge base and development; and finally investigate how knowledge and technology(s) are 
utilised as a means to an end in pursuit of the Professional Project. 
 
Vascular surgery and laparoscopic surgery provide good examples. Both areas pushed 
vociferously for self-regulation during the latter years of the twentieth century. Indeed, it could be 
said that vascular surgery led the way in terms of its use of clinical trials and surgical outcome 
data in order to justify its push for self-regulation. Laparoscopic surgery is also a very interesting 
case, as it is a technique based speciality. Its push for self-regulation was a contentious issue, 
which will be discussed in chapter six. Both areas are still firmly attached to the speciality of 
general surgery, despite their attempts to push for ‘pure speciality’ status and self-regulation on 
the grounds of the sophistication of knowledge and technique which they have amassed over the 
years. 
 
The latter point leads into the third and final section. This section will argue that although 
knowledge and technology are used as justifiers in attempts to self-regulate or self-police, they 
are only two variables among many which will influence the final outcome: if they were the only 
variables involved in specialist differentiation, then comparisons between specialities (and indeed 
aspiring specialities) within the UK would show a consistent pattern.  
 
The speciality of urology will be utilised as a prime example here. Urology was one of the last 
areas to differentiate from general surgery, and it shares similarities in knowledge and technique 
base with both vascular surgery and laparoscopic surgery. However, they have not successfully 
differentiated from the speciality of general surgery. Likewise, if knowledge and technology were 
the only variables involved, then trans-national comparisons would also show consistent patterns. 
In practice this is clearly not the case, as comparisons with the UK and the USA will demonstrate.  
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3.2 Knowledge and Technology: An End in Themselves 
 
Structural functionalism’s emphasis on natural growth in explaining intra-professional 
differentiation invests knowledge and technology with a primacy and objectivity, operating 
autonomously of human agency and action. However, structural functionalism is by no means 
alone in attributing primacy to knowledge, technology, and science. Howell (1995) notes that most 
social historians have implicitly treated the 
 
‘development of medical technology as simply the logical expression of scientific and 
clinical reality; medical knowledge produced by machines and science is treated as more 
“real” and more “objective” than the knowledge produced by theoretical arguments.’ 
(p.11). 
 
Atkinson (1995) also notes that although not all medical sociologists ‘are guilty of it, there is a 
profound danger’ that the natural world i.e. ‘biology, anatomy and pathophysiology is treated as 
given’ (p.24). For example, he goes on to note: 
 
‘The taken-for-granted contrast between the cultural and the natural too readily implies that 
the ‘natural’ is a realm that exists prior to and independently of cultural interpretation. 
Hence, the sociological focus is turned towards the field of culture. But since the latter is 
associated primarily with the lay or non-medical, the world of disease and pathology is 
implicitly granted a privileged status. While illness resides in social meaning and social 
action, disease resides in the natural world.’ (ibid.) 
 
There are members of the medical and surgical professions that regard knowledge and technology 
as the pre-eminent factors behind specialist differentiation and specialisation in general. Clearly 
this position is not untenable per se, yet, not unlike the arguments set out above, it implicitly 
regards knowledge as objective.  
 
An article appearing in the Lancet (1945) entitled “Clinical – Specialism” argues that:  
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‘In general, the differentiation of a special field is influenced by the extent of its intellectual 
content and the complexity of its technique; these influences are natural and in the main 
lead to the sound demarcation of specialist fields.’ (p.210)  
 
The sentiments expressed in this article reflect viewpoints which are fairly widespread in medical 
circles and replicated in more recent discussions (e.g. Moore9 1995; Bernhard 1995; Turnberg 
2000).  
 
For example, specialisation leading to the differentiation of a specialist field is viewed as a 
predictable corollary of and as a mechanism for the progress of knowledge (Bernhard, 1995), as 
a force that has significantly improved patient care and outcomes, to the point where it is irresistible 
(Turnberg, 2000). This is echoed in a statement which reflects the viewpoints of many of the 
surgeons interviewed during the course of the research:  
 
The days when a surgeon could know everything have long gone. The exponential increase 
in knowledge and the extraordinary advances in technology have seen the emergence of 
new specialities, sub-specialists, and super-specialists – specialisation is an irresistible 
force. I think that that’s the fundamental reason, and I don’t see them stopping, and I don’t 
see the posts of medical advance slowing down. It is possible that in the future surgeons 
may no longer be needed, or at least not so many. (Prof. PT. Professor of Surgery) 
 
Although the medical and surgical professions do not explicitly state that knowledge is objective 
and indeed autonomous, nevertheless their language and emphasis implicitly attributes a primacy 
and indeed objectivity to knowledge, as betrayed for example by the words “predictable” and 
“irresistible.” Likewise, stating, that specialisation is a predictable outcome of, and mechanism for 
the progress of knowledge recalls structural functionalist arguments that specialist differentiation 
occurs because it fulfils a functional need. To view the development of intra-professional specialist 
differentiation in surgery as simply the logical expression of scientific and clinical reality is 
erroneous.  
 
 
9 According to Moore (1995) specialisation becomes a force which cannot be stopped in its tracks: 
‘Specialisation sometimes takes hold of a hospital and the hospital cannot stop, like an eagle flying with two big 
fish in its talons. Can’t let go’ (p.149).  
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However, despite the surgical profession’s emphasis on the predictability and logic of 
differentiation, it may be a useful myth propagated by the profession as a means to an end, and 
not an end in itself as the sources would suggest. Historically speaking, the profession has sought 
to associate itself with science. As far back as the latter years of the eighteenth century, surgery 
was able to raise its status on a par with medicine as a result of what Foucault (1972) describes 
as medicine and surgery’s relationship with ‘such perfectly constituted sciences as physiology, 
chemistry and microbiology’ (p.199). Furthermore, ‘science has become the fundamental ground 
for the legitimacy of professional techniques’ (Abbott, 1988:189), as aspiring professional groups 
push for independence and self-regulation. 
 
 
3.3 In Pursuit of Knowledge and New Technologies: A Means to an End 
 
‘In and of itself knowledge is an abstraction. In so far as it is tangible, its growth can be 
measured by counting the number of books and journals that have been published. 
However, for knowledge to be able to exist in books and journals it must have human 
creators and consumers.’ (Freidson, 1988:9) 
 
Human beings produce/create knowledge and new technology(s) and utilise them in the pursuit 
of ‘goals’ as a means to an end, whether personal, professional, economic, or other. 
 
Before focusing on the creation and utilisation of new knowledge and technology(s) by the medical 
and surgical professions, it is worth turning first to the world of science, the world which the medical 
and surgical professions regard themselves as affiliated to. 
 
Studies carried out by Fujimura (1988); Fujimura & Chou (1994) and Atkinson et al. (1997) clearly 
show that scientific knowledge is ‘constructed’ and changed as a means to an end ‘through 
negotiations among actors working in organisational contexts’ (Fujimura, 1988:261). 
 
Fujimura’s (1988) research paper The Molecular Biological Bandwagon in Cancer Research: 
Where Social Worlds Meet provides a good example of how scientists ‘construct doable’ research 
problems which can easily be marketed to the wider scientific community. Whereas researchers 
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had previously studied cancer in other ways, in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, molecular 
biologists and tumour virologists successfully packaged ‘the oncogene theory in a way that they 
claimed encompassed and unified many other areas of cancer research’. According to Fujimura, 
one of the reasons why this representation was widely accepted ‘was that the theory-method 
package fit the institutional and organisational constraints of scientific work in multiple social 
worlds’ (ibid.269). 
 
Atkinson et al. (1997) have identified similar dynamics in their analysis of the discovery of the 
Myotonic Dystrophy gene. They extend Fujimura’s observations by commenting that, though the 
research problems were ‘doable’, in the scientists’ own narratives the discoveries were not 
regarded as inevitable, but acquired by dint of hard work and skill, and with an element of luck. 
This is a salutary reminder of the tortuous and sometimes haphazard paths through which 
knowledge is constructed.  
 
As in science and the social sciences, in the medical and surgical worlds knowledge is a global 
resource: new knowledge ideas and techniques are exchanged between groups and colleagues. 
Groups set up around new ideas and areas of interest develop these and apply new knowledge(s), 
technologies and techniques. Groups are not just a mere fact of social life, or, as the functionalists 
would argue, a structural response to the exponential rise in knowledge. As alluded to in Chapter 
One, Larson (1977) argues that the professional project is not an inevitable by-product of a societal 
functional prerequisite, on the contrary it is a ‘collective mobility project’ (p.66), as it is only through 
joint effort that professionalisation can be potentially realised. Therefore, the project is the 
collective outcome of the actions and efforts of the group. Thus, once the group has been 
established, it is necessary to ensure the group is maintained and if possible, the position of the 
group is strengthened. This is only achievable if the leaders within the group(s) ‘articulate its 
objectives and set in train the work needed to achieve them’ (Macdonald, 1995:188), and the 
rank and file members of the group(s) are fully cognisant of the objectives and agree with them. 
 
In the case of surgery this would entail setting up a society and journal for the particular specialism 
and its body of knowledge and techniques, possibly with self-regulation as a long-term goal. The 
development of vascular surgery and laparoscopic surgery are very good examples of this: both 
areas were brought into existence through the hard work and ingenuity of surgeons committed to 
promoting their specialty as opposed to ineluctable processes. 
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The roots of vascular surgery can be traced back to the pioneering work of a young French 
surgeon named Alexis Carrel (1873-1944). Carrel was noted for his work on the cardiovascular 
system and in particular in relation to the treatment of aneurysms. After moving to the United 
States, he pioneered a technique whereby parts of the aortal wall were replaced with a piece from 
another artery or vein and sewed together; this procedure launched vascular surgery. Carrel’s 
work opened the way for numerous vascular surgical procedures in relation to the larger vessels 
(aneurysms) and superficial vessels (varicose veins) (Porter, 1996). 
 
Vascular surgery began to really take off in the 1950’s. The area’s expansion was aided by 
exasperation at the inability to manage common surgical conditions, operative resourcefulness, 
and the development of effective prosthetic grafts. However, the innovations mostly originated in 
the USA, and it was only in the 1960’s that they began to secure a foothold in the UK. The next 
step was the establishment of The Vascular Surgical Society of Great Britain and Ireland in 1966. 
At that time the society had 29 founder members and today there are 626 members. Vascular 
surgery has continued to develop in the UK aided by such figures as Simon Darke, who acted as 
a catalyst in the setting up of the Vascular Research Group in 1983. Its prime intention was to 
collaborate on clinical and scientific trials, thus advancing the development of vascular surgery, 
treatment, and the knowledge base (Darke, 1997).  
 
In doing so, vascular surgery established a ‘cognitive basis’ (Larson, 1977:15), in other words, it 
defined a distinct body of knowledge, as theirs and theirs alone. The establishment of a cognitive 
basis enabled vascular surgery to clearly distinguish and differentiate the knowledge, or in 
Larsonian terms, ‘commodity’ they were providing from other knowledge bases, in this case 
general surgery. In the 1990’s the leading lights in the speciality began to argue that vascular 
surgery should seek independence from general surgery.  
 
Laparoscopic surgery (described in the BMJ 1987 as ‘The New Surgery’) developed over the 
course of the twentieth century. It was initially introduced by Dimitri Ott, Georg Kelling, and Hans 
Christian Jacobeus. According to Vecchio, Macfayden & Palazzo (2000), Ott began the revolution 
when he performed an intra-abdominal exploratory procedure on a pregnant lady in 1901 ‘and 
afterwards Kelling performed a procedure, called “Koelioscopie”, closer to the definition of 
laparoscopy. In the same year Jacobeus published his first report on what he called 
“Laparothorakoskopie” (p.87). 
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Laparoscopic surgery has expanded over the course of the last twenty years. Although, 
laparoscopic cholecystectomy (surgery of the gallbladder) was the first surgical procedure, of this 
technique related discipline to be recognised (Darzi & Mackay, 2002), many specialities utilise 
this technology pushing its limits ever further. For example, vascular surgeons have been using 
this technology to perform endoscopic arterial procedures (carotid endarterectomies), for some 
time now, and orthopaedic surgeons use the arthroscope for surgery of the joints (Wickham, 
1987). Many of the pioneers of the technique in the UK in abdominal surgery are pushing 
vociferously for a pure speciality separate from general surgery.  
 
Once cognitive differentiation is established, the next stage in the professional project is for the 
group(s) to ‘negotiate cognitive exclusiveness’ (Larson, 1977:15) – that is to say, the authority to 
be autonomous and self-regulating, with a monopoly and control over recruitment and selection, 
education, training and the internal evaluation and regulation of standards, around their particular 
body of knowledge and technical skill. 10 
 
In their quest for speciality status, aspiring speciality groups use the increasing scientific 
knowledge base and sophisticated technology and instrumentation, that is to say, their scientific 
capital as tools of ‘legitimacy’ in their quest for ‘pure’ speciality status. This is not surprising given 
the fact that ‘science, with the broader, related phenomenon of formal rationality, has become the 
fundamental ground for the legitimacy of professional techniques’ (Abbott, 1988:189). 
 
Thus, to quote Foucault (1972): 
 
‘Knowledge is not an epistemological site that disappears in the science that supersedes 
it. Science (or what is offered as such) is localised in a field of knowledge and plays a role 
in it. A role that varies according to different discursive formations and is modified with 
their mutations.’ (p.203) 
 
Those advocating a ‘pure’ vascular speciality, separate from general surgery, argue that the 
practice of Vascular surgery has become complex and extensive, encompassing the factual 
knowledge, technical skill and judgement required to diagnose diseases of the arterial and venous 
 
10 Larson (1977) uses this concept in relation to the growth of the ‘mature’ profession, and not in relation to 
intra-professional differentiation. However, the concept has utility in relation to intra-professional 
differentiation. 
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system accurately and to manage their treatment surgically (Darke, 1997). This requires an ‘in-
depth knowledge of vascular biology, physiology, diagnostic imaging endovascular techniques 
and an appreciation of the multi-disciplinary nature of vascular surgery’ (ibid:.3).  
 
Laparoscopic surgery is unique in that it is technique based (not organ based). Although practising 
surgeons require an in-depth knowledge of anatomy and physiology relating to the area they are 
operating on, the instrumentation and the technique itself provides the scientific ‘legitimacy’ which 
Abbott (1988) refers to above. Instrumentation is a mechanical aid based on scientific principles 
of objectivity, rationality, and exactness. Indeed, Stevens (1998) notes that medical instruments, 
such as the Stethoscope (1819), Ophthalmoscope (1851), and the Laryngoscope (1855) signified 
the steady advance of medicine toward a science.  
 
Casper (1998) provides a very useful example from the literature on how foetal surgeons jumped 
on the physiology ‘bandwagon’ and used it to make claims about the legitimacy of the speciality. 
Casper notes that ‘foetal physiology offered a mantle of scientific legitimacy for foetal surgery 
primarily because of the physiologists’ influence as one of the most respected basic scientists in 
the field (pp.80-81). 
 
Bucher and Strauss (1961) amplify this idea by observing that proponents of exclusivity tend to 
proclaim they have unique missions: 
 
‘It is a characteristic of the growth of specialities that early on in their development they 
carve out for themselves and proclaim unique missions. They issue a statement of the 
contribution that the speciality, and it alone, can make in a total scheme of values and, 
frequently, with it an argument to show why it is peculiarly fitted for this task. The statement 
of mission tends to take a rhetorical form, probably because it arises in the context of a 
battle for recognition and institutional status.’ (p.326) 
 
By way of illustration, Bucher and Strauss cite the case of urology and proctology in the United 
States. They note that when these specialities were struggling to attain identities that were not 
aligned with general surgery, they contended that they, and they alone, possessed the necessary 
levels of competence required by their anatomical area and by inference, the general surgeons 
were not competent to manage these. 
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The philosophy underlying this sort of argument is one which is frequently used to justify claims 
for ‘pure’ speciality status. Whether the argument revolves around a proposed system based 
speciality (vascular surgery) or a technique based speciality (laparoscopic surgery), the complexity 
and the challenges of these areas are said to require a specialist, and it is held that specialisation 
leads to better outcomes for patients: 
 
Vascular surgery has definitely come of age over the past twenty years or so and there is 
increasing evidence that outcome for abdominal aortic aneurysms is far better when 
performed by a vascular surgeon. (Mr Z. Consultant Vascular Surgeon – Teaching Hospital) 
 
You cannot expect your colleagues with limited experience in vascular surgery to deal with 
complex vascular disease (occlusive disease) electively or to have to deal with vascular 
emergencies! ... in this day and age, it is unacceptable. So, when you ask me whether or 
not vascular surgery should separate in the future, the answer to that is most definitely 
yes! (Mr X.T. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon and Leading Light - Vascular Surgical Society 
of Great Britain and Ireland) 
 
Casper (1998) shows how foetal surgeons used the complicated and often challenging nature of 
foetal surgery as justification to move the care of the pregnant woman from their obstetric 
colleagues, whom they contended were incapable. Their justificatory arguments centred around 
the obstetricians inferior understanding of ‘perioperative maternal-foetal physiology’ (p.80). 
According to Casper, foetal surgeons maintained that this deficiency in understanding impacted 
on the obstetricians ability to improve care for mother and foetus. However, their superior 
knowledge and understanding of the physiological principles, enabled them to incorporate this into 
perioperative care and improve outcomes. 
 
Indeed, Atkinson (2017) suggests that professionals utilise their ‘rhetorical skills in order to 
construct a plausible account of what is going on or has gone on, in recommending specific 
decisions and courses of action’ (p.75); it is these rhetorical assertions that form part of the 
negotiating stage. Possession of scientific capital associated with the development of technical 
foci and advances in surgical knowledge are a pre-requisite to the negotiating stage. The 
negotiating stage is pivotal, as it is during this stage that the group has to prove that they, and 
they alone, possess the necessary knowledge base and requisite technical skill to perform a 
specified activity(s), and that it would have deleterious consequences if such activities were 
performed by those without the education, knowledge, and training (Macdonald, 1995), ; indeed, 
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education and training is pivotal in establishing a basis for exclusion (Allsop & Saks, 2002). The 
central element in the negotiation of cognitive exclusiveness and exclusion is ‘autonomy of 
technique’ (Larson, 1977:38). 
 
Although vascular and laparoscopic surgeons are not attempting to prove the incompetence of 
general surgeons, at least not in such harsh language, they are nonetheless attempting to justify 
their claims for ‘exclusiveness’ and ‘monopoly of expertise in the market’ (ibid.: xvii) with regard 
to a specific system – or, in the case of laparoscopic surgeons, technique. Laparoscopic surgeons 
argue that learning laparoscopic techniques requires a steep learning curve and may take months 
or years; in the wrong hands things could go horribly wrong, but in the right hands patient 
outcomes are optimised.  
 
Laparoscopic surgery is a different ball-game to open surgery… it requires a new set of 
skills and if you make an error then things can go pear shaped very quickly, with 
catastrophic consequences. (Mr D. – Consultant General Surgeon with a Specialist Interest 
in Laparoscopic Surgery) 
 
An article in the BMJ, by Darzi & Mackay (2002) adds further weight to claims for exclusiveness 
by reference to the technically sophisticated nature of a specific procedure. In addition, the authors 
point out the benefits of ‘expertise’ in terms of cost: 
 
‘Laparoscopic colectomy is technically demanding, and most surgeons have been 
reluctant to invest the time in mastering the procedure. Nevertheless, centres that have 
gained sufficient expertise report benefits in terms of patients’ comfort and disability, 
length of stay, and cost.’ (p.32) 
 
The issue of technique employed in hernia repair also appeared in a report by the UK Medical 
Research Council’s Laparoscopic Hernia Trial Group (Lancet 1999) which concluded that: 
 
‘the learning curve with laparoscopic hernia repair is steep and relates to the degree of 
technical difficulties it introduces to hernia repair, and that although there are clear 
advantages associated with laparoscopic repair, concerns about rare serious 
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complications and recurrence support a move towards laparoscopic hernia surgery being 
performed by specialist surgeons.’ (p.189) 
 
Even though laparoscopy has not broken away from general surgery it has nonetheless been able 
to gravitate towards de facto independence:  
 
The specialist lobby has become very strong …the surgeons who have pioneered 
endoscopic abdominal surgery have drawn up rules of specialisation…in a way they have 
made it more and more of a closed shop and less and general surgery. (Professor C. – 
Professor of Surgery) 
 
At this stage in the professional project although aspiring specialities seek to justify their claims 
for professional status in terms of demonstrating exclusiveness, it is by no means inevitable that 
their quest will be successful. Though the aspiring groups may have a potential market for their 
services, whether this potential is realised will depend on other variables.  
 
 
3.4 Knowledge and Technology: Variables Within a Larger Equation 
 
Knowledge and technology are important as they provide a base for the possibility of new 
boundaries However, they do not determine whether tasks will be differentiated, or where the 
boundaries should be. This is reflected in the significant variations in the rate of specialist 
differentiation within the UK, and between the UK and other countries, despite ‘internationalisation 
being one of the underlying themes in the practice of surgery in the twentieth century’ (Rutkow, 
1993:506). 
 
Turning first to the UK and differences in the rate of specialist differentiation: in the UK 
Laparoscopic surgery has a highly sophisticated body of knowledge, employing the latest 
techniques and technologies, and linking these to improved patient care in the form of outcomes. 
However, its quest for ‘pure’ speciality status has as yet been unsuccessful, even though the 
arguments used to justify exclusivity recall those employed by the speciality of urology, which 
successfully broke away from general surgery during the 1980’s. 
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Urology’s quest for independence began in the late 1960’s. Its justification centred on the 
introduction of a new technique for removing the prostate gland, known as transurethral resection. 
A surgeon (anonymous) writing in the BMJ notes: 
 
‘One in every 10 men who pass the age of 40 will sooner or later need an operation for 
benign enlargement of the prostate. In England and Wales 80% of these operations are 
performed by general surgeons using (as a rule) one of the open operations which require 
an abdominal incision and enucleation of the adenoma from its “capsule.” The technique 
has altered little since the turn of the century. Yet, unless the adenoma is exceptionally 
large, it may be removed equally completely piecemeal through the urethra using a 
resectoscope – an operation that is virtually painless, needs half the time in hospital, and 
has a low complication rate and a mortality less than half that of any of the open techniques. 
Nor are the results inferior: indeed, the success rate after transurethral surgery is in some 
respects better than open operations.’ (1980:590) 
 
The author then goes on to ask why, if the technique is so successful is it not employed universally. 
He proposes the following explanation: 
 
‘Firstly, a handful of patients have enormous adenomas and the resectoscope cannot be 
manoeuvred past them with safety, but such people are rare. More usually transurethral 
resection is not performed because the surgeon has not been trained in the method. The 
technique is not easy to learn or to teach, and if it is to be done in safety it demands 
protracted apprenticeship and specialisation in urological surgery. Without this 
specialisation the resectoscope may cause havoc, and general surgeons without special 
training are wise to prefer open operations. There is also a clinical argument that the need 
for urological skill is not confined to the prostate: its advantages are even more definite for 
patients with cancer of the bladder or urinary calculi, but the numbers are less easy to 
extract and compare. Alas, for the humble prostate the difference in results between the 
specialist and the generalist are there for all to see.’ (ibid.) 
 
Thus, as in laparoscopic surgery, the justification for exclusiveness centred on the steep learning 
curve associated with mastering the new technique: in the wrong hands it could cause havoc, yet 
in the right hands it optimised patient outcomes.  
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The case of vascular surgery also has similarities to urology; although it is not associated with a 
specific technique like urology, it seeks to justify its claims for independence based on patient 
outcomes. It could also claim to have a different knowledge base to General surgery, for it is a 
system based (not organ based) body of knowledge, requiring knowledge of vascular-biology. 
Indeed, vascular surgery has many anatomical and practical aspects in common with cardiac 
surgery. According to one surgeon this was another reason why urology was able to break away 
from general surgery i.e. because it had a different knowledge base: 
 
We were able to break away because our knowledge base was so different to surgery – 
about 60 per cent of Urology work is physician work, physiology-bladder physiology and 
renal physiology because of renal failure. And so, it was that dichotomy which led people 
to see it as a separate knowledge type. (Mr J. Consultant Urologist – Teaching Hospital) 
 
When comparing the rates of specialist differentiation trans-nationally, the differentials between 
the UK and the USA are interesting. Ophthalmology provides a good example of how the invention 
of an instrument (the Ophthalmoscope, 1851, by H. von Helmhotz 1821-94; provided a basis 
around which specialist interests could develop (Stevens, 2003). Yet although this instrument was 
widely available in both the UK and the United States, specialist differentiation developed at 
different rates in the two countries. In the US ophthalmology became a recognised speciality with 
its own speciality board in 1917 (Stevens, 1998), yet in the UK ophthalmology did not achieve its 
own fellowship examination until 1947, when the FRCS (Fellowship of The Royal College of 
Surgeons) was instituted (Stevens, 2003). 
 
The invention of the laryngoscope (1855) provided yet another basis around which specialist 
interests could develop and, not unlike ophthalmology, despite the technology being available in 
both countries, the specialities developed at different rates. In the US otolaryngology had its own 
speciality board by 1937 (Rutkow, 1993), yet in the UK it did not obtain its own Fellowship 
examination until 1947 (Stevens, 2003).  
 
Orthopaedics also provides an interesting point of trans-national comparison. Admittedly there 
may have been differences ‘between the members of the BOA (British Orthopaedic Association) 
and the AOA (American Orthopaedic Association) in their therapeutic orientations’ (Cooter, 
1993:37) around the latter years of the nineteenth century, in as far as the AOA aspired to a ‘more 
credible surgical image’ (ibid.: 34) while many of their British colleagues favoured a more 
conservative curative approach as opposed to surgical. Yet this in itself cannot account for the 
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differential between the formations of orthopaedics as a speciality in the two countries (US – 1934, 
UK – 1980’s (the late 1970’s in Scotland). After all, attitudes towards operative orthopaedics and 
the advancement of science began to change even before the First World War, and afterwards 
orthopaedics had been able to ‘enlarge its boarders on the operative side’ (Jones, 1918:41). 
 
The United States is also one of the few countries of the world where colorectal surgery or 
proctology is formally recognised as a surgical specialty in its own right, and not a sub-specialist 
area of general surgery (Rutkow, 1993).11  In the UK coloproctology is still a recognised sub-
speciality interest within general surgery. During the 1980’s a ‘small minority of coloproctologists 
believed that coloproctology should be aiming for fully independent speciality status’ (Jackson, 
1992:63). Conversely, there were those who disagreed with these views. They argued ‘that 
coloproctology is no more than a part of general surgery or, at most, a part of the sub-speciality of 
gastroenterological surgery’ (ibid.). Clearly these debates have not been fully resolved.   
 
The examples in this section clearly show that, even allowing for similarities in knowledge and 
technology, other variables play a part in the equation of what is intra- professional specialist 
differentiation. Despite the structural functionalist view that the division of labour and structural 
differentiation naturally evolve as a result of the proliferation of knowledge and technical 
complexity (Parsons, 2012), the advance of science, while vitally important, cannot explain the 
historical and trans-national variations in the development of specialities. 
 
 
3.5 Summary 
 
The chapter has argued that knowledge and technology(s) are a means to an end and not an end 
in themselves. Knowledge and technology are not independent constructs that “cause” scientific 
sub-division and differentiation according to the laws of the social system. On the contrary, 
humans actively create knowledge and utilise knowledge as a means to an end. Knowledge and 
technology(s) provide the basis for the possibility of new boundaries (i.e. specialities), but they do 
not determine whether groups will be successful in their quest to differentiate and self-regulate.  
 
 
11 The American Board of Colon and Rectal Surgery (founded: 1949) (Rutkow, 1993) 
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The comparisons between urological surgery, vascular surgery and laparoscopic surgery show 
this, even though all three areas possess similar characteristics. Specialist differentiation is not 
consistent. For example, vascular surgery has a different knowledge base to general surgery, a 
claim which urological surgery made; and laparoscopic surgery is a sophisticated technique based 
area requiring a high level of technical skill, another claim made by urological surgery. However, 
one has successfully differentiated, while the other two have not yet done so: there must be other 
factors which are in play besides knowledge and technology, and trans-national comparisons also 
lead to this conclusion. Knowledge and technology are global resources, yet despite their 
availability in both countries, specialities in the UK and the United States have developed at 
different rates. 
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4.1 Introduction and Aims 
 
Between 1929 and 1947 intra-professional specialist differentiation radically altered the structure 
of the surgical field, for obstetrics and gynaecology, ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology were 
successful in their quest to differentiate from the general surgical corpus, effectively achieving 
complete self-regulation. The separation of obstetrics and gynaecology, however, went even 
further, in that they not only separated from general surgery, but also from the Royal College of 
Surgeons, a bastion of the general surgical establishment. 
 
The chapter will focus on the factors effecting the pace and direction of intra-professional specialist 
differentiation during this period. The chapter will clearly demonstrate that the success of 
obstetrics and gynaecology, ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology was in no way an inevitable 
or pre-destined phenomenon based on the advancement of knowledge and technological 
innovation; rather that, although knowledge and technology were important factors, given each 
area’s unique background, characteristics and development, success cannot be attributed to these 
variables alone. Success can be explained in Bourdieuian, terms as result of the accumulation of 
capital or resources, the essential components which would eventually prove vital in their quest 
for differentiation given the right conditions.  
 
Before focusing on specific areas, it is necessary to analyse the general context. For example, in 
order fully to appreciate the complexities and the number of variables involved in the success of 
these groups, it is essential to comprehend the structure and composition of the surgical field,  
between 1800 and 1947 (when the last separation occurred before the 1970’s/80’s); the 
supporting power structures which enabled the surgical establishment to procure the knowledge 
which supported its purposes, and suppress the knowledge which did not; and the ways in which 
the establishment adapted to potential challenges at significant contextual junctures as the century 
progressed.  
 
The chapter will then move on to focus on the specific areas (obstetrics and gynaecology, 
ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology) which broke away from general surgery between 1929 
and 1947, emphasising their different backgrounds and characteristics, and how they adapted to 
their context. It will emphasise that, although these areas were successful in differentiating from 
the main surgical corpus, their historical development clearly shows that there was no conscious 
strategy to pursue the professional project since their inception, and that this aspiration arose later 
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in their development. However, accumulated capital became useful when a conscious strategy of 
differentiation and self-regulation was embraced.   
 
In addition to focusing on the above areas, the chapter will focus on orthopaedics. Orthopaedics 
was the largest area to break away from general surgery in the 1980’s in England (in Scotland it 
broke away in the late 1970’s), but the foundations for its becoming a mature speciality were being 
laid during the period 1800-1947. It is therefore important to understand what these foundations 
blocks were and how they impacted on orthopaedics’s professional project in the 1960’s. 
Additionally, orthopaedics provides a useful example of an area which survived against the odds: 
its very existence in 1947 is remarkable, given the obstructions placed in its path by the surgical 
establishment. Orthopaedics’s precarious development adds greater weight to the argument that 
no area is pre-destined to exist. This is an area which had to fight for survival.  
 
 
4.2 The Structure of the Surgical Field 
 
Writing about the structure of the scientific field, (1981, 1991), and university field (1988), Bourdieu 
notes that the field is defined by the distribution of power, between the dominant group(s) and the 
newcomers, in the case of the scientific field, and in the case of the university field, between the 
 
‘temporally subordinate faculties, the science faculty and, to a lesser extent, the arts 
faculty, contrast with the socially dominant faculties, more or less indistinguishable in this 
respect, the faculty of law and the faculty of medicine.’ (1988:41) 
 
The power differentials within the respective fields is the outcome of earlier struggles, resulting in 
the ‘objectification’ of certain types of capital in the structures supporting the field (e.g. the 
education system) and the habitus and dispositions of the agents, and ‘commands the strategies 
and objective chances of the different agents’ (1981:267). The surgical field is no exception to this 
rule. 
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However, the objective relations between positions already won may not be determined by 
struggle alone, as occurred with the profession of surgery in the period 1800 to 1858, but by the 
interaction of surgery with other social fields.   
 
By 1800 the social status of the surgeon was beginning to achieve parity with the social status of 
the physician. This was due in no small part to influential figures such as John Hunter and others. 
In particular, Hunter spearheaded the growth of surgery as a scholarly discipline, this success  
together with the continuing development of surgical techniques ensured this change in status 
(Stevens, 2003), a development reflected in professional organisation: The Royal College of 
Surgeons of Edinburgh was incorporated in 1778, The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland in 
1784, and the Royal College of Surgeons in 180012 
 
The professions with high social standing, such as the surgery, medicine and law were a significant 
feature of the social and cultural landscape at that time.13 In this respect, the structure of the 
surgical profession reflected the hierarchical structure of society and provides a good example of 
how social fields do not exist in a vacuum. Indeed, Bourdieu contends that the social world is 
made up of a number of fields, and given this, it is likely that one field may have an effect on the 
other (Thomson, 2014). This is highlighted by Bourdieu’s analysis of the faculties and possession 
of types of capital. Bourdieu revealed that the professors from the socially dominant faculties 
(medicine, law, and theology), were imbued with the capital of economic and political power, 
reflected in their ‘participation in public bodies - ministerial cabinets, Constitutional Court, 
Economic and Social Council, Council of State, Financial Inspectorate’ (1988:48). However, 
according to Bourdieu, in return, these faculties were not free from government influence, as they 
were directly responsible for ensuring the state had a strong and lasting relationship with its 
citizens.  
 
The surgical field is no exception to Bourdieu’s rule, in relation to the interaction of social fields. 
Indeed, not unlike the French university field, the structure of the surgical field at this time was 
characterised by its interdependency with political and economic power. This was reflected in the 
social composition of the council of The Royal College of Surgeons, which comprised wealthy 
‘metropolitan practitioners’ with connections to the higher echelons in society and not surprisingly 
their political affections were mainly Tory, and religious affiliations, either Church of England or 
Scotland (Lawrence, 1994). 
 
12 Each body developed independently of the others (Stevens, 2003:12-13). 
13 ‘In London the Royal College of Physicians still recruited its fellows from Oxbridge’ (Lawrence, 1994:27).  
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In order to fully understand the structure of the field of surgery it is necessary to appreciate fully 
its reflection of the hierarchical nature of society at that time, and importantly how each interacted 
with and supported the other. 
 
This being the case meant that the dominant or Tory elite seated in the council rooms of the great 
College(s) were in possession of abundant social capital, which in effect enabled them to garner 
more capital and consolidate their position over the rank and file members of the Royal College, 
namely the apothecaries. Apothecaries were the third type of medical practitioner after the 
physician and surgeon and were lower in status; they were the general practitioners. As a result 
of socioeconomic changes, people in England were able to pay for more medical care. Since 
however there were few physicians, the demand for more personnel fell to the apothecaries and 
the members of The Royal College of Surgeons. In order to provide improved care for patients, 
the apothecaries, who knew relatively little surgery, joined the College to acquire the necessary 
surgical skills. A joint qualification, under the aegis of the College, was established as an entrance 
qualification for general practice: the MRCS (Master of the Royal College of Surgeons), and the 
LSA (Licentiate of the Society of Apothecaries) (Rutkow:1993). 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century the elite had consolidated its position as a significant force in 
Victorian society, despite the Royal College of Surgeons being the locus of attacks from the rank-
and-file during the first half of the century; ‘most general practitioners saw the College as the power 
base of privileged minority who looked only to itself and which failed to protect the interests of its 
members’ (Lawrence, 1994:35). The attacks thus centered on institutional reform and the truth of 
scientific doctrine.  
 
The question is, how did the possession of social capital enable this consolidation of power; in 
other words, how was this manifested in practice?  
 
The voluntary hospital system was essentially an institution controlled by and reinforced by the 
social class system at that time, as it was funded by the wealthy elements or the upper strata of 
society. Stevens (2003) notes that: 
 
‘The ancient charity hospitals had employed surgeons to look after their patients on a cash-
or-kind basis. But the physicians and surgeons who attended the new voluntary hospitals 
were expected to give their services free, as did the founders and board members of the 
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new institutions. Subsequently, the older hospitals conformed and ceased to pay their 
attending physicians and surgeons. Thus, a pattern of attending “honoraries” was 
established, drawn from the same social class as the lay members of the voluntary boards 
(namely the upper classes). This system was continued in the voluntary hospitals 
established in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It placed the physician 
and surgeon in a superior, non-contractual relationship with the hospital and it naturally 
excluded from its attending staff the lowly apothecary.’ (pp.14-15) 
 
Because it was a ‘closed’ – appointments system made by the governing board, the number of 
honoraries was small. Therefore, hospital appointments were the means by which a surgeon could 
acquire ‘medical respectability’, publicise, and grow his private practice and garner direct financial 
remuneration from bedside teaching and in the process accumulate economic capital. The 
teaching of medical students at the bedside was a direct outcome of the growing need for clinical 
observation, fuelled by the changes in medicine which had coincided with the widespread 
development of voluntary hospitals; medical science in England followed the general principles of 
Sydenham. It emphasised the importance of the meticulous observation of symptoms. Thus, 
hospital beds became an invaluable means for educating apprentices in disease symptomatology 
and as a result were highly prized and were held by a minority of eminent practitioners. This added 
another facet to hospital staffing in that each honorary surgeon had his own entourage to whom 
he explicated the patients disorder. It was around this model, that medical schools began to 
develop. However, not unlike the appointment system to honoraries, surgical appointments and 
the selection process for apprentices were based on social class and nepotism (Stevens, 2003). 
 
In 1843, to the existing qualification M.R.C.S. (Membership of The Royal College of Surgeons), a 
new, superior, and more prestigious one was added: F.R.C.S. (Fellowship of The Royal College 
of Surgeons). This signified a distinction between the apothecary or general practitioner, and the 
surgeon of high social standing, in control of his own bed base, and his entourage of medical 
students (Stevens, 2003). The Fellowship entitled one to vote for the College’s council and 
rendered one eligible to sit in the Court of Examiners (Rutkow, 1993). 
 
Thus, the elite’ s possession of social capital through its class connections, provided them with 
the necessary capital of surgical authority and power to take control of the constituent mechanisms 
of the surgical field, namely the hospital appointment system, together with the examining and 
teaching systems. As a form of capital, social capital enabled this, as possession of this form of 
capital is associated with membership in a group. It is the group ‘which provides each of its 
members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to 
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credit, in the various senses of the word’ (Bourdieu, 1986:21); in this case, the ability to control 
the mechanisms of the field, which in turn enabled them to garner economic, symbolic, and specific 
cultural capital, all of which, according to Bourdieu (1986), are never completely independent of 
each other, but are mutually reinforceable and exchangeable. 
 
Social capital, with its norms and values, was then ‘objectified’ in these institutions, which helped 
support and perpetuate the established order. Power thus enabled the control, production and 
definition of knowledge, a central strand in any strategy relating to the conservation of vested 
interests and the status quo (Flyvbjerg, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 The Surgical Establishment and Supporting Power Structures (1800-1947) 
 
Although Bourdieu’s work on the scientific field (1981, 1991) does not discuss knowledge, 
preferring instead to use the term ‘official science’ (i.e. ‘the principles used by the dominant group 
in their choice of objects, the solution of problems and the evaluation of solutions’ (1981:270)), he 
nonetheless acknowledges the importance of the education system in inculcating this. For 
example, when he talks of the struggle between the ‘dominant’ and the ‘newcomers’, he notes that 
the dominant occupy the highest positions in the structure of the distribution of what he terms 
scientific capital: 
 
‘In the forefront stands the education system, the only institution capable of securing the 
permanence and consecration of official science by inculcating it systematically (the 
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scientific habitus) upon all legitimate recipients of educative action, and in particular, upon 
all new entrants to the actual field of production.’ (ibid.:271)  
 
Bourdieu (1988) discuses knowledge more explicitly, in relation to the university faculties. For 
example, Bourdieu submits that as ‘dominant’ faculties in the university hierarchy, medicine and 
law are responsible for inculcating the ‘techniques and recipes of a body of knowledge’ (p.63), 
upon the habitus of all new ‘agents’. Bourdieu describes this as ‘knowledge in the service of order 
and power’ (ibid.:69). Indeed, the perpetuation and stability of the system is dependent on all 
agents internalising, what Bourdieu describes as the laws and trajectories of the field. Thus, 
although structures enable strategies of domination, they would not be possible without the new 
recruit’s willingness to accept the rules of the game based on the dispositions of the habitus. 
 
Although the structure of the surgical field during the period 1800 to 1858 was differentiated along 
class lines between the elite general surgeons and the apothecaries, the former being the 
dominant group as a result of their class background, other developments were also taking place 
in this period. 
 
To use Bucher & Strauss’ (1961) terminology, new groupings or ‘segments’ began to develop and 
appear as a result of the interaction of surgical fields from around the world with the surgical field 
in Britain. In particular Stevens (2003) notes that: 
 
‘From Paris, the centre of medical learning in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 
scientific study of disease entities was exported to all centers in the Western world. This 
was a time of discovery, of pushing back the boundaries of surgery, of correlating the 
pathological findings of anatomists at dissection with those observed through the 
symptomatology at the bedside. There was a growing need for facilities in which 
appropriate studies could be made of particular organs, lesions, conditions and diseases.’ 
(p.26)  
 
The staffing system of the voluntary hospitals stifled innovation. Indeed, admission to the honorary 
staff was competitive, resulting in aspiring junior surgeons spending a protracted period of time 
performing junior work in the hospital in the hope that they would come to be regarded favourably 
by their senior colleagues. The surgeons who ran the voluntary hospitals, were fellows of the Royal 
College and generalist in terms of their anatomical remit. Throughout the nineteenth century and 
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beyond, general surgery controlled the largest proportion of the beds in the voluntary hospitals. 
Though staff might acquire special expertise in a particular area, they were not appointed qua 
specialists (Stevens, 2003).  
 
Given the hierarchical nature of the hospital structure, innovative young surgeons interested in a 
specific facet of surgery, or in progressing new surgical procedures, were not able to gain entry 
into the elite group. Though by about 1850 the number of hospital beds in England and Wales had 
more than doubled, totalling almost 8000, there were still not enough opportunities for teaching 
and research, Although, the majority of junior surgeons in the voluntary hospitals accepted the 
protracted career trajectory, there was a frustrated minority of juniors that refused to accept this. 
Therefore, the only option for the disheartened junior or ambitious specialist was to establish their 
own hospital. Stevens notes that from this compelling movement were to grow special hospitals, 
e.g. Moorlands Eye Hospital, London (1804); The Royal Ear Hospital, London (1816). It was 
around these hospitals that the identification of the ‘specialist’ developed. By 1900 the number of 
special hospitals in England and Wales was 128 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
medical societies such as The Ophthalmological Society of the United Kingdom (1881) and The 
British Laryngological and Rhinological Association (1888) began to develop around the special 
hospitals. 
 
Given that fields are social and do not exist in a vacuum, and the fact that the formation of special 
hospitals, professional surgical societies, and the development of surgical periodicals were 
‘important adjuncts to the evolution of surgery’ (Rutkow, 1993:356) during this time, developments 
in this respect could be said to be inevitable. 
 
Specialised scientific medicine thus reared its ugly head. However, despite the fact that, as noted 
above, such developments could be said to be inevitable, specialisation did not necessarily have 
to lead to specialist differentiation with specialist areas separating off from the main surgical corpus 
with their own examination structures.  
 
The members of the new groups, belonging to the same privileged social set, were in possession 
of social capital; they may have been the younger generations interested in particular aspects of 
surgery, or an aspiring specialist. However, class background and preferences regarding 
specialisation are not mutually incompatible. This is evident even today, when a member of the 
upper classes votes for the Labour party, or a member of the working-class votes Tory.  
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The nineteenth century witnessed a movement from the Enlightenment towards Modernity, and 
although many of the norms and values of the patronage-based hierarchical society of the 
Enlightenment remained, members of the surgical profession were being increasingly subjected 
to global changes in the practice of surgery and medicine at large. When social fields meet and 
interact change can occur, resulting in different mindsets among individuals from the same class 
background. 
 
Although the members of the new groups or segments were from the same social background as 
the dominant group within the field of surgery, this did not mean that their social class could be 
operationalised successfully to challenge the status quo at that particular time; indeed a group’s 
chances of survival during this context depended on adherence to the norms and values of the 
‘generalist’ culture which pervaded the surgical world (for detailed discussion see below).  
 
In addition to the above, two related points need to be made from the outset: Firstly, specialisation 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not render differentiation from the main body or 
corpus of surgery inevitable, but rather stimulated ‘the formation of a specialist hospital or society, 
consolidated by the foundation of a specialist section of the Royal Society of Medicine’ (Stevens, 
2003:39). Thus, individual groups did not consciously set out with the intention of playing the long 
game of accumulating capital which could be operationalised when the context was right, hence 
enabling successful differentiation. Secondly, though they were founded around a similar time, 
there were differentials in terms of the amount of capital or resources possessed by each individual 
group within the field.  Groups may start off with different chances owing to factors which are 
peculiar to their particular areas, like genetic predispositions in humans. This may go some way 
towards explaining why, given a similar time trajectory, specialist differentiation cannot be said to 
follow any specific pattern between 1929 and 1947.  
 
Thus, in terms of the structure of the field there were polarisations between the dominant group 
and the newcomers, and between the new groups themselves. This resembles the gradations of 
the class system in Britain, e.g. between the upper middle class and the lower middle class. 
 
Capital was objectified slower in the U.S. than in Britain. Indeed, the structure of the field in the 
U.S. developed in an entirely different way. In Britain, which exhibited ‘autocratic’ professionalism, 
the likelihood of specialist differentiation depended on the structure of the field. By contrast, in the 
United States this sort of structure was very much absent until the 1940’s and 1950’s, and the 
States exhibited ‘democratic’ professionalism (Stevens, 1998). Although there may have been a 
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field, it was not bound by any underlying social undertones and could be said to be more fluid and 
transparent. 
 
 
4.3 The Royal College of Surgeons’ Strategies and Reponses to the 
Challenges of Specialisation: The Dominant vs. The Newcomers, and 
Patterns of Specialist Differentiation 1858-1947 
 
The development of surgery and specialist differentiation should ideally be divided into four 
different phases or epochs, the first comprising the period 1858-1947. As alluded to above, in this 
period the British surgical profession operated very much along the lines of what Stevens (1998) 
terms “autocratic professionalism”, as opposed to the “democratic professionalism” of the United 
States. To understand this epoch, we must realise that the Royal Colleges were part of a 
Conservative establishment which pervaded society at this time. Specialisation was not seen as 
‘natural’ and, thanks to the structure of healthcare at that particular time, the ‘general Surgeons’ 
were able to ward off any usurpers. 
 
The medical and surgical Royal Colleges were both generalist in their orientations, emphasising 
an integrative and broad approach to medicine and surgery.14 Advances made in the specialist 
hospitals were viewed as improvements within the generality of surgery, and not in any way 
separate from it. Such integrative notions were buttressed by the hierarchical system of hospital 
medicine, which in turn was reinforced by societal values at that time. Before the foundation of the 
NHS, the majority of consultants held honorary positions in the prestigious voluntary hospitals. 
General surgeons stood at the pinnacle of the medical order and it was therefore vital for those 
with special interests to express these in terms of aiding the scientific advance of generalists and 
the generality of surgery. To express these in any other way risked alienating the general surgeons 
and given that the only route to private practice was to obtain an appointment as a general surgeon 
in a voluntary hospital, it would be financially deleterious to do so (Cooter, 1993). 
 
 
14 This may have stemmed from the Enlightenment, for example, ‘elite concepts of the body and disease in the 
eighteenth century dwelt on the importance of harmony, of natural place and the serious consequences of bodily 
matter crossing its proper boundaries’ (Lawrence, 1994:29). 
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In many respects, specialising in one operation or disease between 1858-1947 was considered 
tantamount to admission of limited competence and training. Furthermore,  
 
‘specialising entailed putting oneself above one’s peers and this went contrary to the 
notions of medical equality. It meant telling the public directly or indirectly that this disease 
or that operation was best handled by a specialist with greater experience and skill. It could 
involve poaching patients and thus transgressing the conventions of medical etiquette.’ 
(Bynum, 1994:192)  
 
Just as in the Enlightenment, surgeons were chosen for their civility and conduct befitting a 
gentleman as much as their medical knowledge and skill (Lawrence, 1994), and in the societal 
values held by the upper and middle classes at that time the ‘generalist’ enjoyed higher status 
than the specialist. Thus, obtaining an appointment as a consultant general surgeon in a voluntary 
hospital was the accepted route of acquiring the cachet required to access the lucrative private 
practice market (Cooter, 1993). 
 
The logic of the field at this time draws parallels with the structure of the university field, between 
‘knowledge in the service of order and power’ and ‘knowledge confronting order and power’ 
(Bourdieu, 1988:68-69). Bourdieu’s analogy of two opposing poles is germane, as the surgical 
field at this time was organised according to two opposing ideologies: at the dominant pole the old 
knowledge of the generalists was confronted by the new knowledge of scientific medicine and 
specialisation.  
 
As alluded to in the previous section (4.2), there is a distinct difference between specialisation and 
specialist differentiation, and the elite within the profession chose to pursue a strategy of not totally 
quashing specialisation as long as these ideals were first and foremost part of the general science 
of surgery.  Thus, from the middle of the nineteenth century The Royal College of Surgeons sought 
to legitimise scientific medicine and specialisation by defining the boundaries of new knowledge. 
This way they could control the evolution of specialisation more effectively. This was reflected in 
a report in the Westminster Review in 1881 on the progress of the various special departments in 
surgery: 
 
‘With the increasing cultivation of specialism, the integrity of medicine is maintained by the 
greater recognition of broad scientific principles as the only true basis in every speciality. 
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The advancements in the special departments are refinements of surgery, and not in any 
way independent of it.’ (Westminster Review., 116 (1881) pp. 403-39 at p.432. cited in 
Cooter, 1993:38) 
 
Thus far from reflecting a capitulation, the Royal Colleges strategy was a pragmatic one, which 
had the effect of bringing onboard potential stray elements which, left unto themselves, could have 
generated challenges to the status quo, as Abbott (1988) notes: 
 
‘Unlike the mainstream medical institutions, the new specialist institutions outside the 
medical establishment claimed legitimacy precisely on their technical and scientific 
expertise. Only the threat of these alternative institutions and the necessity of controlling 
them led the medical establishment to move towards a scientific legitimation of medical 
techniques.’ (p.189)15 
 
Embracing science with its underlying ideology of ‘naturalism’16 enabled the surgical elite to 
consolidate and maintain its position, despite having to transform itself along with the rest of elite 
Victorian society. The central tenets of the naturalism ideology held that steady natural progress 
had shaped the current milieu and that the same steady natural progress would secure a better 
future (Lawrence, 1994), providing a justification for specialisation, and helping it to become 
accepted under the general umbrella of surgery, even though many in the profession viewed it 
very sceptically.  
 
Given the suspicion and scepticism which existed at this time, any area which appeared as a 
potential threat to the status quo, was effectively quashed.  The development of the so-called ‘new 
orthopaedics’ (Cooter, 1993) and the profession’s reaction (see below) provides a good example 
of this. However, potential threats did not always come in the shape of a new area: metropolitan 
authority could also be challenged by the development of surgical expertise in the wealthy 
provincial cities a case of periphery challenging the centre. It is to this theme that we shall now 
turn. 
 
15 France was different: ‘the high medical establishment had adopted an absolutely scientific basis for legitimacy 
from the start of the nineteenth-century’ (Abbott, 1988:189). 
16 ‘Doctors of all political persuasions were significant figures in the creation of this ideology of naturalism. The 
new doctrine was proclaimed to be based on legitimate physiological enquiry. Its thoroughgoing naturalism was 
completed by linking it to Darwin’s theory of natural selection; this new naturalism was becoming, the culture of 
the Victorian elite’ (Lawrence, 1994:58). 
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In 1883, two hundred surgeons, mainly from the provincial centres, and all of whom were members 
of the Royal College of Surgeons, united behind the call from the Birmingham gynaecologist, 
Lawson Tait, to organise a British Association of Surgeons, along the same lines as their US 
counterpart.17 The Royal College of Surgeons responded by allowing provincial surgeons’ 
representation on its council: the strategy was to circumvent Tait’s proposals, and it effectively 
quashed them (Cooter, 1993). Indeed, The Royal College prevented the foundation of new 
national associations of surgeons in Britain before the First World War. The Association of 
Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland was not formed until 1920 (Platt, 1982). 
 
During this time, it was virtually impossible for a surgeon from the provincial towns, irrespective of 
his surgical skill, to acquire a post in the London hospitals, so some of the most modern surgery 
was performed in the provincial towns. This was especially the case with the ‘new orthopaedics’, 
which provides the next example of a direct threat to the general surgical establishment. Of all the 
new areas which formed during this period, orthopaedics was seen as the greatest threat to the 
elite of the profession, i.e. the general surgeons. In the early nineteenth century, British 
orthopaedics was concerned with treating club feet (talipes).18 However, as the century 
progressed, invasive surgical procedures began to be used alongside mechanical ones. The ‘new 
surgery’, and ‘new orthopaedics’ was developed in institutions outside of the major hospitals, for 
example private clinics or children’s hospitals. Indeed, children’s hospitals were central to the 
advancement of skill and expertise in bone and joint surgery, for by the end of the century a high 
proportion of inpatients required surgical intervention in the treatment of tuberculosis of the bones. 
Unlike the voluntary hospitals, Children’s hospitals were not controlled by general surgeons, and 
as a result provided professional refuge for ambitious surgeons eager to experiment with 
innovative new techniques (Cooter, 1993). 
.  
By the end of the century, however, those practising orthopaedic surgery were being subjected to 
the powerful claim of general surgeons all over the country, that the proper place for surgery was 
in the major voluntary hospitals. The word from the metropolitan surgical establishment was that 
orthopaedic hospitals and children’s hospitals practising orthopaedic surgery were, ‘like other 
specialist hospitals, inimical to the essential unity of surgery.’ (Little, 1862, p.561. cited in Cooter, 
1993:17) 
 
 
17 The American Surgical Association was formed in 1882 by specialist general surgeons. (Cooter, 1993:49) 
18 Three infirmaries were established for the treatment of Talipes: The Royal Orthopaedic Hospital (1838), the 
City Orthopaedic (1851), and the National Orthopaedic (1864) (Cooter, 1993:13). 
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Despite the attraction of specialising in a particular area of surgery (especially amongst provincial 
surgeons), such surgeons were strongly committed to the idea of the essential unity of surgery. 
Indeed, given that many were also practicing general surgeons anything less than a full 
commitment to the general principles of surgery would have resulted in them being shunned by 
their surgical peers (Le Vay, 1990). In spite of this their focus on surgical expertise was viewed 
as a direct threat to the generalist surgical establishment in London who asserted their adroitness 
across the whole of surgery and not specific anatomical areas. It was a direct assault on their 
anatomical territory and a challenge to their supremacy. This was compounded on two counts: 
firstly, the growing international acclaim of British orthopaedists stemmed from their work 
performed in the specialist hospitals, children’s hospitals, outpatient and private clinics, especially 
Robert Jones’s19 clinic in Liverpool; secondly, the development of professional connections with 
pre-eminent American surgeons,20 at a time when the image of orthopaedics in America was 
transforming, so that any association with America was going to create a certain amount of anxiety 
(Cooter, 1993). For example,  
 
‘By 1894 the leading lights from American Orthopaedic Association (AOA) were referring 
to the orthopaedic surgeon as one ‘has been thoroughly schooled in all aspects of 
medicine, who will have a perfect knowledge of pathology, surgical bacteriology, and 
anatomy.’ (ibid.:35) 
 
Two years later the American field of orthopaedics was defined as ‘That division of surgery which 
treats disabilities and diseases of the locomotor apparatus and of the prevention and treatment of 
deformities of the body’ (ibid). This definition effectively set out the basis for the modern specialism 
by recognising the locomotor system as its anatomical domain. However, it was not until the First 
World War (1914) that leading lights in Britain defined orthopaedics as ‘the treatment by 
manipulation, by operation, and re-education, of disabilities of the locomotor system, whether 
arising from disease or injury’ (Ibid.).  
 
Although in the post-war period (1918) the reputation of orthopaedics had significantly improved, 
there were signs that the professional ambit was barely more than before the start of war. Indeed, 
Cooter observes there was evidence of decline as the ‘old-guard generalists’ felt threatened. At 
 
19 LeVay refers to Robert Jones as: ‘quite possibly the greatest orthopaedic surgeon the world has ever seen’  
(1990:137). Indeed, Jones was a pioneering figure behind the development of the ‘new orthopaedics’ (Cooter, 
1993).  
20 For example, William and Charles Mayo, of Minnesota, and J.B. Murphy of Chicago. ‘Most of these surgeons 
had more than a passing interest in bone and joint surgery and ran private clinics where they routinely dealt with 
such cases’ (Cooter, 1993:49-50). 
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St. Bartholomew’s this resulted in a reduction in the orthopaedic bed base by four. In addition, a 
member of the general surgical staff at Guy’s hospital tried to interdict an orthopaedic department 
surgeon from performing a surgical procedure known as Meniscectomy. The surgeon in question 
would not give way and this attempt was eventually defeated. 
 
Clearly such disputes typify the enduring tension between the traditional generalists and the new 
consultant surgeons pursuing modern orthopaedics, as Bristow tried to explain to the readers of 
the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1927:  
 
‘In the old hospitals, tradition plays a great part and change is not lightly undertaken. The 
men who control medical education, and who in reality control the teaching hospitals, are 
in a position of great responsibility. Many of the very best among them view the 
encroachment of so-called specialism with alarm.’ (p.1922) 
 
As far as the elite of the Royal College of Surgeons were concerned, this ‘new orthopaedics’ was 
an affront, a direct threat to their power and traditional territory. ‘Openly expansionist (in part 
because of its generalist orientation), its scope seemed to some almost limitless’ (Cooter, 
1993:132). As one complainant in the BMJ in 1925 noted: ‘I cannot see anything that is excluded 
by the modern orthopaedic surgeon’ (Cheatle, 1925:959). 
 
Indeed, the feeling pervading the Royal College was so strong that in July 1918 a special 
committee of the Council was formed, its objective being to place limits on orthopaedics 
expansionist tendencies. The meeting was presided over by the President of the Royal College 
(Makins). The committee stated that it regarded with: 
 
‘Mistrust and disapprobation the movement in progress to remove the treatment of 
conditions always properly regarded as the main portion of the general surgeon’s work 
from his hands, and place it in those of ‘Orthopaedic specialists’; and thus to educate the 
layman to the belief that the British surgeon is incapable of dealing with the majority of the 
most serious injuries the body may sustain.’ (Royal College of Surgeons, Minutes of 
Council, 16th July 1918, pp.159-60 cited in Cooter, 1993:133) 
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In light of the meeting, figures such as Jones felt that the only way to protect the future 
development and prospects of orthopaedics was to adopt a concessionary strategy: 
 
‘Thus, in accord with the recommendations of the committee of the Royal College of 
Surgeons, the name of the centres was changed from ‘Orthopaedic’ to ‘Special Military 
Hospitals,’ to avoid the implication that only specialists are capable of carrying on the 
surgery practised in the centres and to avoid the recognition of a class of practitioners who 
may, or may not be competent general surgeons.’ (ibid.) 
 
Jones made further attempts to placate the establishment when he argued that: 
 
‘there need be no sharp demarcation between generalists and orthopaedic specialists, and 
by 1920 he was insisting that the general surgeon must have an absolute right to treat any 
case and as many of any type of cases as he desires.’ (Cooter, 1993:133). 
 
However, the onslaught from the ‘old-guard’ generalists in surgery continued without abatement, 
this time with regard to the control and treatment of fractures. Orthopaedists were particularly 
concerned that the treatment of fractures in the large teaching hospitals left much to be desired. 
‘The handling of fractures had passed largely into the hands of junior officers.’  Thus, although the 
‘honorary surgeon (general surgeon) was nominally in control, the hospital resident was actually 
responsible for the treatment in practice’ (Bristow, 1927:1920). Indeed, Bristow21 notes that 
figures such as Jones advocated: 
 
‘the removal of fracture cases from the general wards into special wards, and the transfer 
of fracture cases, by those hospital surgeons not especially interested in the work to a 
fracture department staffed by men whose work and interest lay in that field.’ (ibid.:1922)  
 
Despite the elite general surgeons’ disdain for fractures, they refused to relinquish control of them. 
Their general argument was that transferring any department of surgery from the general surgeons 
to the specialist would have a deleterious effect on the students education, since ‘the purpose of 
the teaching hospital is to educate men so that they should be fit to go out from the hospital into 
 
21 Took up orthopaedics after appointment to Shepherd’s Bush under Robert Jones (Le Vay, 1990). 
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general practice’ (ibid.:1923). Indeed, it is was not until the late 1950s that general surgeons 
began to relinquish the treatment of fractures to orthopaedists (Le Vay, 1990).  
 
The scepticism shared by the elite of the profession was still present in 1945, although in the run 
up to the new National Health Service in 1948, the Royal College was to have an increasing role 
in strategic planning and the formulation of policies (Stevens, 2003). This necessitated an 
acceptance that specialisation was here to stay and that the service had to be planned around 
this. Thus: 
 
‘The recommendations of the college followed the strong conviction expressed in the 
Goodenough Report,22 that consultant practice should be based on the general surgeon 
and general physicians with special interests, rather than on specialities per se. Not only 
undergraduate but also much of the postgraduate education was to be primarily general in 
orientation. The FRCS (Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons) was, at least in theory, 
an ideal examination for the general surgeon, and thus by implication for all those in the 
surgical sub-specialities.’ (ibid.:116)  
 
An anonymous article published in The Lancet in 1945 (18th Aug) and entitled “Clinical Specialism” 
reiterates the sentiment of the Royal College and the Goodenough Report, but also goes a little 
further, and its main points are worth examining in some detail. The author begins by focusing on 
the disadvantages of narrow specialisation: ‘There is no doubt a limit beyond which increasing 
experience in a restricted field warps judgment instead of refining it’ (p.210). However, the author 
then rather curiously begins to describe two functions of specialism in the pattern of medical 
organisation, and in doing so he differentiates between ‘pioneers’ and ‘settlers’ (i.e. specialists 
and generalists): 
 
‘It is necessary to distinguish between two functions of specialism in the pattern of medical 
organisation. One is routine diagnosis and treatment, which is the application of existing 
knowledge with judgment and skill. The other is the advancement of knowledge and the 
improvement of technique… A few of the workers in a given field are ‘pioneers,’ who break 
new ground; the majority are ‘settlers,’ who occupy it. The conditions in which the pioneer 
does his best work are often different from the settler.’ (ibid.) 
 
22 The Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Medical Schools (1944), under the chairmanship of the 
banker Sir William Goodenough (Cooter, 2003). 
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The author then goes on to describe how this would work in terms of the structure of service 
provision: 
 
‘An intensive study of a narrow field is one pioneering method. Clinics for the observation 
and treatment of cases suffering from the same disease, and institutes, hospitals, or 
special departments for handling restricted groups of patients, are appropriate for this 
purpose. There should be as many of them as there are pioneers of good quality to staff 
them. They will be found mostly in large centres of population. They should be allowed to 
specialise as narrowly as they wish, so long as they fulfil their prime function, which is not 
just treating patients but adding to knowledge.’ (ibid.) 
 
However, the author clearly proceeds to state that the majority, namely the ‘settlers’ best work is 
done as ‘generalists’ with ‘specialist’ interests: 
 
‘But for the settlers, too fine a ramification of subdivided specialism carries no advantages 
and is fraught with the dangers of narrowness and monotony. Their best work is done in a 
fairly wide and varied field, though one corner of it may often attract their special interest: 
they may be general surgeons with a special experience of one region or one type of 
operation; but their outlook should remain general.’ (ibid.) 
 
It is this emphasis on the many versus the few, on the generalists versus the specialists, which 
becomes the crux of the article. The author warns of the dangers and folly of over-specialisation, 
and challenges the assertion that brilliance in a field should equal a monopoly: 
 
‘Although organisation is a necessary tool in as far as it is modern societies only tool for 
creating what it lacks – in this case a comprehensive medical service. It is a dangerous 
tool. The planners of specialism are in danger of arguing that because pioneers have done 
brilliantly in their restricted field, they should effectively have a [monopoly]. Any claim to 
the monopoly of work within a special field should be examined critically. It cannot be 
justified by the interests of the pioneers, for there are not enough of them. For routine work 
it can be justified only when the technique involved is so difficult that constant full-time 
practice is necessary to maintain it.’ (ibid.)  
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The author cites neurosurgery and orthopaedics as examples in this argument: 
 
‘Among the subdivisions of surgery, neurosurgery has probably a good case for a 
monopoly of its highly technical field. Whether the same can be claimed for orthopaedics 
is still a matter for discussion. It is questionable whether the inherent complexity of 
orthopaedic principles and technique justify it. Chest surgery faces the same problem… It 
is short-sighted to argue that, because the orthopaedic surgeon can treat a hundred 
fractures better on average, than the general surgeon, therefore every fracture should be 
treated by an orthopaedic surgeon.’ (ibid.) 
 
The author goes on to note that the relationship between the intensive specialists and the general 
surgeon should rather be this: 
 
‘It is the duty of the pioneer to teach the general surgeon as much of his art as the latter 
can reasonably be expected to acquire and practice; it is the duty of the general surgeon 
to learn and use it as far as he can, to know his own limitations, and to seek the expert’s 
help, without fears for his own prestige, when faced with a problem that goes beyond his 
competence This sort of relationship between general surgery and its subdivisions will not 
develop if the latter are organised into watertight compartments.’ (ibid.:211) 
 
For this reason, the author argues, there should be no further divisions within surgery. However, 
in doing so the author does acknowledge that ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology are both 
well-defined specialities, even though it was not until 1947 that they fully differentiated from 
general surgery with their own examinations: 
 
‘On this, the pattern of any national service of specialists that may be instituted, and the 
official recognition accorded to higher qualifications, will have an all important influence. 
Therefore, we would urge that the categories in such a service be as few as possible, 
Medicine and surgery, as now generally recognised, should not be further subdivided. This 
would not apply, of course, to the already well-defined specialities which lie outside general 
medicine and surgery; obstetrics and gynaecology, radiology and anaesthetics.’ (ibid.) 
 
The author backs up his arguments utilising the Darwinian Biological model as an analogy: 
 
105 
 
‘The biologists have taught us that man achieved his superiority over the animals not 
merely by developing a superior brain but also by preserving a generalised adaptable 
bodily structure. We are led by the evidence of comparative anatomy to ponder upon the 
freedom of the will, or at least freedom of action, which we have because our bodies are 
versatile, untrammelled by specialisation for extreme but particular skill, and capable of 
any task the mind may imagine. The body politic is analogous; overspecialisation in the 
long run will hinder growth and adaptation, and it is at this stage in development most 
carefully to be guarded against.’ (ibid) 
 
During the closing paragraphs the message is clear and strong: there should be no further 
differentiation into separate speciality areas, and general surgery should remain in the state it is 
in at the time of writing. It is also quite interesting that the biological analogy is used here, almost 
one hundred years after its adoption and assimilation into surgical parlance. It is interesting to note 
that the author alludes to obstetrics and gynaecology as being well-defined specialities, however 
he omits to mention the foundation of the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
(registered in 1929, with Royal assent in 1938). 
 
The author also fails to omit whether the Royal College ‘capitulated’ in the face of adversity with 
regard to the foundation of a new Royal College for Obstetrics and Gynaecology, However, despite 
the omission in the article, this is an important point. ‘Capitulation’ is a strong word, and the 
question is, is it applicable to the case of obstetrics and gynaecology  
 
In the case of obstetrics and gynaecology, the strategy of the Royal College of Surgeons was, 
from the outset, outright opposition to the proposed foundation of a new Royal College. The Royal 
College of Physicians also objected to any suggestions of a rival college. Fletcher-Shaw (1954), 
notes that the opposition of the two Royal Colleges stemmed partly from a real difference of 
opinion with their opponents about the conduct of qualifying examinations: 
 
‘The conjoint examination at that time was very much the province and the property of the 
two Colleges, which they naturally wished to safeguard. They thought the emphasis placed 
on midwifery in the Final Conjoint examination was correct, while those who founded the 
new college made no secret of the fact that they considered the midwifery portion of this 
examination most unsatisfactory.’ (p.29) 
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At the same time, it is clear that the nub of the issue was the proposed foundation of a new College 
to rival their power as Stevens explains: 
 
‘Up to this point the specialities had been contained within their walls either because 
specialisation naturally followed from the MRCP or FRCS diploma, or through the speciality 
diplomas arranged between the two Royal Colleges through their own Conjoint Board. 
University diplomas did not present a problem to the Colleges, but the creation of a new 
professional College challenged their traditional supremacy as the great leaders of 
medicine and surgery.’ (2003:45)  
 
This apprehension is reflected in the closing paragraph of an article written by an eminent member 
of the Royal College of Physicians which appeared in the March 26th edition of the BMJ, in 1929. 
The writer points to the failings of the two Royal Colleges with regard to training in obstetrics and 
gynaecology: 
 
‘The present movement is due to the neglect of obstetrics and gynaecology by the Royal 
Colleges. The Royal College of Physicians instituted a special diploma in 1783, and has 
conferred its fellowship on a number of its obstetrical and gynaecological members; but it 
cannot be said – although Harvey, Blundell, Denman, Matthews Duncan, and others 
received that honour – that, in recent years, the Fellowship has been conferred as freely as 
on its medical members, or as the importance of the subject and the character of its 
practitioners deserved. An improvement in this respect is overdue and would be 
welcomed.’ (Spencer, 1929:523)  
 
The author even goes as far as to suggest that these failings could be addressed effectively if the 
two Royal Colleges amalgamated into a Royal Academy of Medicine: 
 
‘But to form a new college, which could not, at least for many years, compete in tradition, 
buildings, library, or funds with the existing Royal Colleges, would be to place obstetrics 
and gynaecology in a position of inferiority which its importance and achievements do not 
deserve. Far better would it be to extend the work of the Conjoint work of the two Royal 
Colleges by a complete amalgamation, as Clifford Allbutt suggested, into a Royal Academy 
of Medicine.’ (ibid.) 
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That this would ever have happened in practice is highly unlikely, given that both the Royal 
Colleges had their own unique histories and traditions and were fiercely competitive. The absence 
of any response from either the Presidents of the two Royal Colleges speaks volumes. 
 
The Royal College of Surgeons and the Royal College of Physicians had neglected obstetrics and 
gynaecology for many years, and to suggest improvements at that stage in the game, especially 
after the Articles of Association had been submitted to the Board of Trade, was akin to trying to 
close the stable door after the horse had bolted. The intervention of the state in asking the 
Presidents of the two Royal Colleges to meet with Blair Bell (Chairman of the Council of 
Signatories of the proposed College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists) shows the gravity of the 
situation. Blair Bell had already proposed an amendment to Articles 3 (e) and 3 (f)23 before the 
meeting, as a concessionary move in order to meet the objections raised by the Royal Colleges. 
The President of the Royal College of Physicians (Sir John Rose Bradford) decided to give his 
consent to ‘this compromise’, while the President of the Royal College of Surgeons (Lord Berkley 
Moynihan) refused to change his position in relation to this; towards the end of the meeting, 
however, Moynihan accepted the suggestions after additional negotiation (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
There was an assumption ‘that this agreement would be put before the Comitia of the Royal 
College of Physicians and the Council of the Royal College of Surgeons at their next meetings’ 
(ibid.:38). The Royal College of Physicians did this on July 4th, and the motion was carried 
unanimously. The President of the Royal College of Surgeons, however, played a different game: 
 
‘He called a meeting of those who had examined in obstetrics for the Conjoint Board, and 
the upshot was that a committee of the two Presidents, and four of the signatories of the 
proposed new College including myself (Fletcher-Shaw) was formed to draw up regulations 
for a new diploma in obstetrics and gynaecology of the Royal Colleges.’ (ibid.) 
 
23 Article 3 (e) To take part (if invited) in the examination of candidates for admission to the British Register of 
Medical Practitioners in co-operation with teaching and examining bodies authorised to conduct medical 
examinations for the purpose of qualifying candidates for admission to the British Register of Medical 
Practitioners.’ Article 3 (f) To grant to Registered Medical Practitioners certificates or equivalent recognition of 
special knowledge in Obstetrics and Gynaecology either alone or in co-operation with teaching and/or examining 
bodies authorised to grant such certificates provided always that every certificate shall contain on the face of it a 
statement to the effect that it does not, of itself, confer or purport to confer any legal qualification to practise 
gynaecology or obstetrics and that it is not issued under or in pursuance of or by virtue of any statutory or 
government sanction or authority. But should the Royal College of Physicians, London, and the Royal College of 
Surgeons, England, jointly agree to invite the co-operation of obstetricians and gynaecologists in an examination 
for the granting of a diploma in obstetrics and gynaecology and for so long as this arrangement shall remain in 
force the College shall alone not grant a diploma in obstetrics and gynaecology but shall be debarred from 
entering into similar arrangement with other bodies authorised to grant such certificates (Fletcher-Shaw, 
1954:37-38). 
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However, approval was still not forthcoming from the Royal College of Surgeons. The College’s 
strategy was to play the signatories of the proposed new College at their own game, namely, to 
establish a diploma in obstetrics and gynaecology which would rival any diploma from a new 
College in advance of the college being ‘registered'. The Royal College of Surgeons employed a 
further delaying tactic when it tried to amend the disputed clauses even further, but in the end the 
signatories refused this and submitted the Articles to the Board of Trade. These were accepted, 
and the new College was established in 1929 without the formal backing of the Royal College of 
Surgeons (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
Thus, the Royal College of Physicians capitulated as soon as it realised the overwhelming odds 
of its ever being able to turn the situation round. The Royal College of Surgeons did quite the 
reverse, choosing instead to play the politics of delay and distraction, but to no avail. Both Colleges 
had acted far too late, despite opportunities to improve the teaching of obstetrics and gynaecology 
in the early years of the twentieth century. A precedent had now been set! 
 
In the case of ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology, the Royal College faced pressures for 
change, internally and externally. This primarily centred around the necessity to clearly delineate 
a ‘specialist’ and implement the proposed specialty training programme. Additional factors were 
the size and influence of the specialist groups within the College walls and the significant effect 
they had on the generalist ethos of the Royal College (Stevens, 2003).  Last but not least was the 
increased role of the Royal College as a source of professional expertise (Rivett, 1998) in policy 
matters in the run up to the NHS.  
 
The Royal College of Surgeons was thus faced with the fact that the size and influence of these 
groups meant that there was a danger that if their demands were not taken seriously, they would 
establish new Colleges outside of its authority.  The College was also faced with the fact that it 
had to come to some decision on its structure and role as educator and representative body in the 
new health service; ‘the numerical balance of rapidly growing specialist fields would be of 
increasing importance in the National Health Service where the consultant staffing pattern would 
change quickly under the program of expansion’ (Stevens, 2003:106), together with the need to 
define what exactly a specialist should be provided additional momentum.  
 
The request from the British Association of Ophthalmologists and the British Association of 
Otolaryngology for separate Fellowship examinations was granted by the College Council in July 
1943. ‘A similar request was made by the British Association of Otorhinolaryngologists on behalf 
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of its members in 1945. The FRCS in ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology were instituted in 
1947’ (ibid.:112). 
 
Prima facie, one could say that the Royal College of Surgeons capitulated under pressures from 
various sources, but it could also be argued conversely that the stated aims of the Royal College 
of Surgeons was to retain surgery as a unified whole, as well as maintaining jurisdictional control 
over surgery; and that, although it failed on the former, it succeeded with the latter. Therefore, it 
could be argued that given the contextual pressures at that time, the Royal College had little choice 
but to act in the way it did; but that rather than as a sign of weakness, this should be viewed as a 
rational and pragmatic strategy which would safeguard the College’s jurisdictional hold over 
surgery as a whole, in as far as the areas in question remained within the walls of the Royal 
College, unlike obstetrics and gynaecology. Thus, in many respects this example is similar to the 
Royal College’s decisive move in terms of legitimating scientific medicine, resulting in 
maintenance of jurisdictional claims: adaptation can be a sign of strength and not weakness, 
survival and not extinction.  
 
 
4.4 Knowledge is Power, and Power is Knowledge 
 
Francis Bacon famously said that ‘Knowledge is power,’ and this has been regarded as 
‘encapsulating one of the most fundamental ideas of the Enlightenment’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998:226). 
However, during what could be termed as the first era in surgery, i.e. 1800-1900, it could be said 
that Power and Knowledge cannot be separated from each other in the way Bacon does. Flyvbjerg 
argues that:  
 
‘The relationship between knowledge and power is commutative: not only is knowledge 
power, but more importantly power is knowledge. Power determines what counts as 
knowledge, what kind of interpretation attains authority as the dominant interpretation. 
Power procures the knowledge which supports its purposes, while it ignores and 
suppresses that knowledge which doesn’t serve it.’ (ibid.) 
 
Power during the first surgical era derived primarily from social class, which effectively enabled 
control over knowledge; the knowledge of the dominant group or elite was embodied in the health 
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care structures (the medical curriculum and the hospital), which buttressed the status quo and 
were mutually reinforcing, thus enabling the elite general surgeons in the Royal College to promote 
or suppress knowledge, with the result that they were able to consolidate their power over the 
field. 
 
However, surgery then entered what could be termed a ‘transitional phase’, during which the 
prospect of ‘New Knowledge’ began to rear its ugly head.  This process was fuelled by the advent 
and legitimation of scientific knowledge, which began to develop during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Though the elite general surgeons were still the dominant group within the 
Royal College, the seeds of change had been sown during the first half of the twentieth century 
the transitional phase ended, and the context changed. Specialisation was here to stay, as 
reflected in the growth of specialist groups. World War II had seen the development of new 
techniques, and as medicine and surgery became even more scientifically advanced and the 
membership of specialist groups increased, the old conservative surgery of the generalists was 
challenged. Also, the proposed introduction of a National Health Service would effectively 
dismantle the old health care structures which buttressed and supported the elite generalists of 
the Royal College. 
 
Given the changing context, knowledge could potentially equal power; yet conversely power could 
still equal knowledge. Whether the former was possible would very much depend on the amount 
and type of accumulated capital/resources possessed by the groups in question, and importantly, 
the right variables being in place at the right time in order for knowledge to become effectively 
operationalised.  
 
The following sections of this chapter focus on the development of obstetrics and gynaecology, 
ophthalmology, otorhinolaryngology, and orthopaedics, paying particular attention to the 
accumulation of capital/resources, which would eventually prove vital in their quest for specialist 
differentiation. Of the four areas, orthopaedics is the odd one out, in that it did not differentiate 
from surgery until the 1980’s. Nonetheless, foundations were laid during this period which would 
later prove essential in their quest for specialist differentiation. 
 
As alluded to earlier, (in section 4.2) it may be useful to view the profession of surgery as a 
collection of segments, but as in any other field there are multiple inequalities: between those that 
hold the reins of power, and between those that do not. In many respects, and particularly the 
potential to rise may be dependent on having access to the right resources at the right time 
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inasmuch as, one could liken this field or structure to the class structure: some will rise and some 
will not.  
 
 
4.5 Obstetrics and Gynaecology – A New Professional College is Born 
 
Obstetrics and gynaecology achieved the ultimate accolade with the foundation of its own 
professional college in 1929. This was a triumph of specialist differentiation. However, its 
beginnings were humble. In terms of its position in the structure of the surgical field during the 
nineteenth century, obstetrics, and gynaecology, possessed less inherited or initial ‘capital’ than 
ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology; in many respects it shared a similar position to 
orthopaedics, in so far as the elite of the profession viewed it with disdain. 
 
Obstetrics and gynaecology also had the problem of bestriding both medicine and surgery, so that 
its fate was tied up with both the Royal College of Surgeons and the Royal College of Physicians. 
For example, in the early part of the nineteenth century when attempts were being made to force 
the Royal Colleges to found examinations in midwifery both reacted in a less than positive manner: 
 
‘At one time the Prime Minister was approached, and in reply to his enquiry for information 
from the Royal College of Physicians, the President, Sir Henry Halford, replied by saying 
that no man who has an academic education ought to practice obstetrics. Soon after, at a 
Comitia, he stated that obstetrics is no calling for a gentleman. The Royal College of 
Surgeons at this same period gave no greater encouragement to the man-midwives and 
excluded from its Council and Court of Examiners anyone who practised obstetrics.’ 
(Fletcher-Shaw, 1954:5)   
 
Although, the advent of anaesthesia advanced the field of gynaecology, and antiseptics improved 
the safety of obstetrics, the relative position of obstetrics in relation to medicine and surgery was 
that of a minor component: 
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‘The Royal College of Physicians was more interested in medicine than in obstetrics. The 
Royal College of Surgeons was more interested in surgery than in gynaecology, and 
obstetrics and gynaecology received the minimum attention from both.’ (ibid.) 
 
Change was also obstructed by the hierarchical structure of the voluntary hospitals and the 
inflexible system in relation to the way the bed base was allocated. ‘The physicians and surgeons 
in the teaching hospitals in London retarded the development of obstetrics and gynaecology 
departments’, and furthermore ‘would not give up beds for the proper teaching’ (Stevens, 
2003:44) of this branch.  
 
The foundation of departments in obstetrics and gynaecology encountered resistance from 
physicians and surgeon’s country wide. Such opposition was counteracted by the formation of 
separate special hospitals. ‘The hospitals in London24 founded specially for obstetrics and 
gynaecology were uninfluenced by conservative physicians and surgeons and as a result were 
free to develop as they wished’ (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954:9).  
 
This freedom was a mixed blessing, for on the one hand it allowed the Gynaecological group to 
play an important role in the expansion of gynaecological surgery, but on the other hand it opened 
up the real danger of a separation of obstetrics from gynaecology, given its surgical outlook. 
Fletcher-Shaw uses Victor Bonney, a brilliant gynaecologist in the forefront of the development of 
surgical gynaecology and at the height of his career in the 1920’s, as an example when making 
the point with regard to the real danger of the separation of obstetrics and gynaecology: 
 
‘Now in the nineteen-twenties, Bonney wished all gynaecologists to follow in his footsteps, 
to be Fellows of the Royal College of Surgeons, to be trained abdominal surgeons, and to 
consider each gynaecological problem from the surgical angle.’ (ibid.:10) 
 
In addition, given that Bonney had a cult following amongst the trainees, together with the fact that 
around the turn of the century the London based gynaecological trainees took the examinations 
for the Royal College of Physicians (M.R.C.P.) and the Royal College of Surgeons (F.R.C.S.). 
 
24 Queen Charlotte’s, the City of London, and York Road, for obstetrics and Chelsea, Samaritan and Soho for 
gynaecology (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954:9). 
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Then within ten years, they were satisfied with taking the F.R.C.S. on its own, pointed to the 
potential for separation (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
Despite obstetrics and gynaecology’s low level of ‘initial capital’ however, it was able to 
differentiate almost sixty years before orthopaedics, with which it shared similarities, and twenty 
years before ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology, which started off with higher levels of initial 
capital. The question which arises is: how was this possible?  
 
From the outset it should be stated that obstetrics and gynaecology’s differentiation from medicine 
and general surgery was not in any sense predestined. In this regard it has something in common 
with all the other areas which eventually differentiated. In many respects, the remarkable success 
story of obstetrics and gynaecology only reinforces the argument propounded throughout this 
thesis, namely that specialist differentiation is not an inevitability. Obstetrics and gynaecology’s 
success, not unlike that of other areas, is attributable to the accumulation of capital/resources 
throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, even though the specific types 
of capital it possessed at the outset were scanty.  
 
Despite obstetrics and gynaecology’s initial handicap, there were three indirect factors which 
probably worked in favour of their accumulating specific types of capital – social capital, symbolic 
capital, scientific capital, specific cultural capital and economic capital which would prove useful 
in the long-term: firstly, the development of obstetrics and gynaecology, especially surgical 
gynaecology, was faster in the provincial centres outside of London itself, simply because it was 
performed outside of the teaching hospitals and although special hospitals were founded in the 
capital, the special hospitals in the provinces grew in size and significance as they became the 
designated teaching units for undergraduates; secondly, the development of surgical gynaecology 
under figures such as Bonney, a general surgeon who had a good reputation and following 
(Fletcher-Shaw, 1954), helped gynaecology as an arm of general abdominal surgery to become 
more attractive; thirdly, given that surgical gynaecology became a recognised arm of general 
surgery, and its techniques were developed and perfected, it was likely to attract private practice, 
another attraction for new recruits. 
 
As with all groups there will be leaders and pioneers, as well as the rank and file membership. 
Leaders and pioneers may disagree on the objectives of the group, and rank and file members 
who may or may not be fully cognisant of the objectives of the leaders (Larson, 1977).  
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It is also likely that objectives change with contexts.  In this respect, obstetrics and gynaecology’s 
early development was no different to the other areas. During the group’s early years, special 
hospitals were established, followed by the formation of medical societies which were set up by 
likeminded surgeons in and around the ‘special hospitals’. During the maturation stage - the final 
stage in the development of the specialist area during the latter years of the nineteenth century – 
the area was to become a specialist section of The Royal Society of Medicine (Stevens, 2003). 
 
However, although part of the capital (in Bourdieuian terms) accumulated during the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries was due to indirect factors, this does not negate that there were 
conscious efforts to accumulate types of capital. Indeed, Bonney, not unlike his trusted adviser 
(Sir John Bland-Sutton), became an ‘abdominal and gynaecological surgeon’. His own operative 
skill put him at the forefront of operative gynaecology, and during the early years of the twentieth 
century he set out on his quest to ensure fellow gynaecologists followed the same path, to be fully 
trained abdominal surgeons and Fellows of the Surgical Royal College (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
However, this conscious effort to accumulate capital on the part of Bonney was purely for the 
establishment and betterment of surgical gynaecology, and in no way represented an attempt to 
accumulate capital to realise a long-term goal such as specialist differentiation for obstetrics and 
gynaecology, and the foundation of a professional college. Bonney’s reaction to the suggestion to 
found a College clearly backs this up. Fletcher-Shaw documents that when the suggestion was 
publicly proclaimed, Bonney, who by then was a member of the Council of the Royal College of 
Surgeons, strongly opposed it, as he feared that it might be a retrogressive step which could lead 
to gynaecology taking several steps backwards. This is not to say however, that there were no 
obstetricians or gynaecologists whose dream it was to found a separate college. Fletcher-Shaw 
reflected on what some began to think towards the end of the nineteenth century: 
 
‘While I was undergoing a full five years’ apprenticeship in resident appointments it seemed 
to me to be pointless to spend a further two years of study on subjects little related to this 
chosen branch of medicine. Clearly, however, the young physicians and surgeons had 
always gained much by being compelled to prepare for higher examinations after their 
junior appointments and before being elected to senior posts. This period of mental 
digestion and mental stimulation would be invaluable to the young gynaecologist if only it 
could be obtained in his own subject. If only the long clinical training in some schools 
could be combined with the discipline of working for a higher examination in obstetrics 
and gynaecology, what an improved what an improved race of candidates both types of 
school would provide.’ (ibid.:6) 
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Fletcher-Shaw then goes on to opine that the only way to achieve this was through the foundation 
of a Royal College: 
 
‘The only way to achieve this was by setting up a Royal College which would insist upon 
both clinical training and examination as being equally important factors in entry to its 
membership. And this would at the same time advance the teaching of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology and restore to a proper partnership the three main divisions of the great body 
of medicine.’ (ibid.)  
 
However, this wouldn’t be an easy dream to realise, for obstetrics and gynaecology had arms on 
both sides of the divide, namely medicine and surgery, and there were forces pushing and pulling 
in both directions. In particular, there were four different factors in the equation: obstetricians 
(physicians); gynaecologists (general surgeons); general practitioners; and midwives.  
 
Midwifery was well on the way to becoming a separate self-governing area. A register was 
introduced through the Central Midwives Board in 1902 and produced stringent regulations for 
practice. Midwifery’s skills base and respect as a profession is reflected by their central role in 
childbirth (Stevens, 2003). Thus, obstetrics was being practised on two levels: by consultants in 
the special hospitals, and by midwives and general practitioners in the community. This raised an 
important question: was obstetrics and gynaecology one field of practice or two?  
 
This question was not resolved at the time, although, if Bonney’s movement had succeeded there 
wouldn’t have been any need for this question, as a permanent separation would have occurred.25 
 
Despite Bonney’s movement there were gynaecologists who wanted to prevent the divorce of 
obstetrics and gynaecology. At the same time there was another factor which called for a College: 
‘the failure to raise the standard of medical teaching in obstetrics had become a scandal’ (Stevens, 
2003:44), the most serious effect being the ‘high maternal mortality rate, then 4.33 per thousand 
live births’ (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954:12). 
 
 
25 Two or three universities did separate the teaching of obstetrics and gynaecology, although at succeeding 
elections they were amalgamated (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954:11). 
 
116 
 
The difficulty lay in trying to find a group of leading gynaecologists who were likely to carry the 
obstetricians and gynaecologists of the country with them: 
 
‘Often over the years, I had compiled a list of leading Gynaecologists, men of character as 
well as ability, who were likely to carry the Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of the country 
with them, provided that all in the group agreed upon a policy and would whole-heartedly 
support it. There lay the difficulty. In such an individualistic profession as ours there were 
likely to be differences upon detail, and these were likely to be exaggerated into principles 
unless the whole group could be brought together for discussion. This was impossible 
during these years, and any attempt would have ended only in bringing together an 
unrepresentative group from one of the five obstetric societies.’ (ibid.:13)  
 
The following account of events from 1923 onwards provides more clear evidence that the 
foundation of a professional College was far from inevitable. It was not until 1923 that Fletcher-
Shaw realised that a body already existed for the purpose, namely the Gynaecological Visiting 
Society. This society had been founded back in 1911 by Blair Bell, a gynaecologist from Liverpool, 
and its thirty members were chairs in all British universities except for two. In view of the fact that 
Blair Bell was leader of the society, it was he who was approached by Fletcher-Shaw in 1924: 
 
‘Blair Bell at once saw the value of a College and grasped the broad outlines of my 
proposals, but he also saw the difficulties and asked for a little time to think it over. During 
the December examinations he discussed the matter with his external examiners, Sir Ewen 
Maclean and Mr Comyns Berkeley. After some correspondence, it was finally agreed that I 
should bring up the matter for discussion at the next meeting of the Gynaecological Visiting 
Society, which was held in Cardiff on February 2, 1925. The necessity for such a College 
was acknowledged, the general principles unanimously accepted and Blair Bell, Comyns 
Berkeley, Ewen Maclean and myself were elected to form a committee to explore the 
possibilities of founding such an organisation.’ (ibid.:14) 
 
Fletcher-Shaw goes on to note that it was not until the 22nd April 1925 that the committee was able 
to hold its first meeting, and that it was during that meeting that the committee received its first bit 
of bad news: 
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‘Comyns Berkeley had busied himself in getting information as to the procedure in 
founding a Royal College and now he dampened our ardour by telling us that a Royal 
Charter was never given to an organisation to which there is opposition. Opposition from 
the Royal Colleges was one thing we could be certain of, so this information brought our 
activities to a halt.’ (ibid.:17) 
 
Berkeley had, however, discovered an alternative way of proceeding: to establish the College as 
a company with Limited Liability, with approval from the Board of Trade to remove “Limited” from 
the title. Fletcher-Shaw recalls that it was decided to accept this route after much debate and a 
decision was made to propose to the next meeting of the Gynaecological Visiting Society that the 
establishment of the college was achievable, albeit in a more modest form (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
However, Fletcher-Shaw also notes that the success of the proposals was doubtful without the 
adequate support of the leading figures in obstetrics and gynaecology in London: 
 
‘Before the next meeting of the Gynaecological Visiting Society, in June 1926, it was clear 
that the success of the College was very doubtful unless we secured the support of the 
leading senior obstetricians and gynaecologists in London. It was too much to expect 
young men to give enthusiastic support to a movement opposed by their seniors, or even 
one which did not have their full support.’ (ibid.:19) 
 
With this in mind, Sir Francis Champney’s, Sir George Blacker, Dr Herbert Spencer, Dr Watts 
Eden26 and Dr Fairbairn were all approached, and a meeting over dinner was arranged: 
 
‘At the end of the evening, Champney’s, Eden and Fairbairn promised qualified support to 
the College. Champney’s and Eden were opposed to the word College, preferring 
Association, while Fairbairn opposed examinations. Sir George Blacker opposed for the 
curious reason that he disliked the other two Royal Colleges and would take no part in 
founding a third. Herbert Spencer was undecided that evening, but apparently after 
sleeping on it, decided against.’ (ibid.:22) 
 
 
26 Fletcher-Shaw notes that Watts Eden was ‘accepted as a leader, not only in London alone, but in British 
obstetrics generally’ (1954:21). 
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The atmosphere had thus changed, the members of the Gynaecological Visiting Society had 
accepted the broad principles set out in the first memorandum and had worked towards these 
aims. Conversely the  
 
‘older men accepted only the necessity of founding somebody to ensure co-operation 
amongst gynaecologists. The idea that a College could be founded on the lines of the two 
older Royal Colleges, to which they had given allegiance all their professional lives, and 
that its examinations could ever rival theirs, was to their mind unthinkable.’ (ibid.:23) 
 
However, according to Fletcher-Shaw the whole question of title, College or Association was 
settled tactfully and cleverly: 
 
‘This question of title, College or Association, was settled tactfully and cleverly by Comyns 
Berkeley. He asked me to give a written description of the organisation as visualised by 
the Committee, but without any title, so that he could the matter further with Champney’s. 
He subsequently suggested that I should get a memorandum in favour of the title College 
signed by a considerable number of professors who supported the plan. I quickly and 
easily secured a memorandum signed by professors of obstetrics and gynaecology in 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Newcastle, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield, Birmingham, 
Bristol, Wales and Belfast. Apparently, this impressed Champney’s; at any rate he now 
agreed to the title College.’ (ibid.) 
 
According to Fletcher-Shaw,  
 
‘having obtained the tentative support of Champney’s, Eden and Fairburn, and the 
unconditional support of the members of the Gynaecological Visiting Society, the next 
move was to proceed with the drawing up of the Articles of Association.’ (ibid.)  
 
At the next meeting of the Gynaecological Visiting Society, in February 1927, the registration 
documents which had to be submitted to the Board of Trade had to carry nine signatures. As 
Fletcher-Shaw notes this was not without hitches: 
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‘The meeting decided that on the nine signatories, and by this time all accepted the 
principle that the College should have the power to choose its Members by examination, if 
it so desired, though Champney’s, Fairbairn, and I think Eden, still hoped that this would 
not be necessary. To claim also the right to institute an examination for undergraduates 
and postgraduates was strongly opposed by them and a number of others, on the ground 
that it was foolish to ask for something unattainable.’ (ibid.:25) 
 
Issues such as these would not be  
 
‘resolved until the whole project of founding the College, together with the proposed 
Articles, was put before a meeting of consultant gynaecologists invited from all the 
recognised hospitals in the British Isles. This took place on 26th April, 1927. On the 
following day, the British Congress of Obstetrics and Gynaecology opened in Manchester.’ 
(ibid.:26)  
 
The outcome was positive, and the memorandum and Articles of Association were submitted to 
the Board of Trade. Additionally, the General Medical Council and Ministry of Health were 
approached without objection. In June 1928 a notice was posted in the Times advising that any 
‘objections’ should be lodged up to and including the 11th July (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
Although everything appeared to be running smoothly, an objection from the solicitors of the Royal 
Colleges emphasized the precarious nature of the process. The Royal Colleges’ objection was: 
‘That the granting by the proposed College of Certificates for proficiency in Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology would be an infringement of the privileges granted to the two Royal Colleges’ 
(ibid.:28). 
 
As time moved on, the opposition from the Royal College of Physicians began to wane, but that 
of the Royal College of Surgeons increased. This obviously placed the Board of Trade in a difficult 
position: 
 
‘The arguments were in favour of granting registration to the new College, but it was very 
difficult to do so in the face of opposition from the Royal Colleges, which for so long had 
dominated medicine. We knew that the Board of Trade and the President of the Royal 
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College of Physicians were consulting Sir George Newman, Principal Medical Officer to the 
Ministry of Health, as, there is little doubt, did also the President of the Royal College of 
Surgeons. But as one of his senior officials said, if the delay is due to Newman, he is in a 
fix, as maternal mortality is one of his greatest problems.” It was evident he wanted an 
amicable settlement, and he advised Blair Bell to invite the two Presidents to dinner to 
discuss the matter in a friendly way. This he did but unfortunately without reaching any 
agreement.’ (ibid.:35) 
 
Despite this setback, it appears that fortuitous circumstances had the potential to place the 
process back on track. According to Fletcher-Shaw, a chance meeting between Sir Boyd Merriman 
(Solicitor-General)27 and Neville Chamberlain (Minister of Health), who happened to be staying at 
the same club in Manchester, gave him the opportunity to tell him informally about the College. 
 
The resignation of the Baldwin government cleared the way for a new administration headed by 
Chamberlain. The new Prime Minister’s first speech made maternal mortality a priority in the 
government’s reform agenda. This was obviously ‘political capital’ from heaven, so to speak, and 
such heaven-sent opportunities could not be passed up easily! Fletcher-Shaw immediately wrote 
a letter to Sir Boyd Merriman, describing the aims and objectives of the College-to-be, as well as 
noting that the Board of Trade was hindering its establishment: 
 
‘I pointed out that maternal mortality was now in the public eye, as evidenced by speeches 
made by the Minister of Health and now by the Prime Minister, but for a much longer period 
it had been gravely considered by the teachers of obstetrics, who believed that the only 
way to achieve a permanent reduction in mortality was by improved teaching and training 
of medical students and graduates. We all held that this could be best brought about by 
the creation of a College in line with the older Colleges of Physicians and Surgeons. I gave 
him a detailed history of our discussions and the enquiry and told him how the Board of 
Trade was delaying our registration. I ended with the statement that, as the Prime Minister 
had brought the subject of maternal mortality into party politics, it seemed unlikely that the 
present election could be fought without some public manifesto from the obstetricians.’ 
(ibid.:36) 
 
 
27 Boyd-Merriman had worked closely with Chamberlain when preparing his National Health Insurance 
(Fletcher-Shaw, 1954:35). 
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The outcome of the letter was the intervention of Neville Chamberlain, who at short notice, 
requested a meeting with Blair Bell and the Presidents of the two Royal Colleges at the Ministry 
of Health. The outcome of the meeting was that there would be an amendment to the Articles of 
Association, namely that any diploma or certificate in obstetrics and gynaecology granted by the 
College should carry no legal qualification to practice these. The President of the Royal College 
of Physicians, Sir John Rose Bradford, agreed to the compromise, but the President of the Royal 
College of Surgeons, Lord Moynihan would not move. However, despite Moynihan’s 
intransigence, the amended clause was submitted to the Board of Trade and the registration was 
finally accepted on 9th September 1929. On the 13th September 1929 the official Limited Company 
documentation was received, with consent to remove the word “limited” (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
The College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists was born! 
 
As in medicine and surgery, College membership became the recognised route for consultant 
appointments in obstetrics and gynaecology. Obstetrics and Gynaecology were combined. The 
symbolism and kudos attached to a new College was reflected in the increased standing of the 
specialty and its practitioners, this was even more marked following the bestowing of a Royal title 
to the College in 1938, although the charter was only approved in 1946, because of the Second 
World War. Clearly the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists was not destined to 
exist: its very existence was a triumph over strong opposition. As alluded to earlier, the formation 
of a professional College is the ultimate form of specialist differentiation (self-regulation). Although 
the magnitude of this should not be understated, it is the underlying rationale which acts as a 
precedent, e.g. for the need to raise standards of training and be fully represented in the 
undergraduate curriculum (Stevens, 2003). 
 
 
4.6 Specialist Differentiation: The Cases of Ophthalmology and 
Otorhinolaryngology 
 
Ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology were the second success stories of the first half of the 
twentieth century. They were able to secure the support of the Royal College of Surgeons for their 
requests to have fellowship examinations in ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology alone, which 
effectively meant complete separation from general surgery, their own examination structures and 
control over speciality standards, and a monopoly in the market for services based on their 
expertise. In this respect they were both successful in pursuing the ‘professional project’  
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Ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology were possibly more loosely attached to general surgery 
than orthopaedics, since they both had a medical as well as a surgical aspect/angle. They were 
also both non-threatening in terms of their remit, whereas orthopaedics was seen as a threat to 
the territory of the generalist and hence the status quo.  
 
The private practice angle must also be taken into account. Private practice in ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology was attractive and certainly attracted more interest than that in orthopaedics, 
which had a lowly image. Thus, as long as the dispositions of the ophthalmologists and 
otorhinolaryngologists were to play the game, that is to say, they were first and foremost general 
surgeons with a specialist interest in eye or ear nose and throat surgery, this satisfied the old 
guard, many of whom ‘held dual appointments at the voluntary as well as a specialist hospital’ 
(Stevens, 2003:28). Indeed, many of the voluntary hospitals established their own special 
departments (Bynum, 1994). These factors had a potential effect on the interest in these areas, 
and this increased the numbers – a pivotal factor when it came to self-regulation in 1947.  
 
Ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology were successful in their quest for differentiation thanks to 
a change in context, but also because they both had specific capital resources which orthopaedics 
did not possess, such as scientific capital associated with the development of technological foci 
(instrumentation); economic capital, due in no small part to its ability to attract private practice and 
social capital, as the membership of the respective areas flourished and a sense of collective 
identity developed. In addition, Ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology had a better start 
genetically speaking than obstetrics and gynaecology, and certainly better than orthopaedics. Both 
ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology were less tightly attached to general surgery, and as a 
result they were not seen as a threat to the territory of the general surgeons at a time when 
orthopaedics was. 
 
In consequence it was able to accumulate or garner specific types of capital more readily, so by 
1943 they were both large areas with technological foci, and this (together with other variables) 
enabled them to differentiate. Time may also be a healer in certain respects, as areas may 
accumulate capital in the form of resources. For example, ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology 
did not immediately challenge the status quo, indeed practising ophthalmologists and 
otorhinolaryngologists continued to practice as general surgeons with a special interest in either 
ophthalmology or otorhinolaryngology (Stevens, 2003).  
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To have attempted separation from general surgery forty years earlier, at the turn of the century, 
would have been unthinkable. As with many things, timing was of the essence. As noted in the 
previous chapter, both ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology developed around specific 
instrumentation, namely the ophthalmoscope and the laryngoscope, and at the turn of the century 
they were fairly well developed areas with special hospitals devoted to their fields, and diplomas 
organised jointly by the Royal College of Surgeons and the Royal College of Physicians.28  
 
The interplay of these factors enabled ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology to demand their 
own examinations within the College structure. Admittedly, it is difficult to gauge the weight of 
separate factors, since they are very much interlinked. The size and influence of both of these 
areas altered the power dynamics within the College, and, given the external factors operating at 
the same time, aided the political outcome.  
 
The College accepted the role ‘of spokesman for consultants in the National Health Service 
negotiations,’ the implication being ‘that they were equally representative of all groups of specialist 
practice. In fact, they were not’ (Stevens, 2003:110). After general surgery, ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology were the largest groupings at that time, and jointly they outnumbered the 
general surgery contingent.29  
 
In an effort to placate these groupings the College held a special meeting in May 1944, the aim 
being to discuss whether to appoint additional members to council. Such a measure would provide 
representation for these groups, and hence a ‘broader base for national negotiation’ (ibid.:112). 
However, this was not enough to satisfy the growing demands of these aspirant groups for a 
separate training structure. Its inadequacy in their eyes is reflected in a piece written in the 1946 
edition of the Lancet which questioned the value of the FRCS examination, with its emphasis on 
the generality of surgery, for eye surgeons and E.N.T. surgeons: 
 
‘Of what value is detailed knowledge of the anatomy of the limbs or of herniae to an E.N.T. 
or eye surgeon? Why ask an E.N.T. surgeon about spondylolisthesis or the surgery of renal 
calculi? No E.N.T. specialist is fit to operate on a hernia or treat a fractured limb or give an 
 
28 The new diplomas which required a modest training period (typically six months), were of particular use to 
GPs with an interest in eye diseases, or ear nose and throat conditions, but were not of the same standing as the 
FRCS which was the prerequisite for consultant staff (Stevens, 2003). 
29 The number of General Surgical Fellows in the College 1938-39 numbered 375; ophthalmology, 244; 
otorhinolaryngology, 156 (ibid.:111). 
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opinion on an abdomen 5 years after passing the F.R.C.S., so why teach him in the first 
place?’ (p.978) 
 
The F.R.C.S. in Ophthalmology and Otorhinolaryngology were instituted accordingly in 1947 
(Stevens, 2003). 
 
 
4.7 Orthopaedics: Laying the Foundations for the Mature Speciality  
 
Orthopaedics did not differentiate from general surgery until the 1980’s. However, as with all 
differentiated areas, the mature speciality was not something which developed and came about 
overnight. Given the various obstacles put in its way by the dominant elite of the surgical 
establishment, it is nothing short of a miracle that it still existed on the eve of the new National 
Health Service. Given this, any discussion of specialist differentiation in orthopaedics worth its salt 
should be a tale in two halves: from the 1800’s to 1948, and from 1948 to 1980.  
 
During the 1800’s, orthopaedics’ relative position within the structure of the surgical field and its 
initial capital were low, especially in comparison with areas such as ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology. Inasmuch as it was viewed with disdain by the surgical establishment, it held 
a similar position to obstetrics and gynaecology (as noted in section 4.5), but unlike obstetrics and 
gynaecology was seen as a direct threat to the establishment. For orthopaedic surgery was more 
closely related to general surgery, in that it was especially concerned with the skeletal system and 
related structures, thus crossing through the organ geography inhabited by the old-guard general 
surgeons. In this respect, it could be said that orthopaedics was indirectly confronting order and 
power given their knowledge and anatomical remit. However, in practice orthopaedics did not 
possess any exchangeable assets to trade on the capital stock exchange, and their knowledge 
was subordinated to the surgical authority and power of the generalists, and marginalised. Unlike 
ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology which had the ophthalmoscope and the laryngoscope, 
orthopaedics lacked scientific capital in the form of scientific and or technological focus and given 
that its clinical focus was on childhood diseases and deformities which tended to affect the poor 
and industrial working class, it was highly unlikely that there would be any opportunity for private 
practice among the middle and upper echelons of society. One of the only conditions applicable 
to this section of society was Scoliosis (curvature of the spine) and this was the surgical territory 
of the generalists in the voluntary hospitals (Cooter, 1993). 
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This lack of scope for private practice was obviously going to be unattractive to the younger 
generation of surgeons. Thus, in addition to scientific capital, orthopaedics did not possess 
symbolic capital (‘attached to a proper name and capable, just like a famous brand name in 
business, of guaranteeing a lasting relationship with a captive clientele’ (Bourdieu, 1988:58)), 
given its association with the poor working class, and economic capital (‘which is immediately and 
directly convertible into money’ (Bourdieu, 1986:16)), in view of the lack of opportunities for 
private practice. 
 
The fact that orthopaedics was seen as a threat by the establishment and associated with crippled 
children and the industrial working class resulted in its marginalisation from the established body 
of British hospital medicine (Cooter, 1993). In this respect it resembled obstetrics and 
gynaecology, which was marginalised from the prestigious teaching hospitals, especially in 
London.  By contrast, it was unlike ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology, which became part of 
the prestigious voluntary hospital system in the second half of the nineteenth-century precisely 
because they were not seen as a threat to the establishment and were not associated with poorer 
social groups.  
 
Orthopaedics’s marginalisation obviously meant that it was absent from the medical curricula, 
which further resulted in a lack of understanding in relation to the clinical work of the orthopaedists.  
This would have been especially so amongst medical students and trainee surgeons. Indeed, its 
low status and general dreary image was reflected in the membership of the BOS (British 
Orthopaedic Society): the BOS was formed in 1894; it rarely had more than 33 members at its 
meetings at any one time, and only had a short life (four years) Given the precarious position of 
orthopaedics within the surgical field at that time it was prone to the effects of the plotting and 
manoeuvring of the elite general surgeons as it tried to secure a place in the highly esteemed 
teaching hospitals (Cooter, 1993). Indeed, given the anatomical remit of orthopaedics, and its 
lowly social image, it was in the interests of the elite to control access and thereby circumvent any 
attempt by orthopaedics to secure a place in the prestigious teaching hospitals. Failure to do so, 
could have potentially jeopardised the ‘conservation and accumulation of the capital’ (Bourdieu, 
1986:23), in this case social capital, which was the foundation for surgical authority and power 
within the field. 
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The First World War provides a clear example of this. According to Joel Goldthwait30, writing in 
the Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery 1933, orthopaedics came into its own during the war 
because: 
 
‘The type of injury to be treated had rarely ever been seen by the orthopaedist any more 
than the general surgeon, but the basic principle of training made the orthopaedic surgeon 
see from the very beginning an end result, and the special case simply demanded the 
adaptation of well understood principles to the War casualty.’ (p.282)  
 
Indeed, Jones was able to implement this fundamental principle towards the end of 1914, when 
concerns were being voiced by the War Office about the wastage of manpower. Jones’s strategy 
of experimenting with special hospitals for restorative function (Jones, 1918) proved so successful 
that he ‘was given permission to increase the number of beds in Liverpool and start similar 
establishments in other centres’ (Cooter, 1993:114). 
 
The ability of orthopaedics to rise to the challenges of war helped to transform its standing. 
According to Cooter, ‘no longer was the specialism the butt of medical jokes – a pretentiously 
labelled medical backwater for the treatment of crippled children’ (ibid.:106). Indeed, military 
orthopaedics clinical territory was extensive, encompassing the treatment of ‘gross deformities, 
the reconstruction of joints, grafting operations on bones, muscles, and tendons, and the repair of 
injured nerves’ (Jones, 1918:41).  
 
However, the territorial advances made by orthopaedics during the war were short lived. Although 
orthopaedics was now recognised its professional territory was barely larger than before the war. 
Many of the orthopaedic techniques developed during the war were adopted by the general 
surgeons, especially young men, who were on the whole receptive to the new surgical techniques 
and knowledge and were keen to perform the most up-to-date treatment (Cooter, 1993). But few 
of these young surgeons had any interest in specialising in orthopaedics. For consultant trainees 
in hospitals, too, orthopaedics still remained unattractive for, in addition to low remuneration in its 
practice; it still lacked the appeal of the abdomen (Jones, 1918).  
 
 
30 ‘Joel Goldthwait organised America’s first clinic for adult cripples (at the outpatient department of Boston’s 
Carney Hospital)’ (Cooter, 1993:39).  
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Orthopaedists had accumulated symbolic capital and scientific capital, proving that they were 
competent and adept at handling complex military injuries, including fractures. Yet they were not 
able to utilise this, given that they were marginalised and too few to constitute an effective lobby 
in surgico-politics. For example, the newly formed BOA (British Orthopaedic Association) of 1918 
only had twenty-four members, and by 1919 this had only risen to twenty-six (Cooter, 1993). 
Consequently, orthopaedists were more or less directly constrained by their immediate political 
context.  
 
Thus, at the end of the war, orthopaedics was no closer to establishing a niche in the prestigious 
teaching hospitals. Indeed, Le Vay (1990) notes that although there were cases of orthopaedic 
surgeons being appointed to the teaching hospitals after World War I ‘there were often ferocious 
running battles for beds and services with the general surgeons’ (p.142).  
 
In addition, Jones’s hope that undergraduate orthopaedic programmes would be established in 
the London teaching hospitals also proved wishful thinking. Jones was also hopeful that the 
military orthopaedic centres established during the war years would be equipped for the training 
of postgraduates in orthopaedics. (Cooter, 1993) These hopes, ‘were extinguished however, by 
1924 when the Ministry of Pensions (who had taken over control of the orthopaedic centres) 
relinquished its lease’ (ibid.:131) on many of them. The result being that most of the centres were 
restored to their original function of poor law infirmaries.   
 
The case of industrial injuries also provides another clear example of orthopaedics’s precarious 
position, and its dependence on positive contextual circumstances. Cooter notes that: 
 
‘In view of the obstacles thrown in the path of orthopaedic expansion in the voluntary 
hospitals at the end of the war, one might have expected orthopaedics to seize these 
opportunities in industry. After all, this was an open domain where new claims for expertise 
could be staked without fear of vested medical interests. However, despite the encouraging 
rhetoric and the apparent opportunities Jones and his colleagues were unable to transfer 
military orthopaedics to industry social, political and above all economic circumstances 
determined the limits of the possible.’ (ibid.:138) 
 
Industrial medicine did not have a very glamorous image, indeed the medical care of workers with 
disabilities was not overly attractive to the vast majority of wealthy benefactors and local 
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authorities. Moreover, workers and industrialists viewed it with indifference. Workmen’s 
Compensation acts in operation at the time acted as a disincentive to undergo medical treatment, 
given that treatment would have a direct affect on compensation payments (i.e. they would be 
reduced or stop altogether). As far as industrialist employers were concerned, lump-sum 
compensation settlements for disability were preferable given their convenience and cost-
effectiveness, as opposed to indeterminate and inestimable ‘weekly payments’, and potential 
rehabilitative treatment. Clearly the absence of industrial rehabilitation schemes in Britain before 
the 1920’s can be explained in terms of economic agendas. Such factors impeded the growth of 
industrial orthopaedics (treatment of industrial related injuries). Additionally, the absence of special 
centres for the treatment of industrial injuries (fractures) run by orthopaedists resulted in most 
industrial injuries being treated by GPs and general surgeons in the voluntary hospitals (Cooter, 
1993). 
 
However, despite the lack of opportunities in industrial medicine, orthopaedics found itself being 
steered towards other causes. Clearly as Cooter aptly notes: 
 
‘To some extent all professional agendas are set by circumstances outside the immediate 
control of the professions involved. But some agendas are determined more than others, 
and this was especially so for orthopaedics in the increasingly cold economic climates of 
the post-war years.’ (ibid.:152) 
 
The central protagonists who set this agenda were prominent professional figures such as George 
Newman, public health physician, author of a treatise on the impact of social problems and infant 
mortality (Infant Mortality: A Social problem), and last but not least, Chief Medical Officer to the 
Ministry of Health. Newman was keen to build on and develop the advances made in the treatment 
of crippled children prior to the war. Newman argued that scientific advances achieved during the 
war should make it possible to deal with crippled children more effectively (Cooter, 1993). 
 
Thus, particular circumstances ensured that the health of children was elevated to the top of the 
political programme and as far as Jones and his colleagues were concerned it was professionally 
advantageous to take advantage of this potential capital. Indeed, Jones and his colleagues 
developed a national scheme with the intention of killing two birds with one stone, so to speak: on 
the one hand curing crippled children and on the other integrating ‘orthopaedists into traditional 
centres of medical authority and status’ (ibid.:154).  
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The plan was that the children’s orthopaedic hospitals (COH’s) were to be separate from the 
existing voluntary hospitals and, where possible, located in rural areas. With ‘Clinical cooperation’ 
and ‘teamwork’ in mind it was suggested that if the voluntary hospitals    
 
‘would institute an orthopaedic section of their outpatient department and appoint one of 
the surgeons of the COH’s to take charge of it. Outpatients coming up could then be 
referred readily, for opinion or transfer, from general to the orthopaedic side or vice versa.’ 
(BMJ, 11 Oct. 1919, pp.457-60. cited in Cooter, 1993:154) 
 
Despite Jones and Girdlestone’s31 best efforts to organise a national scheme and integrate 
orthopaedics into the teaching hospitals, neither was fully achieved. The failure to fully 
operationalise the plan was partly due to the sheer scale of its ambition. The idea that the vested 
interests of the generalists (whether in the provinces or London) would be readily put to one side 
in aid of cooperation, teamwork and a more patient centred approach was naive. Indeed, teaching 
hospitals were still highly territorial, e.g. they were reluctant to refer cases of poliomyelitis to 
orthopaedic hospitals, suggesting that there was a disinclination to recognise orthopaedists’ 
assertions in relation to their knowledge and expert skill and support them in their quest for 
professional growth (Cooter, 1993).  
 
Nonetheless, despite these failures, by ‘the 1930’s there were some 40 orthopaedic hospitals and 
orthopaedic clinics in operation in Britain, run either by voluntary agencies or the municipal and 
county councils, or by combinations of both’ (Cripples’ Journal., 3 1927, p.178. cited in Cooter, 
1993:162), but, needless to say, their experience with crippled children had not moved them any 
closer to securing that all important position in the teaching hospitals. Indeed, despite the 
existence of orthopaedic clinics in the teaching hospitals of London, as in the provincial centres, 
there was no equivalent increase in the orthopaedic bed base or the organisation of service 
delivery under the control of the orthopaedists (Cooter, 1993). 
 
Thus, orthopaedics still remained, on the periphery of British hospital medicine. The question is: 
could fractures provide the necessary capital (in Bourdieuian terms) which orthopaedics needed 
at that time? Fractures, not unlike crippled children, were a major interwar issue. The subject 
received much attention not only in the press, but also at governmental level. Indeed it  
 
31 When Jones and Girdlestone launched the Central Council for the Care of Cripples after World War I, 
Girdlestone was its honorary secretary (Le Vay, 1990:153). 
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‘became a subject of government inquiry, and in new ways forged links between medicine, 
industry, trade unions, and local and national government. The BMA, the British Hospitals 
Association, the TUC, and the London County Council, along with the Ministries of Health, 
Labour and Pensions were only some of the more visible parties to become actively 
involved in the issue.’ (ibid.:180)  
 
As far as orthopaedists were concerned, it was imperative that they were able to control fractures, 
because of diminishing openings in the field of crippled children (Cooter, 1993). Indeed, many 
orthopaedists feared ‘that when there will be no cripples, there will be no orthopaedic surgery’ 
(Adolf Lorenz, 1936: pp335-6. cited in Cooter, 1993:180). Thus, the control of fractures had 
important implications for the very survival of orthopaedics.  
 
One of the principal figures in the movement was Harry Platt. During the war years and beyond, 
Platt was a young surgeon who, not unlike his seniors and contemporaries, fought the battle for 
the control of fractures. Le Vay notes that ‘his year in Boston (1913), at the instigation of Jones 
and the invitation of Brackett, then chief of orthopaedic surgery, exposed him to the influence of 
Lovett, Bradford and Goldthwait’ (Le Vay, 1990:151).    
 
On Platt’s return from Boston in 1914, he was appointed to an honorary consultant surgical post 
at Ancoats Hospital. Ancoats Hospital was a large inner-city voluntary hospital, located north of 
the city of Manchester in a heavily populated industrial district, with a high incidence of fracture 
cases. And, significantly, the hospital management board had liberal tendencies In addition, the 
hospital had the perfect environment for an orthopaedist enthused with the reformist zeal of 
American surgery and within months of his appointment Platt was working towards his goal (of 
establishing a fracture clinic) with two other young and ambitious surgeons (Morley and Douglas)32 
(Cooter, 1993). Platt and his colleagues devised a scheme whereby all incoming cases (and 
hospital beds) were divided ‘according to surgical specialities. Thus, Platt was to establish 
therapeutic control over all incoming fracture cases and establish uniformity in their treatment’ 
(ibid.:182). 
 
In 1921 Platt went on to publish the basic principles of the ideal fracture service in the Lancet. His 
principles were utilised by orthopaedists in papers and lectures from the mid 1920’s to the 1940’s. 
In addition, Platt’s principles also found expression in a report by the King’s Fund in 1924 Despite 
 
32 John Morley (later Professor of Surgery at Manchester University) and W. R. Douglas (later a renowned 
cancer surgeon at Manchester’s Christie Hospital) (Cooter, 1993:182) 
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the committees brief, namely ‘The Report on the Disposal of Ambulance Cases,’  it was palpable 
from the report findings that there was an acute requirement for a consistent and co-ordinated 
approach to accident services, with the recommendation that the overall control of these services 
should sit under one specialist group (Cooter, 1993). 
 
The Vienna Accident Hospital also featured in an editorial in the Lancet in 1926. The idea behind 
the hospital was the brainchild of an Austrian physician and surgeon, Lorenz Bohler who had an 
interest in the treatment of fractures during the First World War. The article highlighted the fact 
that specialised fracture treatment practised at the hospital had ‘saved the insurance societies 
something in the neighbourhood of £18,000’ (p.864). Such a figure acted as a stimulus for debate 
with regard to the whole question of accident services. In particular it focused attention on the 
appalling fact that in the UK the insurance companies ‘contribute nothing to the treatment of their 
injured clients in hospital.’ Indeed, the article argued that ‘both equity and self-interest alike should 
lead the companies to support an accident department in every hospital’ (ibid.). 
 
At this time, however, orthopaedists were selective in the use of the Bohler model, for two reasons:  
 
‘the Vienna Accident hospital was intended not just for fractures, but for accident cases of 
all kinds. References to the hospital did not therefore serve the interests of those seeking 
to expand their professional space on the basis of fracture treatment alone. The other 
reason why the orthopaedists had to be selective in their use of the Bohler model was that 
the Vienna Hospital was an institution separate from other hospitals and medical schools. 
As such it hardly furthered the orthopaedists’ ambition of securing a permanent niche 
within the major teaching hospitals.’ (Cooter, 1993:192) 
  
However, accident hospitals were not rejected outright, as Cooter notes: 
 
‘Rather it was by putting accident hospitals forward as one option among others that they 
exploited the wider social and political issues of accident services, and also served their 
own in hospital fracture clinics. While explaining the difficulties involved in establishing 
separate accident hospitals, they revealed the economic viability of accident departments, 
meaning primarily hospital fracture clinics under their control.’ (ibid.:193)  
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In the 1930’s the fracture movement cause was accelerated following an investigation and report 
published by the British Medical Association in 1935 (Le Vay, 1990), the outcome of which was 
the passing of a parliamentary motion in April 1936, which led to the Home Secretary, the Minister 
of Health and the Secretary of State for Scotland establishing a committee, under the 
Chairmanship of Sir Malcolm Delevingne (Cooter, 1993). Although the Committee’s brief was – 
‘to report on provision for the rehabilitation of persons injured by accidents’ (Delvinge, Final 
Report, 1939: pp.4, 23-5, 121. cited in Cooter, 1993:197) it was not all doom and gloom as the 
Committee in its 1939 Report focused solely on the organisation of fracture services:  
 
‘Like the BMA’s Report on Fractures, the Delevingne Reports, by reiterating the 
orthopaedists’ social, therapeutic and economic rationales for efficient fracture treatment, 
legitimated the professional self-interests behind them. Not only did the Delevingne 
Committee justify the control of fractures in the hands of fracture experts, but by complying 
with the notion that voluntary hospitals were the most appropriate place for fracture clinics, 
the committee also conferred the basis for the status and authority that the orthopaedists 
had been seeking. Furthermore, it provided a means of reproducing that authority by 
recommending proper undergraduate training in fracture treatment. Finally, by 
recommending departure from ordinary practice in respect of remuneration in the form of 
honoraria of between £300 and £500 per annum to the surgeons in charge of the fracture 
clinic, the Committee took the step towards accepting a salaried service for orthopaedists 
within the voluntary sector.’ (Cooter, 1993:197) 
 
However, if measured in terms of the number of dedicated fracture clinics founded prior to World 
War II, despite the recommendations of the report the orthopaedists’ campaign for fracture 
services was only partially successful.33 Indeed, a piecemeal approach was the order of the day, 
with financial restrictions, ongoing differences between hospitals and the delaying tactics 
employed by the Ministry of Health. Despite this, the orthopaedists were successful in recruiting 
working class trade union members in support of rehabilitation schemes. Indeed, by the 1930’s 
economic growth and reduced unemployment figures ensured that the rehabilitation of workers to 
full fitness gained credence in social and economic thinking (Cooter, 1993). Since one of the most 
important industries to the national economy was the coal industry, orthopaedic interests also 
found favour with labour leaders. The Miners’ Welfare Commission was the perfect conduit 
 
33 By this date four out of twelve London teaching hospitals had fully-developed fracture clinics, and there were 
only 74 fracture clinics in the country as a whole, 17 of which were in industrial Lancashire. Among the latter 
was the clinic established by Platt at the Manchester Royal Infirmary in 1936, four years after his appointment as 
the infirmary’s first honorary Orthopaedic consultant (Cooter, 1993:196). 
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‘through which such support could be fed without causing political and economic commotion’ 34 
This enabled the Ministry of Mines and Supplies (1942) ‘to stimulate the Commission into building 
rehabilitation centres throughout the coalfields’ (ibid.:215-216).  
 
Although it is was not until the late 1950s’ (Waugh, 1990) that general surgeons began to 
relinquish the treatment of fractures to their orthopaedic peers (Le Vay, 1990), the orthopaedists 
were able to accumulate additional types of capital on three counts: firstly, the Delevingne Report 
was pivotal, for it justified the control of fractures in the hands of experts, namely the orthopaedists; 
secondly, in accepting the view that the most suitable setting for fracture clinics, is in the voluntary 
hospitals, supported the orthopaedists in their cause to secure a ‘permanent’ place in the teaching 
hospitals; thirdly and by no means least, the committee’s recommendation that undergraduates 
should be trained in the treatment of fractures (Cooter, 1993) 
 
The types of capital accumulated were invaluable. The justification for control of a condition based 
on expertise enabled the accumulation of scientific capital around knowledge and technique; 
symbolic capital in relation to the expertise of orthopaedists in the treatment of fractures; specific 
cultural capital, as mastery of the techniques associated with the treatment of fractures would 
require long-periods of training by experts in the technique. In addition, the recommendation that 
the knowledge and technique around the treatment of fractures should be an integral part on the 
medical school curriculum, enabled the accumulation of the capital of surgical authority; a form of 
social capital which supports the control of the examining and teaching systems (Bourdieu, 1981). 
 
Thus, although the orthopaedists did not succeed in taking over the treatment of fractures until the 
late 1950’s, the necessary foundations were created during the 1920’s and 1930’s and to a certain 
extent during the Great War. The accumulated capital was then able to be ‘transferred’ when the 
context allowed. The foundation of the National Health Service in 1948 provided the right 
contextual conditions, and this will be treated in detail in Chapter Five. 
 
The fact that the context was not right for orthopaedists to take over the control of fractures from 
the general surgeons, does not mean, however, that some of this accumulated capital was useless 
 
34 Orthopaedic interests had already been generously served by some of the regional Miners’ Welfare Funds. For 
example, in 1933, Sheffield Royal Infirmary received £25 000 from the fund in order to build a fracture unit 
within the Miners’ Welfare ward; and Platt’s fracture clinic at the Manchester Royal Infirmary, when it was 
incorporated into a new Orthopaedic and physiotherapy building in 1938, received £13 000 from the Lancashire 
and Cheshire Miners’ Welfare Committee (ibid.:215). 
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in the late 1930’s and early 1940’s. On the contrary it was effectively operationalised in their next 
quest, to which the focus will now turn. 
 
As in the 1920’s, orthopaedics was once again (in the late 1930’s) faced with having to make 
decisions regarding its future survival. Leading orthopaedists leaders such as Rowley Bristow 
(writing in the Lancet (1937) pointed out that ‘it was likely, that eventually all fracture clinics will be 
under the care of the orthopaedic surgeon of the hospital’ (p.1063). 
 
However, Bristow was keen that orthopaedics should not rest on its laurels; indeed, Bristow opined 
that in the interests of professional preservation  
 
‘the vision of the future generation of orthopaedists must be to the attainment of a second 
objective – the furtherance of investigation and active research into the basic problems 
which form the background of orthopaedics – problems in the applied anatomy, 
physiology, and pathology of the locomotor system. This can only come about when 
orthopaedic surgery is accorded its rightful place in the medical schools and universities.’ 
(ibid.) 
 
Conversely, as far as Harry Platt, one of the leading lights in the fracture movement, was 
concerned, securing a place on the medical curriculum was more of a necessity in order to ensure 
the survival of orthopaedics.  
 
‘I do not think that orthopaedic surgeons will fail to make contributions both massive and 
audacious to technological advances, but I foresee the danger that our contributions to 
general ideas may be negligible, unless we can ensure recruitment to our speciality.’ (Platt, 
1963, pp.32-41, at p.34. cited in Cooter, 1993:240) 
 
As Cooter notes, from Platt’s perspective  
 
‘the place of the specialism in the structure of medical education was more fundamental 
than the pursuit of research and development, for upon it appeared to depend not only the 
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status and security of orthopaedics within medicine’s academic echelons, but once again 
its very survival.’35 (p.240)  
 
Platt was also worried by the signs of a possible decline in the specialism. Despite the fact that 
the membership of the BOA had risen  
 
‘from 24 in 1918 to almost 300 by 1940, since 1934 only nine members had risen from the 
ranks of ‘Associate’ to ‘Active’, with the latter usually indicating full commitment as an 
orthopaedic specialist to hospital consultancy and private practice.’ (ibid.) 
 
Clearly the lack of expansion could be attributable to concerns regarding the lack openings in the 
field for highly profitable private work, and its association with lowly outpatient departments 
(Cooter, 1993). Platt was also concerned about the way in which orthopaedics was perceived. In 
particular he was scathing of the postgraduate course which Jones and his colleagues had 
established in Liverpool in 1924. Platt argued that such a degree only served to reinforce a ‘regard 
of orthopaedics as a narrow specialism suited only for postgraduate study’ (ibid.:242) Such a 
view, it was feared, would not aid recruitment. 
 
In 1942 Platt’s drafted a Memorandum on Education.36 Platt’s memorandum called for a formalized 
national educational programme akin to the Manchester programme which he had been 
developing since the mid-1930’s. In this, ‘orthopaedics formed a systematic and examinable part 
of undergraduate teaching and clinical work in general surgery’ (ibid.:244), as he noted in his 
memorandum: 
 
‘During the first two clinical years all students should spend part of their surgical 
dressership on the orthopaedic unit and should attend a comprehensive course of 
systematic lectures covering both ‘trauma’ and ‘cold orthopaedics’. In the 6th, the final 
clinical year, teaching should be available in the general orthopaedic outpatient clinics and 
major fracture clinics and in revision classes and seminars, where small groups can be 
 
35 Bucher and Strauss (1961) note that the area in which professionals come most frequently into conflicts of 
interest is in gaining a proper foothold in institutions; a segment must be represented in the training centres or 
undergraduate curriculum in order to develop and survive (p.331). Halpern also stresses the critical importance 
for an aspiring specialist group of achieving an autonomous department in a medical school (1988:57). 
36 The BOA requested the Memorandum given the impending hearings of the Goodenough Committee on 
Medical Education (1942) (Cooter, 2003). 
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brought into contact with the orthopaedic clinical tutors.’ (Platt, 1950, pp.1-4. cited in 
Cooter, 1993:244) 
 
Fortuitous circumstances had played into the orthopaedists hands; given that Platt had 
professional connections with Goodenough (Chairman of the Committee) and Sir John Stopford 
(Vice Chairman of the Committee).37 The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Medical 
Schools (1944) ‘left no doubt that a specialism without a scientific profile was doomed to the 
proverbial dustbin of history'. Its section on orthopaedics endorsed Platt’s views as well as adding 
that ‘possibly no other type of surgical condition offers so many opportunities for inculcating the 
important principle of considering every aspect of surgical illness.’ (Report of the Inter-
departmental Committee on Medical Schools, 1944, ch.3. cited in Cooter, 1993:238 & 246) 
 
The Goodenough Report had thus given Platt capital towards realizing his ambition, namely, to 
ensure that orthopaedic surgery became a central component in the medical curriculum. Thus, 
although the quest for control of the treatment of fractures was not at that time a resounding 
success, the accumulated capital (namely the findings of the Delevingne Committee, not only in 
terms of its recommendation that undergraduates should be properly trained in fracture treatment, 
but the general tone of the report which stressed the importance of orthopaedics as an area) 
served to make Platt’s words even more poignant given the context and remit of the Goodenough 
Report itself. The Goodenough Report’s emphasis on the importance of orthopaedics in terms of 
the benefits of its general anatomical geography in terms of its use and applicability to other 
surgical illnesses was also very significant. This will be focused on in Chapter Five. 
 
Thus, in light of the central tenet of the Goodenough Report’s findings, namely the necessity for 
all areas to develop a scientific profile or risk extinction, the orthopaedists were largely compelled 
to redefine the nature of their speciality as one based on the authority of science. Indeed,  
 
‘scientific and technological research became a strategy vital to professional survival. For 
it was a means of securing a footing on the top rung within the university medical schools. 
To argue the case for research and development whether basic, clinical or technological 
was simultaneously to argue the need for an appropriate place to conduct that work, and 
increasingly that place would be the university medical school.’ (Cooter, 1993:237) 
 
37 Platt had been a charter member of the Advisory Committee of the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals’ Trust, of 
which Goodenough was the Chairman. He was also a close colleague of Sir John Stopford the vice-chancellor of 
Manchester University, and formally Dean of Medicine.  
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Clearly this understanding vindicated Bristow’s (1937) stance on the importance of orthopaedic 
research, a stance which Platt disagreed with at the time.   
 
 
4.8 Summary 
 
The period 1800 to 1947 is a very significant epoch in the history of the surgical profession of the 
United Kingdom; a period in which ‘new specialised scientific knowledge’, with its emphasis on 
technical and scientific expertise and clearly defined boundaries of knowledge, confronted the ‘old 
conservative knowledge’, with its emphasis on the careful observation of patients symptoms rather 
than scientific experimentation, and an integrative and broad approach to medicine and surgery. 
It was also a period of transition, as old health care structures were placed in a precarious position 
by the proposed introduction of a National Health Service.  
 
The chapter has attempted to demonstrate that, from a sociological standpoint, intra-professional 
specialist differentiation in surgery cannot be understood in isolation from the contextual junctures 
in which the areas in question, namely obstetrics and gynaecology, ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology were located. Correspondingly, while they constitute significant resources, 
the advent of scientific knowledge and increasing technical sophistication during the period cannot 
account for the success of these groups if analysed in isolation from characteristics specific to the 
groups and variables which were operationalised at that time. 
 
Intra-professional specialist differentiation is a journey and not just an end-point. The successful 
differentiation of orthopaedics from general surgery and the creation of the mature speciality in the 
1980’s was due in no small part to the vital foundation blocks laid during its turbulent and 
precarious development from 1800 to 1947. However, the specific forms of capital accumulated 
during this period was not part of a conscious strategy in terms of pursuing a project towards 
professional differentiation; rather it was a strategy which was utilised for the very survival of 
orthopaedics as an area during this contextual juncture. It is during the second epoch in surgery 
that a conscious strategy was pursued on the road to maturity. 
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Specialist Differentiation 1948-1990  
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5.1 Introduction and Aims 
 
The period 1948 to 1990 is the second surgical epoch. It is a period characterised by the 
dismantling of old health care structures and the establishment of new ones in the form of a 
National Health Service (5th July 1948). With new healthcare structures came new relationships, 
as the profession and state entered into a partnership of mutual dependence: the profession 
became dependent on the state for incomes and resources, and the state became dependent on 
the profession for the planning and the smooth running of the service.  
 
In light of this, The Royal College of Surgeons adopted a new role as a policy making body within 
the National Health Service.  The profession accepted that specialisation was here to stay and the 
new health service had to be planned around this however; despite the plethora of groups within 
the political infrastructure of the Royal College ‘generalism’ was still favoured over ‘specialism’ 
during the first decade of the health service.  
 
Between 1960 and 1983 the strong ‘generalist’ tradition was challenged by forces inside and 
outside of the walls of the great College. By 1988 orthopaedics, neurosurgery, cardiothoracic 
surgery, urological surgery, and plastic Surgery were fully differentiated and distinct self-regulating 
specialities in their own right. The tables had now firmly turned, and the emphasis was now firmly 
on the adequate training of the ‘Specialist’ and not on the ‘Generalist.’ 
 
The chapter will begin by focusing on the relationship between the state and the medical 
profession in the running of the new National Health Service. It will argue that the relationship 
benefited the profession more than the state. For example, it will clearly show that the profession 
was placed in a powerful position in terms of influence and control of resources at every level of 
the decision making machinery (namely the macro-governmental, meso-regional, and micro-
hospital levels); and that this provided a context in which specific types of capital could be 
accumulated by groups. For example, groups would have the potential to access the necessary 
resources to support the development of new esoteric techniques, which could be used be as 
potential lobbying power if and when they decided to pursue the professional project. The 
development of Orthopaedic surgery provides a pivotal example of this. 
 
The maturation process of Orthopaedics in the years following the establishment of the health 
service will clearly show that, unlike the pre-NHS private market, the National Health Service 
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provided a fertile ground for advancement. Seminal figures such as Sir John Charnley were able 
to develop sophisticated techniques in the treatment of fractures adding further ‘capital’ to the case 
for the complete control of fractures by Orthopaedic surgeons – and not general surgeons, as the 
case had been since the cessation of the First World War in 1918. In addition, the development of 
sophisticated surgery for the replacement of arthritic joints by figures such as Charnley enabled 
orthopaedics to carve out a distinct area of knowledge and technical skill which required special 
training.  
 
It was during the 1960’s that orthopaedics actively pursued the professional project, utilising 
specific types of capital accumulated throughout its development, particularly the sophisticated 
technical foci developed and nurtured in a profession driven health care environment conducive 
to the advancement of knowledge.  
  
Not unlike the discussion in the preceding chapter, the surgico-political machinations between 
1960 and 1988 analysed in this chapter will show that, although knowledge and technical 
sophistication may carve out clear and distinct demarcation lines between different types of 
knowledge and skill and the justification for self-regulation, this does not determine ultimately 
whether or not a group will be successful in its quest for separation. 
 
 
5.2 The Structure of the Surgical Field 
 
On the eve of the establishment of the new National Health Service in 1948, the structure of the 
surgical field was differed markedly from that back in 1848, both in terms of its composition, and 
also in terms of its political dynamics. The new structure clearly reflected a new contextual 
juncture; this juncture being the second surgical epoch. 
 
By 1947 three areas had successfully differentiated from surgery: obstetrics and gynaecology, 
ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology. Obstetrics and gynaecology no longer resided within the 
walls of the great Royal College, given the fact that they now had their own specialist College; by 
contrast, though they had the status of independent specialities, ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology remained within the walls of the Royal College, with full representation on the 
College Council and their own fellowship examinations.  
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Other areas of specialist expertise with non-generalist orientations were also growing in strength, 
namely neurosurgery, urology, thoracic and cardiac surgery and plastic surgery (Stevens, 2003); 
last but certainly not least there was orthopaedic surgery, with its vast therapeutic territory and 
generalist orientation.  
 
Although these areas continued to be attached to general surgery, their growing strength changed 
the political infrastructure of the College and consequently its internal political dynamics: the 
position of the abdominal surgeons within general surgery and the College was now openly 
challenged. 
 
The abdominal surgeons had been the dominant force in surgical politics within the College since 
the 1880’s (Cooter, 1993), when abdominal surgery had really taken off. Abdominal surgeons 
were seen as the natural leaders in surgery. Their anatomical remit was generalist in orientation, 
contributing to knowledge and technique and the advancement of the craft of surgery (JBJS, 
1946) Indeed the appeal of abdominal surgery (Jones, 1918) attracted many young surgeons. 
However, this power base began to erode, not only owing to the growing strength of other areas 
within the College, but also as a result of state intervention, namely the establishment of the 
National Health Service.  
 
The establishment of the National Health Service effectively dismantled the structures which 
supported and buttressed the power of the dominant group: the prestigious voluntary hospitals 
were nationalised, and consultants became salaried employees of the state. Their livelihoods no 
longer depended solely on a private market, which was at best, unpredictable and was effectively 
controlled by the elite general surgeons residing in the voluntary hospitals. (Cooter, 1993)  
Competition for patients was going to be a thing of the past. Societal values which had reinforced 
the hierarchical system of hospital medicine had also changed: by the 1940’s specialisation was 
no longer thought to transgress medical etiquette. Indeed, society had witnessed huge advances 
in scientific medicine and surgery during the two World Wars and had largely accepted the idea 
of specialisation (Bynum, 1994).  
 
Thus although ‘abdominal surgeons sought to cling to their power and authority’ (Cooter, 
1993:243), it proved increasingly difficult for them to do so. The political infrastructure, far more 
complex than it had been thirty years earlier, could no longer be reduced to a simple common 
denominator in Bourdieuian terms, between a powerful group imbued with specific forms of capital 
and a new group(s) with relatively little capital or between the dominant surgical elite and aspiring 
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specialists from the new groups, that were developing. In its inclusion of more than one group, the 
political infrastructure of the Royal College of Surgeons was beginning to take on some of the 
characteristics of the American surgical infrastructure. The authority which regulated specialisation 
in the United States was the Advisory Board for Medical Specialities. This ‘specified standards for 
the approval of new boards in relation to their organisation, and the general and professional 
qualifications to be expected of the candidates’. It had the character of an ‘umbrella organisation, 
which included representatives of each specialty board together with representatives from certain 
other bodies’ (Stevens, 1998:245). 
 
Whether each speciality board had the same number of representatives on the Advisory Board is 
unclear, but Stevens does note that ‘acceptance or rejection of new speciality boards was based 
on the opinion of interested groups’ (ibid.:331); ‘the new boards were successful on the same 
grounds as the old, because of their ability to manoeuvre successfully in relation to other speciality 
groups’ (ibid.:327). 
 
Given this sort of pluralistic structure, in which power does not rest with any one particular group, 
alliances will be formed between groups resulting in a fluid, not static, political dynamic. The ability 
to form alliances may be determined by the collective social capital possessed by a group(s), that 
is to say the ‘multiplier effect’. Bourdieu describes the multiplier effect as the combined capital of 
all members of the group and includes ‘material profits, such as all types of services accruing from 
useful relationships, and symbolic profits’ (1986:22), such as those resulting from membership of 
a group with power and status. The resulting benefits from the multiplier effect is not restricted to 
the group, only, as inter-group relationships and alliances are likely to reap benefits for all groups 
concerned. Although Bourdieu does not explicitly state this in this particular work (1986), his other 
works, most notably his work on the French university field, describes the interdependency 
between groups, for example the interdependency between the dominant groups (medicine and 
law) in the university hierarchy, and the state. 
 
Although specialist differentiation in Britain had not nearly evolved as far as in the United States, 
given the changes to the political infrastructure the British political dynamic post 1945 began to 
resemble the American one, becoming more fluid.  
 
The orthopaedists clearly felt that, in the wake of the erosion of the power base of abdominal 
surgery, there was in some senses a power vacuum to be filled. This view, though perhaps 
inevitable during a transition period, when groups jockey for power, was at best simplistic.  
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The orthopaedists hoped that, given abdominal surgery’s precarious position, and their own 
anatomical remit and generalist orientation, ‘authority and leadership in surgery would naturally 
pass to them’ (Cooter, 1993:243). In this situation it is obvious why orthopaedics now more than 
ever wanted to remain first and foremost part of general surgery, ‘advancing the general 
craftsmanship of surgery’, and ‘contributing to general ideas’ (JBJS, 1946:194). Indeed, the 
importance of this is underlined by an anonymous source writing in a later volume of the Journal 
of Bone and Joint Surgery. The article notes the appointment of a prominent orthopaedic surgeon 
to a London Chair of Surgery, not specifically orthopaedic surgery. A feature of the appointment 
to which the article draws attention is that it enshrines a ‘recognition that the surgery of the 
locomotor system is based no less firmly upon the background of general surgery than the surgery 
of the viscera’ (JBJS, 1948:206). 
 
However, despite orthopaedists hope that leadership in the affairs of surgery would pass to them 
the realities of the situation were different: abdominal surgeons had not lost power as such, rather 
the potential for any one group to hold power had been curtailed; power would be held by a plurality 
of groups. Orthopaedics at this time was still smaller than ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology: 
in 1949 there were 227 orthopaedic specialists, in comparison with 295 ophthalmologists, and 276 
otorhinolaryngologists. Since orthopaedics was still part of general surgery it numbered 227, out 
of a total of 1,126 surgeons which included abdominal surgery, urology, neurosurgery, plastic and 
thoracic surgery. (Stevens, 2003:111)   
 
Thus it would be a little premature to adopt Bucher and Strauss’ theory of social movements within 
a profession, and apply it to the case of orthopaedics: 
 
‘Pockets of resistance and embattled minorities may turn out to be the heirs of former 
generations, digging in along new battle lines. They may spearhead new movements which 
sweep into power.’ (1961:333) 
 
Nonetheless, by 1949 orthopaedics was on the road towards acquiring institutional prestige, and 
would eventually acquire power in its own right, even though this scenario was not on the cards 
at that time.  
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5.3 Fragmentation Ceases  
 
The fragmentation of surgery had thus ceased at this point in time (post 1947). Indeed, given the 
political infrastructure in the Royal College at this time, further fragmentation would have been 
political suicide.  
 
The new political context ushered in a new role, and with it new responsibilities for the Royal 
College of Surgeons: this, and the Royal College of Physicians, emerged as ‘policy-making bodies 
under the new National Health Service’ (Stevens, 2003:106). It was therefore politically astute for 
orthopaedics, neurosurgery, urology, thoracic and plastic surgery to remain within the walls of the 
great College, where staffing levels and the organisation of the service would be planned. 
Operating from within the walls of the College they would have a central role in policy formation 
and obviously have the ear of the government of the day. Operating from outside the College, this 
would have been harder to achieve.  
 
On the whole, generalism was still favoured over specialism; the Goodenough Report (1944) 
expressed a strong conviction that ‘consultant practice should be based on the general surgeon 
with special interests’ (ibid.:116) rather than on individual specialities. This view also underpinned 
the consultant appointment machinery in operation at the beginning of the NHS, 
 
‘Consultant status was defined by the review committees set up for that purpose at the 
beginning of the NHS. Because of the staffing structure of the British voluntary hospitals, 
recognition of the consultant through staff appointment was an accepted concept. The 
replacement of the community as voluntary contributor and customer by the community 
as taxpayer and consumer, made little difference to this basic philosophy. The consultant 
still had to compete for an appointment by a special hospital board, and the boards, 
although agents of the Minister of Health were still composed of eminent members of the 
local community and were likely to favour a man with a general as opposed to a specialised 
training record.’ (ibid.:186) 
 
Given that these were the realities of the context of the time, the specialist areas were contented 
to work hard within the walls of the College, furthering their areas but under the broad umbrella of 
general surgery. Indeed there were no regrets as far as orthopaedics was concerned when Sir 
Harry Platt was elected to the Presidency of the Royal College of Surgeons in 1954 (Le Vay, 
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1990), a step of momentous significance not only for orthopaedics, but also for specialisation. This 
was the first time that a specialist area of general surgery had been represented in the highest 
seat. 
 
However, this state of affairs would not last forever. The state of equilibrium was altered when 
fragmentation reared its ugly head once again, this time in the 1980’s. Orthopaedics, neurological 
surgery, cardiothoracic surgery, plastic surgery and urology all differentiated from general surgery 
when specialist examinations in these areas were instituted by the Royal College of Surgeons.  
 
Given the above events, there is one pivotal question which needs to be asked, namely: to what 
extent did the context of the National Health Service aid these developments? After all, at the 
inception of the NHS all of these areas were quite happy to remain under the umbrella of general 
surgery. 
 
 
5.4 The Relationship Between the Medical Profession and the State 
 
The foundation of the National Health Service was the product of changing social demands, as 
well as ‘an attempt to solve the major organisational problems caused by the rapid expansion of 
medicine and medical specialisation in the 1930’s and early 1940’s’ (Stevens, 2003:353).  
 
The intervention of the state in creating a National Health Service, a central element in Britain’s 
welfare state, with responsibility for medical services, did not in any way mean that professional 
authority or power would be weakened. Indeed, the reverse was true. Discussions of medical 
power frequently employ the concept of professional autonomy to refer ‘to the legitimated control 
that an occupation exercises over the organisation and terms of its work.’ (Elston, 1991:61) Elston 
goes on to note that Professional autonomy can be further broken down into three main categories: 
 
‘economic autonomy, the right of doctors to determine their remuneration; political 
autonomy, the right of doctors to make policy decisions as the legitimate experts on health 
matters; and clinical or technical autonomy, the right of the profession to set its own 
 146 
standards and control clinical performance, exercised, for example, through clinical 
freedom at the bedside.’ (ibid.:61-62)  
 
Given the ambit of the government’s role within the proposed health service, it was dependent on 
the cooperation, expert advice, and the determination of the medical profession to make the 
service work (Stevens, 2003). Thus, medicine was to retain its professional autonomy. As a 
gesture of ‘goodwill’, the legislation enshrined ‘the right to private practice in hospital pay beds’ 
(Klein, 1995:19), and also provided consultants with a new system of financial awards for merit 
or distinction. As stipulated by Aneurin Bevan, the profession would enjoy ‘direct participation in 
the planning and running of the service.’ Doctors would serve on the new health authorities, 
‘something which the profession had fought for during the planning stage of the health service; 
regional authorities were also given executive status, instead of being merely advisory bodies’ 
(ibid). At the level of the hospital, doctors were given complete autonomy to do what they thought 
right for their individual patients, and it was this drive at the level of the hospital that would be 
essential in terms of ‘managing the tensions between the demand for health care and the available 
supply’ (Salter, 2004:7). 
 
Thus, a symbiotic relationship was established between the state and the profession. In the words 
of Klein (1990:702) ‘the politics of the double bed’ that underlay the foundation of the NHS was 
born, creating  
 
‘a situation of mutual dependency. On the one hand the state became a monopoly 
employer: effectively members of the medical profession became dependent on it not only 
for their own incomes but also for the resources at their command. On the other hand the 
state became dependent on the medical profession to run the NHS and to cope with the 
problems of rationing scarce resources in patient care.’ (ibid.:700)  
 
Salter builds on Klein when he describes this political relationship as ‘a triangle of intersecting 
forces between medicine the state and civil society’ (Salter, 2004:1). He notes that: 
 
‘The forces in operation within the triangle follow a certain logic: (1) As members of a 
welfare state, citizens receive their health care rights from the state delivered to an 
appropriate standard by medicine. (2) The welfare duty of the state is thus fulfilled, it gains 
the respect of its citizens whilst relying on the medical profession to manage the inevitable 
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tensions between the demand for health care and the available supply; (3) By fulfilling its 
obligation to both, the profession receives the trust of the citizenry, the privilege of self-
regulation from the state, and a consequent set of social, economic and political 
advantages.’ (ibid.:7) 
 
The mutual dependency described by Klein and Salter, takes the interdependency between the 
surgical profession and the state to a different level. During the first surgical epoch the relationship 
between the ruling elite/state and the surgical field was based on social class, and the social 
capital benefits derived by the profession through membership of that set/group. By contrast, the 
second surgical epoch takes the relationship to a different level of interdependency, based on the 
exchange of specific capital: professional expertise (symbolic capital) and economic and political 
capital (incomes, resources, and influence). Thus, the state accumulated symbolic capital, based 
on its relationship with the medical experts and in return, the medical profession accumulated 
economic and political capital, as their incomes were guaranteed by the state; they received 
resources to run the service and were influential at the macro, meso and micro levels of the 
service. 
 
 Fig 5.1 The Triangle of Intersecting Forces (Salter, 2004:7) 
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Klein and Salter’s theories regarding the relationship between the state and the profession (and, 
in Salter’s case, the profession, the state and civil society) will be utilised fully in section 5.5. The 
following section will focus on the three levels of the decision making machinery within the context 
of the new National Health Service, namely macro, meso and micro, in order to understand their 
dynamics and their potential for utilisation of and exchangeability of capital. 
 
 
5.5.1 Professional Participation in the Health Service: Macro, Meso and 
Micro Levels 
 
The medical profession always played a crucial part in ‘the management process used to deliver 
health care within the NHS’ (Marnoch, 1986:12). Indeed, their influence at the national level 
(government and strategic level the profession was involved) in the organisation and running of 
the service at operational level. Leaders of the profession  
 
‘have also been instrumental in constructing concepts of the population’s health needs. 
Patterns of service delivery and the growth of new sub-specialities and treatments have 
also been largely shaped by the profession.’ (ibid.) 
 
Thus, in terms of the decision-making machinery of the NHS, what distinguished the medical 
profession was the extent to which they permeated every level (Klein, 1995).  
 
On a macro-level, within the Ministry of Health, ‘doctors were represented at the very top of the 
Ministry through the Chief Medical Officer’ (Ham, 1999:166). The Ministry also ‘retains a regular 
panel of “consultant advisers,” chosen by the Chief Medical Officer of the Ministry to provide 
guidance as required on topics concerning particular speciality areas’ (Stevens, 2003:261). The 
Central Health Services Council (CHSC), established through ‘the 1946 NHS Act, constituted the 
normal advisory mechanism for the Ministry of Health’ (Rivett, 1998:50), and the Presidents of all 
the Royal Colleges as well as other members of the profession were represented on it. Indeed,  
the medical and surgical Royal Colleges ‘maintained powerful positions as sources of expert 
opinion’ (ibid.:51). 
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At the meso-level within the Regional Health Boards (RHBs) ‘the medical membership averaged 
32 per cent, and in one it reached 42 per cent’ (Klein, 1995:51). At the micro-level the profession 
was well represented on the Hospital Management Committees (HMCs), ‘somewhere between 20 
and 27 per cent’ (ibid.). At the micro-level of the hospital, the medical profession enjoyed an 
influential position because of consultants’ role as the direct providers of services. Indeed, the 
government guaranteed the clinical freedom of doctors to ‘ensure medical participation in the NHS 
upon its creation in 1948’ (Harrison & Schulz, 1989:202). Clinicians were fully responsible for the 
any decisions made regarding the treatment of their patients, and  
 
‘although they were required to act within broad limits of acceptable medical practice and 
within policy for the use of resources, they were not held accountable to NHS authorities 
for their clinical judgements.’ (Ham, 1999:167) 
 
Despite structural changes following the 1974 and 1982 reorganisations, the medical profession 
maintained a strong presence, leaving the structure of medical dominance at these levels more or 
less intact (Saks, 1995).  
 
 
5.5.2 The Medical Profession, Policy Making, and  
Implementation: Macro, Meso and Micro Levels 
 
The Chief Medical Officer of Health, the voice of expertise within the Ministry, provided advice to 
the Minister, to whom he had direct access. George Godber, Chief Medical Officer to the Ministry 
from (1960-1963) was responsible for placing the idea of a hospital plan on the Ministerial agenda. 
Godber advocated replacing the outdated old hospitals with purpose built modern ones (Rivett, 
1998). The idea of the District General (Hospital) was born, out of Enoch Powell’s (Minister of 
Health) hospital plan for England and Wales (1962) (Klein, 1995). The new District General 
Hospital’s would comprise ‘600-800 beds, each serving a population of 100,000 to 150,000 people’ 
(Rivett, 1998:176). The medical profession played a pivotal role in providing the necessary expert 
advice and detailed planning with regard to what a modern hospital service should be like (Klein, 
1995). 
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The Central Health Services Council also acted as a central channel of advice to the Ministry of 
Health. Its first eighteen months were fairly turbulent as a number of significant issues faced the 
service (Rivett, 1998). The significant issues included: ‘the functions of the District General 
Hospital (DGH) in light of the developments since the Hospital Plan (1962)’ (Klein, 1995:67).  
 
However, the CHSC was not the only channel of advice to the Ministry: there was a ‘growing 
tendency for the Minister of Health to appoint specialist bodies or committees of inquiry to consider 
each subject as it arose’. Many were set up as ‘joint working parties of Ministry and professional 
representatives, such as the working party on the hospital medical staffing structure (Platt Report, 
1961)’. The Platt Committee comprised ‘leading members of the Royal Colleges, the Ministry’s 
medical department, and professionals who regularly served on other professional bodies such as 
the General Medical Council’ (Stevens, 2003:263). 
 
At the meso-level regional health authorities were powerful and influential. This, however, is not 
reflected in diagrammatic representations of the structure of the NHS between 1948 and 1974, 
which clearly show a line of accountability running from the centre to the periphery. However, this 
line is always drawn as running one way, which underestimates the level of two-way interaction 
between the constituent parts of the structure. Indeed, given the substantial executive powers of 
the regions within this structure, they were not just ciphers through which national policies were 
implemented, but had their own aims and objectives.  
 
 
Fig 5.2 The Structure of the NHS 1948-1974 
 
Ministry of Health
Boards of 
Governors –
Teaching 
Hospitals
Regional Hospital 
Boards
Hospital 
Management 
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Fig 5.3 The Hidden Structure of the NHS 1948-197438 
 
The fact that regions were the ‘financial conduit between central government and hospitals’ 
(Forsythe: 1998:61) meant that they played a proactive part in the battle for funds between the 
centre and the periphery (between macro and meso). They also 
 
‘allocated capital for medical and surgical equipment as well as new fabric and allocated 
revenue to the hospital management committees (HMCs). The financial responsibilities 
were onerous but these gave them power as the main agents of change for the hospital 
services.’ (ibid.)  
 
Rivett provides a pertinent example of the power of the regional boards in determining the priority 
of new hospital developments: 
 
‘In the South East Metropolitan RHB specialist services were dominated by large teaching 
hospitals, Guy’s and King’s. The Senior Administrative Medical Officer (SAMO) decided to 
raise the standing of the hospitals at Canterbury and Brighton, so that there would be 
centres of expertise nearer the coast. Money was invested in them. Regions varied in their 
ethos; those in the south were used to working in close cooperation with the Ministry of 
Health, which might be to their advantage.’ (1998:172) 
 
38 The information incorporated in the diagrammatic representations of the NHS are taken from Stevens (2003); 
Forsythe, 1998 and Rivett 1998.  
Ministry of Health 
Boards of Governors Regional Hospital Boards 
Hospital Management Committees Medical Advisory Committee 
Medical Profession 
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The region was also responsible for medical staffing, ‘held most consultants contracts and (save 
for the teaching hospitals) made senior appointments’ Accordingly, ‘consultants seeking to 
influence events had to have influence at regional level. (ibid.). 
 
The power of the regions did not diminish in the wake of the NHS reorganisations of 1974 and 
1982; indeed, the regional authorities (i.e. regional medical officers (RMO) after 1974, and regional 
directors of public health (DPH) after 1988) still retained considerable influence and power 
(Forsythe, 1998). Given this, it is worth noting a consultant’s experiences under the regional 
health authorities following the 1974 reorganisation: 
 
‘Hospital consultants were responsible to the RMO (Regional Medical Officer), who had 
considerable power. An exceptional RMO like John Revans in Wessex or Rosemary Rue in 
Oxford had enormous influence in the planning of hospital services, right down to the 
appointment of extra consultants, and the development and distribution of new services 
and the necessary capital investment.’ (Lee-Potter, 1997:247) 
 
Lee-Potter goes on to note that consultants frustrated by the failure to provide them with the 
resources that they thought necessary to develop their departments and their speciality could 
always go and see the RMO about it. If he or she thought that particular consultant worth 
supporting, means would be found: 
 
‘This was the NHS which I found when I was appointed the first consultant haematologist 
in Dorset in 1969. I spent five years labouring single-handed in the vineyard before going 
to see Dr Revans with my plans and demands. He listened and more medical staff and 
resources were provided.’ (ibid.) 
 
The regions’ role as financial interface between the centre and the periphery (i.e. the macro and 
the micro), together with the fact that they were not merely neutral but powerfully proactive, with 
their own objectives and responsible for providing services where professional involvement was 
strong, exposed them to the lobbying power of the consultant groups, especially those in the acute 
specialities such as surgery and general medicine, which were the most influential. Indeed, this is 
not surprising, as it is highly probable that larger groups will be in possession of greater levels of 
specific types of capital. This was especially the case in this context, as the specialties of general 
medicine and general surgery, together with their sub-specialist areas, were the largest specialty 
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groups in the NHS, and collectively possessed social, symbolic, scientific, and economic capital, 
which provided additional lobbying leverage.  Ham’s work on policy-making in the Leeds Regional 
Hospital Board (RHB) reaches similar conclusions: he argues that power on the board was 
‘weighted heavily in favour of the professional monopolists’ who successfully utilised a variety of 
channels enabling them to ‘influence decisions’ (Ham, 1999:171). 
 
Thus, there was clearly interaction between the meso (regional) and the micro (hospital) levels, 
but also between the micro level (consultant lobbyists) and the meso level (regions).  
 
The last point in particular highlights the power of the consultant body within the micro context of 
the hospital, and one which is extremely important. Although, theoretically speaking, the Hospital 
Management Committees39 were the interface between the region and the consultant body, in 
practice they were no more than a channel, and a benign one at that, for forwarding decisions and 
policy recommendations from the Medical Advisory Committee (MAC). 
 
The Medical Advisory Committee has the power to act on behalf of the consultants and put plans 
into effect; it is the executive body for consultants (Stevens, 2003). It considers questions put 
forward ‘by its own members or put to it by the Hospital Management Committee (HMC). These 
may concern equipment and staffing levels, priorities in building or supplies programs, or drug 
costs.’ If necessary, ‘their policy recommendations may be forwarded promptly to the regional 
hospital board’ (ibid.:265) via the HMC. Conversely, Stevens notes that the MAC could make 
direct contact with the regional board in cases of conflict with the HMC.  
 
In the teaching hospitals the structure was different. Teaching hospitals were so designated ‘by 
the Minister, with university advice, because of their special importance to medical education’ 
(Rivett, 1998:33). Each teaching hospital board of governors was directly accountable to the 
Minister, not to the regional board. Given this, the relationship between the two fluctuated between 
close collaboration and no collaboration of any kind. Rivett provides a pertinent example, of how 
the board of governors in the teaching hospitals in Oxford and Cambridge bypassed the decision 
making machinery of the regions and controlled the delivery of hospital care within the city and 
neighbouring districts.  
 
 
39 HMCs membership consists of volunteer members drawn from the community, the hospital administrator and 
representatives of the senior nursing staff and representatives from the consultant body. (Stevens, 2003:265-266) 
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The significance of teaching hospitals to medical education brought with it ‘prestige and cachet 
which, combined with better resources, allowed them to attract better staff and additional 
resources, which enabled them to influence NHS policy more generally’ (Pollock, 2004:88). In 
addition, the large teaching hospitals in London operated as groups which enabled them to wield 
more power, given their combined social capital. As alluded to in section (5.2), the collective social 
capital accumulated by a group is the sum total of its parts, that is to say, the accumulated capital 
of its members. Bourdieu (1986) describes this as the ‘aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources’ (p.21), realisable through group membership. St Thomas’ Hospital in London provides 
one such example of a London teaching hospital group and included the Royal Waterloo Hospital 
for sick children and women, the general lying-in hospital, and the Grosvenor hospital for women. 
Thus, teaching hospitals were very influential in shaping the directional flow of NHS revenue. 
(Pollock, 2004)  
 
The potential for consultants/specialities to “directly” influence the development and organisation 
of acute care is clearly evident. Nonetheless, there are those who argue that resources are not 
necessarily decided “directly” through the lobbying actions of the consultant group, but “indirectly” 
through the clinical decisions of the consultant group. 
 
In other words, the influence of doctors was exercised through ‘decisionless decisions’ (Bachrach 
& Baratz, 1970. cited in Ham, 1999:172). The clinical autonomy enjoyed by clinicians, ‘and the 
consequent power over resource allocation was thus an important factor limiting the role of health 
boards and authorities’ (Ham, 1999:172). Thus, since consultants had a major influence on the 
use of resources in the NHS, their behaviour ultimately determined patterns of resource allocation 
and service development in the NHS:  
 
‘From the early days of the NHS, doctors rather than managers (then tellingly, called 
administrators) had dominant and pervasive influence. The Shape and distribution of 
services arose from an accumulation of individual clinical decisions, with managers 
supporting and administering these arrangements rather than seeking to challenge them.’ 
(Davies & Harrison, 2003:646)  
 
Thus, as Ham notes,  
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‘the power of the medical profession was manifested not so much through formal bids for 
development considered by regional hospital boards as through the continual process of 
innovation which pre-empted resources for development.’ (1999:172).  
 
This became evident in 1948, when the legacy of spending commitments and developments in 
specialist areas were inherited by the state upon the establishment of the NHS.  
 
‘The need to provide specialised services, and sub-specialisation, had the double effect of 
driving up the number of consultants from roughly 4,500 in 1948 to 7,000 by 1960; and 
placed the development of hospital services on top of the agenda.’ (Rivett, 1998:137).   
 
Within the context of the NHS, decisions taken by consultants to introduce revolutionary surgical 
techniques in the treatment of conditions such as varicose veins created a pressure in the system, 
which impacted on the bed capacity for more acute conditions. This in turn put pressure on the 
RHBs, who understood the necessity to advance the provision of specialist treatment and ensure 
equitable access for all (Rivett, 1998). 
 
Thus, returning to the issue of the symbiotic relationship between the medical profession and the 
state (or in Salter’s case, the medical profession, the state and civil society), quite clearly there is 
a relationship between medicine and the state and civil society: the medical profession became 
dependent on the state not only for their incomes but also for the resources at their command, 
and the state became dependent on the medical profession to control the demand supply problem, 
whilst upholding citizens’ right to the health care. 
 
This relationship, however, is not equal, as it first appears, but rather a very one-sided 
asymmetrical relationship. Accordingly, Salter’s use of a triangle, with the implication of equal 
relationships between the three parties, is inappropriate (even though Salter places medicine at 
the top of the triangle which would imply a hierarchical relationship between the three).  
 
Salter (2004) notes that ‘citizens’ receive their ‘right’ to healthcare, free at the point of delivery, 
from birth to death, 'from the state delivered to an appropriate standard by the medical profession’ 
(p.6). It is the profession which defines the exact scope of ‘comprehensive’; this is related to the 
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‘law of supply and demand’, which in this case should perhaps be inverted to the ‘law of demand 
and supply’: the profession creates the demand through medical and surgical innovation. 
 
As far as the state is concerned, it has fulfilled its welfare duty aided by the medical profession. 
Yet it is reliant on the medical profession to manage the tension between demand and supply, 
when in fact, as noted above, it is the profession which created this tension in the first place. As 
Klein notes: 
 
‘Consumer demand in all health care systems is strongly influenced by medical decisions. 
If there is an increase in the number of doctors, and if they have an incentive to generate 
extra activity, one would predict also an increase in demand.’ (1995:157)  
 
It is this disparity between patient demand and the ability of the NHS to supply this demand, that 
has always been a significant characteristic of the NHS. In other words the profession had the 
state, to put it politely, in a political headlock: the state was reliant on the profession for fulfilling its 
responsibilities and promises to the electorate, so the profession had both a ‘political function and 
a bargaining position of systemic significance’ (Salter, 2004:1), for example, the threat by 
employees to discontinue their services. The profession also had civil society in a headlock, for 
the private sector benefited all the more as the disparity between demand and care widened. 
 
The professional (economic, political, and clinical) autonomy of medicine resulted in the so-called 
symbiotic relationship being very one-sided and the state being open to exploitation from the 
profession, which had the state exactly where it wanted it. It is also clear that there were also 
power differentials within the professional field itself, between the powerful teaching hospital 
consultant cadre and the non-teaching hospitals. The teaching hospitals were closer to the NHS 
policy making machinery (macro-level), and had the potential to utilise their combined social, 
economic, and symbolic capital to lobby and influence policy, and attract further economic capital 
to progress their specialist areas, especially if arguments for greater resources were couched in 
terms of the benefits for education, medical or surgical. However, this situation could also work 
against consultants, since they would have been directly accountable through the board of 
governors to the Minister, who may not have been as malleable as the Senior Administrative 
Officer’s (SAMOs) at regional level. In addition, many of the powerful teaching hospital consultants 
were also represented in the higher echelons of the Royal Colleges, which had the ear of 
government.  
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Despite the power differentials between the teaching and non-teaching hospital consultants at the 
macro-level, it would be an oversimplification to assume that consultants in the non-teaching 
hospitals were without power, as the obverse is true. Indeed, all consultants enjoyed the privilege 
of clinical autonomy, and as alluded to above, clinical decisions taken at the micro-level indirectly 
influenced the flow of resources. In addition, the Medical Advisory Committees were the conduit 
for consultant lobbying, either via the Hospital Management Committee’s or directly to the 
Regional Board.  
 
Thus, given the nature of the relationship between the medical profession and the state, the 
National Health Service provided a context ripe in opportunities for the accumulation of specific 
capital, in particular the development of esoteric techniques (scientific capital), and with it the 
growing sophistication of sub-specialities such as orthopaedics, neurosurgery, plastics, cardiac 
and thoracic’s and urology (symbolic capital) (Rivett, 1998). As well as further growth in these 
areas, there was also the further development of sub-specialisation within general surgery, as 
special interests began to develop, resulting in the growth of areas such as vascular surgery, 
upper-gastrointestinal surgery, colorectal surgery, breast surgery, hepato-pancreatico-bilary 
surgery, endocrine surgery, and transplant surgery. 
 
An effect of sub-specialisation is to change the scale at which it becomes appropriate to provide 
services. Thus, by the 1960’s it was clear that the pattern and content of the hospital service had 
to be rationalised at a district and regional level. The Hospital Plan (1962) was brought in to solve 
these organisational problems. The plan ‘aimed at a network of District General Hospitals (DGH’s) 
of 600-800 beds, normally serving a population of 100,000-150,000’ (ibid.:176). District General 
Hospitals would provide the generality of medicine and surgery as well as surgical specialties such 
as, orthopaedics and ophthalmology and age and gender specific specialities, such as paediatrics 
and obstetrics and gynaecology. In addition, all DGH’s would provide accident and emergency 
services. The specialities that required a higher population base such as neurosurgery, plastics 
and thoracics, would require regional level provision. For those areas that were super-specialised 
for example, transplant surgery, supra-regional provision would be needed. As service provision 
became increasingly differentiated between the macro (larger regional centres) and the micro 
(district general hospitals), certain sub-specialist areas of general surgery, such as neurosurgery, 
plastics, and cardio-thoracics, became increasingly detached from the general surgery practised 
within the district general hospitals (Rivett, 1998).  
 
Orthopaedics too was loosening the link between itself and general surgery. Not only was it 
practised at a regional level; at the level of the district general hospital some orthopaedic surgeons 
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tended to deal with fractures, others with joint replacement, whilst general surgery was 
concentrating more and more on peripheral vessel surgery and the abdominal tract. Orthopaedics, 
whose future looked quite bleak within the context of the pre-NHS private market, was on the road 
to maturity at last (Cooter, 1993). 
 
 
5.6 The Road to Maturity: The Case of Orthopaedics 
 
In the run up to the establishment of the NHS, ‘scientific and technological research became vital 
to professional survival’ (ibid.:237), for it was a means of securing a sure foundation within the 
university medical schools where much of this research would take place. University medical 
schools’ special status as providers of medical education, with their direct links to the Minister of 
Health, made it even more necessary to be at the centre of the medical curriculum. To be at the 
centre opened up the potential to influence the growth and development of special areas, while 
being on the periphery restricted influence. Orthopaedics achieved the vital position: it became an 
integral part of the medical curriculum within the university medical schools (1950s), which 
became central to the structure of medicine under the new health service (Cooter, 1993). 
 
By 1970 orthopaedics had been transformed and stood poles apart from the orthopaedics 
practised before the advent of the NHS in 1948. Orthopaedics was no longer at the periphery of 
hospital medicine; on the contrary, orthopaedics was now an essential part of hospital medicine.  
This represents ‘a very different set of social relations and professional interests. Of these, the 
greater kudos, security and income of its practitioners are signs and symbols’ (ibid.:234).  
 
Signs and symbols of success may well include the above, but the most eloquent status symbol 
of orthopaedists was becoming an independent speciality with control of its own examinations, 
and by the 1960’s this was being increasingly sought after. The question is what changed between 
1948 and the 1964 which altered their goals from gaining a prestigious place in the university 
medical schools to seeking independent specialist status; and what sort of capital they 
accumulated during this period which enabled them to differentiate from general surgery in the 
1980’s. 
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Despite the fact that sixteen years is a relatively short space of time in comparison with 
orthopaedics’ precarious period of adolescence between 1800 and 1948, much happened over 
this relatively short period. 
 
By the 1950’s orthopaedists were pushing back the boundaries of orthopaedic science and 
surgery with the development of esoteric techniques, especially through the breathtakingly vast 
work of Sir John Charnley. Charnley’s earlier work was concerned with the management of bone 
trauma and fusion of joints by compression methods and his work on the treatment of fractures 
without surgical intervention (Wroblewski, 2002), in no small measure demonstrated the skill and 
expertise required in the effective treatment of fractures. This no doubt provided further scientific, 
specific cultural and symbolic capital in the orthopaedists’ quest for the total control of fractures.  
 
During the post-war period (1945 onwards) ‘members of the British Orthopaedic Association 
(BOA), began collectively to push for the national provision of what they called orthopaedic and 
accident services’ (Cooter, 1993:193). Indeed Capener (1958) writing in the Journal of Bone and 
Joint Surgery notes: 
 
‘The application of orthopaedic methods to casualty services was a major gain from the 
two world wars. In many, but still too few, parts of the British Isles, orthopaedic surgeons 
have assumed a greater responsibility for this work. We emphasise too few. A committee 
of the British Orthopaedic Association is at present engaged in studying this 
problem…suffice to say that we cannot be complacent with the present provision. There 
are too many casualty departments with only nominal consultant supervision. The 
incidence of major and minor accidents in transport and industry as well as domestic 
circumstances, demands far better organisation than generally exists, and it is in 
orthopaedics where this should particularly be found.’ (p.617)  
 
Given that trauma injuries (not unlike orthopaedics itself) were not restricted to one area of the 
body, their treatment would ‘cut across the organ geography of other medical and surgical 
specialities, these changes were to raise serious problems of conceptualisation as well as of 
hospital organisation’ (Cooter, 1993:181). 
 
However, within the context of a National Health Service this would change. The opening of the 
M1 motorway in 1959 led to a new style of driving. Rivett (1998) explains, that the types of injury 
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sustained were more traumatic, took place over a 24 hour period, and given the distance covered 
by the motorway, were spread over a wide geographical area. In 1962 the Standing Medical 
Advisory Committee (SMAC)40  set up a group to study the provision and organisation of accident 
services, chaired by the eminent Orthopaedist and President of the Royal College of Surgeons, 
Sir Harry Platt. Rivett notes that the committee recommended a system whereby a  
 
‘central accident unit would be attached to every teaching centre, and there would be other 
accident units in selected hospitals, and support from peripheral casualty services.  It was 
also agreed that effective treatment not only required good facilities but also experience.’ 
(ibid.145) 
 
The argument for trauma surgery being entrusted to orthopaedics was a success. This was due 
in no small part to the strenuous work and accumulation of specific types of capital (scientific 
capital, symbolic capital, specific cultural capital and the capital of surgical authority), by the 
fracture movement prior to the establishment of the NHS, and of course to the major advances 
under key figures such as Charnley in the 1950’s. However, the scientific capital accumulated 
prior the establishment of the health service, although significant, was not of the level accumulated 
in the 1950’s, that is to say, the orthopaedics practised in the 1950’s was poles apart in terms of 
its scientificity. This was also reflected in Charnley’s surgical endeavours in the 1960’s, especially 
in relation to his revolutionary surgical procedure for the treatment of the arthritic hip, namely the 
‘low frictional torque arthroplasty (LFA)’ (Wroblewski, 2002:824).  
 
Charnley received funding from the Manchester RHB (Regional Health Board) and made an 
unrivalled and major contribution to 20th century surgery, by developing revolutionary surgical 
techniques combined with meticulous scientific research around implant fixation and longevity. In 
1962 he was the first surgeon to introduce acrylic cement (polymethylmethacrylate PMMA). From 
1962 onwards Charnley chose to concentrate all of his energies on hip replacement surgery. After 
perfecting the surgical technique, he began to impart his knowledge to other surgeons (Rivett, 
1998). 
 
As he observed in his lecture to the British Medical Association in 1959, the technique’s 
sophistication required an unprecedented degree of training. ‘This type of surgery demands 
training in the mechanical techniques which, though elementary in practical engineering, are as 
 
40 The SMAC - a committee of the Central Health Services Council (Rivett, 1998:50). 
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yet unknown in the training of the Orthopaedic surgeon’ (Wroblewski, 2002:825). By the late 
1960’s the success of the procedure created a high demand (Rivett, 1998), as it became the 
treatment of choice for Osteoarthritis of the hip joint. Knee replacement surgery was also being 
developed at this time by Michael Freeman of Newcastle, who introduced a prosthesis in 1968 
(BMJ, 1967).  
 
Joint replacement surgery became synonymous with orthopaedics. The demand it created, 
however, could not be easily supplied by the NHS. By the early 1980’s the need for hip 
replacements ‘overwhelmed the wards allocated to the trauma service and spilled into the beds 
needed for general surgery and elective orthopaedics’ (Rivett, 1998:311).  
 
By the 1960’s orthopaedics had control of fractures and had developed sophisticated esoteric 
techniques, which required special training; the focus had moved from the acquisition of general 
skills to the narrow and in-depth training required to master these highly specialised esoteric 
techniques. Orthopaedics was so highly specialised that it no longer identified itself as part of the 
generality of surgery. Orthopaedists such as John Charnley called for 
 
‘a primary examination for orthopaedic surgeons orientated intelligently towards 
orthopaedic surgery and traumatology, and a final examination with examiners who were 
orthopaedic surgeons. In other words, there should be an FRCS in orthopaedics as a 
specialist examination to bring it in line with the American boards.’ (1964:1249)  
 
In particular Charnley was frustrated to see that, in desperate attempts to get the final fellowship 
examination, young specialists were ‘returning to their flat in the evening to start reading about 
gastrectomy or cerebral tumours instead of being able to immerse themselves in orthopaedic 
surgery’ (ibid.). 
 
Orthopaedists clearly had good arguments to back up their proposals: they had become highly 
specialised and, in the process, accumulated much capital. However, sophistication in terms a 
widening knowledge base and the development of esoteric techniques alone, though pivotal in 
any argument in favour of cognitive exclusiveness and differentiation, do not suffice to guarantee 
it. Other factors would need to enter into the equation in order for knowledge and technology 
(scientific capital) to be operationalised. 
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5.7 Specialist Differentiation and the Royal College of Surgeons 
 
Within the Royal College there was a basic conflict between two types of groupings: generalists, 
who advocated the continuation of the ‘strong postgraduate generalist tradition embodied in the 
Goodenough Report (1944), and which the general FRCS was the last bastion’ (Stevens, 
2003:349); and specialists, who advocated the institution of specialist examinations and a 
movement away from broad generalist education, beginning with the ‘acquisition’ of specific  
narrower skills. 
 
During the early 1960’s three groups were venting their spleen regarding what they saw as the 
deficiencies of the general FRCS in relation to orthopaedics, ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology.  
 
The orthopaedists, on the other hand, were concerned about the lack of focus on the theory and 
principles of orthopaedic surgery under the general FRCS. Although both ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology were both fully differentiated specialities in their own right, with their own 
specialist fellowship examination, they were still required to sit the College’s primary examination 
in the basic medical sciences. Given the College’s generalist slant, this resulted in candidates 
being examined in the general anatomy of the body and not only the eye, or ear, nose, and throat, 
as one an ophthalmologist wrote in 1963:  
 
‘It seems quite unacceptable that keen aspiring ophthalmologists should be failed because 
they do not know the minute anatomy of the pudental nerve, and psoas major, the external 
pollicus longus, and the pubic bone. Is this essential or even useful knowledge for an 
ophthalmologist?’ (Morgan, 1963:743)  
 
In terms of the College’s political infrastructure at this time (1964), there were 1,794 general 
surgeons – which included orthopaedics, neurosurgery, cardio-thoracics, plastics and urology as 
well as the new sub-specialist areas of vascular, upper-gastrointestinal, colorectal, breast, 
endocrine and transplant; out of the 1,794 the orthopaedists numbered 394. The ophthalmologists 
numbered 306 and the otorhinolaryngologists numbered 312. Thus, at this particular juncture in 
time, the grouping together of orthopaedics, ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology would not 
carry enough might if it came to the stage where pressure needed to be applied, given that 
together they numbered 1,012, as opposed to 1,400 (Stevens, 2003). 
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The generalists, however, were concerned that any ‘further changes in the FRCS would create a 
new rash of qualifications in the sub-specialities of neurological surgery, thoracic surgery and 
plastic surgery and urology’ (ibid.:348).  Given that there were no murmurings coming from these 
areas, at this stage their worries seemed unfounded. These arguments would go on for another 
decade before any decisive movements were made on behalf of the groups advocating changes 
to the FRCS.  
 
Given that in the period 1948-1974 the consultant numbers tended to double every ten years 
(Godber, 1961), by the mid 1970’s the number of consultants under general surgery and related 
specialities was likely to be somewhere around the figure of 2,80041. This would mean that any 
potential grouping involving orthopaedics, ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology would be 
around the 2,024 mark.42 
 
Despite the protestations from ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology, when it came to the crunch 
another grouping stuck their heads above the parapet. Several specialities (including, as can be 
deduced from the range of speciality examinations introduced by the Edinburgh College in the late 
1970’s, orthopaedics, neurosurgery and cardiothoracics) voiced their concerns regarding the lack 
of ‘formal assessment of specialist knowledge or skills acquired by UK and Irish trainees during 
specialist training’. Indeed, English (1989) notes that ‘they were sufficiently concerned by this state 
of affairs that they indicated that unless the Surgical Colleges did something to rectify matters, 
they would consider mounting their own examinations’ (p.31). 
 
The Royal College of Surgeons however, appeared to drag its feet. This is probably attributable 
to the fact that, even though these bodies were powerful, and allowing for the fact that their 
numbers were likely to have doubled by this stage, their combined might did not equal the 
combined might of the general surgical body which still included the other sub-specialist areas.  
 
For example, if one assumes that orthopaedics’ numbers had doubled since 1964, then by the 
1970’s it would stand around the 788 mark; likewise, if neurosurgery had 31 consultants in 1948 
(Stevens, 2003:114) it was likely to have around 127 by this time. Although there are no figures 
 
41 Stevens notes that in 1964 there were 1400 general surgeons (including related sub-specialist interests). The 
figure 2800 was obtained by doubling Stevens figure. (This is based on Godber’s observation that consultant 
numbers tend to double every ten years). 
42 This figure was obtained by doubling Stevens’s figures for 1964 (2003:111).  
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for urology, if one supposes that it had 100 plus surgeons, the combined figure would have been 
around 1015, while that of general surgery and related specialities would have been 1785. 
 
Even if, hypothetically speaking, cardiothoracics and plastics43 had joined the band-wagon the 
respective figures would have been around 1572 (general surgery and related specialities) vs. 
1228 (orthopaedics, neurosurgery, urology, cardiothoracics, and plastics).  
 
In the event it was the ‘Edinburgh College which seized the political opportunity and the initiative’ 
(Kirk, 1989:29) and in the ‘late 1970’s started to institute specialist examinations for its Fellowship, 
first in orthopaedics, neurosurgery and cardiothoracic surgery’ (English, 1989:31). The Edinburgh 
College also planned to ‘institute similar examinations in all of the surgical specialities’ (Royal 
College of Surgeons Edinburgh, 1994:18). Thus, the Royal College of Surgeons as leaders of 
surgery had been beaten to it by its rival College north of the border.  
 
The Royal College had little choice now but to act, in order to avert further damage being inflicted 
on its reputation as the great leader in surgery. An excerpt from the Royal College of Surgeons 
(minutes of Council meetings on the 10th October 1985) clearly indicates the urgency of the 
situation. For example, it notes: 
 
‘That a commitment be made now to explore the various options for introduction as soon 
as possible, of a two-tier examination in surgery, the first part of which would test basic 
surgical principles and the second part of which would consist of which would consist of 
an Intercollegiate assessment of higher surgical training.’ (p.32) 
 
By 1988 ‘complete Intercollegiate agreement was reached regarding the necessity for separate 
assessment of basic training in surgery in general and of higher surgical training in the specialities’. 
The Colleges agreed that ‘the new FRCS examination would incorporate desirable components 
of the basic sciences’. It was also agreed that ‘assessments of Higher Surgical Training would be 
carried out by Intercollegiate Boards in each of the specialities’ (Kirk, 1989:29). The successful 
completion of ‘these higher examinations would entitle a Fellow of a Surgical College to place a 
 
43 Godber (1961) notes that thoracics had 44 consultants in 1948 and plastics had 27 Consultants. The figure 
above was obtained by working on the premise that the figures for the above would have been: thoracics (132) 
and plastics (81). These are of course only approximations.  
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suffix indicating his or her surgical speciality after the letters FRCS’ (Royal College of Surgeons 
Edinburgh, 1994:19). 
 
Thus, had the College not moved when it did, there could have been catastrophic results. For 
example, the fellows of the Royal College of Surgeons in these specialist areas might have 
defected to the Edinburgh College, or as in the case of (ophthalmology which founded a College 
in 1988 and received a Royal Charter in 1993, www.rcophth.ac.uk/about/college/history) they 
might have insisted on forming a brand new specialist College. Either of these scenarios, or a 
combination of them, would have effectively meant that the Royal College of Surgeons would have 
been left with a generalist core, as well as otorhinolaryngology. Its leadership in surgery could 
have been considered defunct, and the government might have been left with no other choice, but 
to intercede, given that such questions were of importance to the health and wellbeing of the 
general public (Stevens, 2003).  
 
 
5.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has focused specifically on a new contextual juncture characterised by new 
structures and new relations; paying particular attention to how these provided the potential for 
the further growth and maturation of groups as distinct areas of knowledge and technical skill 
during this period; and ultimately how these effected the pace and direction of intra-professional 
specialist differentiation during this period. The maturation of orthopaedics during this period has 
provided a specific example. 
 
At the inception of the National Health Service in 1948 orthopaedics had fulfilled its primary 
objective, namely, to become an integral part of the medical school curriculum within the university 
medical schools. There was no conscious strategy towards separation from general surgery at 
this stage given the exigencies inside and outside the walls of the College operating at that time. 
Its immediate aims were to take advantage of abdominal surgeries precarious position as leaders 
of the general surgical tradition, as well as the political opportunities afforded by the Royal 
Colleges central role in the planning and organisation of services within the new health service. 
Remaining inside the walls of the college could potentially enable them to influence the planning 
of services around their area.  
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By 1964 orthopaedics was consciously pursuing a project towards professional differentiation and 
self-regulation; no longer content to remain part of the general surgical corpus as it had been in 
1948. The foundation of the National Health Service in 1948 which was very much professionally 
driven provided the necessary conditions in which orthopaedics was able to build on the 
developments made prior to the health service for example, in the treatment of fractures; 
developing sophisticated esoteric techniques a fundamental bench-mark in the professional 
project towards differentiation and self-regulation.  
 
Despite the success of orthopaedics in developing a distinct and clearly delineated knowledge 
and technological base requiring narrow and in-depth training reflected in no small part by their 
success in completely taking over the treatment of fractures from general surgeons during the 
1960’s; it was not successful in operationalising this capital until the 1970’s (Scotland) and 1980’s 
(England) when self-regulation became a reality. 
 
The experience of orthopaedics and other aspiring groups at this time, for example, neurosurgery 
and urological surgery clearly demonstrates the politically contested nature of knowledge. 
Although these groups had grown in number and strength over the years; the general surgeons 
still outnumbered these groups and remained a dominant grouping within the Royal College with 
the capacity to veto any further attempts at differentiation from the surgical corpus at that time. 
However, roughly twenty years later the exigencies of the immediate situation left the Royal 
College of Surgeons with no choice but to grant independent status to these groups.   
 
Challenges to generalism thus arose on two fronts. Within the walls of the College, the growth and 
increasing scientific complexity of the aspiring specialist groups raised the issue of the lack of 
formal assessment of this specialist knowledge or skills at the postgraduate level. This issue, 
which was becoming of concern to the government of the day, was taken up enthusiastically by 
The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, the rival College north of the border, thus creating 
an external challenge.  
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6.1 Introduction and Aims 
 
If the preceding surgical epoch was characterised by a strong emphasis on the ‘generalist’ and 
general surgical training; then the third surgical epoch 1990 to 1997 was characterised by a strong 
emphasis on the ‘specialist’ and specialist training. The change in emphasis necessitated a new 
and enlarged surgico-political structure in which cooperation between old and new structures 
became the order of the day. However, irrespective of the prominence given to specialism over 
generalism paediatrics and maxillofacial surgery were the only areas to break away and 
differentiate from general surgery during this period, despite vociferous campaigning from the 
peripheral vascular surgical lobby.    
 
In addition to the changes experienced by the surgical field, the relationship between the medical 
profession and the state which had characterised the delivery of care since the inception of the 
National Health Service came under attack from a Conservative government intent on curtailing 
the spending power of the medical profession. The reforms that followed were revolutionary in 
nature: the creation of an internal market in health care with new structures; the intention being to 
shift the balance of power from clinicians to managers.   
 
Given the changes to and complexity of the new surgico-political arena it is essential to fully 
understand these structures and elucidate where ‘power’ inheres. The thesis has focused on the 
English Royal College given its power, status, and leadership in surgery not only in England but 
in the UK as a whole. However, given that the emphasis has now changed from the training of the 
generalist to the training of the specialist – with the corollary being the Royal College now finds 
itself occupying a common political space with the other Royal Colleges together with a plethora 
of specialities; and (specialist associations) – it is important to understand the structure or 
structures where decisions regarding specialist differentiation are taken, and by whom. The 
opening two sections of this chapter will provide a full analysis of the new power structures.    
 
The previous chapter stressed the importance of the relationship between two social fields (i.e. 
the state and the medical profession) in the running of the health service; and in particular the 
power of the medical profession in this relationship which resulted in a clinician led service and 
copious amounts of capital for aspiring specialist groups. Given the revolutionary changes to the 
structure and delivery of services brought in with the new NHS White Paper (1990) the chapter 
will analyse the power of the profession vis- a-vis the state and its new cadre of managers.  
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The chapter will clearly show that despite the structural changes, the state and management relied 
heavily on the profession; indeed, the very success of the reforms rested on the goodwill and 
expertise of the profession. Furthermore, the profession’s ability to adapt to a situation which 
threatened the clinical autonomy of its members enabled the profession to reassert and strengthen 
its position in the concordat between itself and the state. In adopting a position of ‘collective 
professional autonomy’ (Klein, 1995) the profession effectively enhanced its political autonomy 
as national guidelines for service development and provision were adopted by government, 
purchasers of health care and trust managers.  
 
In addition, the chapter will argue that collective professional autonomy also resulted in greater 
central control over individual clinicians at the level of the hospital. Leaders of aspiring specialist 
groups at the macro-level were able to clearly delineate areas of knowledge and skill more than 
ever before at the micro hospital level as procedures were equated with volume and outcome and 
demarcation lines were drawn between the type of hospital where they could be carried out (i.e. 
specialist centres or district general hospitals). This, it will argue, had a political logic to it as the 
potential existed for aspiring groups to build up greater volumes of ‘capital’ to justify their quest for 
self-regulation and specialist status. 
 
The chapter will then move on to focus on the success of paediatrics and maxillofacial surgery in 
differentiating from general surgery, and conversely the failure of vascular surgery. It will focus on 
specific contextual factors during this period as well as other factors which can account for success 
and failure.  
 
 
6.2 The Structure of the Surgical Field and its Evolving Political 
Infrastructure 
 
By the 1990s the plethora of fully differentiated specialities with their own postgraduate 
examinations and with a powerful interest in advancing the status of their speciality, markedly 
changed not only the surgico-political infrastructure, but also the structures within which these 
professionalized groups would operate. The general agreement reached by 1988 regarding the 
necessity for separate assessment of basic training in surgery in general and of higher surgical 
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training in the surgical specialities necessitated the development of a new structure with a plethora 
of committees (political arms) supporting it.  
 
The emphasis had now moved from generalism to specialism; generalism no longer defined 
surgical practice and the specialist was in the ascendant. Thus, two opposing positions in social 
space changed places (Bourdieu, 1988), and the social field (surgical field) now valued scientific 
capital over social capital, based on class background. Co-operation also became the order of the 
day as the great surgical institutions (namely, the Royal College of Surgeons of England, The 
Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Glasgow and The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland) jointly co-ordinated specialist training 
across the UK. The independent surgical institutions each with their own histories and each with 
their own political infrastructure, although still independent, became institutions within a larger 
surgical structure; the arms of surgery had come together as one.  
 
The four surgical Royal Colleges were each individually responsible for basic surgical training, the 
aim of which was ‘to provide a common-trunk of training in the principles of surgery in- general’ 
(Galasko, 1997:6). This would also be 
 
‘assessed by each of the four surgical Royal Colleges individually through their own 
Collegiate examination; the Royal College of Surgeons of England being responsible for 
the basic surgical training in England and Wales. An Intercollegiate Committee on Basic 
Surgical Training and Examinations was established to standardise the requirements for 
the basic training examination and the content of the examination.’ (ibid.:5-6)  
 
Although the Royal Colleges were individually responsible for basic surgical training, higher 
surgical training was handled jointly by the four surgical Royal Colleges. From 1991 onwards, 
 
‘higher surgical training required the successful completion of the Intercollegiate 
Fellowship Examination in the relevant surgical speciality. These examinations are run by 
Intercollegiate Boards, each surgical speciality having its own board, and the board and 
the board chairman form a sub-committee of the Senate. Higher Surgical Training is co-
ordinated through the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland and its committees.’ 
(ibid.:6)  
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The Joint Committee on Higher Surgical Training (JCHST) is the body responsible for advising the 
surgical Royal Colleges on all matters pertaining to higher surgical training. It is supported in the 
day-to-day management of the scheme at operational level by specialist advisory committees 
(SACs). There is an SAC for each of the surgical specialities, namely general surgery, 
otorhinolaryngology, orthopaedics, neurosurgery, plastic surgery, cardio-thoracic surgery, and 
urology (JCHST, 2005). The JCHST is funded on a proportional basis by all four of the surgical 
Royal Colleges (Galasko, 1997).  
 
Given the emphasis had changed from the surgico-political machinations of groups within the 
structure of the individual surgical Royal Colleges to broader structures, questions pertaining to 
whether there is a dominant group operating within this structure and if so where within the 
structure power inheres would no doubt receive rather more complex answers. The complexity of 
the new structure and the plethora of interests which resides within these structures precludes 
against any simplistic answers.  
 
 
Fig. 6.1The Current Political Infrastructure in Surgery    
 
In light of this the most appropriate starting point would be to focus in greater depth on the 
component/constituent parts of the surgical structure beginning with the surgical Royal Colleges. 
Given that the thesis has focussed on the Royal College of Surgeons of England throughout it is 
therefore pertinent that the focus remains on this institution, and its role in the wider surgico-
political arena.  
 
Organisations and structures are created by groups; the foundation of the Royal College of 
Surgeons as a professional organisation at the beginning of the nineteenth-century is no exception 
The Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and 
Ireland (SSGBI)
The 9 SAC’s (Specialist 
Advisory Committees)
The Specialist Associations
JCHST (The Joint Committee 
for Higher Surgical Training)
JCIE (The Joint Committee 
for Intercollegiate 
Examinations)
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to this rule. The Royal College was created by the members of the surgical profession in order to 
educate surgeons, but also it acted as a licensing body in order to protect against unqualified 
practitioners and hence protect its professional monopoly in the market place.  
 
As with any organisation over time ‘the groups it embodies and the vested interests they have 
created’ (Selznick, 1957:16., cited in Cropper, 2001:84) become institutionalised. Given that the 
Royal College was founded by, and dominated by, surgeons who were “general” in the true sense 
of the word the values of surgical generalism were embodied within the institution.  
 
The Royal College of Surgeons was surgery institutionalised; its status was derived from its Royal 
Charter which implied professional eminence, its power from its ‘statutory role’ as educator and 
‘maintainer of standards in surgery’ (Galasko, 1997:5), and reflected in its central policy making 
role as the voice of surgery and the profession within the National Health Service (Stevens, 2003). 
 
As with any institution, survival is of paramount importance; institutions ‘are affected, even 
penetrated by their environments, but they are also capable of responding to these influence 
attempts creatively and strategically’ (Scott, 2001:179); conversely institutions are also faced with 
situations whereby their position becomes untenable resulting in changes which are neither 
creative, nor strategic, but forced.  
 
The Royal College is not unlike other institutions; its role as the voice of surgery has to be protected 
and preserved this can be seen throughout the history of the Royal College.  Over the course of 
nearly two centuries the Royal College as an institution has faced situations where it has adapted 
creatively and strategically but has also been faced with situations where it has been forced into 
making necessary yet unpalatable changes. 
 
Thus, the Royal College of the twenty-first century is markedly different to the College of the 
nineteenth century, and indeed the College of the twentieth century. The body of surgery has been 
slowly dismembered as specialist groups have broken away and founded their own Colleges the 
first being obstetrics and gynaecology in 1929, and latterly ophthalmology in 1988; and specialist 
groups have been granted their own specialist examinations with ophthalmology and 
otorhinolaryngology being the first in 1947, and paediatrics and maxillofacial surgery being the last 
in 1992 and 1994; and latterly the changes to the examination structure following the introduction 
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of higher surgical training necessitated new relationships with the other surgical Royal Colleges 
as well as the specialist associations. 
 
According to an eminent Professor of Surgery in London, the pendulum has shifted away from 
general surgery, which dominated the College Council as well as the office of President, to other 
groups such as the orthopaedic surgeons who are a large grouping within the College: 
 
Now the Council of the College, who are elected by the fellows, have traditionally until 
recently – the Council has been heavily dominated by general surgery, and most of the 
Presidents in living memory have been general surgeons; but it has changed. Now the 
orthopaedic surgeons of whom I think there are nine hundred or a thousand – it’s a big 
grouping have large numbers of their colleagues on the Council of the College – the current 
President is an orthopaedic surgeon. But the general surgeons must feel a bit dismayed 
by this move, because you look around the Council of the College now, and you don’t see 
many people that you know. There is an ENT surgeon and a neurosurgeon on, and these 
are quite small specialities; so, the pendulum has shifted away from general surgery on 
the College Council. (Prof W. Professor of Surgery) 
 
There are those however, who disagree with Professor W. and argue that the values of the College 
are still very much ‘generalist’; this comes interestingly enough from an orthopaedic surgeon: 
 
Well the number of orthopaedic surgeons in this country is either greater than the number 
of general surgeons or it’s the same; and the Royal College of Surgeons is a general 
surgical club. It produces a thing called The Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons, 85 
per cent of which is general surgery, and it has a token orthopaedic section… (Mr D. – 
Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon – DGH.) 
 
Irrespective of whether this is the case or not there is a debate amongst the surgical community 
regarding the power and influence of the Royal College given the introduction of higher surgical 
training and its associated structural changes; there is a dichotomy between those who argue as 
Professor C. and Mr XT. that the College has become weaker in the face of the growing strength 
of the specialist associations: 
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I don’t think that the Royal College is a powerful political force anymore; I think that the 
Royal College of Surgeons has become weak now because the tail that used to be part of 
it and wagged by the College is now the specialist associations which has lots of tails and 
is wagging the College instead. (Prof C. – Professor of Surgery) 
 
Within the new structure some bodies have become stronger while others have become 
weaker; the specialist associations have become stronger and the Royal College has 
become somewhat weaker. Within this structure the SAC has become powerful. The SAC 
has the power to grant or withdraw educational approval for a post, so if I want to train a 
vascular surgeon here I have to have SAC approval; if they come along and say you are 
not training to a certain standard they can withdraw that, which would mean I wouldn’t get 
anybody coming here to work for me, which would be worrisome in service terms and 
professionally. (Mr X.T. Consultant Vascular Surgeon and Leading Light – Vascular 
Surgical Society of Great Britain and Ireland) 
 
And those who argue like Professor W. that the new surgico-political structure whereby the Royal 
College is obliged to share a common political space with the three other surgical Royal Colleges 
has resulted in a dilution of its power: 
 
The Senate is the body which upsets all the Colleges because for historical reasons you 
have two other Colleges in Scotland and you also have the Royal College of Surgeons in 
Ireland. The Colleges power is to some extent limited by the fact that there are four Royal 
Colleges in these islands which is quite unnecessary but one we are left with. We have got 
one in Ireland, and we have two in Scotland which is absurd – all of which seem to carry 
the same weight as the Royal College of Surgeons. (Prof W. Professor of Surgery) 
 
Conversely however, there are those on the other side of the divide such as Professor M. who 
argue that the Royal College is still not only a powerful political force in terms of its political clout, 
but it is still surgically powerful in that it has retained control of the examination structure as well 
as having statutory responsibility for the maintenance of standards in surgery:  
 
The College still has tremendous political clout and statutory responsibility with regard to 
the maintenance of standards; it’s also powerful because it controls the examination 
structure. A dignified statement from the President actually does get the press of the world 
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around, and they do actually listen; The President of the Royal College of Surgeons usually 
has a direct voice to the Minister of Health if not the Prime Minister himself. If a surgical 
question comes up, he is usually the person to ask because the College is still very 
powerful. (Professor M. – Professor of Surgery) 
 
And The President of The Royal College of Surgeons of England fires a salvo when he disagrees 
with Mr XT’s assessment when he notes that the specialist associations are merely carrying out 
their educational duties; duties which the Royal College has bestowed upon them: 
 
The SAC (Specialist Advisory Committee) is a sub-committee of the JCHST (Joint 
Committee on Higher Surgical Training) which is a sub-committee of the Senate. If you say 
it is the SACs that have the control that’s their function. The JCHST meets quarterly and all 
the SAC chairman are on that as well as the Presidents and representatives from all four of 
the Royal Colleges, and the SAC chairmen give a report to the JCHST. So, to say that the 
Colleges have become weaker at the expense of the SAC’s is untrue; the SAC’s are the 
Colleges with the specialist associations, but on the SAC’s, you will have representatives 
from the four Royal Colleges and the specialist association. (President – RCS) 
 
As with most things there are elements of truth on both sides of the divide. The Royal College is 
still responsible for training as well as maintaining the standards in surgery. In basic surgical 
training the College holds the ultimate veto as to which junior hospital posts in NHS Trusts are 
sanctioned for training (Salter, 2004). This work is carried out by the ‘Hospital Recognition 
Committee’ (Galasko, 1997) which is run solely by the Royal College of Surgeons. According to 
Salter each post  
 
‘carries an accreditable value – the period of accreditable higher specialist training that can 
be gained in each speciality for which the post is approved – and the withdrawal of College 
approval means that, for training purposes, the post ceases to exist. The exercise of this 
sanction in circumstances where a College deems that a post, and the resources attached 
to it, no longer meets the educational criteria generates much heat.’ (p.111)  
 
A hospital in the southeast (1991) provides a pertinent example of the contentious nature of 
College sanctions: 
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We were one of the first hospitals to be inspected for our surgical posts following the 
introduction of basic surgical training in 1991, and immediately we were blown out of basic 
surgical training and they de-recognised our posts because we couldn’t conform with the 
criteria which they had laid down, namely that basic surgical trainees should not be 
involved in significant amounts of service work (i.e. routine work on the ward) which is fine 
if you’ve got pre-registration house officers to do it, but if you’re in neurosurgery and you 
haven’t got pre-registration house officers you can’t fulfil this. Now the Society of British 
Neurosurgeons have had a battle with the College over this and it is now appreciated that 
there has to be some element of flexibility. (Mr Y. – Consultant Neurosurgeon – Teaching 
Hospital) 
 
Another instance of this was recorded during the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry (1999) (Hearing 
Summary 14th June), when the then President of the Royal College of Surgeons Sir B. J. gave 
evidence. He recalled a case where he took the decision to de-recognise a post at a hospital: 
 
‘The Hospital Recognition Committee believed that the trainers concerned were unsuitable 
for training their senior house officers at basic surgical training level and this was reported 
back to me personally as President of the College by the chairman of the Hospital 
Recognition Committee, and I took the view, given the evidence that had been provided to 
me, that instant de-recognition should take place and that happened.’  (p.10) 
 
In higher surgical training, although there is a close overlap between the specialist associations 
and the College in all aspects of speciality training, from the Speciality Fellowship Examination to 
the inspection of higher surgical training posts, and although the College is represented on all the 
committees dealing with higher surgical training – the Joint Committee for Intercollegiate 
Examinations (a sub-committee of the Senate), the Joint Committee on Higher Surgical Training 
and the Specialist Advisory Committees – its wings have been clipped.  
 
The Royal College has been forced to occupy a common political space with the three other 
surgical Royal Colleges; and although its original role in training and maintaining standards in 
surgery has not changed, the goal posts have; old structures are now obliged to congregate 
around specialist surgery, therefore, ‘The important political point is that the primary unit of 
epistemic power is the speciality around which other structures are obliged to congregate’ (Salter, 
2004:109). 
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Thus, irrespective of the fact that the Royal Colleges are represented at every level of specialist 
training, at the end of the day the Royal Colleges are dependent on the specialist knowledge, 
which is the domain of the speciality itself, this is reflected throughout the higher surgical training 
structure. Epistemologically speaking the speciality possesses the knowledge and expertise; 
accordingly, the training curriculum and examinations are developed by the speciality in 
conjunction with the specialist advisory committee and intercollegiate board for the speciality 
(Salter, 2004).  
 
The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) provides a pertinent example. 
The ASGBI is the speciality association for general surgery and the SAC defined sub-speciality 
associations within general surgery.44 Issues pertaining to higher surgical education, curriculum 
and training are dealt with by the Association of Surgeons Education and Training Board (ASETB) 
This ‘Board will liaise with the Intercollegiate Board in General Surgery, as well as the SAC in 
General Surgery’ (ASGBI, 2004:47). The composition of the Board is as follows:  
 
‘the Chairman, the President of the Association, the Chairman of the SAC in general 
surgery and representatives from the Education Committees of the SAC defined sub-
speciality organisations within general surgery (breast, endoscopic, vascular, 
coloproctology, transplant, upper-gastrointestinal and endocrine).’ (ibid.)  
 
So, within this political space (i.e. the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland) you have the 
surgical Royal Colleges and the nine SAC-defined surgical specialties and their representative 
Associations; this is akin to a political melting pot where a plethora of interests are represented. 
Thus, for example, the President of The Royal College of Surgeons of England will not only 
represent the interests of surgery as a whole, but also the particular interests of the English Royal 
College, not unlike the Presidents of the other surgical Royal Colleges; and not forgetting the 
specialty associations, the representatives of specialist surgery, will have the interests of the 
specialty at heart. Thus, each group has a delegated representative or representatives with power 
to ‘speak and act in its name’ and ‘shield the group as a whole’ and its interests, that is to say, the 
social capital and associated capital, ‘which is the basis of the group’ (Bourdieu, 1986:23). The 
protectionism employed in the interests of the group is echoed by two consultants, with 
experiences of college council and specialty associations:     
 
44 The Association of Breast Surgery (BASO); The Association of Coloproctologists of Great Britain and Ireland 
(ACPGBI); The Association of Endoscopic Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (AESGBI); The Association of 
Upper Gastro-Intestinal Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (AUGIS); The British Transplantation Society 
(BTS) and The Vascular Surgical Society of Great Britain and Ireland (VSGBI). 
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You see you have the College interested in the College, and the associations interested in 
the speciality. The Association don’t have the statutory responsibility in terms of the Royal 
Charters, recognition by government and so on, but they have the grass roots membership; 
they could then take that away from the College; however, I think that most people would 
wish to maintain the position of the college. (Mr N.P. – Consultant Surgeon and Member of 
Council The Royal College of Surgeons 
 
For twelve years I was a member of the Council of this College, then I became President of 
the ASGBI, and now I am Chairman of the Federation of Surgical Speciality Associations; I 
chair all of the Speciality Associations. The Speciality Associations want the Colleges to 
be responsive to their needs and demands, but they do not want to in any way damage the 
Colleges, therefore they will work with the College.  (Professor V.J. –Professor of Surgery) 
 
Thus, the Senate sits at the apex of the surgico-political infrastructure, effectively controlling what 
happens in surgery: 
 
The Senate is the voice of surgery; it controls what is happening; it is the voice of British 
surgery with government. Things will not happen in British surgery without the approval of 
Senate. (Professor V.Z. – Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh)  
 
Therefore, aspiring groups wishing to pursue a professional project whereby they differentiate from 
their parent speciality to form an independent speciality will require the permission of the Senate: 
 
Surgical problems, surgical solutions are aired/discussed. These can be problems brought 
forward that fall within the respective speciality organisations; or they can be problems 
brought forward by the colleges themselves. Also, if you are talking about the decision to 
create another speciality then that would have to be a decision of the surgical Senate; that 
would be a major decision. If the underlying principle is that they do not want to have 
anything to do with the general surgery anymore; they want to be independent, then that 
would require the agreement of the Senate and the Associations. They would also have to 
find a mechanism for them to set up a similar structure to inspect posts, to approve 
training, to conduct exams; and these three components are very specialist and very 
costly; I don’t think any individual sub-speciality group would have the will, or the funding 
 179 
to do this as an independent exercise. (Professor V.Z. – Royal College of Surgeons of 
Edinburgh) 
 
However, this does not negate the fact that given the number of groups and interests represented 
on the Senate, it is highly likely that power will inhere in more than one structure, in other words 
important decisions regarding specialist differentiation and the creation of further specialities may 
be decided not only be intergroup alliances on the Senate, but by the machinations and power 
struggles within the specialist associations themselves before they even have a chance of 
reaching the Senate. The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) provides 
a good working example of this. 
 
 
6.3 The Politics of Specialist Differentiation: The Association of 
Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland 
 
The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) is the speciality association 
which represents general surgery and its sub-specialist areas. Given that the Association 
represents what is the largest speciality within British surgery it holds an influential position within 
the Senate which (according to a former President of the Association) gives it a priceless 
advantage over the Royal College of Surgeons of England given the political machinations within 
the structure: 
 
The ASGBI has one priceless advantage over the College, in that it represents Great Britain 
and Ireland, so it can speak for the totality of general surgery. Whereas the Royal College 
of Surgeons of England as its name suggests represents English surgery. At the same time 
The English College does not get on well with The Royal College of Surgeons of Edinburgh, 
and that does create a certain amount of problems. (Professor A.V.P. – Professor of 
Surgery) 
 
It is therefore not surprising that there are struggles and tension within the structure for control of 
the reins of power: 
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The Association of Surgeons has become stronger; the ASGBI is becoming increasingly 
influential; it doesn’t have any executive power, but into that feeds all the sub-speciality 
associations; and there’s a certain amount of conflict between these groups about who’s 
holding the reins. (Mr X.T. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon and Leading Light – Vascular 
Surgical Society of Great Britain and Ireland 
 
There is also likely to be conflict for the reins of power given that those who control the association 
are able to negotiate with important special publics outside the field of surgery, namely the state. 
This is akin to the point made by Bucher and Strauss (1961) in their work. In particular they note 
that there is a struggle for control of the professional associations given that ‘those who control 
the professional associations are able to negotiate with relevant special publics’ (p.332). The 
ability to negotiate with the state could be potentially advantageous for those sub-specialist groups 
within the association who aspire to separate from general surgery as potential ‘capital’ could be 
accumulated aiding their lobbying power within the surgico-political arena of the Senate towards 
their goal of achieving ‘pure’ speciality status. Conversely it could be advantageous for those 
wishing to block further specialist differentiation within the speciality.   
 
Thus, it could be said that the structure of the ASGBI is a social field within a larger social field 
(i.e. the surgical field). In other words, it is a sub-field of the field of surgery and given that this is 
the case it will display some of the characteristics of the surgical field. For example, it is likely that 
there will be a powerful group or groups and thus inequity in the distribution of specific forms of 
capital. As is the case with all sub-fields, it will have its own ‘internal logics, rules, and regularities’ 
(Thomson, 2014:70). For example, the ASGBI has its own unique history, executive board, 
internal governance structure, rules, and regulations around elections to council, and strategic 
aims. The sub-specialist areas (sub-fields) it comprises are sub-sub fields of the surgical field and 
the same principle will be replicated throughout each sub-sub-field. 
 
Although it is difficult to ascertain exactly who is holding the reins of power within the association, 
it is highly likely that the executive members will wear two hats: the hat which represents the 
interests of the speciality of general surgery, and the hat which represents the interest of their sub-
speciality group. Thus, not unlike the Senate of Surgery, the Association is a political melting pot 
where a plethora of interests are represented and the potential for intergroup alliances is high, 
especially if the future and combined capital of the group is under threat, from aspirant specialty 
groups. 
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In many respects the Association of Surgeons faces a similar problem to that faced by the Royal 
College of Surgeons during the 1940’s, namely, how to prevent the fragmentation of general 
surgery. In particular the advent of speciality fellowships and speciality associations being able to 
control their own training and standards with regard to higher surgical training (HST) has resulted 
in aspiring speciality groups within general surgery (such as the vascular surgeons and colorectal 
surgeons) beginning to call for a recognised speciality separate from general surgery. These 
groups are pushing hard for recognition, as they are afraid, they will end up being trapped in the 
speciality of general surgery and as a result, will not be able to control their own work and decide 
their own fate (Kirk, 1989). 
 
Jackson (1992) notes:  
 
‘there are several loud and persuasive voices now arguing that peripheral vascular surgery 
should seek independent speciality status and others are suggesting that the surgery of 
children should be carried out exclusively by paediatric surgeons.’ (p.63)  
 
For example, the vascular surgeons argue that: 
 
The movement for independent speciality status is certainly being led by vascular surgery. 
Urology separated some years ago now, but there is no reason why vascular surgery 
should not become a pure speciality too…there is no reason why urology should be any 
more of a speciality than vascular surgery. For technical reasons vascular surgery is 
different to the other sub-speciality areas of general surgery…a vascular surgeon can do 
virtually anything in the abdomen as when fixing an aneurysm, they are dealing with the 
abdominal cavity; a colorectal surgeon can do anything except vascular procedures as 
they won’t have undergone the necessary training…likewise with breast surgeons. So 
technical reasons set us apart from our surgical colleagues. (Mr W.  – Consultant Vascular 
Surgeon – Teaching Hospital). 
 
Jackson also notes that there are those who believe that coloproctology should also aim for 
independent speciality status. However, Jackson an exponent of sub-specialisation within general 
surgery is against further specialist differentiation and fragmentation of the speciality. He argues 
that ‘the case for coloproctology and other disciplines seeking separate speciality status separate 
from general surgery is not made’ (p.65). 
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Jackson argues that: 
 
‘the consequence of splitting away from general surgery would be considerable and to the 
ultimate detriment of the patient. The status of the few remaining general surgeons would 
diminish – they would become second rate surgeons in the eyes of their specialist 
colleagues and in the eyes of the patient, being looked upon as failed specialists. They 
would be insufficient in number to train the large number of embryo specialists in the vital 
core general surgical training that all specialities accept as necessary before embarking 
on specialist training.’ (ibid.) 
 
Clearly there are internal struggles; however, strategies aimed at conserving the status quo may 
serve to resolve these disputes or at least placate these groups to a certain extent should these 
discussions reach the Senate for further consideration. For example, the President elect of the 
Association notes that:  
 
There is an increasing fragmentation of general surgery into these component parts and 
the question is will the whole remain?  And will the Association of Surgeons be able to 
survive? I’m pretty sure that both will. Indeed, I think that the Association of Surgeons has 
been quite intelligent in that it has not procrastinated as this ferments unrest. For example, 
it has agreed to find ways of addressing the problem of specialist training in vascular 
surgery through opening up discussions with the Senate regarding the proper assessment 
of sub-specialities within the general surgery examination. It has also offered time at its 
annual meetings for each of these groups to have symposium within the confines of that 
meeting and because there are still only about 1300 general surgeons within Britain that’s 
still small enough to want to remain a group. (Professor G.W.A.– Professor of Surgery)  
 
Professor G.W.A. also notes another seminal example of a conservation strategy employed by 
the Association with regard to laparoscopic surgery. Laparoscopic surgery is a relatively new area 
and is something of a test case between ‘organ related’ disciplines and a ‘technique related’ 
discipline. Indeed, parallels can be drawn with orthopaedics in the 19th and early 20th century, as 
not unlike orthopaedics, laparoscopic surgery cuts across the organ geography of the body of 
surgery. By placating this group, the association may be able to contain this group within its walls, 
possibly arresting plans for them to seek independent speciality status in the future. Professor 
G.W.A. documents the problem and the outcome in detail:   
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Laparoscopy came in around the late 1980’s and all of a sudden established surgeons had 
to learn a whole new bag of tricks because it’s very difficult operating with cameras…if we 
come back to the sub-specialisation issue there is a very active group called the 
Association of Endoscopic Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland, and in (C) you have one 
of the leading lights, a man called Mr P. It is largely through his persistence that he now 
has a seat on the Council of the Association of Surgeons representing endoscopic surgery. 
A number of people feel that this is a bastard sub-speciality and that it will wither as it were 
and that this new grouping which has been sort of a ginger group won’t survive. Minimal 
invasive surgery is appropriate to vascular, lower GI as well as upper GI, and a number of 
us feel that actually endoscopic cholecystectomy is the province of upper GI surgery, not 
some separate sort of technique related grouping. So, it’s an uneasy alliance at the 
moment; it’s quite a big group and they have good symposia and it’s a developing area, so 
the ASGBI felt obliged to have them in the party pissing from inside the tent rather than 
from outside the tent as it were. But when it comes to whether they should have their own 
training scheme, then people get a little bit concerned about that and this is an unresolved 
argument. So, Mr P. is pushing hard for endoscopic surgery as a separate speciality; a 
number of us don’t actually agree with that. It is a terribly important technique and it needs 
to be properly taught and so on, but endoscopic surgery of the of the gallbladder belongs 
with open surgery of the gallbladder, endoscopic surgery of the colon with open surgery 
of the colon. So, this is actually something of a test case where you have got a ‘technique 
related discipline’ competing against an ‘organ related discipline’.  There is a clash of 
interest here which I would have thought was very germane to your thesis… It’s unresolved 
at the moment; so, there on the Council of the ASGBI we have P. representing the 
Endoscopic Surgery and we have somebody else representing Upper GI Surgery, which 
includes quite a lot of Endoscopic surgery – and who shall decide on the proper training 
of somebody coming through who wants to be an Upper GI surgeon? Does he have to have 
some sort of dual accreditation? (Prof G.W.A. – Professor of Surgery) 
 
The conservation strategies utilised by the ASGBI with regards to vascular and laparoscopic 
surgery were very perspicacious. For example, proactively agreeing to liaise with the Senate on 
behalf of the vascular surgical cadre not only served to placate this group, but also would enable 
the ASGBI to control the pace and direction of any changes to specialist training. Likewise, offering 
the laparoscopic group a seat on the council of the ASGBI not only placated them, but would 
enable the council to manage their ambitions and maintain organ boundaries where possible. 
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However, it is unlikely that the vascular or laparoscopic surgical cadres would risk breaking away 
from the generality of surgery at this point, given the specific capital benefits accruing from 
membership of a large and powerful group, with all of its combined capital. As alluded to in 
previous chapters, membership and participation in a large group concentrates social capital, as 
the group is the sum of its parts, that is to say, individual members bring with them their 
accumulated capital in all of its forms, and in return secure the benefits of the combined capital 
resources of the group, as a whole (Bourdieu, 1986). Given the prestige and political influence of 
the Association on the Senate, and its potential to lobby government, it is highly likely that the 
specific types of capital to be garnered by the sub-specialty associations, besides social capital, 
is symbolic capital (attached to a name of repute, guaranteeing mutually beneficial relationships), 
and political capital (Bourdieu, 1988).  
 
Conversely, given that the group is the sum of its parts, it is important for the ASGBI to retain the 
sub-specialty areas of general surgery under their umbrella, as if they were to lose these areas, 
this would have a deleterious effect on the combined capital resources of the group. Thus, in 
addition to the conservation strategies outlined above, the association’s strategy is to be ‘a thriving 
institution that is recognised by members as useful and important’; the association intends to fulfil 
this strategy by adopting a ‘proactive philosophy’, with an emphasis on getting things done, as 
opposed to being reactive. The association contends that this is imperative in the current surgical 
field, where the ‘Royal Colleges, The Senate of Surgery, Specialty and Sub-specialty Associations 
jockey for attention’, resulting in ‘duplication of work and effort across professional bodies and 
poor decision-making processes’ (www.asgbi.org.uk/about-us/strategic-aims). 
 
However, despite the placatory measures adopted by the Association, in order to indirectly thwart 
the aspirant sub-specialist groups in their quest to achieve ‘pure’ speciality status, the success or 
failure of these groups will be very much dependent on their ability to accumulate specific forms 
of capital from other social fields which could possibly be utilised as lobbying power in the surgico-
political arena. The state and the internal market context of the NHS may provide such 
opportunities.  
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6.4.1 The State and the Profession: Redressing the Balance 
 
Since its inception the NHS has been dogged by an inequity between the demand for its services 
which is medically created, and what it can realistically be expected to supply given the financial 
constraints which exist.  
 
With the increasing disparity between patient demand and expectation, and the ability of the 
medical profession and NHS to supply this demand for healthcare, the government reached the 
conclusion that more robust systems of ‘accountability were required to ensure that doctors carried 
out their part of the concordat between medicine and the state’ (Salter, 2004:193). 
 
The Thatcher government was no longer content with the medical profession having the state in 
what was akin to a ‘political headlock,’ and set about re-engineering its macro-level relationship 
with the medical profession. In January 1988 the NHS review was conducted by the Prime Minister 
and cabinet colleagues, and on this occasion the medical profession were not invited to participate 
in this process. Indeed, this was a first, as in the past the medical profession were always 
represented at the table. (Rivett, 1998) 
 
The philosophy espoused by the new managerialist agenda (Klein, 1995), with its emphasis on 
key performance indicators (KPI’s), organisational effectiveness, population needs analysis, the 
commissioning and contracting of services and the optimum use of resources, was a perfect fit 
with the ideological values of the Thatcher government with their emphasis on competition and 
the free market, greater public choice, and the need to remove the over reliance of the state on 
the medical profession. Given the attraction of a managerialist agenda, the state began to 
progressively unpick the close relationship it had with the medical profession in favour of 
cementing a closer relationship with NHS managers (Salter, 2004). Indeed, the underlying 
motivation for the reforms introduced by the NHS and Community Care Act (1990), was to address 
the disparity in the relationship between doctors and managers, in favour of managers. Certainly, 
it was a priority for the Thatcher government to curtail the autonomy of clinicians and hold them to 
account as their spending decisions were seen to be unregulated (Hunter, 1994).  
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6.4.2 The Internal Market or Purchaser Provider Split (PPS) 
 
Given the above, the central foundation block of the NHS reforms which began to be implemented 
in April 1991 was the purchaser-provider split or PPS. 
 
The key concept of the purchaser-provider split was the separation of the functions of purchasing 
and service delivery. According to Ham (1997): 
 
‘Before the reforms were introduced, district health authorities (or boards in Scotland) 
(DHAs) received a budget from regional health authorities (RHAs) to manage the hospital 
and community health services in their areas.’ (p.16)  
 
However, Hunter notes that: 
 
‘conflating the purchaser and provider functions in a single organisation was regarded as 
resulting in a potential conflict of interest between the preferences of providers on the one 
and those of the users on the other.’ (1994:6) 
 
The environment post Working for patients was, by contrast, theoretically market choice driven.  
The reforms were ‘designed to break the strong link that existed between district health authorities 
and their local providers’ (Ham, 1997:16), in order to liberate and encourage ‘health authorities to 
develop services appropriate to the assessed needs of their populations’ (Hunter, 1994:6). 
 
Given this logic, the providers (acute hospitals) ‘would be transformed into autonomous NHS 
Trusts whose budgets would depend on their competitive efficiency in getting contracts from 
purchasers (health authorities)’ (Klein, 1995:184). Thus, in theory ‘the contracting system would 
allow the purchasing authority to shop around for the best deal on quality and price’ (Hunter, 
1994:6). It was not only health authorities that would have the ability to shop around, as one of 
the central tenets of the NHS reforms was, to enable General Practitioners to become fundholders 
(Marnoch, 1996). This was in-keeping with the importance attached to their so-called ‘gate-
keeping’ role, in relation to secondary care since the establishment of the National Health Service. 
(Roland & Coulter, 1992).  
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As fundholders, GPs would be allocated a budget which would enable them to purchase specific 
types of care, (e.g. elective surgery) from public and private providers (Marnoch, 1996). Thus, in 
effect GPs would act as informed purchasers on behalf of their patients and in the process would 
use health service budgets more economically (Newdick, 1995).  
 
In view of the fact that service delivery in secondary care is clinically led, and that clinical decision 
making impacts on spend and quality of service provision, clinical performance management 
would be fundamentally important in terms of influencing a unit’s market position (Marnoch, 1996). 
Markets are driven by competition. This essentially means the seller would be unwise to charge 
above the market price for any length of time. To do so will court competition from competitors,  
 
‘either existing or prospective, to enter the market and swallow up the expensive sellers’ 
share. This simple mechanism based on a constant threat from the purchaser to buy 
someone else’s product, provides a strong lever against costly inefficient behaviour on the 
part of producers.’ (ibid.:28) 
 
The NHS reforms presented managers with a range of mechanisms (Hunter, 1994) in order to 
ensure that doctors ‘formed part of the corporate effort to fulfil the contractual agreements with 
commissioning agencies’ (Salter, 2004:193). In doing so the state began to extend into 
professional territory, and in doing so challenged the profession’s right to professional autonomy, 
embodied in the relationship between the state and the profession, established in the run up to 
the NHS in 1948. 
 
Professional autonomy is multi-faceted; although these were highlighted in Chapter five, it is worth 
noting them again. Professional autonomy can be broken down into three main categories: 
 
‘economic autonomy, the right of doctors to determine their remuneration; political 
autonomy, the right of doctors to make policy decisions as the legitimate experts on health 
matters; and clinical or technical autonomy, the right of the profession to set its own 
standards and control clinical performance, exercised, for example, through clinical 
freedom at the bedside.’ (Elston, 1991:61-62) 
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The state had already begun to undermine the profession’s political autonomy given the fact that 
the Thatcher government chose not to involve the profession in the NHS review held in 1988 or 
consult them on the proposed changes which were later embodied in the White Paper (Rivett, 
1998). The economic and clinical/technical autonomy were next in the firing line.  
 
 
6.4.3 Professional Autonomy at the Micro-Level: Consultants 
Contracts, Appointments and Distinction Awards 
 
As alluded to in the previous chapter consultant contracts were held at the regional level, however 
under the new plans consultant contracts would be handled by the new NHS Trusts. This provided 
Trusts with the authority to reach decisions on the terms and conditions of consultants and other 
staff groups. This was a direct threat to their professional independence, and understandably the 
profession was concerned about the ability of self-governing hospitals to depart from national 
remuneration levels (Lee-Potter, 1997).  
 
On the question of consultant appointments, the Department of Health had one major change in 
mind. This was that the district general manager should join the appointment panel as a full voting 
member. This would enable a manager to ascertain how amenable a potential appointee might be 
to managerial priorities if they differed from medical ones. The Secretary of State for Health 
Kenneth Clarke also felt that as part of the move towards greater management control of 
consultants, this should also include clearly defined roles and responsibilities and disciplinary 
processes. (Lee-Potter, 1997). This would enable managers to openly discuss contracts with their 
consultants and provide clarity around their roles and responsibilities (Hunter, 1994).  
 
At the inception of the NHS (1948) distinction awards were introduced to secure the backing of 
hospital consultants. In effect, this would ‘give consultants deemed to be meritorious by their peers 
special financial rewards, over and above their basic salaries’ (Klein, 1995:19). Under the new 
proposals the awards became another tool in order to ensure consultants compliance with the 
government agenda. On distinction awards,45 the main proposals were: 
 
 
45 The distinction awards scale ran from C to A plus (Lee-Potter, 1997). 
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‘That awards would be regularly reviewed and could be withdrawn if performance was 
shown to have fallen; that the lowest, ‘C’ award should only be given to those who had a 
commitment to management and the development of the service; that no one should be 
allowed to obtain a higher award without joining the ladder at ‘C’ award level; and that 
managerial input should be increased on the regional ‘C’ award committees which 
recommended who should receive one. In addition, the regional health authority chairman 
would now chair these regional committees instead of a senior consultant, and he would 
be joined by five senior managers.’ (Lee-Potter, 1997:128-9) 
 
 
6.4.4 The Development of a Corporate Culture: Audit and Directorates 
 
The NHS reforms also firmly established the importance of medical audit for consultants. 
(Marnoch, 1996).  
 
‘Medical audit can be defined as the systematic, critical analysis of the quality of medical 
care, including the procedures used for diagnosis and treatment, the use of resources, and 
the resulting outcome and quality of life for the patients.’ (Newdick, 1995:171)  
 
The logic behind medical audit is clear. ‘Quality and costs’ should play a significant role in the 
operation of a competitive market in health care. The use of key performance standards or 
indicators (KPI’s), for benchmarking and ‘regularly’ evaluating the processes in relation to patient 
care (Marnoch, 1996) should ensure the efficient use of resources.  By 1990 medical audit 
became a compulsory facet of patient care and was stipulated in hospital clinicians contracts 
(Palmer, 2002); clearly this had ‘major implications for the accountability of consultants and 
therefore their management’ (Hunter, 1994:7) 
 
Conversely, this was a means of bringing consultants on-board. Given the purchaser provider 
splits inbuilt market mechanism Trusts would have to develop a culture which was more ‘corporate’ 
in style. However, this could only be achieved if the consultant body played a significant role in it 
(Hunter, 1994). Thus, in addition to medical audit, clinical directorates were established in which 
consultants ‘as directors assumed responsibility for the performance of a particular part of a 
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hospital’s activity’ (Newdick, 1995:168). According to Frostick & Wallace the effect of this initiative 
was that the:  
 
‘day-to-day management of resources for each speciality’ was ‘devolved to the clinician 
level (i.e. the clinical directorate)’ and directorates were also expected to ‘develop the 
strategy for the speciality (or specialities) they represented, putting the case to the hospital 
management board for the appropriate level of finance.’ (1993:246)  
 
 
6.4.5 Management Arrangements and Structural Changes - Macro and 
Meso-Levels 
 
As well as the micro-level changes, the White Paper aimed to strengthen management 
arrangements at macro and meso-levels.  
 
In the new Department of Health (DH), this was to be achieved by appointing a Policy Board and 
NHS Management Executive. The policy board was responsible for overseeing matters of policy 
and was appointed and chaired by The Secretary of State for Health. ‘The Board would set 
objectives for the NHS Management Executive’ (Lee-Potter, 1997:62).  
 
The NHS Management Executive (ME) was established as the pinnacle of the health service 
(Ham, 1999), and at its helm was, Duncan Nichol, a seasoned administrator with over twenty 
years of experience in the health service (Lee-Potter, 1997). According to Ham, the ME was in a 
good position to ensure that the reforms worked given that it comprised experienced professionals, 
ranging from senior health service managers, businessmen and businesswomen, and civil 
servants. However, it was acknowledged that it was unrealistic for the Management Executive to 
assume direct control of all 190 district health authorities (Lee-Potter, 1997). Conversely, greater 
control could be exercised over the regional health authorities. This would be achieved through 
slimming them down.  
 
As alluded to in (Chapter Five Section 5.5.2) RHAs were powerful strategic planning bodies with 
numerous responsibilities including: ensuring parity in specialist service provision and medical 
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staffing (consultant contracts). However, the eventual destruction of the region’s role was 
inevitable, ‘because regional planning did not fit in the new market dogma’46 (ibid.:63).  
 
At a local level, the composition of health authorities was to be revised along business lines. This 
came under ‘Other Issues’ in the White Paper: 
 
‘Chairmen and members of health authorities will continue to have a vital role in the 
management of the service and will need to spearhead the changes that the Government 
is proposing in their White Paper. Because so much management responsibility is now to 
be delegated to local level, the Government have decided that the membership of 
authorities should reflect this new role.’ (ibid.:73)  
 
Thus, the membership of RHAs and DHAs were cut back. Originally both types of authority were 
composed of 15 to 20 members; their number was reduced to no more than 11 members, 
comprising: non-executive (5 members) executive (2-5 members) with a chairman who was a non-
executive. The Secretary of State for Health would appoint the Chairmen and the RHA non-
executives and the RHA’s would be responsible for the appointment of the DHA non-executives. 
It was proposed that non-executive members be appointed based on their respective skill sets 
and previous experience. For example, the government were keen to appoint businessmen and 
women who it hoped would bring business acumen into the health service. The appointment of 
the executive members had to comprise the following: a general manager, finance director and a 
maximum of three other executives. It was the responsibility of the non-executive members to 
appoint the general manager, and it was the responsibility of the general manager and the non-
executives to appoint a director of finance and three other members of the executive team. (Lee-
Potter, 1997) The result being: structures which represented government philosophy on health 
care.  
 
 
 
 
46 In 1994 eight regional offices were created, replacing 14 regional health authorities. Whereas regional health 
authorities and regional health boards had been significant bodies in their own right with a visible role in the 
NHS, regional offices as arms of the civil service with far fewer staff worked much more in the background. Not 
only this, but regional directors were accountable directly to the Chief Executive of the NHS Executive and sat 
alongside him as members of the NHS Executive Board (Ham, 1999:155). 
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6.5.1 New Structures, Old Dynamic 
 
Despite the creation of new organisational structures and the development of a corporate culture, 
the NHS according to Klein (1995) ‘had a number of features that made the notion of an internal 
market problematic’. The theory of    
 
‘the internal market was that it would be driven by purchasers, thus reversing the 
dominance of providers that had characterised the NHS in the previous four decades It was 
the purchasers who would determine what their populations required in the way of 
services, and then shop around accordingly. No longer would service developments be 
driven by the interests and ambitions of consultants.’ (p.205)  
 
In practice however, things worked differently. The success of the reforms were dependent on 
receiving the backing and cooperation from the medical profession. (Klein, 1995). This would 
require an element of mutual-dependence on a macro-level between government, purchasers, 
and the profession, and on a micro-level between management and clinicians and purchasers of 
health care Thus, changing the institutions and the labels on them proved easier than changing 
the dynamics of the service.  
 
 
6.5.2 Macro-Level Health Planning and the Voice of the Expert 
 
Thus, despite the fact the reforms at government and strategic level advertised the impotence of 
the profession in the policy arena; the fact that the dynamic had not changed meant that the 
profession was not totally impotent.  
 
The White Paper Working for Patients encouraged patients to behave as ‘consumers with market 
power and product choice; patients could now expect not just health care, but better quality health 
care also’ (Salter, 2004:5). If the logic underlying Salter’s Triangle of Intersecting Forces is utilised 
here then the state was still dependent on the profession as it had been in the past not only in the 
day-to-day running of the service, but in planning and strategy necessary to meet these 
 193 
expectations. Indeed, the centrality of the profession(s) as a source of expertise is documented 
by Salter 47 as an integral part of the ‘mutual penetration that results from the interdependence’ of 
profession and state; and ‘an integral part of the agreement accompanying the foundation of the 
NHS’ (ibid.: 13-14). Thus, despite the sidelining of the profession during the consultation stages 
in the run-up to the reforms, the government could not afford to sideline the profession during the 
implementation stages of the reforms, and beyond.  
 
If the relationship during the second surgical epoch could be described as being based on the 
exchange of specific capital: professional expertise (symbolic capital) and economic and political 
capital (incomes, resources, and influence), then the relationship between the state and the 
profession during the third surgical epoch, should be described as one of necessity, on the part of 
the state. Indeed, the state grudgingly involved the profession, as opposed to embracing the 
relationship and gleaning symbolic capital in the process. However, regardless of this, the 
relationship placed the profession in an advantageous position to influence the direction of policy 
and garner political and economic capital.  
 
Thus, the surgical profession proactively responded to the 1991 reforms in recognising that it was 
their ‘responsibility’ for explicitly delineating best practice and in doing so providing exacting 
standards against which surgeons’ could be evaluated (Klein, 1995). In this respect the profession 
was reasserting its right to ‘self-regulation’ a central tenet of professional autonomy; a tenet 
enshrined in the agreement accompanying the foundation of the NHS, and importantly a right 
which formed the basis for the triangle of intersecting forces (Salter, 2004). In reasserting this 
fundamental right, it could be said that these steps taken by the profession strengthened its 
collective professional autonomy (Klein, 1995).  
 
 
6.5.3.1 The Role of the Surgical Profession in the Running of the Health 
Service: Clinical Guidelines 
 
One of the central concerns of the surgical profession was the necessity of ‘establishing national 
minimum standards of service provision’ (Ham, Smith & Temple, 1998:6). Given that this was the 
 
47 Salter utilises the works of Moran: Governing the health care state. A comparative study of the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Germany (1999); and Moran and Wood: States, regulation, and the medical 
profession (1993). 
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case the Royal Colleges together with the specialist associations were not backwards in coming 
forwards when it came to advising the government on this matter. Indeed in 1991 ministers 
established the Clinical Standards Advisory Group (CSAG), in response to the profession’s 
concerns regarding the potential impact of the internal market on clinical standards (Rivett, 1998). 
 
This group was ‘statutory and multi-professional and its remit was to advise ministers on standards 
of clinical care’ however, its function was not to set clinical guidelines48 (ibid.:430). Although, the 
CSAG’s function was not to set clinical guidelines, between 1990 and 1997 the Royal Colleges 
and specialist associations produced these for the government. The guidelines were then filtered 
down through the NHS Executive to the purchasers of surgical services, and to NHS Trusts. For 
example, the NHS Executive produced guidelines on contracting for specialist services.49 Many of 
the specialist associations also produced guidelines which were disseminated directly to the 
purchasers of surgical services, namely district health authorities and GP fundholders.50  
 
 
6.5.3.2 The Surgical Profession and Training 
 
In addition to the profession’s role in producing guidelines regarding standards of surgical care, it 
was also responsible for approving training posts for basic surgical and higher surgical trainees. 
In particular, ‘the ability of the colleges to give and withhold basic surgical training approval’ (Ham, 
Smith & Temple, 1998:6) and the ability of the Joint Committee on Higher Surgical Training 
(JCHST) via its Specialist Advisory Committees (SACs) to withhold training approval for higher 
surgical training posts, gave the profession a useful means by which it had the potential to move 
service provision in the direction it wished. This ability became even more significant following the 
Calman Report on Specialist Medical Training 1993; and the Calman-Hine Report on the 
organisation and delivery of cancer services 1995. Both reports clearly showed that the voice of 
the expert was by no means defunct! 
 
 
 
48 Each group had a lay chairman and members appointed by the Royal Colleges (Rivett, 1998:430). 
49 The emphasised that: ‘Sensible contracting needs to take into account the optimum population size not only 
for the stability of contracted referrals but also to give sufficient ‘critical mass’ for clinical effectiveness’ 
(Contracting for specialist services, NHS Management Executive, 1993 cited in British Association of 
Paediatric Surgeons: 1994:4). 
50 See the list in Senate of Surgery, 1997:37-41, esp. 11, 18, 29, 33, 36, 40-46, 55, 63-65.  
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6.5.3.3 The Calman Report on Specialist Medical Training-1993 
 
In 1992 the Chief Medical Officer Sir Kenneth Calman chaired a working group on specialist 
medical training. The groups objectives were two-fold: ‘improving the quality of higher specialist 
training and bringing UK higher medical training in line with European Community requirements 
for specialist training and recognition’ (ibid.:4).  
 
The working group’s recommendations were published in 1993 as the ‘Calman Report’ (Hospital 
Doctors: Training for the Future, the report of the working group on Specialist Medical Training). 
The Report recommended that ‘the period of training including general professional training, 
should not exceed seven years after full registration for most specialities’ (Hunter & McLaren, 
1993:1281).  
 
The recommendations were intended to facilitate ‘an expansion in consultant numbers in hospital 
practice supporting a movement towards a more consultant-based delivery of patient care’ (Ham, 
Smith & Temple, 1998:5). 
 
 
6.5.3.4 The Calman-Hine Report on the Organisation and Delivery of 
Cancer services - 1995 
 
In October of the same year Sir Kenneth Calman and Dame Deidre Hine (Chief Medical Officers 
of England and Wales respectively) set about developing a model for specialist cancer services; 
an expert advisory group was appointed, and the report was published in 1995. 
 
The report recommended that ‘everyone should have access to a uniformly high quality of care to 
ensure maximum cure rates and the best quality of life’ (Rivett, 1998:402). The report proposed 
a structure comprising three essential components of care: the ‘primary care team, district general 
hospital cancer units, and designated cancer centres’ (Calman, 1998:213). The cancer units 
based in district general hospitals (not all district general hospitals) would be responsible for 
treating the more commonplace cancers, such as breast, colorectal and lung. The cancer centres 
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would be responsible for treating the cancers that were less commonplace and rarer, and that 
demanded particular esoteric skills and specialist support services (Rivett, 1998). For example, 
many cancer centres would deal with diseases affecting children and adolescents (Calman, 
1998).  
 
 
6.5.3.5 The Surgical Profession and Models of Service Provision 
 
As documented above (Sec 6.5.3.1) the profession was concerned with establishing national 
minimum standards of service provision hence their central role in the work of the CSAG; related 
to this the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland and the Royal College used their position 
to recommend models of service provision.  
 
For example, reports published by the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland: Consultant 
Surgical Practice and Training in the UK (1997); and The Royal College of Surgeons of England: 
The Provision of Emergency Surgical Services: An Organisational Framework (1997), 
recommended radical restructuring of the delivery of surgical services following the development 
of the internal market and the requirement to alter training arrangements as a result of the Calman 
Report 1993. The reports also reflected the findings of the expert advisory group on cancer 
services 1995: 
 
‘Changes continue to take place in the delivery of healthcare in the United Kingdom 
following the development of internal markets in the National Health Service (NHS) and the 
requirement to alter training arrangements. The Senate of Surgery fully recognises the 
opportunities to maximise efficiency of services and training and to deliver cost effective 
quality health care but is concerned about potential threats to the standards of surgical 
care.’ (The Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland, 1997:1) 
 
The Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland (1997); and The Royal College of Surgeons of 
England (1997) believed that bigger hospitals (acute general hospitals – AGH’s) were necessary 
in order to meet the current pressures for change and provide the best clinical outcome for 
patients: 
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‘The ideal model for organising healthcare would be served by a population base of 450-
500,000 because of the critical requirement for increasingly specialist expertise, the 
pressures for change brought about by recent changes in working and training 
arrangements… Existing hospitals serving smaller populations should consider 
coordinating services or develop arrangements with other centres in order to ensure the 
highest quality of service for their surgical patients.’ (The Senate of Surgery of Great Britain 
and Ireland, 1997:1) 
 
However, they also recommended that in the remote smaller hospital, in which an emergency 
service must be maintained, surgeons would need to be more generally trained to continue to 
practice a wider range of surgical care for both emergency and elective admissions. However, the 
recommendations emphasise that surgeons practising in remote hospitals… 
 
‘should develop links with more specialist professional colleagues so as to enable the 
ready transfer of appropriate patients without contractual or organisational impediment to 
a larger centre with the available expertise and resources. There will remain a continuing 
need for generalists in both surgery and medicine.’ (Royal College of Surgeons of England, 
1997:7) 
 
 
6.5.4 The Realities of the Purchaser Provider Split and Meso-Level 
Health Planning 
 
Despite the wide ranging organisational and structural changes which accompanied the creation 
of the purchaser provider split, namely the introduction of separate purchaser provider roles; the 
restructuring of health authorities (DHAs and RHAs) in particular the trimming down and eventual 
disbanding of ‘the traditionally powerful and insulated regional tier’ (Ferlie et al., 1996:52), the 
dynamic remained professionally/provider driven. This is due to a number of inherent features in 
the NHS. This can be further evidenced when analysing the ‘quasi-market’ (ibid.) in action (i.e. 
the purchaser provider split). 
 
At the time of the reforms (1991) ‘the NHS was, as it still is today, a collection of different types of 
markets for surgical services, making generalisation a high risk activity’ For example, there is an 
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‘oligopoly of providers dominating the market’ (Klein, 1995:205-206).  Supra-regional specialities 
such as liver transplantation and complex cranio-facial surgery are provided by a single provider, 
covering a number of regions (Baker, 1998). Specialist regional services are also provided by a 
small number of providers, for example, neurosurgery, and cardiac surgery. In the case of 
neurosurgical services:  
 
The market doesn’t really exist in neurosurgery, I mean purchasers could try and buy 
services from adjoining neurosurgical centres but that in itself would be difficult as they 
haven’t got the capacity to take on other work – and in that sense it is a monopoly in that 
they don’t have anyone else to turn to but us. (Mr R. Consultant Neurosurgeon – Teaching 
Hospital) 
 
Lastly there is elective surgery, which is more likely to face competition; added to this is the 
geographical factor. For example, Klein (1995) notes that the higher the number of providers in 
one region, or city, the greater the competition. This is the case in the capital and is reinforced by 
a prominent London surgeon: 
 
The internal market has caused a lot of damage to the trust. We have a lot of sterile 
competition at the moment. I mean here we are in West London with three or four 
competing trusts cutting each other’s throats competing for patients, and the results of 
this hospital confirm that it has been disastrous for us. Only this month we have had 
operating lists taken away from us, and we are losing beds because we are over-spent. The 
whole thing is artificial and should be replaced with a more sensible planned system 
whereby trusts don’t compete against each other with a diminishing amount of money. 
(Prof W. - Professor of Surgery) 
 
Conversely, providers based in rural areas may not face any competition, given their geographical 
context (Klein, 1995).  
 
The reality of the situation on the ground revealed that, despite the operation of a contracted 
service, there was evidence that informal dependencies and past relationships persisted; indeed, 
official rhetoric was modified accordingly.  
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‘Purchasers became transformed into commissioners: recognition that monogamy rather 
than polygamy characterised the internal market, with most purchasers and providers 
locked into permanent relationships in which both partners sought to influence the other.’ 
(ibid.:206).  
 
A pertinent example of the continuation of relationships is provided by Ferlie et al. (1996) For 
example, they note that the Director of Public Health (DPH) continued to hold ‘informal speciality 
meetings with clinicians from different trusts despite the fact that the advent of trusts and 
competition meant that such meetings were not necessarily appropriate’ (p.178). Thus, the theory 
needs to be separated from the reality. The theory goes:  
 
‘Purchasers will be able to specify in their contract with providers the quality of care they 
expect for their patients. Along with their formal powers purchasers have a range of 
informal mechanisms for promoting change. They can for example promote discussion 
and professional debate and can foster a particular organisational culture. All of these 
mechanisms at the disposal of purchasers depend on their being well informed about 
patient needs and clinical and organisational issues in the delivery of services. Supplying 
this information, along with professional medical advice is the role of the director of public 
health and his or her team.’ (CSAG Report on Cleft Lip and Palate Surgery, 1997:83) 
 
The reality is somewhat different, as Klein (1995) aptly notes: 
 
‘The logic of the purchasing role is to analyse the health status of the population being 
served as the first step towards defining ‘needs’ for health services. This means in turn, 
identifying those sections of the population or geographical areas where there is a 
mismatch between health status and health care provision. The bias, in short, is towards 
identifying inequity – though, in practice, the public health staff of many purchasers still 
lack the technical capacity for doing so effectively and comprehensively.’ (p.234)  
 
Lee- Potter (1997) concurs with Klein when he writes that ‘medical input to the new authorities 
(i.e. district health authorities) came from directors of public health, who were salaried officers and 
rarely had any detailed knowledge of specialist hospital medicine’ (p.181). 
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Also, importantly, any advice regarding clinical and organisational issues in the delivery of services 
must come from the experts; from the colleges, specialist associations and the providers 
themselves. Indeed, purchasers were turning to the specialist associations for advice when it 
came to purchasing surgical services. For example, in 1994 The British Association of Paediatric 
Surgeons (BAPS) produced a guide for purchasers of paediatric surgical services and they note 
in their introduction: 
 
‘Recent approaches by NHS purchasers to the British Association of Paediatric Surgeons 
(BAPS) for advice has shown that there is a need for specific guidance. The BAPS 
Executive Committee has therefore compiled these guidelines.’ (p.1) 
 
Another example is breast cancer services. All health authorities received national guidelines on 
purchasing for breast cancer services.  
 
The British Breast Group which is part of the British Association of Surgical Oncology in 
their report recommended that a minimum of 50 new cases of breast cancer per year should 
be treated in order for a unit to be classed as a breast cancer unit. (Mr K.T. – Consultant 
Surgeon with a Special Interest in Breast Surgery - DGH) 
 
District Health Authorities and GP Fundholders purchasing decisions were based on professional 
advice; therefore, it is fair to say that the profession was involved albeit indirectly in service 
planning. According to a breast surgeon purchasers of breast services would only purchase from 
certain units: 
 
Purchasers are saying that they will only pay for breast cancer services from breast cancer 
units, and this is happening in most parts of the country at the moment. This is the health 
authorities who will only pay for certain types of care from groups of surgeons who they 
know are specialists. (Mr K.T. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Breast 
Surgery-DGH) 
 
If purchasers needed advice from the Royal Colleges, and specialist associations with regard to 
clinical and organisational issues in the delivery of specialist services, then they also needed the 
advice from providers with regard to the type of services they offered.  
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6.5.5 Micro-Operational Level 
 
Prior to the changes the shape and distribution of services arose from an accumulation of 
individual clinical decisions with managers seeking to administer these arrangements rather than 
seeking to challenge them. The reforms brought with them institutional changes, namely the 
introduction of self-governing trusts, managerial control over consultants contracts and 
appointments, and increased managerial input on regional distinction award committees, as well 
as the introduction of clinical directorships.  
 
The reforms were central to the intended cultural shift from a producer-led service to a user-driven 
one. However, the evidence presented thus far suggests that the old-dynamic has not changed. 
In practice it was the providers who had the expertise and the information about services: 
 
‘In the words of one district health authority manager: in the early days, it was like going 
blindfold into a supermarket with a trolley and asking the staff to fill it up. There was in 
short, a problem of information asymmetry.’ (Klein, 1995:205)  
 
This offered an opportunity for providers to influence the decisions of purchasers. Thus, between 
1991 and 1997 GPs began receiving more and more information from hospitals, either from 
surgeons or management explicitly stating the specialist interests of surgeons, and the services 
on offer at the trust, as one GP notes:  
 
Since 1990 it has been made much clearer by hospital trusts what it is, they do and who 
does it. Before 1990 any decisions on referrals were made entirely on what I knew about 
the surgeons. Now they are publishing a little list of what they do, so we are guided by them 
in a way that we weren’t before. (Dr P. – GP Fundholder – Cambridgeshire) 
 
Other GPs talked about being invited to lectures and seminars given by surgeons:  
 
We are getting constant feedback from surgeons through seminars and lectures organised 
and delivered by them. (Dr M. GP-Fundholding Practice – North Yorkshire)  
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Management also jumped on the band wagon according to another GP:  
 
We are getting feedback from management; they are saying Mr O. is a general surgeon with 
a special interest in vascular surgery and Mr L. is a general surgeon with a special interest 
in colorectal surgery. This also happens when new surgeons are appointed to post. (Dr D. 
– GP-Fundholding Practice – Berkshire) 
 
Management involvement in this process is certainly not surprising given the fact that GPs are a 
source of income for the trust as one general practitioner notes: 
 
When the reforms were introduced trusts saw GPs as the source of their income – because 
they made money through referrals. I think it was also in the interests of management to 
make sure that referrals are made to the appropriate surgeon, as inappropriate referrals 
could potentially lead to a surgeon getting into an area, they are not best suited to and as 
a result they get poor results in the league table. (Dr P. – GP-Fundholding Practice – 
Cambridgeshire) 
 
From a surgeon’s perspective management’s involvement in publicising surgeon’s interests is not 
surprising either, according to a breast surgeon in P: 
 
If management are able to market something, then it becomes attractive to them. For 
example, a breast clinic…they love that! For example, I said to them don’t give me any more 
publicity because we’re just about managing now, if you publicise it, we will get too many 
referrals…they did, and we have. (Mr K.T. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in 
Breast Surgery - DGH) 
 
However, it would be overly simplistic to draw the conclusion that the relationship between 
purchasers and providers leaves the former without any voice whatsoever. Whilst it may be true 
that purchasers decisions on service provision are heavily influenced by the plethora of national 
guidelines laid down by the powers that be in the profession, and information emanating from the 
providers, there is evidence that purchasers are trying to effect change particularly with regard to 
waiting times for elective surgery: 
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What we tend to do is identify areas where we feel the waiting list is too long, and that might 
be say for cataract surgery – and so we would be putting pressure on the trust for more 
cataract surgeons to be appointed.  
 
However, he tempers this by saying:  
 
But of course, you know that whenever you do that you have to take the overview – often 
you can’t have more cataract surgeons without there being a cost somewhere else and it’s 
the risk of this which makes us as purchasers use this influence fairly lightly. I mean how 
do you decide whether somebody on the left with a cataract should get priority over 
somebody on the right with a diabetic retinopathy. So, although GPs can exert this 
pressure on trusts it is used fairly lightly, however, it can’t be done without the influence 
of the surgeons themselves – it’s got to be both. (Dr P. – GP Fundholding Practice – 
Cambridgeshire) 
 
Thus, given that the dynamic appears to be intact, is Ham (1999) correct when he notes that: ‘the 
medical profession continues to be dominant and the challenge of corporate rationalisers, 
especially politicians and managers, has not seriously threatened this dominance at the micro 
level’ (p.173), or conversely, is the reality on the ground more complex? 
  
Klein (1995) concurs with the latter and points out that any analysis of the ‘distribution of power 
between management and consultants in terms of winners and losers’ runs the risk of ‘over-
simplifying a complex situation’, given that both consultants and managers ‘have a shared interest 
in institutional survival’ (p.244). Indeed, Klein notes that the relationship between the two may be 
one of mutual dependence and reciprocity.  
 
Managers are reliant on the support of clinicians without which their strategies and targets are 
unlikely to reach fruition. Failure to achieve targets may affect their position given that the renewal 
of their contracts is dependent on realization of these. Conversely, if clinicians obstruct and 
undermine managers their arguments for additional budgetary resources required for the 
development of services, may fall on deaf ears. Therefore, the post 1991 dynamics at provider 
level may encourage new forms of adjustment and adaptation between clinicians and managers, 
as opposed to creating a disparity of power, with managers holding the trump card. (Klein, 1995). 
This is reinforced by one consultant: 
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Most networks are set up by doctors – I am the lead clinician HPB surgery at the (Q) Cancer 
Centre and we’ve developed a network with all the other hospitals so all big cases come to 
us but there’s been zero funding associated with that for that it’s all been through telephone 
calls, writing letters, visiting people telling them what we can do, telling people very quickly 
if there’s a problem – that sort of thing. And I think it’s an area that the management side 
could help with a lot more – we’re now at the stage where the doctors set up  the links then 
the business managers go in and sort it all out – I mean there’s got to be give and take 
because I don’t want it to sound like it’s us and them because you’ve got to work together 
– I feel very strongly that interested doctors advance more than anything else and I think 
that doctors should take responsibility for management as well as managers. (Mr. L.A.B. – 
Consultant Surgeon with a Special interest in HPB Surgery – Teaching Hospital)  
 
This mutual dependence takes many forms, and in practice it could be said that the balance of 
power was tilted towards the former. For example, the arrival of the so-called health care market 
and competition in the 1990’s, pushed managers into proactively developing strategies around the 
provision of services with targeted action plans to facilitate delivery. Thus, it could be said that 
managers adopted a more corporate approach in order to preserve services, and progress them 
further (Davies & Harrison, 2003).  
 
Conversely, as alluded to in (Section 6.4.4) the corporate culture favoured by management could 
only succeed if clinicians were a part of it. Thus, it was considered essential that all Trusts appoint 
a clinician into the medical director post, and clinical directorates were formed ‘as a means of 
linking corporate management to clinical activity’ (Marnoch, 1996:51). Indeed, given 
managements increasing reliance on this clinically led model to operate services (Hunter, 1994) 
in an efficient and cost-effective manner, it could be said that the role of clinical director increased 
professional power within Trusts. Indeed, Ferlie et al. (1996) argue that the post 1991 market-
based system  
 
‘led to significantly higher professional involvement in the management process at both 
strategic and operational levels within units which for senior management may involve 
some sharing or loss of control to professionals.’ (p.183) 
 
In addition, despite the potential for medical audit to become a means by which management hold 
clinicians to account (see section 6.4.4), medical professionals adopted a proactive approach in 
developing their own clinical audit tools and methodologies in order to ensure they controlled the 
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standards in relation to clinical practice. Indeed, it is clinical managers and not senior health 
service managers, that are responsible for providers' performance against clinical benchmarks 
(Ferlie et al. 1996). 
 
Given the operation of a ‘quasi-market’ in which trusts compete management  
 
‘may well become dependent on innovative, clinical product champions for new products 
and services. The reputation of innovative clinicians becomes a prime intangible asset 
which will affect the Trusts business performance.’ (ibid.:192) 
 
Indeed, clinicians were in a strong position in terms of service development especially if their 
speciality attracted referrals, as one consultant noted: 
 
In terms of liver cancer and problems with the liver and bile duct system – you see what I 
do frightens other doctors so they are keen to send it on – at the same time when we had 
the internal market I was encouraged to build a business up by management because 
whenever we did a case it brought money in through extra-contractual referrals. (Mr L.A.B. 
– Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in HPB Surgery – Teaching Hospital)  
 
Thus, with extra-contractual referrals in mind management were keen to make additional 
consultant appointments if the trust was attempting to expand a specialty and draw in work from 
surrounding areas, for example: 
 
Additional consultant appointments have been based largely on attempts by trusts to 
expand an area of service and hence draw in work from surrounding areas. (Mr J.  
Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Upper Gastro-Intestinal Surgery – Teaching 
Hospital) 
 
Although, Mr J. did go on to note that consultants are the main drivers when it comes to service 
development and provision, and the appointment of additional consultants to the surgical cadre: 
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However, I would say that the decision about the development of services is made by 
surgeons within the hospital. It’s not a management decision – I would say it is not often a 
management decision – but it would be the surgeon saying look we have got a single 
handed vascular surgeon and he can’t carry on on his own – so if we are going to provide 
a vascular service we must appoint another one – that kind of thing. (Mr J.  Consultant 
Surgeon with a Special Interest in Upper GI Surgery – Teaching Hospital) 
 
Clinical directors were also influencing the process on behalf of their consultant colleagues. One 
in particular was keen to push forward the specialisation debate as hard as he could.  
 
I am pushing for a specialist upper GI surgeon – and this July we are interviewing 
prospective vascular surgeons, because we don’t have a vascular rota here yet, and this is 
something that I have been pushing for!.. I am pushing forward sub-specialisation here as 
hard as I possibly can. You can’t have in this day and age a large body of patients treated 
by just any old bloke – it’s just not acceptable any more. (Mr M.P.M. - Consultant Surgeon 
with an interest in Coloproctology and Clinical Director (Surgery) – Teaching Hospital) 
 
Thus, although clinicians were at odds with a corporatist or business approach to health care, they 
shared management’s values in as far as wanting to maintain and develop the trusts facilities. 
Clearly the greater the success of their trust, the greater chance they have of developing their 
interests further with management backing. Indeed, this ‘empowered’ innovative clinicians to 
‘carve out a niche for their services’ (Ferlie et al. 1996:178).   
 
Interview data illustrates that at speciality level professionals are proactive in developing services 
and adopting strategies for long-term growth in order to attract external sources of funding from 
the wider surgical community. 
 
Mr U (consultant Otorhinolaryngologist) and Mr R. (consultant Neurosurgeon) provide a pertinent 
example of two surgeons who have perfected a surgical technique which is not only of interest to 
themselves but has significance for others too, namely the wider surgical community nationally 
and internationally: 
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I am an ENT surgeon, but my area of specialist expertise is skull-base surgery. My 
neurosurgical colleague and I have managed to build up a very strong skull-based practice 
here… in fact we are one of two centres in the country specialising in this type of surgery. 
Our reputation has enabled us to attract external funding for a fellowship scheme for 
visiting surgeons from this country and Europe. In the long-term my colleague and I would 
like to see the department recognised as an international centre of excellence… this would 
allow us to attract higher levels of funding’ (Mr U. - Consultant ENT Surgeon with a Special 
Interest in Skull-based Surgery).  
 
In the short-term the attainment of external repute based on scientific capital, associated with the 
development of a specific surgical technique or approach brings with it scientific authority and 
symbolic capital – cachet and recognition (Bourdieu, 1981), which in turn is converted into 
economic capital (Bourdieu, 1986); in this case, external funding for a fellowship scheme. In the 
long-term the development of sophisticated techniques and garnering of capital assets such as 
these could be used to justify specialist differentiation in the area concerned. 
 
 
6.6.1 The Internal Market in Health Care, the Surgical Profession and the 
Pace and Direction of Specialist Differentiation 
 
Re-examining the themes of professional autonomy, and the specific areas identified by Elston 
(1991), the medical profession has never had large-scale ‘economic autonomy’ since 1948, so 
there has been no significant change there.  In terms of ‘political autonomy’ this has been retained 
at the macro-level, where the government is dependent on the expert advice of the profession on 
health planning and the organisation of surgical services.  
 
The third area of professional autonomy identified by Elston, is ‘clinical or technical autonomy’. 
This is a crucial area of control, as prior to the 1991 reforms ‘patterns of service delivery and the 
growth of new sub-specialities and treatments were largely shaped’ (Marnoch, 1996:12) by 
innovative clinicians at the micro-level, with management merely acting as a rubber-stamp for their 
decisions (Davies & Harrison, 2003). Although the reforms post 1991 were designed to curb the 
power of consultants especially at provider level with the introduction of managerialism and the 
so-called market in health care, the professional/provider led dynamic appears to be intact despite 
the wide ranging reforms.  
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Ironically the adoption of a new managerialist agenda by a government intent on curtailing clinical 
freedom (Klein, 1995) may have inadvertently paved the way ‘for a renaissance of professional 
power’, as ‘whatever the outcome of the manoeuvrings between doctors and mangers the 
parameters of the management agenda seem likely to remain medically defined’ (Hunter, 
1994:18), none more so than with regard to the regulation and control of clinical standards and 
practice.  
 
 
6.6.2 Collective Professional Autonomy and Specialist Differentiation 
 
The NHS reforms were regarded by many as revolutionary in terms of their reach and their 
implications for the medical profession (Hunter, 1994). For the first time the state was threatening 
the very autonomy of the profession, a central tenet of Salter’s (2004) triangle of intersecting 
forces. In adapting to this threat, the surgical profession increased its ‘collective professional 
autonomy’. Collective professional autonomy has two central strands running throughout, namely: 
Developing clinical guidelines and models for national minimum standards of service provision; 
and explicitly delineating best practice, and in doing so providing exactness and ‘visibility’ to the 
standards against which surgeons’ clinical skills could be evaluated (Klein, 1995). 
 
Although the profession has always had the right to self-regulation (i.e. to set its own standards 
and control clinical performance), control from the Royal Colleges was often lax in the hospital 
context, with the effect that poor clinical standards went unnoticed. Collective professional 
autonomy therefore introduces greater centralisation and control over individual clinicians, as well 
as giving the profession, enhanced political autonomy as national minimum standards of service 
provision and strategies are developed for government, purchasers of health care and trust 
managers. 
 
The question is how has collective professional autonomy effected the pace and direction of 
specialist differentiation in surgery? 
 
The surgical profession is not a homogenous body; on the contrary it comprises ‘many groups 
with different identities, many values, and many interests’ (Bucher & Strauss, 1961:326). Indeed, 
this has led many to argue that the surgical profession is ‘more tribalistic than collegiate’ However, 
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‘an exception occurs when the profession is under threat or perceives itself to be so. Then a united 
front is put up as doctors combine against a common foe’ (Hunter, 1994:19); the internal market 
and the new managerialist agenda provided such a threat.   
 
Given that the internal market reforms were the most far-reaching since the inception of the NHS; 
and given the potential implications of a market in health care, this provided the necessary platform 
for the profession to call for the introduction of clinical guidelines and for a radical restructuring of 
surgical services across the country. 
 
Specialisation and sub-specialisation seemed to be the order of the day, as the specialist 
associations; the Senate and the Royal Colleges were united in calling for greater centralisation 
of specialist services, with volume and outcome becoming the terms in vogue. However, beneath 
the surface of the veneer of unity it was highly likely that opposing agendas were operating; Bucher 
and Straus (1961) noted this with regard to the professions public relations front whereby the 
profession negotiates with relevant special publics. They note that: 
 
‘The outsider coming into contact with the profession tend to encounter the results of the 
inner group’s efforts; he does not necessarily become aware of the inner circle or power 
struggles behind the united front.’ (p.332) 
 
In this case the special publics were the state, and as noted earlier in the chapter whilst 
specialisation (i.e. sub-specialisation and super-specialisation) were welcomed by the Senate of 
Surgery; the Royal Colleges and the plethora of speciality associations which represented the 
surgical specialities; specialist differentiation was a different matter entirely. The specialist 
associations, for example, the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI), 
representing the speciality of general surgery and its various sub-specialist branches were keen 
to keep the speciality united and avoid fragmentation. Conversely, many of the sub-specialist 
branches had other agenda’s, indeed the internal market provided the platform which enabled 
specialist surgery to participate in the setting up of clinical guidelines, as well as service planning 
which it had not been able to do during planning stages of the NHS in 1947/48, as many of these 
groupings had yet to be founded.  
 
Given this, the leading lights in many of the sub-specialist branches were keen to set up their own 
speciality separate from general surgery, for example, vascular, laparoscopic and paediatric 
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surgery respectively, set out rules and guidelines directly relating to the type and number of 
procedures which sub-specialists in these areas should carry out.  
 
The leaders or pioneers of these groups are predominantly found in the highly specialised world 
of the teaching hospital, located in the large urban centre. Therefore, the rules and guidelines 
regarding the type and number of procedures which sub-specialists in these areas should carry 
out reflected the volume and output which these centres could generate given the staff levels and 
population bases they served as one consultant noted: 
 
The guidelines are drawn up by people in teaching hospitals who have a different 
perspective on things. I remember I was at this breast meeting and this professor from a 
teaching hospital was laying down the law on how many breast clinics should be run, and 
how quickly patients should be seen and so on. And somebody stood up and said that I 
happen to know that your unit is quite well staffed, could you give us some figures, so we 
can compare them with the average DGH (District General Hospital) and he wouldn’t 
answer. (Mr K.T. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Breast Surgery - DGH)  
 
However, the guidelines ruled out DGH’s with fewer consultants’, smaller population bases and 
lower volume output. For example, a consultant from a DGH notes:  
 
These guidelines which the associations set impossible goals. For example, when I went 
along to the Association of Endoscopic Surgeons meeting they were saying that unless 
you’re doing 200 laparoscopic cholecystectomy (gallbladder) a year you shouldn’t be doing 
them; if you’re not doing a certain number of advanced laparoscopic cases per year you 
shouldn’t be doing them; now in a place like (G) we’ll only get one or two splenectomies 
per year open. Likewise, when I go along to the upper-GI meeting the goal posts get moved; 
unless you’re looking after a million patients you shouldn’t set up an upper-GI unit, and 
that’s the latest thing that’s come from the association. (Mr A.E.P. – Consultant Surgeon 
with a Special Interest in Upper-GI Surgery – DGH) 
 
Thus, the guidelines specifically drew demarcation lines between the specialist and the generalist 
with regard to certain procedures, another example being paediatric surgery. All specialist 
paediatric surgery had to be dealt with by specialist paediatric surgeons in specialist centres, 
leaving minor paediatric surgery to general surgeons in district general hospitals:  
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Here in (G) we have six general surgeons, one of which has a specialist interest in 
paediatric surgery. He will do the more general sort of stuff like appendectomies, inguinal 
hernias and so on. Anything more complex would just have to go to (H)…and that’s just 
the way it is…and the British Association of Paediatric Surgeons have produced guidelines 
on this. (Mr B.T.A. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Vascular Surgery – DGH) 
 
In setting specific guidelines and rules the aspiring specialist groups wanted to create a ‘closed 
shop’ around their area of specialist knowledge, as one consultant notes: 
 
The specialist lobby has become stronger, and for them to have drawn up rules of 
specialisation and sub-specialisation and super-specialisation, they will make it more and 
more of a closed shop and less and less general surgery, thus running a closed shop 
around their area of knowledge gives them power. (Mr C.A.V. – Consultant Surgeon with a 
Special Interest in Vascular Surgery - DGH) 
 
Running a closed shop around their area of expertise, enables groups to control their knowledge 
base through regulating ‘the conditions of access to the right to declare oneself a member of the 
group’ (Bourdieu,1986:23). This enables groups to exercise surgical authority and power, a form 
of social capital which supports the control of the examining and teaching systems (Bourdieu, 
1981). In addition, to the power of surgical authority, the specialist groups derive scientific capital 
(associated with advances in technology and surgical knowledge), and specific cultural capital (not 
unlike an art, ‘it can only be acquired in the long-term, and at first hand’ (Bourdieu, 1988:59)). 
The accumulated types of capital is then converted into political capital, in the form of lobbying 
power in the surgico-political arena at the macro-national level.  
 
Thus, there is undoubtedly a political logic behind the moves described by the surgeon above; 
clawing in work from difficult cases from the hands of their generalist colleagues in district general 
hospitals, lends weight to the argument that difficult cases should be performed by specialists, 
hence justification for their calls for specialist status. 
 
Given the fact that the government takes onboard these professional guidelines, clearly this is a 
situation where the micro is effecting the macro and in turn the macro effects the micro. Clearly 
these guidelines could not be ignored and had to be taken onboard by surgeons and management 
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alike not only for clinical reasons, but also because of medical litigation which would not only be 
costly to the consultant but also the trust concerned: 
 
These professional guidelines are impossible to ignore because they are generally taken 
on board by government and by the management of the trust. So even though you might 
feel confident in treating a particular condition in the same way one has done for years 
pretty soon one could find oneself out on a limb and it’s always the same in surgery – it’s 
fine if things go well, but if something goes wrong then you could do it 999 times beautifully 
with no complications, but then if you have one thing that goes wrong – and if you are 
contravening the latest guidelines – then you will be exposed to litigation and criticised, 
despite your considerable experience. (Mr B.T.A. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special 
Interest in Vascular Surgery – DGH) 
 
The guidelines can stop surgeons from practising in certain areas, take breast cancer, for 
example, GPs no longer refer patients to surgeons who are not recognised breast cancer 
specialists. Also, surgeons who are not recognised breast specialists may feel vulnerable 
medico-legally. (Mr K.T. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Breast Surgery – 
DGH) 
 
Trusts also faced a plethora of guidelines from the profession and government on the management 
of certain conditions and specific areas of practice for example, cancer, head and neck. The 
guidelines on cancer and head and neck surgery pushed trusts into developing certain areas in 
specific ways which had to be sustainable at consultant level. Obviously, this had the effect of 
directing resources towards certain areas of practice as a consultant and trust medical director 
notes:  
 
We are under particular pressure to appoint specialists in recognised areas laid down by 
the profession and reflected in Department of Health policies, for example cancer, and head 
and neck. This is pushing us into boxes of practice that will require being sustainable at 
consultant level more than two consultants in each of these specialist areas. (Mr S. – 
Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Coloproctology and Trust Medical Director – 
DGH) 
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Thus, the collective professional autonomy, described by Klein (1995), introduces greater 
centralisation and control over the individual clinician’s ability to exercise clinical freedom with 
regard to the types of procedure which they carry out. In particular district general hospital 
surgeons found themselves disadvantaged by this, in contrast to consultants in the large teaching 
centres who found themselves more empowered given the fact that many of them drafted the 
guidelines. 
 
This inequity between teaching hospitals and district general hospitals has always existed and is 
not something which came about as a result of the internal market. Indeed, as alluded to in 
(Chapter five, section 5.5.2) teaching hospitals association with medical schools brought with it 
status which, combined with their social, and economic capital, enabled them ‘to attract better staff 
and still further resources which enabled them to influence NHS policy more generally’ (Pollock, 
2004:88).  
 
The ability of teaching hospitals to attract the most talented was fully utilised during the years of 
the internal market. Indeed, Pollock suggests that it was customary for the large teaching hospitals 
to head hunt specific clinicians from their neighbours in order to develop particular specialist 
services, and in doing so, vie for additional patient income. Pollock provides a pertinent example 
of this practice:  
 
‘a research professor in gynaecological cancer was brought over with fifty staff from Bart’s 
with the promise of several million pounds of infrastructure. The professor was alleged to 
have said that it cost UCLH and UCL more to get him than it cost for Real Madrid to buy 
David Beckham.’ (ibid.:106) 
 
 
6.7.1 Intra-Professional Specialist Differentiation: Push and Pull 
Factors 
 
Collective professional autonomy is forcing a trend towards sub-specialisation. For example, in a 
single clinical speciality such as general surgery the guidelines and protocols set out by the 
Senate, the Royal Colleges, the specialist associations, the Calman-Hine Report (1995) and 
Calman Report (1993) are forcing a trend towards sub-specialisation, whereby consultants will 
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specialise in areas such as breast surgery, or colorectal surgery. This necessitates consultants 
giving up areas of work where they are deemed not to have carried out a sufficient number of 
procedures to attract Calman-Hine accreditation. 
 
Thus, collective professional autonomy generally speaking had the potential to be advantageous 
in terms of capital accumulation for aspiring groups wishing to break away from the parent 
speciality. In this respect it could be said that it had the potential to increase the pace and direction 
of intra-professional specialist differentiation. However, paediatric, and maxillofacial surgery were 
the only areas to successfully separate from general surgery in 1992 and 1994 respectively; 
whether paediatric and maxillofacial surgery’s success can be attributed to collective professional 
autonomy alone is unlikely as this raises questions regarding vascular surgery’s lack of success.  
 
There are financial constraints on sub-specialisation and specialist differentiation; indeed, financial 
realities meant that such developments had to be balanced against providing a service. Although, 
in major teaching centres which employ more surgeons, there may be more opportunity for certain 
areas to withdraw from the general surgical take conversely, in smaller trusts with fewer surgeons 
and less money this is impossible, and the priority is to:  
 
Maintain an appropriate level of General surgery without crippling the service. (Mr M. Chief 
Executive Officer – DGH) 
 
Thus, although the ideal for clinicians may be to encourage the development of specialisation, and 
for some specialist differentiation, conversely, having a totally specialised service is unattainable 
as one Professor of Surgery notes: 
 
Because there is a limited budget for health care in this country which really shows no sign 
of expanding there has to be a limit to the type of service that you can provide. Running a 
totally specialised service in this country so that every patient who comes into hospital is 
treated by a specialist in that particular area of practice, at the moment is unattainable 
because we do not have enough surgeons in this country…we are desperately short of 
surgeons in this country. (Professor S.W.W.– Professor of Surgery) 
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This is not specific to general surgery; on the contrary areas such as orthopaedics have 
experienced significant changes over the last two decades (Frostick & Wallace, 1993). Total joint 
replacements, joint arthroscopy, and major spinal surgery have all developed into significant sub-
specialist areas resulting in surgeons’ reluctance to remain on the general orthopaedic take:     
 
The trust has a problem with specialisation. For example, here the orthopaedic surgeons 
are asked to do the general orthopaedic take, but they are reluctant. They are saying how 
can I remain on the general take when I haven’t touched anything but knees on an elective 
basis for the last ten years? This is a very valid point for example, if your granny has a fall 
and breaks her hip do you want somebody operating on her hip who has had little 
throughput of anything else but knees for the last ten or so years? The answer is no you 
don’t! So, the pressure is there to appoint more hip surgeons, but obviously this will cost 
the trust money. (Mr H.W.W. – Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon with a Special Interest in 
ACB (Anterior Cruciate Ligament Reconstruction – Teaching Hospital) 
 
In addition, trusts not only faced pressure in terms of balancing service provision and development 
against available resources, they also faced additional pressure from the profession, namely the 
Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland, the Royal Colleges and specialist associations 
which issued guidelines on training and staffing requirements. The Senate of Surgery of Great 
Britain and Ireland (1997) and The Royal College of Surgeons of England (1997) recommended 
larger hospitals of 450,000-500,000. Thus, in general surgery, for example, this would allow: 
 
‘fifteen general surgeons to cover the sub-specialities of vascular, breast, endocrine, upper 
GI, hepato-pancreatico-biliary surgery, coloproctology and general paediatric surgery. This 
complement would provide at least two consultants per major sub-speciality, enable site 
specific specialisation to meet the recommendations of the Chief Medical Officers’ Expert 
Advisory Group on the Provision of Cancer Services and allow a four man emergency 
vascular surgical rota in addition to a general surgical rota comprising the gastro-intestinal 
surgeons and others.’ (The Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland, 1997:19) 
 
In practice, however, the recommendations proved problematic for trusts serving a population of 
200,000 and under, and the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland, hoped that these 
problems could be overcome by amalgamating: 
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‘adjacent smaller trusts into larger units, the hub-and-spoke delivery of specific surgical 
services between major speciality centres and smaller units or the rationalisation of 
speciality services between separate trusts, with stratification of patients according to 
clinical need.’ (ibid.:21)  
 
Trusts were also faced with the introduction of the Calman training scheme. Although, it was 
beneficial to clinicians in larger centres, this was not the case for small DGH’s. For example, the 
Vascular Surgical Society of Great Britain and Ireland guidelines on the provision of vascular 
surgical services states that: 
 
‘The Calman Training System means that there is a need to train doctors against a 
background of shorter working hours and in a reduced time. This means that the centres 
at which they are to learn must have sufficient clinical volume, expertise and facilities to 
provide adequate experience. There needs to be enough consultant staff with the time to 
supervise and teach.’ (Darke, 1997:2)  
 
In addition, given the shorter training period of  
 
‘between five and six years in a surgical speciality trainees will acquire expertise in a 
narrow field with less general experience in that speciality than prior to the introduction of 
the Calman training scheme in 1996.’ (Royal College of Surgeons, 2000:12).  
 
Although this may be beneficial to aspiring groups pursuing the professional project with the 
ultimate goal being intra-professional differentiation, it has implications for general emergency 
cover, as a prominent Professor of surgery notes:       
 
The Breast surgeons will come off the on-take rota, as they won’t be sufficiently well trained 
with Calman – hyper-specialisation and shorter-training – they may be good at getting rid 
of a breast lump but won’t have a clue about how to deal with an emergency perforated 
colon. (Professor S.W.W. – Professor of Surgery) 
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On the other hand, as we will see below in the discussion of vascular surgery, private practice 
complicates matters, as it can provide incentives not to specialise or sub-differentiate. 
 
 
6.7.2 Vascular Surgery: Two Steps Forward and Three Steps Back 
 
The effect of push and pull factors is highlighted by the failure of vascular surgery whose journey 
along the path of the professional project was halted abruptly. This can be attributed to four factors: 
the demography of the country, a shortage of surgeons across the country, issues relating to 
recruitment and lastly private practice. 
 
One of the leading lights in the field of vascular surgery and The Vascular Surgical Society of 
Great Britain and Ireland (VSGBI) explained why the vascular surgeons were back tracking on 
their original aims of ‘pure’ speciality status for vascular surgery: 
 
Things have rather slowed down rather than reversed. Basically, from the data on workload 
a population of around 150,000 will generate an appropriate caseload for one consultant 
vascular surgeon maintaining expertise and teaching. Thus, an ideal vascular unit would 
be a minimum of four consultant vascular surgeons catering for a population of 600,000 or 
more. But the geographical reality in this country is you cannot do that. (Mr X.T. – 
Consultant Vascular Surgeon and Leading Light in the VSGBI) 
 
Mr XT. goes no to note that: 
 
Although places like London should be amalgamating hospitals in order to produce what I 
call the ‘eclectic’ hospital serving 600,00051 with four teams of everything in it. But I’ve just 
been up there, and Bromley, Dartford, Lewisham and Greenwich with a combined 
 
51 The Vascular Surgical Society of Great Britain and Irelands’ figures for the provision of a vascular service 
were slightly different from those advocated by the Royal College of Surgeons of England. The VSGBI 
advocated one vascular surgeon per 150,000 head of population, in contrast to the RCS which advocated one per 
100,000+ head of population (Darke, 1997). 
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population of 1.2 million have five pathetic little hospitals all of them with around 400 beds, 
none of them eclectic. (Mr X.T. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon – VSGBI) 
 
However, although the idea of grouping together trusts in order to provide a service for a much 
larger population of patients is also a sensible solution to the vagaries of providing a service. The 
problem of course is combating the vested interests which are at stake. For example: 
 
The reforms have produced pressure for trusts to group together to provide a vascular 
service for a large population of patients. At present we have two vascular surgeons at the 
(BR) for a population of 450,000, whereas if you take the recommended figure advocated 
by our society, then we should have another vascular surgeon. However, financially 
speaking this may be a problem, so if you had two or three hospitals grouping together 
and pooling resources, you could bring the population up to well over a million then you 
might be able to have seven or eight vascular surgeons. This would certainly be cheaper 
than either the patient being sent off to (OP) as an extra-contractual referral, or the patient 
being bumped off and the hospital being sued because the patient was treated by someone 
who was not appropriately qualified. However, in practice grouping hospitals together is 
difficult as there are vested interests at stake. (Mr G.B. – Consultant Surgeon with a Special 
Interest in Vascular Surgery - DGH) 
 
This is not to say that the grouping of some hospital trusts has not been successfully achieved, 
however, in practice these have tend to be large teaching hospitals in London which were offering 
the same service. For example, St Thomas’, Guy’s, and King’s all merged as one medical school 
under the recent reforms of medical schools in the capital, thus enabling a grouping together of 
service provision: 
 
St Thomas’, Guy’s and Kings all have vascular surgeons who are general surgeons with a 
special interest in vascular surgery. They will cover each other for vascular emergencies 
and will each be appointed to all three hospitals for emergency work. They will come off 
the general take and become ‘pure’ vascular surgeons. This is likely to happen within the 
next year. This could also happen within other large cities such as Manchester and 
Birmingham. (Mr J.T.B. Consultant Surgeon with a Special Interest in Colorectal Surgery) 
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Thus, without any major rationalisation or grouping together of trusts the reality on the ground was 
that over half of the hospitals in the UK did not conform to the recommended population base:  
 
The needs of patients in vascular surgery is best served by specialisation. But there are 
demographic limitations and you cannot put adequate teams for emergencies in every 
single hospital. It comes down to what I call the ‘eclectic’ hospital serving a population of 
600,000 with a four man vascular rota. But the reality of my data shows that this will never 
be realised in over half of the hospitals because of demography.  For example, you cannot 
afford to have four vascular surgeons when you only have enough work for one and a half 
of them. So, if you were going to employ those people cost-effectively, they would have to 
have another interest, because only half of their time will be spent doing vascular surgery. 
(Mr X.T. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon – VSGBI) 
 
However, this problem is not peculiar to vascular surgery, according to another leading light in the 
field of coloproctology namely, Professor S.W.W. In particular Professor S.W.W. talked at length 
about specialisation and service provision, and in particular the difficulties of providing a specialist 
service within the context of the NHS: 
 
There are problems with providing a specialist service within the NHS. Next year I am 
President of the Association of Colorectal Surgeons, and we are quite clear that there is no 
way that we can actually break away from general surgery if that means saying I will not 
take part in the general surgical emergency take. Now there are some hospitals in this 
country where there are ‘pure’ colorectal surgeons, for example St Mark’s Hospital in 
London, which is a specialist hospital. There are also ‘pure’ vascular surgeons many more 
than colorectal surgeons, for example, at St. Mary’s Hospital in London the Professor of 
Surgery is a vascular surgeon and he does not do the general take. The breast surgeons 
have broken away, apart from one or two areas and the problem is they are now no longer 
competent to deal with emergencies. Now the vascular surgeons were moving along this 
line and they said that they wanted to break away but representatives from the higher 
echelons of the vascular surgical society speaking at the MMS the other night were 
backtracking on this idea. (Professor S.W.W. - Professor of Surgery) 
 
When asked why he felt the vascular surgeons had backtracked on their original aims, and indeed 
why his own specialist association had decided not to break away from the general take, he gave 
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two reasons for this.  Reasons which he felt were driving against further specialisation within 
general surgery: 
 
Ok you have two things driving against specialisation. One is the health service having to 
provide it; two, is the realisation that it’s not demographically feasible.   (Professor S.W.W.  
– Professor of Surgery) 
 
As alluded to earlier the third factor which halted the ambitions of vascular surgery is the issue of 
recruitment, which is related to personal career prospects and private practice: 
 
Personal career prospects is another factor which basically changed our philosophy. A lot 
of young men are now coming through who do not want to do “pure” vascular surgery, 
they want to do something else as well; so they want breadth to their work. And of the 
course the factor which always comes into play even though many of us won’t admit it, and 
that is the issue of private practice. Because the majority of vascular conditions will be 
handled as an emergency, this cuts down the scope for private practice. (Mr X.T. – 
Consultant Vascular Surgeon – VSGBI) 
 
This clearly shows that, owing to several factors, vascular surgery was not able to operationalise 
its knowledge or technological expertise. In particular it is interesting to observe Bucher and 
Strauss’ (1961) point regarding the different identities and interests which may be present in 
‘master segments’ (i.e. specialties) played out here within a ‘segment’ (i.e. a sub-specialty of 
general surgery and sub-sub-specialty of the field of surgery). Therefore, within the sub-specialty 
field of vascular surgery, there will be the leaders pursuing the professional project towards ‘pure’ 
specialty status and the rank and file members (including new recruits), who may or may not be 
fully cognisant of the objectives of the leaders. Indeed, Larson (1977) suggests that the 
professional project is not a ‘deliberate’ or conscious effort for all members of the group, and for 
some members, this may have little or no importance. For example, in reality, economic, and 
symbolic capital (attached to private practice), were more important to rank and file members; this 
capital could be put at risk if vascular surgery were to differentiate from general surgery. As alluded 
to in section (6.3), vascular surgery benefitted from the social capital and the combined specific 
forms of capital, such as economic and symbolic capital, through its membership of the ASGBI. 
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6.8 Summary 
 
The period 1990 to 1997 was a period during which specialist surgery became firmly entrenched 
in the surgical parlance of the United Kingdom; a period affording opportunity for aspiring specialist 
groups to accumulate capital at the micro-hospital level; capital which had the potential to be 
transferred as lobbying power in the macro-surgico-political arena. For example, inter-professional 
interdependence between clinicians and management proved conducive in the development of 
new esoteric techniques, and collective professional autonomy (Klein, 1995) with its plethora of 
guidelines allowed clearer demarcation lines between procedures and areas of expertise.  
 
Despite, conditions being generally favourable for specialist differentiation between 1990 and 
1997, paediatric surgery and maxillofacial surgery were the only areas to break away from the 
corpus of general surgery in 1992 and 1994.  
 
It would be simplistic to attribute paediatric surgery’s success primarily to accumulation of capital 
during this period, and vascular surgery’s lack of success to missed opportunities in terms of 
capital accumulation. Clearly the conditions operating from 1991 onwards; in particular the 
profession’s emphasis on service guidelines provided paediatrics and maxillofacial surgery with 
the catalyst needed to self-regulate, conversely, the foundation for their success was laid prior to 
1991. 
 
According to one informant, paediatrics broke away in 1992. Although there are references to the 
paediatric fissure in the minutes of the Royal College of Surgeons, details regarding the political 
process are absent. It is possible that they were discussed in additional documents, but these do 
not survive in the College archive and it was not possible to trace them.  Interviewees, including 
three paediatric surgeons, were unable to shed further light on this issue. Nonetheless a 
hypothesis can be formulated: clearly the origins of the split have to be sought further back than 
1991, as one year could not have sufficed to bring about such a dramatic change. It will be argued 
more fully in chapter 7 that paediatrics had long been accumulating perceptions that children 
deserved to be treated by specialists with an understanding of their ‘particular needs’ (Craft, 2003) 
This, rather than the reforms of 1991, is likeliest to lie at the root of paediatrics becoming a self-
regulating independent speciality. 
 
 222 
A similar picture obtains for maxillofacial surgery, which separated in 1994 
(www.baoms.org.uk/page.asp?id=48).  As with paediatrics, documentation about the politics is 
not forthcoming, but one can confidently reconstruct the origins of separation as lying well before 
1991.  Already in the late 1980s, it became compulsory to obtain a dual qualification in dentistry 
and medicine, so that it became distinct from other areas of general surgery, with the effect that, 
in due course, separation would cease to be politically contentious. Thus, even allowing for the 
capital accumulated during the early years of the internal market, the seeds for specialisation were 
sown prior to 1991. 
 
Vascular surgery not unlike paediatrics and maxillofacial surgery was able to accumulate capital 
prior to 1990; in particular it was able to develop a distinct knowledge and technical skills base 
demarcating it from general surgery. However, unlike paediatrics, conditions were not operating 
in favour of vascular surgery separating from general surgery, both internally and externally. 
Clearly the case of vascular surgery re-emphasises the underlying theme running throughout the 
thesis, namely that knowledge and technology delineate areas of expertise, however they do not 
determine the outcome of the professional project.  
 
Ironically, the professionally driven growth of knowledge and technology and demand for specialist 
services may impede further differentiation, given the financial injection required to fund it. 
Specialist differentiation has reached a point at which its progress over the years has peaked; and 
although ‘clinical networks’ (Edwards, 2002) may be a solution to geography and manpower 
issues, however the powers that be in the profession within the senate of surgery and the individual 
specialist associations may wish to hold off further differentiation for as long as possible.  
 
The speciality of general surgery provides a pertinent example here. The chapter has clearly 
shown that the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) has much ‘political 
capital’ both inside and outside of the surgical establishment. Further differentiation within this 
speciality could possibly threaten this. Therefore, the powers that be within the association may 
wish to maintain a broad and inclusive church and forestall any attempts at differentiation before 
they reach the Senate. The example of laparoscopic surgery covered at the beginning of the 
chapter provides a seminal example of this.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Possible Future Scenarios in the Surgical Field 
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7.1 Introduction and Aims 
 
At the time of writing (2007) the surgical field comprises nine specialities. In this respect the field 
has remained unchanged since the creation of the speciality of paediatric surgery in 1992, and 
maxillofacial surgery in 1994.  
 
The time has now come to consider how the field might change in future years. This thesis has 
consistently argued that the instances of specialist differentiation in surgery which arose in the 
past were not inevitable, but only came about thanks to the right combination of variables being in 
place at the right time.  Similarly, we do not regard future developments as inevitable, and 
accordingly it is not possible to make straightforward predictions about what will happen.  
However, one can predict what would probably happen if particular combinations of variables were 
to arise.  It is in this spirit that we shall attempt prediction in what follows.  
 
The surgery of the twenty-first century is radically different to the surgery practised during the 
nineteenth and indeed the first half of the twentieth centuries. Specialist differentiation has 
fragmented the once united surgical corpus, and the surgical Colleges, the bastions of the ‘old-
surgery’, have been obliged to congregate around the ‘new-surgery.’ The ‘old-surgery’ was 
general and expansive in nature, almost colonial in its reach, whereas the ‘new-surgery’ is highly 
specialised and compartmentalised into unique bodies of knowledge and skill. These in turn have 
been further compartmentalised through sub-specialisation and super-specialisation, resulting in 
internal fragmentation. Many in the field question how far this process will go, and indeed whether 
it is necessary. 
 
Just as the surgery of the twenty-first century is markedly different to the surgery practised during 
the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century respectively, many of the challenges facing 
surgery in the twenty-first century are also different.  
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that Surgery is a social field like any other, so that it will 
interact with, and face challenges from, other social fields and its environment. The outcome of 
these challenges and interactions will affect the surgical field as a whole. In particular, given the 
differentials in power and interests, and the struggles and strategies which characterise the field, 
the interaction will effect the field’s individual components, namely the specialities, and the way 
they interact with the field as a whole and each other. In addition, the field will face directives and 
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policies from the wider professional field it belongs to (i.e. the medical profession). Thus, the 
potential for further specialist differentiation in surgery will depend on the outcome of these 
complex interactions. 
 
 
7.2 The Surgical Field: Challenges from and Interaction with Other 
Social Fields 
 
Since the inception of the NHS (5th July 1948), the surgical profession has been obliged to enter 
into a relationship, and interact, with the state. This relationship is a central tenet of the Triangle 
of Intersecting Forces. The triangle is maintained in a state of equilibrium by the mutual 
dependency which bind the fields which make it up, namely the medical profession, the state and 
civil society (Salter, 2004). 
 
This equilibrium was disturbed in the 1980s and early 1990s when the government attempted to 
invade, what Salter describes as, the ‘sacred territory’ of clinical autonomy within the NHS. The 
surgical profession was subsequently faced with new challenges following the election of a labour 
government in May 1997, intent on pushing through a performance agenda. The White Paper The 
New NHS: Modern Dependable emphasised that future performance would be assessed not only 
in relation to ‘efficiency and cost-effectiveness’ (Ham, 1999:56), but more importantly in relation 
to ‘health improvement, fair access, effective delivery of appropriate healthcare, patient 
experience and health outcome’ (DOH, 1997:64-65). 
 
With the emphasis on standards of delivery, NHS Trusts were one of the central organisations in 
the structure developed by the Blair government (Ham, 1999). Indeed, the government 
established ‘a new statutory duty for Trusts to work in partnership with other NHS organisations 
e.g. Primary Care Groups and health authorities’. Additionally, Trusts were expected to ‘participate 
in strategy and planning by helping shape the local health improvement programme (HImP)’ 
(DOH, 1997:45). 
 
Continuing the emphasis on partnership, the government was keen from the outset to promote the 
closer involvement of clinicians in drafting service related contracts with commissioners, and in 
ensuring greater parity between Trusts’ financial and clinical priorities (DOH, 1997). 
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In addition, trusts were expected to embrace the concept of ‘clinical governance’. Chief-Executives 
would be held ultimately responsible for ensuring the quality of the services provided by their trust, 
and the White Paper proposed that each Trust should establish a Sub-Committee of the Board 
led by a senior member of the consultant body with responsibility for steering the quality agenda. 
 
Additionally, National Service Frameworks would be established for major areas of care and key 
disease groups in order to ensure consistency of approach and quality in patient care across the 
NHS (DOH, 1997). There were also proposals for a National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
in order to ‘give new coherence and prominence to information about clinical cost-effectiveness’ 
(ibid.:58). This would be achieved through the production and dissemination of guidelines related 
to clinical care and the use of audits (Baker, 1998). 
 
The White Paper also proposed the creation a Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), in order 
to ensure excellence throughout the health service. It was intended that these arrangements 
would, in conjunction with the introduction of clinical governance, ensure that there were more 
robust measures in place to systematically review and continuously improve on quality standards 
(DOH, 1997). This was indicative of the government’s commitment ‘to put quality at the heart of 
the new NHS’ (Ham, 1999:60). 
 
Quality and patient care were catapulted onto the public stage on the 29th of May 1998, following 
the GMC’s ruling  
 
‘that two surgeons from the Bristol Royal Infirmary were guilty of continuing to operate on 
children with heart defects when they knew their death rates were unacceptably high. In 
addition, a doctor manager was found guilty of failing to stop the operations after he had 
been alerted to the high mortality.’ (Salter, 2004:123) 
 
The government responded by announcing that ‘for the first time in the history of the NHS hospital 
Trusts were to be held legally accountable for the quality of the service they provided’52 (DOH, 
1998a. cited in Salter, 2004:128). Additionally, the consultation document A First class service: 
quality in the new NHS which followed this announcement stated an expectation of ‘a 
 
52 ‘The requirement was subsequently given statutory force by the Health Act, 1999’ (Salter, 2004:128). 
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management-led system of clinical governance designed to set and monitor clinical standards’ 
(DOH, 1998b. cited in Salter, 2004:128). The government’s  
 
‘definition of the new managerial concept of clinical governance was a framework through 
which NHS organisations are accountable for continuously improving the quality of their 
services and safeguarding high standards of care by creating an environment in which 
excellence in clinical care will flourish.’ (DOH, 1998b:33. cited in Salter, 2004:128) 
 
Professional self-regulation, a sacred tenet of the Triangle of Intersecting Forces also became a 
target for state intervention (Salter, 2004). The consultation document noted that ‘if public 
confidence in doctors so seriously dented by events such as Bristol is to be restored, self-
regulation must be modernised’ (DOH, 1998b:33. cited in Salter, 2004:128). It was therefore 
proposed that self-regulation be situated in the public arena i.e. ‘within a state-administered 
apparatus of accountability’ in order to ensure that it be ‘open to public scrutiny, responsive to 
changing clinical practice and changing service needs, and publicly accountable for professional 
standards set nationally and the action to maintain those standards’ (DOH, 1998b:para.3.44. 
cited in Salter, 2004:128).  
 
Thus, it could be argued that Bristol was fortuitous as it opened a window onto the political agenda, 
which the government utilised with great gusto. Indeed, it is highly likely that the government was 
planning to clip the wings of doctors by restricting their professional freedom (Salter, 2004) before 
the Bristol debacle, given that the government’s statement in the 1997 White Paper noted that, 
although it would ‘continue to work with the profession, and its regulatory bodies’, its aim was to 
‘strengthen the existing systems of professional self-regulation by ensuring that they are open, 
responsive and publicly accountable’ (DOH, 1997:59).  
 
Be that as it may, the profession was facing a serious challenge to its self-regulatory powers from 
the state. It also faced mistrust from the general public (civil society). Thus, the relationship 
between the public (civil society) and the profession, another central tenet of the Triangle of 
Intersecting Forces had also been destabilised (Salter, 2004). Certainly, the relationship between 
the surgical field and the state, could be described, as one of open challenge to the symbolic 
capital of the surgical profession, that is to say, the prestige associated with its expertise. Thus, in 
challenging the surgical profession, the state garnered symbolic capital (credit and reputation) 
from the general public (civil society).  
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Indeed, public feeling over the Bristol issue was so strong that in June 1998 a government inquiry 
was announced with an extensive brief and resources, to investigate ‘the management of complex 
paediatric heart surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary Trust’ (Salter, 2004:123).The policy window 
was well and truly open, and other events made sure it remained so 53  
 
It could be said that Bristol was a watershed in the relationship between two social fields: between 
civil society and the medical profession as a whole and in particular surgery. However, despite the 
fact that Bristol was a defining moment in this relationship, it was also a sign of wider societal 
changes: the ‘erosion of deference,’ increased media activity, and a society ‘whose members were 
far better educated than their predecessors’. It was also ‘a society experiencing rapid technological 
change’ (Klein, 1995:134). Indeed, science was pushing forward the boundaries of knowledge, 
and the medical profession played a central role in this. As surgery became more and more highly 
specialised, guidelines proliferated, and new procedures abounded, so the public’s expectations 
became correspondingly greater. This is a pertinent example, of interplay between fields. Indeed, 
fields are not isolated in space, on the contrary, fields interact and occurrences in one field can 
have an effect on adjoining fields (Thomson, 2014), as is the case here between civil society and 
the medical profession.  
 
This impacted on the field of private health care, as the owners of private health care facilities 
(BUPA, NUFFIELD) graded procedures and laid down guidelines regarding the number of 
procedures surgeons had to carry out, linking this to the fees they could earn, as an orthopaedic 
surgeon notes: 
 
BUPA insists on a certain number of procedures for hips and knees, and they’re talking 
about having a premium or reduced fee for people who have done fewer than 20 hips a year 
or 15 revisions. (Mr E.M. Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon with a Special Interest in Joint 
Revision Surgery – Teaching Hospital) 
 
In addition to this the surgical field was faced with the implications of policies introduced by the 
government through the Department of Health (DOH) during the 1990’s. For example, the New 
Deal on junior doctors’ hours, which was fully implemented in 1996, and the European Working 
 
53 A plethora of other cases also came to light, most notably the Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital Trust, 
Alder Hey with regard to the retention of children’s organs and the GP, Dr Harold Shipman who was found to 
have killed 215 of his patients (Salter, 2004). 
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Time Directive (EWTD) (1998) which required the implementation of a 48 hour working week for 
consultants (Royal College of Surgeons, 2000). 
 
As well as facing challenges from, and interacting with other social fields, the surgical field also 
faced challenges from the wider professional field in the shape of policies which had been 
developed by the profession for the Department of Health (DOH). The policies concerned, such 
as, the Calman training scheme (1993), and the Calman-Hine Report (1995) on the provision and 
organisation of cancer services, had the potential to effect the surgical field, especially the 
individual specialities. 
 
In addition to facing challenges from, and interacting with, other social fields, the surgical field, like 
other social fields, has to interact with its environment. For example, the surgical field interacts 
with the environment which the NHS occupies. Thus, it has to contend with the logistics of 
providing a service given particular demographic factors. 
 
 
7.3 The ‘Triangle of Intersecting Forces’: A State of Equilibrium  
 
Despite the state’s incursion into the hallowed turf of professional self-regulation through its newly 
created regulatory agencies NICE (The National Institute of Clinical Excellence), and CHI (The 
Commission for Health Improvement) the state had overlooked the fact that without the 
profession’s help its policies could not be operationalised. 
 
As soon as NICE was set up in 1999 it was obvious ‘that to fulfil its mandate regarding national 
standards it would require the cooperation of the medical and surgical Royal Colleges’ and 
specialist societies’, as ‘they control the essential knowledge resources’ (Salter, 2004:155).  
 
The foundation of CHI promised swift political results for the state through its proposed monitoring 
and evaluation remit. However, in practice non-medical agencies such as these were unlikely to 
succeed in infiltrating the hallowed territory of clinical practice without the help of clinicians, 
especially as the reality of a clinical governance agenda led by managers at the clinical coal-face, 
was at best unrealistic (Salter, 2004). For example, Thorne (2001) argues that ‘although 
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government discourse places a statutory duty on CEO’s, managers recognised their lack of 
expertise and ability to gain access to the clinical domain’ (p.200).  
 
Thus, despite the destabilisation of the Triangle of Forces, equilibrium returned, resulting in the 
surgical profession retaining its right to self-regulation as well as gaining a significant bargaining 
position. The profession adapted itself to the political context, adopting a patient centred and 
transparent approach. Salter describes this as a ‘patient centred political discourse’ (2004:206).  
 
The new approach built on the existing quality agenda with its emphasis on audit, clinical 
guidelines and continuing medical education (CME),54 but placed a greater emphasis on 
transparency and accountability.  
 
During the 1990’s the Royal College of Surgeons of England ‘led the field of surgical audit through 
the Clinical Effectiveness Unit established in 1990’ (Royal College of Surgeons 1999:2). In 
addition, it was represented together with the other surgical Royal Colleges and medical Royal 
Colleges on the NCEPOD (National Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths) steering group 
(Royal College of Surgeons, 1999). Some specialist societies were also advanced in terms of 
audit and their development of systems (Salter, 2004). For example, The Society of 
Cardiothoracic Surgeons had a long history of audit dating back to when the United Kingdom 
Cardiac surgical register was established in 1977 (Keogh, et al, 1998). 
 
The Royal College of Surgeons of England had also been responsible for continuing medical 
education (CME). In view of the GMC’s (General Medical Council) policy proposal on revalidation 
in 2000 following the events surrounding Bristol, the College adopted a proactive stance on 
continuing professional development (CPD) (Salter, 2004). Whereas the previous CME approach 
 
‘was viewed by the medical profession in terms of updating their knowledge, the changing 
political climate and the need to be more accountable meant that clinicians would now have 
to demonstrate that they were developing professionally and that their activities were 
educationally and cost effective and improved their practice.’ (du Boulay, 2000:393)  
 
 
54 This was developed by the Royal College and specialist associations during the years of the internal market, 
when collective professional autonomy became the norm. 
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As alluded to above, if the profession’s control of the ‘essential knowledge resources’ (Salter, 
2004:155) and adaptation to the changing political climate enabled them to retain control of 
professional regulation; a significant bargaining tool, and a dependency from which the profession 
could aspire to gain ‘new forms of access and influence over the health policy community’, given 
the fact that the state is ‘obliged to negotiate with the self-regulatory apparatus of the profession 
in order to recruit the surgical expertise necessary to obtain quick political results’ (ibid.:206-207). 
 
It is not surprising therefore, that there was competition between the Royal Colleges and specialist 
societies for control of this new political realm (Salter, 2004). For example, in aftermath of Bristol 
the Royal Colleges and specialist associations ‘produced a disparate array of idiosyncratic 
proposals reflecting the traditional separation between them’ (ibid.:204).  
 
Cardiothoracic surgery provides a good example of this. Inevitably the negative media coverage 
surrounding Bristol was directed towards the speciality of cardiothoracic surgery. The Society of 
Cardiothoracic Surgeons, however, were confident that given their particular history and expertise 
in auditing adult cardiac surgical procedures, their society possessed the necessary database and 
knowledge to support standard-setting procedures which, they believed, ‘should go some way to 
restoring public confidence’ (Keogh et al., 1998:1760) in the wake of Bristol.  
 
The society also added a paediatric surgical database to their endeavours, as well as 
‘democratically assuming responsibility for quality control of individual surgical practices – a new 
role for any specialist society within the United Kingdom’ (ibid.). In addition, in 2003 ‘the Society 
announced that it would publish star-ratings for its members based on death rates on the operating 
table: a very specific and public form of professional accountability’ (Salter, 2004:204).  
 
 
7.4 Prospects for Specialist Differentiation in the Future 
 
As alluded to earlier, specialist differentiation has resulted in nine defined surgical specialities. 
Each one of these areas has experienced sub-specialisation, and predictions abound as to how 
far this process will go. For example, the death knell of general surgery has been sounding for 
many years:  
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‘In the dining rooms of teaching hospitals and in the bars at conferences specialist 
surgeons may be heard forecasting the imminent demise of the general surgeon and his 
replacement by specialised multi-disciplinary teams who will concentrate on one system, 
or even one part of one system.’ (Irving, 1986:741)  
 
Yet despite these forecasts, general surgery remains intact, albeit highly sub-specialised. Given 
the renewed emphasis on quality and outcome, sub-specialisation is certainly here to stay. Yet 
specialist differentiation is an entirely different ball game. 
 
The government’s plans for the NHS, together with the post Bristol fall out, has reinforced the 
state’s dependence on the profession, and in turn opened up new arenas of influence, where the 
potential for the accumulation of political ‘capital’ is high. To quote a Royal College of Surgeons 
workforce document:  
 
‘The opportunity now exists for the surgical profession to engage more effectively as 
partners with the government, NHS planners and managers in helping to implement the 
visions for the future embodied in the NHS Plan.’ (2001:7)  
 
However, although there is potential specific forms of capital out there for aspiring groups intent 
on pursuing the professional project, this thesis has argued throughout that capital in its numerous 
forms does not suffice alone to ensure specialist differentiation: this only occurs when a set of 
variables interact at the right time, and even then the variables will be different from group to group, 
reflecting each group’s unique developmental history. It also needs to be reiterated that not all 
groups aspire to differentiate, and even when the leaders of a group do, they need to have the 
support of the rank and file membership. This was one factor amongst many which prevented 
vascular surgery from separating from general surgery, as highlighted in Chapter six. This latter 
point leads nicely onto the future prospects for specialist differentiation in the specialty of general 
surgery. 
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7.4.1 General Surgery 
 
Though specialist differentiation has made the largest inroads into its vast surgical territory, 
General surgery is the still the largest speciality. The composition of general surgery in 2006 is the 
same as it was a decade ago. It is highly sub-specialised, as indicated in Table 7.1: 
 
 
All general surgeons are trained in the generality of surgery and receive training in the sub-
speciality of their choice in the last two years. Surgery in general provides a common training stem 
servicing the sub-specialities of vascular surgery, breast surgery, endocrine surgery, colorectal 
surgery and upper gastrointestinal surgery (Royal College of Surgeons, 2001). 
 
However, in an era when there is an emphasis on the quality agenda (most notably clinical 
governance, outcome and Calman-Hine), together with rising patient expectation and litigation, as 
well as the effects of changes in the surgical training structure as a result of Calman, the emphasis 
on sub-specialisation is likely to become more pronounced, and the term ‘general’ a legacy from 
a bygone era (Royal College of Surgeons, 2000). 
 
Approximate number of subspecialists 
 
Coloproctology 538 
Vascular 449 
Endocrine 140 
Breast 443 
Upper gastrointestinal/hepatobiliary 518 
Military 125 
Transplant 800 
 
Source: Royal College of Surgeons, 2005 Developing 
a Modern Surgical Workforce 
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For example, in larger hospitals in the UK there is a separate vascular rota for both elective and 
emergency vascular conditions. According to a practising vascular surgeon based there, (Q) 
provides a good example of this: 
 
Somewhere like (Q) you’ve got seven pure vascular surgeons not involved in general 
surgical emergencies and only doing vascular surgery both on an emergency basis and 
electively – and there are lots of other big cities usually associated with teaching hospitals 
– medical schools where that is the case. Thus, in large centres of population you’ve got 
increasing numbers of pure vascular surgeons. (Mr Z. Consultant Vascular Surgeon – 
Teaching Hospital) 
 
In areas of the country where DGH’s (District General Hospitals) served populations which were 
not sufficiently large to support an independent vascular unit, managed clinical networks are 
enabling some DGH’s to provide such a service: 
 
Wakefield, Dewsbury and Pontefract merged to provide a twenty-four-hour vascular service 
seven days a week. This is covered by pure vascular surgeons and general surgeons with 
a sub-specialist interest in vascular surgery. (Mr Z. Consultant Vascular Surgeon)   
 
Indeed, the specialist association for general surgery, namely The Association of Surgeons of 
Great Britain and Ireland (ASGBI) forecasts that, in areas where vascular surgeons still participate 
in the general surgical take, ‘the contribution of vascular surgeons to the general surgical rota will 
diminish in the future’ (Royal College of Surgeons, 2005:42). They also note that given the 
specific nature of breast and transplant surgery, more and more surgeons specialising in these 
areas find that they are less and less able to undertake the full range of emergency surgery. 
Consequently, their place on the rota will have to be filled by other surgeons, and it is likely that 
‘emergency general surgery may be provided by upper and lower gastrointestinal surgeons only’ 
(ibid.). 
 
In light of this, the prospects for vascular surgery in terms of specialist differentiation look fairly 
promising, though several factors will determine the outcome: Firstly, whether or not differentiation 
is on the policy agenda of the vascular surgical body; secondly, whether the vascular surgical 
body in general would be for or against this; thirdly, whether a ‘pure’ vascular service would be 
feasible throughout the country; fourthly, there would be the expense incurred in setting up another 
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speciality; last but certainly not least, would the ASGBI want vascular surgery to break away from 
its ranks. 
 
According to one vascular surgeon although there has been talk of splitting vascular surgery off in 
the past there are no such plans at this time: 
 
There’s been talk of it, but no plans for it – no concrete decisions. (Mr Z. Consultant 
Vascular Surgeon) 
 
However, he does go on to note that one of the things which might influence how things develop 
is vascular radiology, esp. interventional radiology: 
 
There is a huge recruitment problem in vascular radiology, particularly interventional 
radiology, for a variety of reasons. Because of that, one suggestion has been to implement 
a model which operates in other countries, that is: to have a single vascular specialist. (Mr 
Z. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon) 
 
In practice this could potentially solve the problem which is still present in some parts of the country 
i.e. the ratio between the number of consultants appointed and the population base. For example, 
in a city like York, which is thirty miles from Leeds and even further from Hull, with its nearest 
geographical relative being, Harrogate, it is difficult to operate a clinical network. However, it would 
be also impractical to appoint four vascular surgeons, as there may only be enough elective work 
during the day for two: 
 
If vascular surgeons were given a basic training in interventional radiology where the 
straightforward aspects of interventional radiology and skills are learned, this would mean 
that the vascular surgeon will do all of the surgery required but could also do a fairly high 
proportion of radiology work – the straightforward diagnostic angiogram, the 
straightforward angioplasty. This would mean that you could appoint four vascular 
surgeons to do the out of hours cover for surgery and simple interventional radiology, and 
even though there may not be enough elective work during the day to warrant a four-man 
team, you could also find them some straightforward radiological procedures to support 
this. (Mr Z. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon) 
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The consultant notes however, that this is a long way from happening: 
 
There are discussions between the Vascular Surgical Society and the British Society of 
Interventional Radiology, but they are a long way from either reaching an agreement let 
alone putting it into practice – but this is something which might change in the future. (Mr 
Z. – Consultant Vascular Surgeon) 
 
Thus, it would appear that vascular surgery is some way off from making any moves towards 
breaking away from general surgery. Even if the tentative proposals with radiology reach fruition, 
there will need to be a favourable consensus within the ranks of the vascular surgical society. It 
will be necessary to address issues relating to the expense of setting up a new speciality with a 
separate examination structure and achieve political consensus within the ASGBI before it even 
reaches the Senate of Surgery.  
 
The prospects for specialist differentiation in other areas of general surgery will ultimately depend 
on a number of factors. Calman-Hine in particular has forced a trend towards greater sub-
specialisation. This has caused consultants to give up areas of work where they are deemed not 
to have carried out sufficient procedures to attract Calman-Hine accreditation. This has effected 
areas such as coloproctology, and in larger conurbations a pure colorectal service is provided. 
However, the removal of vascular, breast and transplant surgery from the emergency on-call rota 
in general surgery means that other areas have to take their place; as noted earlier, coloproctology 
is one such area. This in itself will require extra consultants in this area, so it is highly unlikely that 
coloproctology would break away from general surgery, given the potential repercussions for 
emergency general surgery. However, the potential for ‘clinical networks’ (Edwards, 2002), 
together with the fact that cancer services is one of the governments National Service Framework 
priorities, could give coloproctology some political capital with the government, and economic 
capital, especially in terms of resources.  
 
Laparoscopic surgery is still an area which evokes strong feelings, because it is a technique and 
not an organ based speciality. It is also interesting that, despite its popularity with trainees, it fails 
to get a mention in the in the latest service framework document to come from the Royal College 
of Surgeons and the Speciality Associations: Developing a Modern Surgical Workforce 2005. 
Although consultants will continue to be appointed with laparoscopic interests, either as their 
primary sub-speciality interest or as a secondary sub-speciality interest, it is highly unlikely that 
laparoscopic surgery will break away from general surgery given the resource implications for 
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general surgery in terms of replacing the consultant numbers on the general take. Nonetheless, 
given its cost-effectiveness, laparoscopic surgery does have the potential to remain a player with 
government. 
 
 
7.4.2 Trauma and Orthopaedics 
 
Trauma and orthopaedics is the second largest speciality and, like general surgery, highly sub-
specialised. Most surgeons are general trauma and orthopaedic surgeons, but many have a sub-
speciality interest. The increasing trend towards sub-specialisation can be seen by examining the 
number of consultants associated with each sub-speciality set out in Table 7.2 
 
England      Wales 
 
 
Joint replacement and revision  227      14 
Acute trauma    206     12 
Knee     201     12 
General orthopaedic   134     8 
Shoulder and upper limb   109     6 
Children’s orthopaedic   99     6   
Hip surgery    90     5 
Spinal     90     5 
Hand     83     5 
Sports     60     4 
Foot and ankle    49     3 
Trauma reconstructive   47     3 
Other (including oncology,   34     2 
 
 
 
Approximate number of subspecialists      
    England    Wales 
 
Joint replacement and revision  227     14 
Acute trauma    206    12 
Knee     201    12 
General orthopaedic   134    8 
Shoulder and upper li b   109    6 
Children’s orthopaedic   99    6 
Hip surgery    90    5 
Spinal     90    5 
Hand     83    5 
Sports     60    4 
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Other (including oncology,   34    2 
limb reconstruction) 
 
Source: Royal College of Surgeons, 2005 Developing a Modern Surgical Workforce 
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Not unlike general surgery, trauma and orthopaedics needs to be able to provide a general 
emergency front-line service. This is becoming increasingly problematic at a time when surgeons 
are becoming more sub-specialised, for this results in their speciality losing core general 
emergency skills. However, despite this paradox, NCEPOD reports and in particular The Royal 
College of Surgeons document The Provision of Emergency Surgical Services: An Organisational 
Framework (1997) pushed the British Orthopaedic Association (BOA) into setting up a ‘consultant 
led-trauma service’ (Royal College of Surgeons, 1997:3). This placed a big strain on elective 
orthopaedics, as ‘there is a growing trend towards the conduct of trauma surgery by consultants 
in daylight hours following recent NCEPOD55 reports’ (Royal College of Surgeons, 2001:38). 
The strain on elective orthopaedics has led many to question whether or not trauma should 
separate off from orthopaedics, and some to pray for the day when it will: 
 
I pray for a time when trauma will separate. Yes, I think that trauma used to be done badly 
by the orthopaedic surgeons who were basically at home, while the senior registrars did 
the on call, and over the last 10 or 12 years people have developed an interest in trauma – 
and I’m sure as you know there are pure trauma surgeons – Oxford is a good example. (Mr 
E.M. – Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon with a Special Interest in Joint Revision Surgery) 
 
Conversely, there are those who cannot see trauma separating off from orthopaedics, for varying 
reasons: 
 
I don’t see it being hived off from orthopaedics because there aren’t many people who just 
want to do trauma – for two reasons: because a) you’re on call; and b) there’s no private 
practice and we come back to that subject time and time again. It’s not seen as…well it’s 
always out of hours, it has an unpredictable workload, and surgeons don’t like things that 
are unpredictable like that. (Mr H.C. – Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon with a Special 
Interest in Arthroscopic Joint Replacement) 
 
Even though it is unlikely that trauma will separate, there is a potential solution to the problem of 
trauma interfering with elective orthopaedics which is currently being developed in (R): separating 
elective work and trauma work on two different sites. 
 
 
55 The Royal College of Surgeons document cites: NCEPOD: Then and Now: The 2000 Report of the National 
Confidential Enquiry into Perioperative Deaths. London. 
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Well we’re taking the old elective work from off the two sites to one of the smaller hospitals 
in town and developing an elective centre and the trauma, spines, hands and kids are all 
going to come here – that will focus the trauma expertise on a site that’s got all of the other 
services, neuro, plastics, vascular surgery and cardiothoracic and it will allow the elective 
work to go ahead in a planned way without interference from acute admissions. (Mr E.M. – 
Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon with a Special Interest in Joint Revision Surgery) 
 
Another area which could potentially separate in the future is spinal surgery. Orthopaedic 
surgeons have traditionally concerned themselves with the lumbar region of the spine, while 
neurosurgeons have dealt with the neck. However, as sub-specialisation has progressed, complex 
spinal work has increasingly been carried out by pure orthopaedic spinal surgeons and not by 
general orthopaedic surgeons in district general hospitals. However, according to many 
neurosurgeons, there is a trend developing whereby they are under pressure to take on a lot of 
the more complex degenerative spinal cases, and one neurosurgeon in particular feels this stems 
from the rise in litigation against orthopaedic surgeons: 
 
Orthopaedic surgeons have traditionally been a big target for lawyers – society wants to 
get back at doctors for what they perceive they do, and it’s unsustainable really – but I think 
it’s a big influence on some people that when they get sued for something they say ‘I’m 
never going to do that again – I’m not going to deal with those cases. But if you withdraw 
from those cases there is no one else to take it up, and that’s why there has been increasing 
pressure on Neurosurgery to take more of this spinal work, and whereas we have the skills 
to take on some of it, we haven’t got the skills to take on all of it. (Mr J.L.C. – Consultant 
Neurosurgeon – Teaching Hospital) 
 
He goes on to opine that spinal surgery will break away from trauma and orthopaedic surgery and 
become part of neurosurgery: 
 
I think that spinal will go… all these things are gradual processes, but I think it will go – at 
the moment spinal surgery is done by a few interested orthopods, the complex spinal work 
is done by a few interested neurosurgeons. The neurosurgeons, as you highlighted earlier, 
tend to look at the neck and a little bit of the thorax, and the orthopaedic surgeons tend to 
be more lumbar and to some extent thorax, but there are places where neurosurgeons have 
skilled themselves up to do pedicle screws in the lumbar spine, and they’ll do some of that 
work, so there’s a lot of overlap. But basically in both camps there are particular interested 
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parties who are doing the complex work – but there’s a lot of simple degenerative work at 
the moment – more than the system has the capacity for, so your general jobbing 
neurosurgeon still has to be able to do that sort of work, and I think little by little he’ll do 
less and less of it, until it comes to the point where you don’t have a general neurosurgeon 
that does spinal work, you either have spinal surgeons and eventually they’ll be jointly 
trained, so you’ll have spinal surgeons and you’ll have other surgeons who do 
neurosurgery. (Mr J.L.C. – Consultant Neurosurgeon-Teaching Hospital) 
 
This viewpoint is also shared by a Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery: 
 
There aren’t vast numbers of specialist spinal orthopaedic surgeons, and I see the day 
neurosurgeons will do it all probably – there will be a few highly specialist orthopaedic 
surgeons who will probably do scoliosis – but I see the day where neurosurgeons rather 
like when plastic surgeons took hands – they will muscle in – maybe it’s just a reflection of 
the expansion of neurosurgery. (Professor H.U. – Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery) 
 
Whether or not this will come to pass remains to be seen. The British Orthopaedic Association 
may not wish to relinquish spinal surgery. Another possibility is that spinal surgery will not separate 
from orthopaedics, but there be joint collaboration between the specialities of orthopaedics and 
neurosurgery with dual accreditation. This would mean that those highly specialist orthopaedic 
surgeons who wished to do scoliosis surgery could still do so, and even go as far as the neck if 
they so wished, this being traditionally the territory of the neurosurgeon. Likewise, the 
neurosurgeon could take on even more of the complex degenerative work, considered to be the 
traditional territory of the orthopaedic spinal surgeon. This would still enable a minor lumber spinal 
service to be carried out by general orthopaedic surgeons in DGH’s. 
 
 
7.4.3 Cardiothoracic Surgery 
 
The major sub-specialities of cardiothoracics are thoracic surgery, adult cardiac surgery, 
paediatric cardiac surgery, cardiothoracic transplantation, and cardiothoracic surgery. The figures 
in Table 7.3 set out the consultant numbers in each of the sub-specialist areas. 
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Cardiothoracic surgery is a speciality which used to be given heroic status by the media and the 
general public. This changed in 1998, when, following the GMC inquiry into paediatric cardiac 
surgery at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, cardiothoracic surgery became the villain. Increased public 
scrutiny, and the need to be publicly accountable and transparent, together with the government’s 
emphasis on the National Service Framework (NSF) for coronary artery revascularisation and the 
cancer plan, have impacted upon the speciality.  
 
The government’s National Service Framework (NSF) initiative has directed increased resources 
towards cardiac surgery, which has had positive and negative effects on the speciality of 
cardiothoracic surgery. The increased resources have significantly increased surgical activity for 
coronary heart disease, and the Royal College of Surgeons’s (2001) projections suggest that there 
will be an ‘eighty per cent increase in activity by 2008, with a rise in annual procedures from 22,000 
to 41,000’ (p.45). However, on the downside, this has had an adverse effect on thoracic surgery, 
according to a cardiothoracic surgeon: 
 
The National Service Framework has increased the pressure on us to perform greater 
numbers of coronary artery bypass grafts, and because of this we find ourselves 
performing less thoracic cases…this raises issues relating to the quality of thoracic work 
performed by cardiothoracic surgeons. (Mr T.D.P. Consultant Cardiothoracic Surgeon)  
 
Audit and clinical governance has increased for all consultants, and cardiac surgeons are 
becoming increasingly super-specialised in their own little niches, For example, a cardiac surgeon 
notes:  
Approximate number of sub-specialists 
 
England  Wales 
Thoracic    38 
Paediatric Cardiac   16  
Cardiothoracic   179  10 
 
Source: Royal College of Surgeons, 2001 The Surgical Workforce in 
The New NHS 
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We work well together across the broad spectrum. If you take adults, probably 70 per cent 
of each of the 6 pure adult surgeons’ work will be Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting, and 
then we’ll each have our own little niches which we’ve shown an interest in or got by 
abrogation – my niche is repeat valve surgery because my predecessors put in a lot of pig 
valves which have fallen apart in people who were too young – so they’ve outlived the valve 
and come back, so I’ve got one of the biggest world practices in repeat valve surgery and 
that’s by abrogation. It’s a labour of love, because it’s a really hard all day operation – 
whereas (P) across the way does Mitral Valve Repairs, which is delightful – we all sort of 
started doing them but he somehow managed to corner the market, and so now he gets 
virtually all of those to do. (Mr T.D.P. – Consultant Cardiothoracic Surgeon) 
 
It is unlikely that this super-specialisation is down to audit and clinical governance alone, though 
these contribute to its diffusion. This model works in (Q) as the cardiac and thoracic services are 
separated, but in hospitals where the service is not separated, Cardiac surgeons are hard pushed 
to carry out their additional thoracic duties which involve ‘prompt surgery for lung cancer’ 
(Partridge, 2002:376).  
 
Although the National Service Framework, together with audit and clinical governance, has 
exacerbated thoracic surgery’s problems, it is highly likely that they had been developing for some 
time. For example, the speciality of cardiothoracic surgery is in many respects a tale of two cities: 
adult cardiac surgery is lucrative in terms of private practice, and as a result is attractive to 
trainees, given the potential to accumulate economic and symbolic capital, whereas thoracic 
surgery does not attract as much private practice and is therefore not as attractive to trainees. In 
addition to this ‘thoracic posts carry arduous on-call commitments’ (Goldstraw, 2002:12).  
 
The problems facing thoracic surgery has led to calls for ‘specialist thoracic surgeons’ as Partridge 
(2002) notes: 
 
‘The need for specialist thoracic surgeons is emphasised by the fact that surgery for lung 
cancer represents less than half of the workload of the 38 purely thoracic surgeons in the 
UK. Surgical management of pneumothoraces, empyema, mediastinal masses, and benign 
and malignant conditions of the oesophagus; lung biopsies; lung volume reduction 
surgery: all need expertise that justifies a specialist approach. Different skills are needed 
in thoracic as opposed to cardiac surgery.’ (p.377) 
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Partridge is certainly not a lone voice in calling for specialist thoracic surgeons, but whether this 
will mean a complete separation from the speciality of cardiothoracic surgery is a different matter. 
For example, a ‘pure’ thoracic surgeon from (Q) does see a time when there will be a specialist 
examination for thoracic surgery, but within the speciality of cardiothoracic surgery: 
 
I think that a specialist  examination is on the cards – I mean, I have been an examiner for 
the speciality fellowship and I think that there will be a case for examining people in 
paediatric cardiac surgery, there will be a case for examining people in adult thoracic 
surgery as well as adult cardiac surgery, plus or minus transplantation – but in terms of 
training if you want to do cardiac you’ve got to do a year’s thoracic, and if you want to do 
thoracic you’ve got to do a year’s cardiac – the examination will probably have a basic 
general cardiothoracic theme plus a specialised theme as well – so I think it will change. 
(Mr V.V.P. – Consultant Thoracic Surgeon – Teaching Hospital) 
 
However, having a specialist examination does not in and of itself equate with having specialist 
thoracic surgeons. On the contrary, thoracic service provision is dependent on ‘enhancing the 
number and quality of training opportunities to entice the young into the speciality’ (Partridge, 
2002:307), in addition to securing government funding to fund new consultant posts in the area 
(Goldstraw, 2002). Cardiothoracic surgery is taking advantage of a policy window which has 
opened up and could make this possible.  
 
The Calman-Hine guidelines on cancer services, together with NCEPOD and other reports,56  has 
stimulated interest in the provision of cancer services overall, linking volume to outcome. For 
example:  
 
I think the thing that’s stimulated thoracic surgery has been the development of cancer 
units, cancer centres, and the Calman-Hine recommendations – that if you’re doing 2 
oesophagectomies you shouldn’t be doing it – you should be sending them to the major 
centres – so there’s a lot of evidence now that volume equals good results – so if you’re 
not doing the volume you shouldn’t be doing it at all – hence the patterns of referrals have 
changed a lot because of the cancer units and cancer centres, and also the availability of 
intensive care, and NCEPOD has had a big influence, as well on looking at cause of death, 
 
56 Partridge (2002: 307) cites the following articles: Fry WA, Menck HR, Winchester DP. The National Cancer 
Data Base Report on Lung Cancer. Cancer 1996; 77: 1947-55; Dambuis RA, Schutte PR, Resection Rates and 
Post-Operative Mortality in 7,899 Patients with Lung Cancer. Eur Respiratory Journal 1996; 9: 7-10. 
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and they announced that if you haven’t got an HDU or an ITU bed available, then you 
shouldn’t be doing that sort of surgery.” (Mr V.V.P. – Consultant Thoracic Surgeon – 
Teaching Hospital) 
 
The guidelines have also highlighted the importance of dealing with certain cancers. Given the 
government’s commitment to establishing ‘National Service Frameworks for disease groups,’ and 
its acknowledgement that ‘the new approach to developing cancer services in the Calman-Hine 
Report point the direction for this’ (DOH, 1997:57), thoracics has received more government 
interest and political capital, in the process: 
 
Breast cancer is very topical, but lung cancer isn’t as topical, but then again, it’s killing 
more women than breast cancer – so now the government have to get interested in it and 
it’s becoming more topical. (Mr V.V.P. – Consultant Thoracic Surgeon) 
 
The White Paper The New NHS: Modern Dependable also gave a commitment to involving the 
profession in developing ‘evidence-based National Service Frameworks’ (DOH, 1997:57). 
Cardiothoracic surgery’s expertise in audit together with the fact that it was proactive following the 
Bristol revelations has contributed to earning it the ear of the government:   
 
The government talks to the speciality association more than the Colleges, particularly 
over the Bristol affair Paediatric surgery, Cardiac surgery, Dr Foster and league tables of 
hospitals – so when it comes to things like that it has been the society that have been 
dealing with it not the Colleges. (Mr V.V.P. – Consultant Thoracic Surgeon) 
 
The speciality has taken full advantage of this political capital with regard to the future planning of 
thoracic services, as Mr V.V.P. notes:  
 
The societies have done more than the Colleges in terms of giving advice on how 
specialities should be set up. For instance, the Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons and 
The European Association of Cardiothoracic Surgeons have developed guidelines and 
protocol etc, and we did one on how a Thoracic unit should be set up. So, they’ve done 
more in terms of planning how many surgeons you should have per million of population, 
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what the services should actually include, and that’s been more useful in planning your 
speciality. (Mr V.V.P. – Consultant Thoracic Surgeon) 
 
The guidelines regarding the provision of thoracic surgical services in the future recommend the 
foundation of pure general thoracic surgical units in centres which include a university medical 
school (Klepetko, Aberg & Lerut, 2001). Examples of such units already exist in some hospitals, 
such as the (Q). Suggestions have also been put forward which would involve collaboration 
between upper-gastrointestinal surgery, a sub-speciality interest of general surgery and thoracic 
surgery. This would go some way towards settling a long-standing dispute over turf: 
 
There’s a big dispute regarding oesophageal surgery and general surgery because we do 
a lot of oesophageal surgery as well, but times have changed a lot, in that a lot of the upper 
GI tract surgeons are doing oesophageal surgery and doing chest surgery as well, but are 
not trained to do chest surgery, so we grumble at the fact that they’re not trained to do it. I 
was at a recent meeting of the Association of Upper GI Tract Surgeons, and we basically 
agreed that anyone who wants to do oesophageal surgery should train for a while in 
thoracic – and the fact that our trainees are not getting general surgical exposure – we want 
our guys to train in general surgery as well so hopefully there will be a good crossover 
between the two specialities – so thoracic surgeons at the moment – some don’t do any 
oesophageal work, a lot do – so we still do quite a bit of upper GI tract or oesophageal 
surgery as well as thoracic surgery. (Mr V.V.P. – Consultant Thoracic Surgeon) 
 
This would not only settle the long-standing dispute, but also benefit thoracic surgery inasmuch 
as it would result in sharing out the workload, allowing thoracic surgeons to focus on the chest 
and in particular malignancies in this area. It would also boost consultant numbers performing 
thoracic work. In addition to boosting consultant numbers, its cross-over with general surgery, 
would also enable thoracic surgery to accumulate symbolic and economic capital, and attract new 
recruits to the area. This model was advocated by Goldstraw (2002), when he argued for greater 
support for thoracic surgeons from what he termed ‘Thoraco-General Surgeons’ (p14).  
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7.4.4 Paediatric Surgery 
 
Paediatric surgery is a ‘young’ speciality not only in terms of the age of those it treats, but also in 
terms of the relatively short period of time since its formation in 1992. It is a broad speciality, 
covering a number of organ systems, as reflected in the range of its sub-specialities. These 
include: ‘urology, hepatobiliary surgery (HPB); thoracic surgery; upper and lower gastrointestinal 
surgery; transplantation surgery and oncology’ (Ong, 2003:2). Paediatric surgery can also be 
divided into specialist paediatric surgery and non-specialist paediatric surgery.  
 
Specialist paediatric surgery consists of four clinical categories: Neonatal surgery; ‘the surgical 
management of infants and children with conditions requiring special expertise’;57 the ‘surgical 
management of infants and children with relatively straight-forward surgical conditions who have 
an associated disorder which in itself requires management in a specialist centre’(BAPS, 1994:2); 
and paediatric urology.58 Specialist Paediatric surgery is carried out by paediatric surgeons, who 
perform 11% of all operations done on children (see Table 7.4). 
 
Non-specialist paediatric surgery consists of the surgical treatment of relatively common disorders 
which do not usually require a major or complex operation or peri-operative care59 (BAPS, 1994). 
Non-specialist paediatric surgery is normally carried out by general surgeons working in district 
general hospitals (DGH’s), who perform 15% of operations done on children (see Table 7.4).  
 
The remaining operations are performed mainly by surgeons from other specialities who have an 
interest in paediatric conditions (Mayor, 2000). The ‘surgical specialities which are not 
encompassed within the definition of paediatric surgery include: ear, nose and throat surgery; eye 
surgery; orthopaedic surgery; plastic surgery; neurosurgery and cardiac surgery’ (BAPS, 1994:2) 
(see Table 7.4). 
 
 
57 ‘These include benign and malignant tumours, hepatobiliary disorders, major or potentially complex gastro-
intestinal abnormalities, the reconstruction of congenital abnormalities, major trauma, abnormalities of the chest 
(excluding the great vessels), endocrine disorders, and abnormalities of the soft tissues of the body’ (BAPS, 
1994:2). 
58 ‘The surgical management of congenital and acquired anomalies of the genito-urinary system in children’ 
(ibid.:3). 
59 Elective procedures: ‘herniotomy for congenital inguinal hernia and congenital inguinal hernia and congenital 
hydrocele, circumcision and repair of umbilical hernia. Emergency procedures: appendicectomy, correction of 
torsion of the testes, and less complex trauma’ (BAPS, 1994:3). 
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However, despite the fact that only 11% of the surgery carried out on children is performed by 
paediatric surgeons, ‘paediatric’ is a broad and all-encompassing term and the sentiments 
expounded in the Platt Report of 1959, namely that ‘children are different, and need to be looked 
after by people who understand their particular needs, and should have services designed 
specifically for them’ (Craft, 2003:891) have been reiterated over the years. Indeed, paediatric 
surgery’s growth as a surgical speciality was heavily influenced by this and subsequent reports 
(e.g. The Court Report, 1976). 
 
Just as the growth of paediatric surgery as a pure speciality was influenced by the plethora of 
reports since 1958, the future of the speciality is likely to be influenced by the recommendations 
emanating from The Paediatric Forum of The Royal College of Surgeons of England (2000b), in 
conjunction with the post-Bristol Kennedy Report (2001), together with the government’s emphasis 
on quality and clinical standards and the introduction of clinical governance, and the National 
Service Framework for Children.60     
 
Given this, paediatric surgery is the speciality which is likely to accumulate the most capital 
resulting in the potential for ‘colonisation’ across the other specialities, resulting in specialist 
differentiation if the right variables are in place and operationalised at the right time. The specific 
form of capital the specialty is most likely to accumulate, is scientific capital, linked to the 
uniqueness of the child and the extensive knowledge base, skills and experience required to treat 
them. 
 
Whether there is a conscious effort by the speciality of paediatric surgery to extend its territory is 
not clear. However, the paediatric forum, which has representatives from not only paediatric 
surgery but from across the broad spectrum of surgical specialities which undertake paediatric 
surgery, has been proactive in producing a report which includes guidelines for the training and 
workload of surgeons carrying out paediatric surgery.   
 
Mayor (2000) notes that the report was developed in view of ‘changes in the training of surgeons 
in England, following the recommendations of the Calman Report (1993), which advocated a move 
from an apprenticeship approach to a more structured programme’ (p.1423). It was also 
 
60 Craft notes that the ‘aim of the national service framework is to improve the lives and health of children and 
young people’ (Craft, 2003:891).  
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developed in response to the report of the National Confidential Inquiry into Perioperative Deaths 
(NCEPOD) (1989), which concluded  
 
‘that the majority of surgeons in all regions operate on children, and whilst much surgery 
and anaesthesia is given by clinicians with a regular paediatric practice, this is not always 
so. Amongst the key recommendations were that ‘surgeons and anaesthetists should not 
undertake occasional practice in paediatric surgery.’ (NCEPOD, 1989. cited in The Report 
of the Paediatric Forum of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, 2000:11) 
 
The report also took into account a further report of the National Confidential Inquiry into 
Perioperative Deaths (1999), which noted that there have been ‘significant shifts in the patterns of 
practice since 1989, with evidence of paediatric sub-specialisation apparent across a number of 
specialities.’ Nevertheless, it also noted ‘that some consultants still persist in performing small 
numbers of operations on infants and very occasional practice is still a feature of emergency 
surgery for children’ (NCEPOD, 1999. cited in The Report of the Paediatric Forum of The Royal 
College of Surgeons of England, 2000:11). 
 
The main thrust of the report is that 
 
‘important changes in education, training and professional attitudes to sub-specialisation 
are required to ensure that children receive surgical care which meets the standards of 
safety and quality to which they are entitled.’ (The Report of the Paediatric Forum of The 
Royal College of Surgeons of England, 2000:5) 
 
In line with this, the report adds that: 
 
‘Occasional practice is unacceptable except in the treatment of life-threatening 
emergencies or minor problems. The surgery of childhood should be concentrated in the 
hands of appropriately trained designated surgeons with a paediatric sub-speciality 
commitment and a workload of sufficient volume and competence.’ (ibid.:5) 
 
In addition, the report proposed an even higher regular workload for cardiac surgery in children: 
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‘Cardiac surgery in children should be undertaken by surgeons with a major sub-speciality 
interest reflected in a minimum of two operating sessions per week for patients with 
congenital heart disease. There is no scope for occasional practice in cardiac surgery.’ 
(ibid.:45)  
 
The report of the Paediatric Forum goes on to note that: ‘intercollegiate examinations should be 
designed to ensure that all surgeons with clinical responsibility for children have been 
appropriately assessed in the paediatric component of their specialty’ (ibid.:5). In particular, 
certain specialties are singled out for not having an adequate paediatric component in their 
intercollegiate examinations (general surgery, cardiothoracic surgery, neurosurgery, oral and 
maxillofacial surgery and plastic surgery) (The Report of the Paediatric Forum of The Royal 
College of Surgeons of England, 2000) 
 
The Kennedy Report (2001) goes even further with regard to paediatric cardiac surgery. It 
recommends that: 
 
‘those surgeons who undertake paediatric cardiac surgery, although not stipulating the 
number of operating sessions sufficient to maintain competence, it may be that four 
sessions a week should be a minimum requirement.’ (p.461)  
 
Furthermore, it stipulated that, in the case of open-heart surgery on young children (including 
neonates and infants), units providing such a service would require ‘two surgeons trained in 
paediatric surgery who must undertake between forty and fifty operations per year’ (ibid.).   
 
Further recommendations in the Kennedy Report specifically about children are that recognition 
is necessary that ‘the healthcare needs of children are different from those of adults’ and ‘specialist 
care must be concentrated in a limited number of centres where the staff have the necessary skills 
and experience’ (ibid.:457). 
 
The specialities have been proactive in their response to the recommendations of the Paediatric 
Forum (2000) and the Kennedy Report (2001). For example, neurosurgery produced a service 
document entitled: Safe Paediatric Neurosurgery (2001) which fully takes account of all of the 
recommendations. However, the document it is at pains to stress that, although neurosurgery as 
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a speciality is fully committed to the development of paediatric neurosurgery, this development will 
be ‘as an area of sub-speciality expertise interest within neurosurgery’ (p.1). Nonetheless, there 
are those within the speciality of neurosurgery who foresee a time when paediatric neurosurgery 
will separate off, for example: 
 
One of the big sub-specialisations in neurosurgery is paediatrics – paediatrics is almost 
separated entirely from all the rest to the point where you can’t do ordinary neuro-
paediatric operations – they are different from ordinary neuro-operations, it’s more the 
aftercare and the looking after the children, and the interaction with paediatric services. 
So, it’s not a skills problem, it’s everything else, but it’s driven a wedge to the extent that 
you can’t do paediatric surgery – you can’t operate on people less than 13 years of age 
even if you wanted to. So, I think that in time paediatric neurosurgery will separate off. (Mr 
J.L.C. – Consultant Neurosurgeon) 
 
This view is not peculiar to neurosurgery, as reflected in a statement by an orthopaedic surgeon: 
 
Paediatric Orthopaedics will become part of the speciality of Paediatrics. If you look at 
paediatric orthopaedic surgeons, they are different to normal orthopaedic surgeons. I think 
that’s what they’d love – the paediatric orthopaedic surgeons to come away from 
orthopaedics and work with committed paediatric surgeons. (Mr L.P.S. – Consultant 
Orthopaedic Surgeon – Teaching Hospital) 
 
Thus, as alluded to earlier, there is a potential for paediatric surgery to colonise, resulting in an 
enlarged speciality. However, whether the complete separation of paediatric neurosurgery, 
paediatric orthopaedic surgery and other specialities is totally practical is another matter. For 
example, the percentage paediatric component of the various specialities as expressed in Table 
7.4 suggests that only six per cent of plastic surgeons perform paediatric surgery. Although this 
figure is likely to have risen in the eight years which have elapsed since the data was collected, it 
is unlikely to have gone up so considerably that a plastic surgeon could justify being a ‘pure’ 
paediatric plastic surgeon. By contrast, separation may be justified in other specialities such as 
otorhinolaryngology. Thus, it is possible that ‘dual’ accreditation will be developed, whereby the 
surgeon will face examinations across two specialities, for example, otorhinolaryngology and 
paediatric otorhinolaryngology. 
 251 
 
 
Table 7.4 Percentage of Paediatric Surgery Carried out across the specialities (Mayor, 
2000:1423) 
 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
Whatever the future may hold for the specialities and sub-specialities of the surgical profession, 
one thing is certain, and that is that the creation of further specialities is not inevitable. Further 
differentiation will be dependent on the right variables or combination of variables being 
operationalised at the right time.    
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CONCLUSION 
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This thesis has investigated the phenomenon of intra-professional specialist differentiation in the 
surgical profession of the United Kingdom.  It has sought to challenge technologically deterministic 
rationale prevalent in the sociology of the professions in the 1950’s and 1960’s and indeed in 
contemporaneous peer reviewed articles and rhetorical narrative obtained during interviews with 
surgical professionals. The rationale attributes a primacy and objectivity to scientific knowledge 
and technical complexity, resulting in inevitable specialisation and sub-specialisation within the 
body of surgery. Indeed, Parson’s, often regarded as the ‘father’ of studies of the professions’ 
(Brante, 1988: 120), propounds an evolutionary approach to understanding societal complexity 
and specialist differentiation; knowledge and technology are viewed as key variables in propelling 
the economy forward and not as convertible capital assets in a political arena.  In challenging this 
rationale, this thesis contributes to a greater understanding and appreciation of intra-professional 
differentiation within the surgical profession, in addition to addressing gaps in the sociology of the 
professions and medical sociology literature.  
 
It is worth reiterating here, the nature of the gaps documented in the introductory chapter. At the 
time of writing, the most recent works in the sociology of the professions, most notably Abbott 
(1988) suggests that there is some inevitability to specialist differentiation, yet at the same time 
he acknowledges that a successful outcome is not always achieved when differentiation is 
attempted. Hugman (1991) discusses the success of sub-groups within the caring professions in 
demarcating and restricting areas of practice however, neither of these works focussed on the 
processual elements underlying the success of some groups and the failure of other groups, to 
differentiate. More recent works in the sociology of the professions, particularly Freidson (2001) 
‘Professionalism: the third logic’, explores specialisation as a concept and investigates the 
relational properties with other specialisations. However, not unlike earlier works, Freidson takes 
specialisation as a given.  
 
If the sociology of the professions literature can be criticised for failing to focus on the reasons for 
the success of some groups and failure of other groups, to differentiate, the medical sociology 
literature is also open to criticism, as it does not question the specialist division of labour. Indeed, 
there is an implicit taken for grantedness in the way the specialist division of labour is used as a 
medium for studying other things. For example, Pringle (1998) used specialist differentiation as a 
means to discuss equality of access for female surgeons and Cassell (1998) also focused on 
gender and surgery. As alluded to in the introductory chapter, exceptions to the tendency not to 
study the specialist division of labour in its own right do exist. Starr (1982) referred to structural 
factors which impact on specialisation in the medical profession at large, while others concentrate 
on specific medical and surgical specialties. For example, Halpern (1988) studied the development 
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of American Paediatrics and Casper (1998), the growth and development of Foetal surgery in 
several hospitals in the United States. Both studies stressed the social nature of specialist 
divisions of labour and the importance of external context specific variables in shaping the 
specialties development. In addition, the studies did not discount knowledge and technology as 
variables however, they recognised that these variables alone, lacked the power to impose their 
own imperatives on the organisation of work.  
 
More recent studies, especially Leeming (2001) ‘Professionalisation theory, medical specialists 
and the concept of “national patterns of specialisation’’, provides a synopsis of two independent 
studies of medical genetics in the UK and Canada, as a means to examine the factors determining 
specialisation in relation to the specific organisational structures of the respective countries. Not 
unlike earlier studies noted above, knowledge and technology are cited as significant variables in 
driving specialisation, as is ‘the development of a mutual awareness among local practitioners that 
they are involved in a common enterprise and the emergence of closely defined obdurate 
structures and standards of practice.’ However, Leeming goes on to note that the specialisation 
process is not that straight forward. Indeed, he suggests that there needs to be further studies of 
the stability of embryonic or potential specialties, ‘and relatedly, the ability of specialty groups to 
preserve and maintain obdurate institutional structures over time’ (p.16).  
 
At the outset the core ambition of this thesis was to challenge technological determinism and in 
doing so, achieve a robust understanding and appreciation of intra-professional specialist 
differentiation within the UK surgical profession. This thesis has achieved what it set out to do. In 
doing so, it transcends the sociology of the professions and medical sociology literature, and 
studies referred to above. It highlights the fact that specialist differentiation is not an inevitable and 
straight forward process; indeed, the plight of the orthopaedists, clearly demonstrates that the 
growth and stability of potential specialties, is very much context dependent. In addition, it 
emphasises that the development, growth, maturation, and experiences of potential specialties is 
not generic; on the contrary, it is specific and very much dependent on the power dynamics within 
the UK surgical profession, relations between the profession and the state, inter-professional 
relationships, and other context specific external drivers. 
 
A working theoretical framework which emphasised action within structure was adopted in order 
to realise this core ambition. The central aim was to build on the Chicago School legacy of Elliot 
Freidson (1970) and Everett C. Hughes (1958), specifically their emphasis on autonomy and self-
direction in understanding the notion of profession; to discover how autonomy and self-direction 
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were developed in the case of the mature profession, and how they were developed in the case 
of aspiring professional groups within the structural boundaries of the mature surgical profession. 
 
The concepts of autonomy and self-direction are very much interlinked. For Freidson (1970), 
autonomy is not inevitable, on the contrary it is a right bestowed by the state, by virtue of securing 
the support of a powerful societal elite. This privilege enables an occupational group to ‘control its 
own work’; to set its own direction and internal standards; indeed ‘only the profession has the 
recognised right to declare…’outside’ evaluation as illegitimate and intolerable’ (p.72). Indeed, 
Larson’s (1977) summation of Freidson’s work on the construction of a professional ideology, 
suggests that professional autonomy enables the profession to construct its own form of social 
reality based on expertise, which effectively allows them to judge their own competence. The 
medical profession views its clinical autonomy as sacrosanct, however this autonomy is only 
‘technical and not absolute’ (p.xii) and as documented in Chapter Six, can be challenged by the 
state, in this case the Thatcher government.  
 
In examining the processual elements by which autonomy and self-direction is successful or 
unsuccessful, the thesis utilised an eclectic theoretical framework: Larson’s (1977) concept of 
‘Professional Project;’ Bucher and Strauss’s (1961) ‘Process’ model, and key concepts: “Social 
field”, “Capital”, “Habitus” and “Power”, from the seminal works of Bourdieu: (The Specificity of 
The Scientific Field 1981; Distinction: A Social Critique of The Judgement of Taste 1984; The 
Forms of Capital 1986; Homo Academicus 1988; The Logic of Practice 1990; The Peculiar History 
of Scientific Reason 1991 and The Social Structures of the Economy 2005). 
 
Larson’s (1977) concept of ‘professional project’ builds on Freidson and Hughes work; the 
concept’s utility lies in its ability to elicit the stages or benchmarks through which aspirant groups 
pass and the justificatory arguments they draw on in their quest for professional status: a ‘market 
monopoly’ (p.104) for their services, and the ‘special privilege of freedom from the control of 
outsiders’ (Freidson, 1970:137&Hughes, 1958). As discussed in Chapter One, the professional 
project is a collaborative enterprise to achieve a particular aim, hence Larson’s emphasis on the 
‘collective’; the project is the collective outcome of the actions and efforts of the group. However, 
Larson does point out that the project is not a ‘deliberate’ or conscious effort for all members of 
the group, and indeed it could be argued that even the pioneers in the field may arrive at a point 
in the project, not by conscious effort and intention; the case of obstetrics and gynaecology 
highlighted in Chapter Five provides a pertinent example. Bonney was an accomplished 
gynaecological surgeon, whose quest was to see all fellow gynaecologists follow the same path, 
256 
 
to be fully trained abdominal surgeons and Fellows of the Surgical Royal College. There was no 
conscious effort on his part to realise a long-term goal such as specialist differentiation for 
obstetrics and gynaecology, or the foundation of a professional college. On the contrary, when the 
suggestion to found a college was publicly proclaimed, Bonney objected as he was concerned it 
would have retrogressive consequences (Fletcher-Shaw, 1954). 
 
The ultimate aim of the professional project is: ‘market control, work autonomy and status 
prerogatives on the basis of specialised training and scarce expertise’ (Larson, 1977:199). 
Specialised training and expertise are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary they are 
interconnected; the underlying cognitive element being, knowledge and technology. Knowledge 
and technology are the essential foundation blocks of the medical and surgical professions, and 
the ‘cognitive basis’ enabling the group(s) to differentiate the ‘commodity’ (p.15) they are 
providing. Indeed, ‘a cognitive base, as the necessary premise of training, is necessary to every 
specific professional project’. It is on this foundation that negotiations around ‘cognitive 
exclusiveness’ ensue (ibid.:208).   
 
Thus, Knowledge and technology are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. They are 
a means by which groups are established, grow, and mature, and seek to differentiate. They are 
a vehicle in the professional project, but alone cannot explain why some groups are successful in 
their quest for establishing ‘autonomy of technique’ (ibid.:38) and why some are not so successful.  
 
It is during the negotiating stage that the group engages in a process whereby they have to prove 
that they, and they alone, have they requisite knowledge, skill and clinical acumen required to 
perform a specified activity(s), and that it would have adverse consequences if such activities were 
performed by those without the education, knowledge, and training (Macdonald, 1995); indeed, 
the education system is the institutional mechanism that ensures closure towards ‘outsiders’ 
(Allsop &Saks, 2002), that is to say, members of the public. However, it also ensures that 
members of the profession not in possession of the requisite knowledge, skill set, and necessary 
qualifications, are not able to perform certain procedures. For example, a general surgeon would 
not be permitted to carry out a laparoscopic prostatectomy. The central element in the negotiation 
of cognitive exclusiveness and exclusion, as noted above, is autonomy of technique. 
 
The cases of urological, vascular, and laparoscopic surgery discussed in Chapter Three, 
demonstrate that despite similarities in the justification for autonomy of technique and specialty 
status, other variables must be operating, as urology successfully demonstrated autonomy of 
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technique and was granted specialty status, while the other two have yet to successfully 
demonstrate this.  
 
Thus, despite the significance of knowledge and technology as a basis for the professionalisation 
of medicine and surgery, and the professionalisation of aspiring groups within the mature 
profession, given the need to have this officially sanctioned (by the state in the case of the mature 
profession, and the surgical establishment in the case of aspiring professional groups) results in 
a politicization of knowledge and technology.  
 
In the case of the state and the mature profession, given the ‘considerable penetration of the state 
by civil society’ (Macdonald, 1995:78) during the sixteenth century, the official founding of the 
medical profession by Act of Parliament in the early 1500’s was not seen as a threat or resisted. 
However, in the case of aspiring groups within the mature profession the equation is different. 
Intra-professional differentiation within the profession, whether historical or contemporary, not only 
challenges the status quo, but has the potential to upset the profession’s equilibrium. The corollary 
is that the control and application of knowledge and technology become highly contested, with 
‘power’ – not knowledge and technology – being the common denominator.   
 
Indeed, the mature surgical profession from the 1800’s to 2007 is characterised by specialties 
which Bucher and Strauss (1961) term ‘major segments’ (specialities) and ‘segments (groups) 
akin to social movements pursuing different objectives in different manners and more or less 
delicately held together under a common name at a particular period in history’ (p.326). Although, 
this thesis has shown that the development of major segments (specialities) and segments 
(groups /sub-specialities) has not followed a discernible pattern, the surgical profession of the 
twenty-first century, not unlike that of the nineteenth and twentieth century is riven by conflicts of 
interest and power struggles. However, unlike the profession of the nineteenth century, the 
contemporary profession comprises a plethora of fully differentiated specialties, with their own 
postgraduate examinations; sub-specialty groups with a powerful interest in advancing the status 
of their areas, and all operating within an enlarged surgico-political structure. 
 
The complexities of the surgico-political structure and the plethora of interests which resides within 
these structures precludes any simplistic answers as to where power inheres. Although, as 
propounded in chapter six, it is likely that power will inhere in more than one structure, in other 
words specialist differentiation and the creation of further specialties may be decided within the 
specialty associations, before they are agreed by the Senate of Surgery. Indeed, Bucher and 
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Strauss argue that power struggles at the level of association are significant for two reasons: firstly, 
control of the associations enables the most powerful group(s) ‘to wield sanctions so as to bring 
about compliance of the general membership with rules and regulations which they have 
succeeded in enacting’; secondly, it enables the powerful  group(s) to ‘negotiate with relevant 
special publics’ (ibid.:332), and with professional colleagues via the various internal committees 
within the  professional structure. The ability to negotiate on behalf of the association, enables the 
group(s) to drive their agenda(s), as associations by their very nature will represent one group(s) 
interests, or a coalition of groups. 
 
The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland provides a working example. The ASGBI 
is the specialty association which represents general surgery and its sub-specialist areas across 
the UK. The specialty of general surgery is the largest specialty and therefore the association 
holds an influential position within the Senate and with government. 
 
The ASGBI faces a similar problem to that faced by the Royal College of Surgeons in the second 
half of the twentieth century namely, how to prevent the further fragmentation of general surgery. 
Chapter Six, documents at first hand the conservation strategies employed by the most powerful 
group(s) within the association, to keep the aspirant group(s) within its walls. For example, 
Laparoscopic surgery is a test case, as it is a technique based sub-specialty which crosses the 
organ geography of upper gastro-intestinal surgery, as well as lower gastro-intestinal surgery and 
vascular surgery. Although, it is difficult to ascertain exactly with which group power inheres, one 
could assume that an alliance of organ related sub-specialties will ensure this group is stopped in 
its tracks. 
 
Clearly, there will always be winners and losers in any internecine battle, with the more powerful 
groups(s) possessing the ability to determine knowledge boundaries and what counts as 
knowledge, as well as employing conservation strategies when threatened. Bourdieu’s works on 
capital and power in social fields (see above) enables an appreciation as to how this is possible. 
 
As a macro-organisational structure, the surgical profession is the outcome of ‘social processes – 
often quite prosaic – which ultimately produce patterns of decisive advantages and disadvantages’ 
(Dennis & Martin, 2005:208). Indeed, Bourdieu (1986) notes that the structure of the social field, 
that is to say the 
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‘distribution of different types and sub-types of capital at a given moment in time 
represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed 
in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining 
the chances of success for practices.’ (p.15) 
 
Therefore, there will be significant differentials in power, between groups in terms of the amount 
and type of capital resources in their possession. (Bourdieu, 1981). Thus, agents and or groups 
‘who begin with particular forms of capital are advantaged at the outset because the field depends 
on, as well as produces more of, that capital’ (Thomson, 2014:67). 
 
Although, Bourdieu (1986) suggests that capital can present itself in three forms namely, 
economic, cultural, and social. It is worth noting that as a concept, capital is not only multi-faceted, 
but also malleable enough to be adapted to fit a particular area of study. For example, Bourdieu 
(1988) applies eight specific types of capital (social capital; educational capital; the capital of 
academic power; capital of scientific power; the capital of scientific prestige; the capital of 
intellectual renown; the capital of political or economic power and the capital of political 
dispositions) in his seminal study of the French university field. In the case of the surgical 
profession the specific types of capital pertinent to this study, are social capital; the capital of 
surgical authority; economic capital; political capital; symbolic capital; scientific capital; and 
specific cultural capital.  
 
Although, at this juncture I do not wish to review these individually (see chapter one section (1.3)), 
it is worth to note that social capital: 
 
‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which linked to possession of a durable 
network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group.’ (1986:21)  
 
is fundamental to understanding how the capital possessed by individuals within a group(s) is 
multiplied through membership of the group, as individual members accumulate the combined 
capital of the group in all its specific forms (Bourdieu, 1986). Given this, social capital is of pivotal 
importance to this thesis. For example, it allows us to appreciate the potential for inter-group 
alliances, as was the case in 1947 when the political infrastructure within the walls of the Royal 
College was far more complex than it had been thirty years earlier, that is to say, it could no longer 
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be reduced to a single common denominator between a powerful group and a weak group. It also 
allows us to understand the logic behind intergroup alliances, based on the combined value and 
convertibility of specific forms of capital. For example, during the second surgical epoch (1948-
1990) the large teaching hospitals in London combined and operated as large groups. This 
enabled the group to convert their accumulated specific forms of capital into political capital and 
lobbying power at the macro level.  
 
However, one of the most significant examples of social capital in action was during the first 
surgical epoch (1800-1947). The nineteenth century provides the greatest contrast between the 
dominant group (surgical elite) and the new groups in terms of possession of this form of capital. 
Bourdieu notes that social capital is ‘associated with social obligations (connections), which is 
convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital’ (ibid.:16). In this context, social capital 
was also convertible into the capital of surgical authority, a particular kind of social capital, which 
not unlike scientific authority, ‘gives power over the constitutive mechanisms of the field’ 
(Bourdieu, 1981:262). Thus, the wealthy surgical elite not only possessed social capital, but also 
the capital of surgical power and authority, which enabled control of the hospital appointments, 
and examining and teaching systems of the field. Control of the appointments system supported 
private practice and financial rewards for bedside teaching. Social capital was thus converted into 
economic capital and given that the field was dependent on social capital, it produced more of this 
form of capital, as surgical apprentices were chosen from the same social class, as only they could 
afford the high teaching fees. This structural disparity would have a decisive effect on the pace of 
intra-professional differentiation during the first surgical epoch. 
 
Parallels can be drawn here with the university field. Bourdieu (1988) points out, that the 
 
‘homogeneity of the professorial body was based on a harmony among habitus which, 
being produced by identical conditions of selection and training, engender objectively 
harmonious practices, and especially selection procedures.’ (p.152).  
 
Not unlike the university field, the perpetuation and stability of the surgical field was dependent on 
consistency of selection and on all agents internalising, what Bourdieu describes as, the laws and 
trajectories of the field. Thus, although structures enable strategies of domination, they would not 
be possible without the new recruit’s willingness to accept the rules of the game based on the 
dispositions of the habitus.  
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The latter point is very important as Bourdieu’s work stresses agency within structure. Indeed, his 
concepts of Habitus, Capital and Field, and their interrelationship, are pivotal in any understanding 
of how equilibrium in the field is maintained. Bourdieu (1984) summarises this interrelationship as: 
[(Habitus) (Capital)] + Field = Practice (p.101). In other words, the agents habitus is influenced by 
his/her position in the field, in relation to the capital possessed, and the types of capital are 
dependent on the field they operate in (Maton, 2014). Fields are thus, social spaces in which 
interaction between agents occur. However, the interaction is not merely a relationship between 
two agents, but is ‘a three-way relation, between the two agents and the social space within which 
they are located’ (Bourdieu, 2005:148). Thus, given the social emphasis there is potential for 
adjacent fields to influence the field in question. For example, according to Bourdieu the dominant 
groups with temporal power in the French university field, namely Medicine and Law were the 
 
‘most directly controlled by the government, the least autonomous from it and at the same 
time the most entrusted with training agents to put into practice the techniques and recipes 
of a body of knowledge.’ (1988:62-63) 
 
This thesis documented the interactions of the surgical field with other social fields; how habitus 
and dispositions of the habitus, and power differentials changed over time as new groups 
developed and accumulated specific forms of capital, and new political structures evolved and 
developed in order to accommodate these changes.  
 
Thus, it has demonstrated that as fields interact and adapt to their environment, their shape, rules 
and regulations, and the significance of specific forms of capital may also change according to the 
logic of the field. For example, during the first surgical epoch, social capital in the form of class 
was important, as the field depended on this form of capital. However, during the second surgical 
epoch (1948-1990) the structure of the surgical field was markedly different. Obstetrics and 
gynaecology had their own Royal College and ophthalmology and otorhinolaryngology remained 
within the walls of the Royal College, with full representation on the College Council and their own 
fellowship examinations. Technical and scientific expertise and specialisation began to challenge 
the conservative culture of the generalist tradition, within the Royal College. Thus, the old 
knowledge of the ‘generalists’ was being challenged by the new knowledge of scientific values. 
The interaction of the surgical field with the state (another social field) in the planning and running 
of the new National Health Service provided fertile ground for the profession and groups, such as 
orthopaedics, neurosurgery, and urological surgery to garner more specific forms of capital, 
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particularly scientific capital, which was growing in value and importance, in addition to other 
forms: political capital, economic capital, symbolic capital and specific cultural capital. 
 
Although success in the professional project cannot be attributed to the accumulation of one 
specific form of capital alone, possession of capital(s) was a key factor in enabling differentiation 
and self-regulation when the right conditions arose for exchange of these assets in the surgico-
political arena. 
 
Orthopaedics provides a pivotal example, of an area that began accumulating specific forms of 
capital, certainly from the 1920’s and 1930’s, and to a certain extent during the Great War. 
However, the conditions prior to the foundation of the NHS, and indeed up to the 1970’s and 
1980’s, were not right to enable differentiation from general surgery. Conversely, this is not to say 
that the specific types of capital accumulated prior to 1948 were not invaluable to their cause, on 
the contrary, the types of capital accumulated were invaluable. As alluded to in Chapter Four, 
section (4.7), the specific forms of capital accumulated were: justification for control of a condition 
based on expertise, enabled the accumulation of scientific capital around knowledge and 
technique; symbolic capital in relation to the expertise of orthopaedists in the treatment of 
fractures; specific cultural capital, as mastery of the techniques associated with the treatment of 
fractures would require long-periods of training by experts, in the technique. In addition, the 
recommendation that the knowledge and technique around the treatment of fractures should be 
an integral part in the medical school curriculum, enabled the accumulation of the capital of 
surgical authority; a form of social capital which supports the control of the examining and teaching 
systems (Bourdieu, 1981). 
 
Between 1948 and 1970 orthopaedics accumulated even greater levels of specific capital, in 
particular, scientific capital, and as the specialist movement within and outside the walls of the 
Royal College gathered momentum, orthopaedics was perfectly placed to operationalise its 
accumulated specific capital and differentiate from general surgery. The Edinburgh College was 
the first to introduce specialty examinations, followed by the English College in 1988. 
 
The surgico-political structure during the third surgical epoch (1990-1997), was enlarged and 
adapted to meet the new challenges relating to specialist surgery. The surgical field was made up 
of a central policy making body namely, the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain and Ireland and 
eleven sub-committees namely, the Joint Committee for Intercollegiate Examinations (JCIE), the 
Joint Committee for Higher Surgical Training (JCHST), and the nine surgical Specialty Advisory 
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Committees (SAC’s). If one were to peel back these structures, one would see a number of sub-
fields, each with its own ‘internal logic, rules, and regularities’ (Thomson, 2014:70). For example, 
the four surgical Royal College’s, all independent institutions with their own histories and each 
with their political infrastructure, although still independent, became institutions within a larger 
surgical structure. In addition, not unlike the surgical Royal Colleges, the specialist associations 
representing the nine surgical specialities, also have their own histories, executives, rules, and 
regulations and comprise a number of sub-fields (sub-sub-fields of the surgical field).  
 
All of the sub-fields and sub-sub-fields of the surgical field will have their own interests, and 
consequently power struggles will ensue. Whether groups succeed or not in these struggles will 
be dependent on the amount of accumulated capital they possess as a group. Bourdieu’s concept 
of capital enables an appreciation and understanding as to why there are some groups in the so-
called ‘hot areas’ (referred to by Bucher & Strauss (1961)), where conflicts of interest and power 
struggles ensue, that are successful in halting the ambitions of other groups or sub-groups. As 
highlighted in Chapter Six Section (6.3), The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland 
(ASGBI) provides a pertinent example of this. 
 
The theoretical triangle, of Professional Project; Process Model; and Capital and Power in Social 
Fields, although eclectic, enable a granular understanding of the processes and power struggles 
within the profession of surgery; behind the veneer of what we take for granted and do not 
question. Larson’s Professional Project provides an invaluable theoretical scaffolding, as it clearly 
benchmarks the steps aspirant professional groups are required to pass through to be granted 
professional status. Bucher and Strauss’ Process Model carries on where Larson’s model finishes, 
as it focuses on the conflicts of interest and power struggles around knowledge as it becomes 
contested. The model is invaluable as it identifies the so-called ‘hot areas’ where conflicts of 
interest and power struggles ensue. Bourdieu’s concepts of Capital, Habitus, Social Fields, and 
Power elucidate why some groups are successful in pursuing the professional project and others 
are not. For example, although scientific capital, associated with the development of technical foci 
and advances in surgical knowledge, is a necessary pre-requisite for establishing a cognitive base, 
and in negotiating cognitive exclusiveness, whether this capital is able to be operationalised, is 
another issue entirely; this will be dependent on the other combined specific capital assets of the 
group and the contextual juncture.  
 
It was stated at the outset that this study would not provide a generic template for explaining intra-
professional differentiation across all professions given the uniqueness of professions in terms of 
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structural characteristics, history, and development. However, this does not preclude the 
formulation of general conclusions which may be applicable to other professions. In order to 
achieve this, it is necessary ‘to remain at a level of abstraction that prevents confusing the unique 
with the general’ (Freidson, 1970: xvii).  
 
Since professions are socially organised and structured fields of human enterprise, as well as 
‘vehicles for special knowledge belief and skill’ (ibid.), there will be differentials in power, ‘struggles 
and strategies’ (Bourdieu, 1981:257) within them, and the structures of the field will take on 
specific forms peculiar to each profession. Conversely, despite the uniqueness of structure in 
which power inheres, power remains the same. That is to say, power is the ability of one group(s) 
to make rules and apply them to other groups, whether that is determining what counts as 
knowledge or enacting laws (Dennis & Martin, 2005). This ability is a consequence of the 
differentials in the possession of capital or resources between dominant and subordinate groups. 
This pivotal factor militates against viewing intra-professional differentiation across any profession 
as an inevitable structural response to a functional need of ‘complex urbanised societies’ (Heinz 
& Laumann, 1982). 
 
In addition to providing general conclusions which can be utilised and applied in future studies of 
intra-professional differentiation across other professions, this thesis has elucidated the structures 
underlying the surgical division of labour in terms of their development. In doing so it has revealed 
intra-professional organisational power dynamics, thrown light onto the realities of organisational 
life in healthcare systems, and contributed to a greater understanding and awareness of inter-
professional and inter-organisational dynamics and power dependence relationships.61  
 
Thus, the study not only has a contribution to make to medical sociology, but as a piece of medical 
sociology it may be of interest to a wider audience. Medical sociology can be helpful in ‘providing 
knowledge to policy makers and managers’ (Hunter, 1990:219). For example, through an analysis 
of the power dependence relationship between the state and the profession the study has 
explicated the dynamic between the profession and the NHS in terms of the organisation of 
surgery. In particular, the contemporary material in chapter six reveals how professionally driven 
agendas impact on the organisation of surgical services at the micro-clinical level, as procedures 
become more and more politicized and services become more and more centralized; the 
 
61 Hunter, (1990) argued that medical sociology can contribute a greater awareness of ‘interprofessional and 
interorganisational dynamics and power dependence relationships’ (p.219). 
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consequence being that District General Hospitals (DGH’s) are unable to provide certain services 
to the local populace.   
 
The relationship between management and the profession at the micro hospital level has been 
expounded in previous studies for example, Ferlie et al. (1996). This study adds to this literature, 
and in doing so provides a fresh insight into the clinician manager relationship and in particular 
how professionally driven agendas impact on this relationship.   
 
Furthermore, in utilising the theoretical framework applied throughout the thesis together with 
interview material, chapter seven expounds variables which may or may not effect the profession 
and service development in the future. It provides invaluable perspectives from surgeons working 
at the clinical coalface. Such perspectives are invaluable to policy makers, particularly at the level 
of the profession. Indeed, during the course of the fieldwork it became fairly obvious that at the 
level of the Royal Colleges there was much interest shown in the responses gleaned from the 
research at the hospital level.  
 
This thesis’s argument against the inevitability of intra-professional specialist differentiation may 
also be of interest to participants in the growing debate in the medical literature regarding the 
necessity of further specialisation and fragmentation in medicine and surgery (e.g. Taylor (1997), 
Loefler (2000) and Turnberg (2000)). 
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Appendix Two 
The Surgico-Political Structure and Composition 
of the Surgical Field 2019 
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As alluded to in chapter seven, at the time of writing (2007) the surgical field comprised nine 
specialities. In this respect the field had remained unchanged since the creation of the speciality 
of paediatric surgery in 1992, and maxillofacial surgery in 1994. However, in 2012 vascular surgery 
separated from general surgery therefore, the surgical field as of 2019 comprises ten specialties. 
As suggested in chapter seven, in 2007 the prospects for vascular surgery in terms of specialist 
differentiation looked fairly promising, although a number of factors would determine the outcome. 
Firstly, whether or not differentiation is on the policy agenda of the vascular surgical body; 
secondly, whether the vascular surgical body in general would be for or against this; thirdly, 
whether a ‘pure’ vascular service would be feasible throughout the country; fourthly, there would 
be the expense incurred in setting up another speciality; last but certainly not least, would the 
ASGBI want vascular surgery to break away from its ranks. 
 
It is difficult to ascertain the significance of the above factors in relation to the 2012 outcome 
however, The Vascular Society for Great Britain and Ireland - ‘Vascular Surgery United Kingdom 
Workforce Survey 2018’ suggests that ‘pure’ specialty status was granted ‘in recognition of the 
increasing demand and highly-specialised nature of modern vascular care’ (p.7). Indeed, the 
workforce document notes that the general surgical consultant workforce had experienced a 39% 
growth over the past decade and the projected patient demand growth for general surgery 
(including vascular surgery) is 67% by 2029.   
 
In addition, to the creation of the tenth surgical specialty, the Senate of Surgery of Great Britain 
and Ireland changed its title to The Surgical Forum of Great Britain and Ireland. Despite the change 
in title, the membership and aims remain unchanged. The SFGBI, is comprised of the Presidents 
and Vice Presidents of the four Royal Colleges and the Presidents of the 10-SAC-defined and 
GMC recognised surgical specialties. It’s aim: to be ‘a truly representative voice of surgery across 
the entirety of Great Britain and Ireland’ (MacFie, 2014:1). 
 
The diagram overleaf is a representation of the current surgico-political structure and composition 
of the surgical field in 2019. The Surgical Forum of Great Britain and Ireland sits at the apex of the 
structure and is responsible for ensuring the highest standards in surgical care across Great Britain 
and Ireland. The Surgical Forum is responsible for Higher Surgical Training (HST) and this is co-
ordinated through the Forum and its various committees namely, the Joint Committee for 
Intercollegiate Examinations (JCIE) and the Joint Committee for Higher Surgical Training 
(JCHST). Higher Surgical Training examinations are run at operational level by the specialties. 
For example, each of the ten surgical specialties has its own Intercollegiate Board and ‘the board 
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and board chairman form a sub-committee’ (Galasko, 1997:6) of the Surgical Forum namely, the 
(JCIE). The Joint Committee on Higher Surgical Training (JCHST) is responsible for advising the 
Surgical Forum on all matters in relation to higher surgical training. It is supported operationally 
by the ten specialist advisory committees (SAC’s) (JCHST, 2005). 
 
Thus, although the diagrammatic representation appears one-dimensional, in practice the Joint 
Committee for Intercollegiate Examinations (JCIE) and the Joint Committee for Higher Surgical 
Training (JCHST) feed into the Surgical Forum of Great Britain and Ireland (SFGBI) and vice 
versa.  
 
The plethora of specialist associations is also represented in the diagrammatic representation. 
The specialist associations represent either a specialty, or sub-specialty of the parent specialty. 
For example, The Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland is the specialty association 
for general surgery and under its umbrella it houses the following sub-specialty associations: The 
Association of Coloproctology of Great Britain and Ireland, Association of Breast Surgery, 
Association of Upper GI Surgery, Association of Laparoscopic Surgeons of Great Britain and 
Ireland, British Association of Endocrine and Thyroid Surgeons, British Association of Surgical 
Oncology and the British Transplant Society.  
 
However, there is specialty associations with affiliations to two parent specialties. For example, 
the British Society for Surgery of The Hand (BSSH) was officially formed in 1968 by enthusiastic 
surgeons from the disciplines of orthopaedics and plastic surgery. In 1991 the society pioneered 
the concept of what they describe as, an ‘interface specialty’, which entailed establishing: 
 
‘in cooperation with the Specialty Advisory Committees (SAC) in Orthopaedic and Plastic 
Surgery known initially as the Standing Liaison Group in Hand Surgery and later as the 
Interface Committee, with the purpose of establishing advanced training posts in hand 
surgery for trainees in either specialty.’ (www.bssh.ac.uk/about/our_history.aspx)  
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The information contained in this diagram is taken from Galasko (1997); JCHST (2005) and the 
respective specialty associations. 
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